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Erland Jansson

India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?

The Nationalist Movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937–47

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Abstract
Politics in the North-West Frontier Province revolved basically around local issues and concerned local power. The operative political units were the village factions led by khans (landlords), who were often close relatives but between whom there was intense rivalry. Initially, the British had allied themselves with the biggest khan in each locality who in return for economic favours supported their rule at the local level. After World War I, however, power at the local level gravitated towards the smaller khans. The Khudai Khidmatgars, who in the early 1930s emerged as the dominant political organisation in the NWFP, were mainly recruited from amongst them and their personal following. Politically, they opposed the alliance between the British and the big khans. Ideologically, they championed the cause of Pakhtun nationalism. In 1931 they became affiliated with the Indian National Congress and through them the Congress gained control over the government and formed a ministry after the 1937 elections. Having lost the support of the government, the big khans, in order to protect their position, joined the Muslim League. Thus party affiliations in the NWFP were largely based on the factional divisions in Pakhtun society. In addition, the Muslim League received strong support from the non-Pakhtun areas of the province where people were repelled by the Pakhtun nationalism of the Khudai Khidmatgars. So long as Frontier politics retained its parochial character, up to 1946, the Khudai Khidmatgars remained the strongest political force in the province but when Independence approached, the question of Pakistan came to the forefront. This was a question of no relevance to the factional division in Pakhtun society. In consequence, Frontier politics assumed an entirely new shape and became dominated by new groups with a strong interest in the establishment of Pakistan. Crucial groups were religious leaders, officials and students, who, appealing to religious feelings, converted the Frontier people to the cause of Pakistan. To salvage their position, the Khudai Khidmatgars restated their commitment to Pakhtun nationalism and raised the demand for independent Pakhtunistan. This was, however, only meant as a bargaining counter to achieve maximum provincial autonomy within Pakistan. After Independence, when the wider national issues had been solved, the Khudai Khidmatgars were again the strongest party in the province but they were suppressed by the new rulers of the province who claimed that the Khudai Khidmatgars by their advocacy of Pakhtunistan proved their fundamental disloyalty towards Pakistan.

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The picture on the front cover shows an Afridi *malik*. The photograph was bought by the author in Peshawar. It has proved impossible to trace any copyright-holder.

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To My Father

Neither the landscape nor the people find their counterparts in any other portion of the globe. Valley walls rise steeply five or six thousand feet on every side. The columns crawl through a maze of giant corridors down which fierce snow-fed torrents foam under skies of brass. Amid these scenes of savage brillancy there dwells a race whose qualities seem to harmonize with their environment. Except at harvest-time, when self-preservation enjoins a temporary truce, the Pathan tribes are always engaged in public or private war. Every man is a warrior, a politician and a theologian. Every large house is a real feudal fortress made, it is true, only of sunbaked clay, but with battlements, turrets, loopholes, flanking towers, drawbridges, etc., complete. Every village has its defence. Every family cultivates its vendetta; every clan its feud. The numerous tribes and combinations all have their accounts to settle with one another. Nothing is ever forgotten, and very few debts are left unpaid. For the purposes of social life, in addition to the convention about harvest-time, a most elaborate code of honour has been established and is on the whole faithfully observed. A man who knew it and observed it faultlessly might pass unarmed from one end of the frontier to another. The slightest technical slip would, however, be fatal. The life of the Pathan is thus full of interest; and his valleys, nourished alike by endless sunshine and abundant water, are fertile enough to yield with little labour the modest material requirements of a sparse population.
(Churchill writing on the Mohmand expedition in 1897 in *My Early Life.*)

I have always felt that there was an odd air of detachment about Peshawar from what elsewhere is the serious business of politics. Here it is regarded more as a game, a game which should not be taken too seriously at that. It can hardly be described as an amateur game—pecuniary profit is definitely expected and taken by the successful players.
(*Extracts from Report of Deputy High Commissioner in Peshawar* 10/12/47.)

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It was Dr Z.H. Zaidi, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, who in 1975 introduced me to the study of Pakistan and the North-West Frontier Province. Today, drawing breath and looking back on the years I have devoted to this study, I am grateful to him for that.

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In 1978 I was an affiliated student in the Department of History, University of Peshawar. I am grateful to the university for helping me to find accommodation, and in the department I am particularly grateful to the chairman, Dr Hussain Khan, and to Dr (Miss) Lal Baha for their assistance.

Only people who have been to the North-West Frontier Province can understand how many people I became indebted to there. Here I shall only mention Colonel M. Sharif Khan and his family who always gave me whatever help I needed and, even more important to a newcomer, the warmth of a family atmosphere. All the others, who showed me hospitality and shared their time with me, I must thank collectively. Some of these people will, I know, disagree with everything I have written, others with much of it, and all of them will disagree with some part or other. I hope they will understand that I have only done my best to interpret the often contradictory evidence which I have received from various sources and that, even if my interpretation does not coincide with the version they have told me, my gratitude to them is no less profound for that.

I have in the course of my work incurred debts of gratitude to the staff of several archives. First I must thank the staff of the India Office Library and Records to whom I have always been happy to return. In 1978 I spent three fruitful months of research in the National Archives of India and the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi. In Pakistan I am first of all indebted to Mr Ageel-uz-Zafar Khan, Senior Research Officer of the Archives of Freedom Movement, Karachi. I must thank the microfilming staff of the National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad, for providing me with microfilms so quickly when I ran out of time there. In Peshawar I am indebted to Mr Jelali, Director of

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I have throughout my work received practical assistance from the Embassy of Pakistan in Stockholm and I wish to express my appreciation to the Ambassador, His Excellency Mr Azmat B. Awan, and his colleagues.

Over and above my personal gratitude to all these people I would in this context also like to place on record that, although the North-West Frontier Province has often been regarded as a sensitive subject in Pakistan, all Pakistani authorities and institutions with which I have come into contact have received me with the utmost cordiality and done everything in their power to facilitate my research and to make my stay in Pakistan a pleasant one. I regard my time in their country as the best of my life.

Miss Ulla Lundberg and Mr Nigel Rollinson have kindly gone through my manuscript and made linguistic improvements.

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Uppsala, February 1981
Erland Jansson

Introduction

The Topic

In the first decade or two after India and Pakistan became independent a large number of studies were published on the rise of Indian nationalism, how the Muslims parted ways with the Indian National Congress and instead rallied under the banner of the Muslim League, and how in the end these two parties became the founders of two different sovereign states, India and Pakistan. Such studies still continue to appear but in the last decade the focus of scholarly interest, particularly in the west, has changed. The general historiographical trend has been to undertake regional or local studies rather than studying the top leadership at the national level. Scholars have taken up the nationalist movement from the limited perspective of a region or locality and have then endeavoured to relate their findings to the existing views of the struggle at the all-India level between the nationalists and the British. The results of these studies have made necessary a modification of the picture which dominated during the freedom struggle and in the immediate post-independence period. No longer is the emphasis so strongly on the ideological aspects of the nationalist movements. Nor are the great upheavals, such as the Congress civil disobedience movements, seen as culminations of a struggle between two forces in constant confrontation, the Indians and the British. Instead a far more complicated picture has emerged. At different times and under differing circumstances the various groups in Indian society responded differently to the nationalist message and the nationalists in their turn adapted themselves to the new situations which arose.

My choice of topic, the nationalist movements in the North-West Frontier Province, 1937–47, is thus in line with the general trend in the historiography of nationalism in the subcontinent. Seen as a part of this trend, my work is intended as a contribution to filling two gaps: first, the local or regional studies undertaken so far have mostly dealt with relatively early periods and ignored the last phase; second, Muslim nationalism and the creation of Pakistan have attracted far less attention than the All-India National Congress.

The basic problem for analysis in this study is: why and how did Muslim nationalism rather than all-India, inter-communal nationalism in the end succeed in the North-West Frontier Province?

The broad outlines of the story are well known. Through its alliance with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgar movement, the All-India National Congress (AINC) had in the early thirties established itself as the domi-

nant political party in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), thereby making it the only Muslim-majority province that was dominated by the Congress. Soon after the inauguration of the Government of India Act of 1935, a Congress ministry took office in the province. It remained in power until the outbreak of World War II, when it resigned together with the other Congress ministries. After the war the Frontier Congress resumed power and even strengthened its position in the elections held in spring 1946. Throughout this period the provincial Muslim League remained weak. In the 1946 elections it failed to win a majority even of the Muslim seats in the provincial assembly. But in the eighteen months between the elections and the coming of independence in August 1947 the situation changed drastically. The strength of the Muslim League grew dramatically and the Congress lost its dominant position. When in July 1947 a referendum was arranged in the province to decide whether it should belong to Pakistan or India, the verdict went overwhelmingly in favour of Pakistan. The Frontier Congress boycotted the referendum and instead raised the demand for the creation of an independent state of Pakhtunistan. This gave rise to one of the conflicts that have since marred the history of Pakistan, namely that between regionalism—or even secessionism—in the Frontier Province, on the one hand, and the central government's desire to assert its authority more strongly and weld Pakistan into one nation, on the other.

From this brief account three questions immediately arise. First, what was the reason for the predominant position which the Congress, or the Khudai Khidmatgars, held in the NWFP from 1930 to 1946? Second, why did the Muslim League fail to win over this Muslim-majority province in this period? Third, what happened around 1946 to alter the situation so drastically? These questions were the starting-point for my investigations.

The NWFP has some features which makes it a particularly interesting field for a study of the nationalist movements. It was the only province in which the Congress and the Muslim League were reasonably evenly matched. The political struggles in the period under review were fought primarily between these two main parties and not between one of them, on the one hand, and the British, on the other. Thus the NWFP offers an opportunity to study both these parties, how they functioned at different levels of politics and how the different levels were linked together in the two national organisations. The small size of the province further facilitates such a study and makes it easier to get an overall picture.

However, the NWFP also presents a very special problem to the historian: it is a very sensitive subject in Pakistan. The country has from its birth been under more or less constant challenge from within and without and its political history has been troubled, to put it very mildly. One regime has followed after the other, each has condemned its predecessor, then fallen and in its turn been as roundly condemned itself. A mood of total disenchantment with those in charge of the nation has set in among wide sections of the population. In this situation it has been felt to be a matter of national interest that the picture of Muslim nationalism and

solidarity, which was projected to the masses during the freedom struggle, must not get tarnished. In fact, the emergence of the Muslim state remains one of the few political events in the nation's history which have never been publicly condemned by the government of the land. The freedom movement is perhaps the only manifestation of something which could be termed a national will. Any re-evaluation of the nationalist experience of the country will therefore be seen by many Pakistani patriots as an attack on Pakistan itself. The fact that the Congress had strong support in the NWFP and that Pakhtunistan has remained a live issue makes the NWFP a particularly sensitive field of study. It is a subject which in the eyes of the Pakistanis cannot be disentangled from the political situation in the country today. The historian must be aware that in Pakistan his findings will be read in the light of that situation. He must therefore not only state his position as compared with that of other scholars but also somehow has to relate his findings to existing political sentiments. My own position in this regard will be discussed later.

The Choice of Period

The period 1937—47 was chosen because it constitutes a clearly demarcated period in the political history of the subcontinent. In 1937 the Government of India Act of 1935 came into operation and 1947 was the obvious point at which to stop. The starting-point, 1937, could perhaps be questioned. The years 1930—32 were of crucial importance for the nationalist movement in the NWFP and maybe ought to have been included. However, this would have entailed too much extra work. Furthermore, in the course of my own work, I came to know that other scholars were working on that period. By leaving out those years I hoped to avoid unnecessary duplication. Finally, our main concern here is the struggle between all-India nationalism and Muslim nationalism and that struggle began on the Frontier only in 1937. Therefore, the years prior to 1937 can be studied in less detail and on the basis of secondary sources.

The Present Research Position

The creation of Pakistan is of unique interest to students of nationalism in the Third World. Broadly speaking, other new states have simply taken over a colonial administration and have tried to weld the territory and the people under their rule into a nation-state. The case of Pakistan is different. Pakistan is in fact the only example of a new state emerging not out of the confrontation with the imperial power but out of a common identity strong enough to break up the old colonial borders. Yet the rise of Muslim nationalism and the emergence of Pakistan have received rather little attention among historians. The books which

exist deal mostly with the ideology of the All-India Muslim League, its programme and organisational structure but contain very little information as to how the party functioned at the lower levels and how mass support for Pakistan was mobilised. These studies also tend to be focused on the Muslim-minority provinces, from which the AIML leadership was recruited, while the provinces, which came to form Pakistan, have been ignored.[1] Finally many of the works which exist on Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent are so biassed, either in favour of Pakistan or against it, that their historical value is limited.

So far as the NWFP is concerned, hardly anything of value has been published on this period.[2] There exist a number of biographies of leading personalities in the province but, although these works contain a considerable amount of interesting data, they are basically of the usual hagiographical or simply propagandistic character all too common in the subcontinent and present only those facts which can be expected to achieve the desired effect.[3] Only two political monographs are known to me. The first is A.K. Gupta's *North-West Frontier Province, Legislature and Freedom Struggle 1932–47*. The value of this work is, however, limited by the fact that it is confined to the legislature and by the author's strong pro-Congress bias. The other is S.A. Rittenberg's dissertation *The independence movement in India's North-West Frontier Province, 1901–1947*. This is a very important work but unfortunately it still remains unpublished. The author has gone through an enormous amount of material and presents an impressive mass of data, from which I have benefited significantly.

Rittenberg's analysis is in part very similar to mine. The most important similarity is the way we regard the role played by traditional divisions in Frontier society for the political mobilisation by the nationalist parties. There are also significant differences between Rittenberg and myself. The most important relate to the fundamental question in this study: why and how did the people of the

[1] Some examples of this are Qureshi, Waheed-uz-Zaman, Hardy and Smith. The only published monograph on Muslim nationalism in a majority-province in my period is, to my knowledge, Sen. However, it seems probable that more will soon appear as a number of scholars are working on the materials which have become available in recent years.

[2] The books in Urdu and Pashto which exist are (with the exception of Khaliq, see below Chapter III footnote 8) not included in this judgement as I do not know these languages and have therefore not been able to go through them. The titles are found in Rittenberg's bibliography. However, their scholarly value is probably limited. Books with scientific ambitions are in Pakistan practically always written in English. Nevertheless it would of course have been useful to have read these books. Whatever their scholarly value, they probably give a good idea of what people think and feel about this period. On the other hand, I think I know that fairly well from my interviews and innumerable discussions.

Two general works, Spain 1963 pp. 193–202 and Hodson pp. 277–288, devote considerable space to the last phase of my period. Spain gives basically only the bare outlines of the story, while Hodson's version is somewhat misleading owing to the author's anti-Congress bias. Rittenberg has published an interesting article (Embree pp. 67–84) in which he summarises some of the results of his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, which is discussed below.

[3] Such works are Tendulkar, Zutschi, Desai and Bhatia.

Frontier Province come to switch over from the Congress to the Muslim League? Our different answers are mainly due to a fundamental difference in our approach.

It is impossible to give an exhaustive account of Rittenberg's approach here. His analysis focuses on the Pakhtun people and how their collective will manifested itself in different situations. The argument is based on the idea of a "collective [Pakhtun] personality" and its character. The Pakhtuns had some characteristics which were of essential importance in their self-identification, while other features were only of subordinate importance. The former, consisting of their tribal background, constituted the most important source of political motivation for them. As this background separated them as much from the other Indian Muslims as from the Hindus, they could join up with the Congress just as well as with the Muslim League. Islam, on the other hand, was only a secondary feature in the Pakhtun self-identification. Gradually, however, a perception crystallised among the Pakhtuns that Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmatgars were allied with a Hindu organisation which stood against the representatives of Islam, the Muslim League. When in 1946–47 serious communal riots occurred between Hindus and Muslims in various parts of India, this secondary feature of their self-identification, Islam, asserted itself and they joined their co-religionists in the Muslim League.

I cannot help feeling that this argument is rather contrived. Moreover, the concept of a collective Pakhtun personality it too vague to play the pivotal role Rittenberg has assigned to it in his analysis. Rittenberg tends to explain doubtful points by referring to the Pakhtun character rather than focusing his research on the real problem. In practical terms this has sometimes meant that he confirms the officially accepted views, although they ought to have been questioned. The concept of a collective Pakhtun personality has also prevented him from seeing how varied the actions and reactions of the Pakhtun people were. Finally he has missed the important role played by people outside Pakhtun society, notably the officials.

Stated more concretely, the main difference between Rittenberg and myself is that Rittenberg has concluded that owing to the extraordinary conditions obtaining in 1946–47 there took place a massive swing in those years from the Congress to the Muslim League. While I agree that there occurred a significant change at that time, I am of the opinion that it was not as drastic as it has been made out to be. The most drastic changes took place in the quite extraordinary situation which arose after independence.

Other important differences between Rittenberg and myself will be dealt with issue-wise as the points arise. Minor ones will generally not be discussed at all. Nor shall I give any references to Rittenberg, or for that matter to Gupta, where our accounts coincide, except where I have drawn directly on them.

Problems for Analysis, Approach and Argument

When in 1975 I began to work on this study, the main influence on my way of thinking was what could be termed the "Cambridge School." According to this school, the gradual withdrawal by the British from the localities and provinces—or, in other words, the gradual introduction of self-government at these levels—to the centre, where, however, they were careful to retain control, was undertaken to minimise the administrative costs for the their Indian empire. When the British handed over governmental control at the lower levels to elected representatives, they gained new, more or less enthusiastic supporters for their rule. This, together with the increasing Indianisation of the civil service, enabled them to economise in the Indian budget while at the same time the fact that they retained the control at the centre meant that they could continue to use India for the requirements of the British Empire. In the wake of the British withdrawal from the localities and provinces different indigenous élite groups began competing among themselves to take over the positions which the British relinquished. This gave the nationalist movement its impetus at the lower levels. The Indian National Congress got support at the lower levels by allying itself with the group or groups there, which could best serve its interests. This argument is then further elaborated and modified according to the findings of each separate study. The fundamental problems for analysis have been how local issues were integrated in the nation-wide freedom movement, how the nationalist message reached down to the grassroot level and how the different levels of politics affected each other.[4]

As already mentioned, such was also my approach to begin with and to a large extent I have continued to view and examine the nationalist movements in the NWFP from this angle. However, in significant respects my perspective has changed. As my work progressed, particularly during my stay in Pakistan in 1978, I became increasingly fascinated by the relevance my topic has for the people of the Frontier even today. The political patterns, which were established in the NWFP in the '30s and '40s, have in large parts survived the coming of independence and the tumultuous post-independence years. Moreover, people *feel* that the experiences of that period are still highly relevant. With changing conditions, parties and other political formations may have altered their character and programmes, but the parties and leaders of today often look upon and present themselves as heirs of the parties and leaders of the nationalist period. Although the events of those days—and the myths that have grown up around them—have mostly been taboo so far as print is concerned, they are still hotly debated by young and old and serve as sources of inspiration, political motivation and not

[4] This is obviously only a skeletal summary which does not do the Cambridge School full justice. Their programme, so to speak, is set out in Seal's introductory article in Gallagher, Johnson and Seal. Other works which belong more or less closely to this school are Baker, Bayly, Brown 1972 and 1977, Johnson, Robinson, Tomlinson and Washbrook.

least defamation. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, his son Wali and their followers are for example accused of being bad Muslims, a charge which is proved, so their opponents maintain, by their former allegiance to Gandhi and the AINC. The Muslim League, on the other hand, is accused of having been a British dummy with no popular support. Thus, it is alleged by some, Pakistan is nothing but a British creation. During my work this current-day relevance of my topic increasingly influenced me in deciding in what direction to proceed and what structure to give to my thesis.

I must right away stress that I do not wish to take sides in the political debates in Pakistan today—beyond wishing Pakistan a prosperous future. I do hope, however, that my work may help to place that part of the discussion, which concerns my period, on a somewhat more factual basis and to cleanse it from the politically motivated distortions which flourish in both camps.

The result of the change of emphasis, which my work has undergone since I began it, could be summed up thus: This study is not so much a contribution to the general scholarly debate concerning the nature of nationalism in the subcontinent as a contribution to the political history of the NWFP and Pakistan; I have endeavoured to place the NWFP in the all-India context of the period but, rather than relating my findings to any general comprehensive theories of nationalism in the subcontinent, I have primarily been concerned with those aspects of the nationalist experience which remain, in one form or another, alive in Pakistan today.

What, then, are these aspects? A few of the most common allegations based on the pre-independence history have already been mentioned. The number of such allegations are legion and I will not attempt any summary of them.[5] However, if I should summarise the significance of my work in this context, it could be said to lie in two fields. First, I have laid heavy stress on "traditional", "non-nationalist" forms of political behaviour.[6] I have done this primarily because they were important for the nationalist movements but also because this fact is so often forgotten in Pakistan today. Every Pakistani knows what stuff post-independence politics has been made of but they are apt to forget that politics was made of

[5] Rushbrook Williams pp. 49–109 and Wali Khan *passim* give some idea of the arguments used by the two sides.

[6] People whose behaviour I have described in some detail to illustrate this may sometimes seem very petty-minded, ludicrous or even crooked. It has naturally not been my intention to depict the Frontier people of those days as special in these regards. Several of the persons, who in this story may appear as somewhat dubious characters, I have on closer contact found to be good, decent people. The most notable example is perhaps Gulab Khan. In the first reference to him that I came across (the handing-over notes by the last British political agent in South Waziristan, quoted in M. Nawaz to M. Ahmad September 1950 TARC File 748–S.T.B. I) he and his associates in the Muslim League in Waziristan were described as "the biggest looters" in the agency. When I asked Askar Ali Shah, who did not have Muslim League sympathies, about Gulab Khan, he said: "He's a fine man. Let's go and see him." We went and I was immensely impressed by Gulab Khan's dignity and intelligence. So is everybody else who knows him.

basically the same stuff during the freedom struggle. They tend to regard all freedom fighters as heroes and those who opposed them simply as villains. This idea of their history has also given them rather a peculiar view of their country's difficulties. They are inclined to hope that a leader will appear and solve their problems for them, rather than themselves tackling the problems which exist in their society.

Second, although I have emphasised the importance of non-ideological factors for the nationalist movements, I have not wished to reduce the story to a nihilistic analysis of social and political structures. On the contrary, during my work I have felt very strongly that the story does have its heroes as well as its questionable characters and that their personalities and individual persuasions influenced the course of events. I have therefore tried to shed some light on what considerations lay behind the actions of leading politicians at crucial points and have sometimes allowed myself value judgments of a kind which is perhaps otherwise not commonly encountered in scholarly works. More specifically, I have in this context endeavoured to trace the developments which led up to the question of "India, Pakistan or Pakhtunistan?" such as it came to exist in my period, to examine what significance the three alternatives had at that time and to shear off later accretions. This I have felt to be important because the debate in Pakistan today too often concerns only who was for Pakistan and who was against it, while the question of what they stood for beyond that is ignored. These over-simplified arguments obviously have political aims. They have led to a distortion of the history not only of the pre-independence period but also of the events arising out of those years. In this way people's political views have sometimes been coloured by distorted facts. A revision of this politically inspired historiography is long over-due. Furthermore, this aspect of my topic should be of particular interest for today's Pakistanis as many of the politicians of those days—including the two main antagonists, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan—are still alive and remain influential in Pakistani politics.

The analysis in this work will move between three different levels: first, the individual political leaders in the NWFP; second, the social, economic and cultural conditions in Frontier society, which determined the modes of political mobilisation; and third, the developments "at the centre", whereby is meant the altering relations between the Government of India, the AINC and the All-India Muslim League (AIML). The latter two levels, so to speak, delimited the field on which provincial politicians, whether they were nationalists or not, could operate.

The origin of nationalism in the North-West Frontier Province will not be discussed here. It is sufficient to state that nationalism was in the air and, for a variety of reasons, had immense attraction for large numbers of people. Some were attracted to it for economic reasons, others had considerations of personal power uppermost in their minds and for many the main attraction was the ideological content of nationalism. However, whatever the reasons for their nationalism, the nationalists were, just like their opponents in provincial politics, subject to the

constraints of their surroundings. Only to a very limited extent was it possible to make a direct appeal to the ordinary people. Instead, provincial politicians had to operate through a number of key or élite groups in Frontier society which could provide them with popular support. So far as their political message was concerned, they had to reduce it to some broad generalities which, on the one hand, could reach down to the grassroots while, on the other, it did not alienate the key group or groups on whose support they depended. Aspiring politicians thus had to find the highest common denominator for the key groups whose support they sought, the ordinary people these groups brought with them, and themselves. The most obvious factor which the nationalists could exploit was the fact that they were all natives of the country while the British were not. Another possibility was to make an appeal on the basis of language or cultural identities and this was also done. For many years, nationalism in the NWFP meant simply Pakhtun nationalism. Yet another factor which they could exploit was religion, notably Islam.

However, as already indicated, the pivotal role in provincial politics was played by a number of key groups in Frontier society. These groups had their own interests which were conditioned by the general social and economic developments in the province, and their political activities were aimed at protecting and furthering these interests. In the given historical context, this meant that they either supported the British or some nationalist movement. As time went on, more and more of them chose to side either the Congress or the Muslim League. Their choice depended on how their interests could be fitted into the demands of the different nationalist parties. Thus this study is to a large extent focused on these key groups, identifying their interests and examining how they were affected by the social and economic developments in the NWFP, on the one hand, and by the changing political situation at the all-India level, the centre, on the other. This leads us on to the third level of our analysis.

Basically the political interests of the key groups in the NWFP concerned local questions and provincial politics therefore revolved mostly around local issues but the developments at the centre to a large extent determined what shape these local problems would take in politics. Firstly, the entire institutional framework of provincial politics—municipal committees and district boards, the legislature, elections, constituencies, etc.—were based on ideas prevailing at the centre and geared to serving its needs. Secondly and more importantly, the British as well as the AINC and the AIML constantly endeavoured to use the provinces for their own needs in the struggle at the centre, seeking allies who in return for concrete benefits would provide them with support in the provinces. Thus this struggle was always in one way or other present in provincial politics, too. However, the requirements of the three parties at the centre varied from one time to another and thus they would at different times exploit different aspects of provincial politics. This, to use a metaphor, meant that provincial politics received different impulses from the centre and in consequence the responses also varied. The key groups in

Frontier society grouped and regrouped, forming alliances among themselves against other groups, supporting or opposing the government or the nationalist parties according to the changing situation at the centre and to their own needs.

The range of action of individual provincial politicians was thus rather restricted. In order to assert themselves they had to manoeuvre in such a way as to get maximum support—or provoke minimum opposition—among the key group in indigenous society as well as at the centre. Furthermore, they had to adapt their programme in a similar manner.

What then about *nationalism?* Surely a strong desire for political emancipation was one of the main ingredients in the political mass movements on the Frontier in the decade before independence? There is no denying this but opposition to foreign rule and the occurrence of popular upheavals against it do not amount to nationalism. What makes a political movement a nationalist one is that it demands the status of nationhood for a given group of people and that this status be given some form of institutional recognition, such as independence or autonomy. This demand was raised, in the name of the people, by the nationalist leaders who, taking the situation in the province and that at the centre into account, gave their demand such a form as to get maximum support at both levels without compromising their own idea of the cause they had adopted.

A nationalist movement also needs a *nation* to represent but on the Frontier there was no group which could be clearly identified as a nation. Instead a nation had to be created, a nation with its own symbols, myths, etc. Under Abdul Ghaffar Khan's leadership, the nationalist awakening in the NWFP first took the form of Pakhtun nationalism. Gradually, however, the Frontier people became divided into two political blocs, Pakhtun nationalists and Muslim nationalists. The former belonged to the Congress while the latter joined the Muslim League. But, as already indicated, the reason why people chose to support the one or the other should not be sought primarily in their Pakhtun ethnicity or their devotion to Islam. Usually the explanation is to be found in the position they held in or vis-à-vis the key groups in Frontier politics. Furthermore, as the situation—in the province or at the centre—changed, the contents of the two different forms of nationalism, the way the nationalist leaders interpreted and expounded their creed, also came to be altered.

However, the provincial leaders were not only mediators constantly trying to adjust themselves to ever-changing conditions. They were men of flesh and blood, with their strong and weak points. They were faced with choices not only of political but also of moral significance. For them, the question was not only how they and their parties could thrive politically but also how their ideals could best be furthered. When their political surroundings changed, they had to decide how far they could adapt themselves politically without compromising their essential creed. This was, in the final analysis, the factor which determined their political behaviour and therefore also how they and their parties fared in politics. If they refused to adapt to the prevailing conditions, they either became politically irrele-

vant and powerless, or else they could be imprisoned, as they often were, or finally, they could try to find some way of hibernating while waiting for better times.

A few words should also be said on the question of credibility. Obviously, if a politician made too sharp a turn to adjust to changing conditions, this was bound to reflect on his credibility. However, it is striking how little practical significance this problem had. Owing to the dominant mode of political mobilisation, a politician could move rather freely from one extreme to another without undermining his own power basis.

Seen from the perspective outlined above, the decade under review can be divided into three periods. The first (Chapters II and III) covers the years 1937—39, when there was little pressure from the centre. In consequence, provincial politics was strongly local in character and content, and nationalist politics was very much subject to the idiosyncracies of Frontier society. The second period (Chapters IV and V) covers the war years when the stakes were higher and both the British and the nationalists tried to tighten their control over the provinces. Provincial politics reflected the situation at the centre, where the struggle intensified, rather than that in the province. As the British were still the strongest force at the centre, British interests by and large determined the contents of provincial politics, too. Finally, there is the post-war period (Chapters VI and VII) when the questions arising out of the impending British withdrawal became of supreme importance and local questions became almost irrelevant. The role of the British was reduced to that of an arbiter before whom the other two parties had to establish their claims. The struggle between these two, on the other hand, became frantic. The position of the NWFP in this struggle underwent a fundamental change and in consequence nationalist politics in the province assumed an entirely new shape.

Before leaving this subject, a few comments must be made on religion, notably Islam, which was the basis on which Pakistan was founded. The role of religion in the politics of the subcontinent is difficult for a westerner to understand. Part of it can no doubt be explained in economic terms but there remain many features which go beyond such concepts. The divisions between Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, even highly educated and "westernised" ones, are very real. People identify with their religious community, even if they do not take much interest in their religion as such. This kind of religious-cultural attachment seems impossible to analyse in economic or other such relatively clear terms. In this work I shall discuss the character of the Hindu, Sikh and Muslim communities in the NWFP but I shall not discuss the causes of communal feeling. Instead I shall content myself with stating that the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims were different communities with their own separate interests, and that communal feelings usually cut across class and other loyalties. However, without questioning the Pakistani people's commitment to Islam or the genuineness of Muslim nationalism, I shall point out certain factors which affected the economic interests of key groups and contributed to shaping Muslim nationalism and to its ultimate victory.

Sources

My written sources require little comment. By far the most important for the reconstruction of the general course of events have been the reports written by officials. Although there is often an anti-nationalist slant in them, these reports were written with a view to giving the government the factual background on which to base its actions and therefore had to be as accurate as possible. Having had access to a large amount of other material, I do not believe that I have been unduly influenced by their anti-nationalist bias.

Unfortunately I have been able to find rather little material emanating from the Frontier Congress. The problem seems to have several explanations. Party offices and private houses have been raided by the police, government archives have been split up and moved, and in the process much material has been lost. Moreover, the leaders did not write much but communicated orally with each other and their followers. Finally, it is obvious that there exists some material in India which I have not been able to locate.[7]

On the Muslim League side, the situation is better. The holdings of the National Archives of Pakistan and the Archives of Freedom Movement have been invaluable. I have also had access to M. Jalaluddin's remarkable private collection.

As regards newspaper material, I have tried to make a representative selection. Of the provincial press, the *Pakhtun,*[8] which usually appeared thrice a month, was the mouthpiece of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, while the *Khyber Mail,* which appeared three or sometimes four times a week, supported the Muslim League. Of the papers based outside the NWFP, the *Hindustan Times* and the *Tribune* were Congress papers, while the British-owned *Civil & Military Gazette* tended to prefer the Muslim League viewpoint to that of the Congress. I have also gone through a series of newspaper clippings from the leading All-India Muslim League paper, *Dawn,* relating to the crucial years 1946–47.

The written sources have finally been complemented by interviews. Since human memory is notoriously unreliable and selective, such oral evidence, given more than thirty years after the events it concerns, can be used only with the utmost care. Generally speaking, I have not used these interviews to reconstruct the course of events, except when the oral evidence has been supported by written sources. Instead they have been used, with observation of the usual rules of *Quellenkritik,* to illustrate or underline more general points which I have made. In a few passages oral evidence has been crucial for the argument. However, I have accepted such evidence only under special circumstances and with reservations. For example, if people admit, though unwillingly, to having been responsible for questionable acts, one has every reason to believe that they were involved in some

[7] See e.g. Chapter VII footnote 216. It is noteworthy that the Central Record Office of the NWFP does not contain any records from my period.

[8] I have gone through the *Pakhtun* with the help of friends who have translated for me.

such act, even if it occurred thirty or forty years ago. One cannot, however, take the details of such admissions too literally. Sometimes I have given rather full accounts of the oral information I have received but I do not claim that this information is entirely correct or reliable. All I claim is that it illustrates or even proves the general point I have made in that context. Finally, the interviews have been important sources of information concerning family and similar matters, on which people's memories are generally extremely reliable in that part of the world.[9]

[9] Many of the interviews I have had to make with the help of interpreters. I do not believe this has meant any serious disadvantage. Except in one or two cases, the interpreters have been highly competent persons whom I know well and who also know me and my work. Most of the people I interviewed did not want me to use a tape-recorder. The quotations from the interviews are therefore mostly not verbatim renderings of what was said but are taken from my notes. One exception to this is the long quote from my interview with Faridullah Shah p. 186. Finally, some of the persons interviewed did not wish their names to appear in print. This I have naturally respected. Anonymous IV also appears under his real name in contexts which he did not feel to be sensitive.

Chapter 1

Background

The North-West Frontier Province

The North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan is as the name indicates situated in the north-west of the country. To the west and north it has an international border with Afghanistan. In the east it borders on the Gilgit agency, Kashmir and Punjab, and in the south lies Baluchistan.[1] The area covered by the province is of immense strategic importance as the gateway to the Indian subcontinent. From the beginning of history Central Asian and Indian Empires have striven to control it but never has it been completely subdued or fully integrated with any settled government.[2]

The North-West Frontier—or simply "the Frontier"—was regarded by the British as the most vulnerable part of their Indian empire. The first time they came into direct contact with these tracts was in 1808, when, fearing a French invasion of India through Persia and Afghanistan, they sent a mission to the Afghan amir.[3] It was not until 1849, however, that the Frontier came under British control. The former rulers, the Sikhs, had been decisively defeated in a brief war and their dominions, including the Frontier tracts, were incorporated into British India.[4]

Throughout British rule the foremost concern of the government on the Frontier was security, internally and externally. Social and economic reform was at best a secondary consideration. This fact coloured every aspect of the administration of the Frontier.[5]

The external threat to the Frontier came first of course from Afghanistan, but far more important was that, whether real or imagined, of the steadily expanding Russian empire in Central Asia. The internal threat came from the extremely unruly population of the Frontier. Most of all the British feared collusion between these three, the Russians, the Afghans and the indigenous population.[6]

[1] See map 1.

[2] Caroe *passim.*

[3] On the basis of the information he collected as head of this mission, Mountstuart Elphinstone wrote one of the most famous books ever written on the Frontier, *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul.*

[4] For the Sikhs and the British annexation, see Caroe 1973 pp. 286–345; Spain 1963 pp. 37 f., 101–109.

[5] Baha 1978 *passim;* Spain 1963 p. 163.

[6] Davies 1974 *passim.*

Until the end of the *Raj* the question where to stop the expansion to the north-west and how to control the Frontier was the subject of much discussion and controversy in England as well as in India. There were two fundamentally different schools of thought. The first advocated the so-called "Close Border System." The adherents of this school held that the Government of India should not assume responsibility for any area which it could not administer as a fully integrated part of the British Indian empire. The extremists of the school regarded the Indus as the natural border of India and were prepared to withdraw behind that line. However, most advocates of the Close Border System accepted the border inherited from the Sikhs. The problem was only that this left a broad belt of no-man's-land between India and Afghanistan. These areas were inhabited by powerful, volatile tribes, which might fall into the lap of Afghanistan or Russia. Under the Close Border System this was to be prevented by diplomatic means.[7]

The other main school of thought was that of the "Forward Policy." According to this school, the British should contain the Russians by extending their own rule as far as possible to the west and north-west. Some extremists maintained that the Oxus was the natural border of India. Others spoke of a "scientific border" along a line from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandahar. All advocates of the school regarded the vacuum left by the Sikh border between India and Afghanistan as undesirable and wished to bring this area under closer control.

In 1893 an international border was delineated in a treaty between the British and Afghanistan. This boundary came to be called the Durand Line after the British negotiator, Sir Mortimer Durand. This line also left a broad hilly belt in the west under British suzerainty, although the British could exercise only the most tenuous control over it. This area was never brought under direct British rule. The tribes living there were instead given an officially recognised semi-independent status. In this way there came to exist a double boundary on the North-West Frontier, an inner one marking the end of the British administration, and an outer one marking the end of British suzerainty.[8]

Up to 1901 the Frontier tracts belonged to the province of Punjab. In that year, however, the unadministered belt and the districts adjoining it were separated from Punjab and constituted into the North-West Frontier Province. This reform was part of a new approach to the border problem devised by the then Viceroy Lord Curzon. The aim of his policy was to bring the Frontier under closer control by the central government. Under the new arrangements the Government of India could deal with the Frontier directly through the men on the spot and no longer

[7] For British Frontier policy, see Davies 1974 *passim;* Caroe pp. 346–349, 370–412; Spain 1963 pp. 115–122.

[8] The exact juridical character of the Durand Line has been the subject of much controversy. Generally speaking, the British and their Pakistani successors have claimed that it constituted an international border, while Afghanistan has claimed it only delineated zones of influence. For a summary of this dispute, see article by Poullada in Embree (ed.), particularly pp. 134–144.

needed to communicate with them through the Government of Punjab in Lahore.[9]

Compared with other British Indian provinces the NWFP was very small. It covered an area of 36,356 square miles, i.e., about three fifths of that of England and Wales together. Only about one third of this area was under direct British administration while two thirds remained unadministered. In 1931 the population of the administered, or "settled" districts was about two and a half million. The population of the unadministered or "tribal" areas was estimated at about the same number.[10]

The Tribal Areas

In the last quarter of the 19th century the British gradually extended their control over the tribal areas. When the NWFP was set up, the loose arrangements which had been made for the tribal areas were overhauled and given firmer shape. The basic features of the tribal administration that was established at this time have remained the same even until our day.

In the period under review in this work the tribal areas were divided into five *agencies,* namely, Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. In each agency the government was represented by a *political agent.* His position has been described as "half-ambassador, half-governor".[11] His main duty was to see that there was no large-scale unrest among the tribes in his charge. Part of the tribal territory, generally speaking areas which were considered less important, had not been constituted into separate agencies. In these areas the functions of the political agents were filled by the deputy commissioners of the adjoining districts.[12]

In the Malakand agency were also included the three so-called "Frontier States" of Chitral, Dir and Swat. In all internal matters they were under the exclusive jurisdiction of their own hereditary rulers and they remained untouched by the political developments in India. The same was the case with Amb, a small state on the border of Hazara district.[13] These states will therefore not be discussed in this work.

The relations between the tribes inhabiting the tribal areas and the British were laid down in official treaties and agreements. The details of these agreements

[9] Baha 1978 pp. 12–31; Caroe pp. 413–420; Spain 1963 pp. 142–144.

[10] *Census of India 1931* p. 4. The figure for the settled districts also includes the population of the trans-frontier posts.

[11] Spain 1972 p. 25.

[12] For the tribal areas and their administration, see Ahmed 1977 *passim*, particularly pp. 23–37, 43–45; Spain 1963 pp. 104–108; Caroe p. 346 ff; *Imperial Gazetteer of India . . . North-West Frontier Province* pp. 59, 61, 210–257; Afridi pp. 40–54; Baha 1978 pp. 32–80.

[13] For Amb, which together with its dependency Phulra, formed the so-called "Feudal Tanawal", see *Gazetteer of the Hazara District, 1907* pp. 186–201.

varied but in all essentials they were the same.[14] Their basic feature was that the Government of India undertook not to interfere with the internal affairs of the tribes. The tribes paid no land revenue or other taxes and were not subject to British Indian law. Instead, they remained free to lead their lives according to their own customary law, *riwaj*.[15] In some fields, however, the government imposed limits on the freedom of the tribes. They were not allowed to harbour outlaws who had fled from the settled districts, but this was a rule which conflicted with their ideas of hospitality and which was therefore often broken.[16] Further, the tribes undertook not to raid in the settled districts. This, too, was a rule which the tribes often ignored.[17] They also had to keep open the passes in their control and certain roads through their territories.

In return for complying with these rules the tribes were paid cash subsidies. Such allowances could be paid either to a tribe or some sub-section of a tribe as a whole, or individually to influential men, who were supposed to maintain order in the tribe. If a tribe did not fulfill its agreements with the government, the subsidies were withheld in part or *in toto*.

A very loose control was maintained over the tribal areas by the government with the aid of militia forces and tribal levies. The recruitment of tribesmen to these forces also served as a form of subsidy to the tribes.

If, or rather when, these means did not suffice to maintain order on the border, the government resorted to punitive expeditions.[18] After World War I bombing by aeroplanes was found to be a cheaper method of bringing a truculent tribe back to order.

A serious complication for the British was that the tribes never severed their connections with the tribes on the Afghan side of the Durand line or gave up their interest in Afghan affairs. Nor did Afghanistan break its ties with the tribes on the British-Indian side. On the contrary, they looked upon them as being in one sense or another within an Afghan zone of influence and paid subsidies to them in much the same way as the British, though presumably on a much smaller scale.

[14] The relevant treaties and agreements (including those with the Frontier States) as well as their background are found in Aitchison pp. 387–633.

[15] An exception was Kurram, which had a semi-settled status. The land was subject to revenue and the people to several British-Indian laws.

[16] For some figures, see Spain 1963 p. 187 f.

[17] In 1919, the year of the Third Afghan War and a very tumultuous one, there were in all 611 such raids into the settled districts excluding Hazara. 298 persons were killed, 463 kidnapped, 392 wounded and Rs. 3,000,000 worth of property lost. The casualties of the raiders amounted to 119 killed, 80 wounded and 40 captured. In the period 1920/21–1937/38 there were in all 1,138 such raids. Spain 1963 p. 186 f. See also below Chapter II footnote 124.

[18] In the period 1849–1902 fifty-five such expeditions were undertaken. The number of troops involved varied between 280 (Utman Khel expedition in 1878) and 40,000 (the expedition against the Orakzais and Afridis in 1897). *Imperial Gazetteer of India ... North-West Frontier Province* pp. 80–82. According to Spain 1963 p. 174, punitive expeditions were equally frequent in the twentieth century.

At the samt time as the NWFP was created, Lord Curzon also initiated a new policy for the tribal areas. This policy could be described as a modified version of the Close Border System. The military presence in the tribal areas was reduced to a minimum but at the same time communications were improved so that the military could take more effective action if necessary. Finally, the tribal subsidies were increased.

This system functioned reasonably well until after World War I, but when in May 1919 Afghanistan attacked India, it broke down. Large sections of the tribes were carried away by a mixture of enthusiasm for the Afghan cause and the hope for loot. Militia forces in tribal territory mutinied, large parts of Waziristan had to be given up to the Afghans and the Khyber Pass was closed by tribal war parties. In the end, however, the Afghans were defeated and before long the British managed to reassert their authority over the tribal areas.[19]

The events of this war, the Third Afghan War, made it clear that once more a new system had to be devised to control the border. Large military forces were stationed at Razmak and Wana in Waziristan and military roads were built linking Wana, Razmak and Miranshah. The organisation of the militia and the tribal levies was completely overhauled and placed on a much firmer basis. A railway was built through the Khyber Pass.[20]

This was the system in force in the period under review in this work. The British liked to call it "the policy of peaceful penetration" while the nationalists looked upon it as a new version of the old imperialist Forward Policy. To begin with it was successful but this was not to last. In the latter half of the 1930s the British were faced with one of the most serious revolts they ever had to deal with on the Frontier. The scene of action was North Waziristan and the igniting spark was the "Islam Bibi case". Late in 1935 a young Hindu girl eloped with or was abducted by a Muslim man, who converted her to Islam, named her Islam Bibi and married her. The girl's Hindu relatives took the matter to court, which resulted in the court ordering the girl to be returned to them. This led to communal disturbances over the whole Frontier. The most serious consequence was the rise of the Faqir of Ipi, who from this time to his death in 1960 was the most notorious outlaw on the Frontier. In 1936, after having raised a large *lashkar* (tribal war party) with which he treatened the district of Bannu, he demanded the return of Islam Bibi to her Muslim husband. The British counter-measures only led to an escalation of the troubles. Within a year the British found themselves forced to undertake an expedition involving 32,000 regular troops and 5000 men from the militia forces. The Faqir of Ipi escaped, however, and the unrest continued on varying scales for the next two decades.[21]

[19] For this war, see Baha 1978 pp. 100–105; Spain 1963 p. 150 f.; Swinson pp. 267–284.

[20] *Report on the Administration of the Border of the North-West Frontier Province* 1936–37 pp. 15–20; Spain 1963 pp. 151–154.

[21] Spain 1963 pp. 184–186; Swinson pp. 327–332; Coen p. 203 f.

The tribal areas were not under the provincial government's authority but were placed directly under the Government of India, which exercised its powers through the Agent to the Governor-General. This office was always held by the governor, prior to 1932 the chief commissioner, of the NWFP and therefore the distinction was somewhat unreal. However, when representative reforms were introduced, the distinction became significant. The authority of the ministers was confined to the settled districts and the tribal areas remained under the central government. In the settled districts the governor had to act on the advice of the provincial ministry but in questions regarding the tribal areas he was responsible only to the Government of India. This enabled the British to keep Indian politics and nationalist politicians out of the tribal areas for most of the period under review. In their internal affairs the tribes remained as free as before and their politics continued to be governed by traditional tribal feuds with few other overtones. Only after World War II did this change and therefore the tribal areas will by and large be ignored in the next few chapters. Instead our attention will be focused on the settled districts.

The Settled Districts

Basically the settled districts of the NWFP were administered in the same way as other provinces of British India. At the head of the provincial government was a governor, who resided in Peshawar. The fundamental administrative units were the districts over which deputy commissioners presided. At the time of its creation the province comprised five districts, Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. In 1937 Peshawar district was divided into two, Peshawar and Mardan. All districts except Hazara were named after the towns in which the district head-quarters were situated. The head-quarters of Hazara district was situated at Abbottabad.[22] The districts were further subdivided into *tahsils*.

However, owing to the government's special consideration for security on the Frontier, the administration had some features which were peculiar to the NWFP. One such peculiarity was that all key officials, i.e., the governor, deputy commissioners and political agents, were recruited from the Indian Political Service, not the Indian Civil Service.[23]

[22] For a description of the different districts, see *Imperial Gazetteer of India ... North-West Frontier Province* pp. 126–209.

[23] The officers of the Indian Political Service could be employed in three different fields. First there was the Political Secretariat which under the direct charge of the Viceroy, controlled the activities of the officers in the field. Secondly, they were employed for the quasi-diplomatic and consular British representation in the Indian states and certain other places such as Aden and Kabul. Thirdly, the Political Service provided the senior administrators of the NWFP and Baluchistan.

Seventy per cent of the members were recruited from the Indian Army and thirty per cent from the Indian Civil Service. In later years some members, particularly in the NWFP and Baluchistan,

The provincial budget always showed a deficit. There were several reasons. The NWFP was a poor province, even by Indian standards. The administrative costs were very high, particularly for the maintenance of law and order. In order not to upset the population the land revenue assessment was low, especially in areas abutting on tribal territory, where the government granted so-called frontier remissions. These remissions were conditional on good behaviour and help to the government against raiders from tribal territory.[24]

To make up for the provincial deficit the central government paid an annual subsidy to the NWFP. In the first few years under study in this work this subsidy represented about two thirds of the provincial government's receipts.[25]

In the administration of justice the executive was given extraordinarily wide powers at the expense of the judiciary through the *Frontier Crimes Regulation.*[26] This regulation contained a number of drastic provisions, which were thought to be suited to the ethos of the Frontier people and capable of compensating for the inadequacies of British legal concepts in this turbulent society. It empowered deputy commissioners to refer civil as well criminal cases to "councils of elders" or *jirgas*. The members of such a *jirga* were appointed by the deputy commissioner under whose jurisdiction the case in question fell. The *jirga* members had no legal training but were men of standing in indigenous society, who could be expected to be well acquainted with the case and who could sound local people

were recruited from the Indian Police and the Provincial Civil Services.

The Political Service never got Indianised to the same extent as other services. Out of 124 officers actually serving in 1947 only 17 were Indians, 12 of whom were Muslims, 4 were Hindus and finally there was one Sikh. A large share of these Indians served on the Frontier; hence the high proportion of Muslims. Coen pp. 4 f., 38, 54 f. For the "Politicals" serving on the Frontier, see also *op. cit.* pp. 169–217.

[24] Baha 1978 pp. 28–30. The table below also illustrates this point.

Selected items of expenditure in the years 1934/35–36/37.

Item	Average sum spent per year (Rs.)
Civil Works	3,236,000
Police	3,186,000
Education	2,122,000
General administration	2,015,000
Medical	631,000
Agriculture	213,000
Public Health	131,000

(*Source:* Cunningham to Laithwaite 20/11/41 Enclosure 2 IOL R/3/1/49.)

[25] The annual subsidy amounted to Rs. 10,000,000. In the period 1937/38–39/40 the total receipts of the provincial government averaged Rs. 18,179,000. Cunningham to Laithwaite 20/11/41 Enclosure 1 IOL R/3/1/49.

[26] Although it mainly deals with the post-independence period, Berry *passim* gives a good comprehensive acocunt of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, its origin, functions etc. See also Spain 1963 pp. 353–355, 376 f.

discreetly about it. The civil cases that were referred to *jirgas* concerned disputes which were likely to lead to murder or some other serious crime. Often a trans-border tribe would be involved in such a case. In criminal cases, trial by *jirga* was often resorted to if the deputy commissioner felt that although the guilt of the accused seemed evident, it would be difficult to obtain a conviction in an ordinary court of law. The decision of a *jirga* was only recommendary and the final decision lay with the deputy commissioner. If he was not satisfied with the findings of a *jirga*, he could refer the case to a new one. There was no right of appeal against sentences passed under this regulation, but it was common to petition the governor for a revision. The maximum sentences which could be passed were fourteen years' rigorous imprisonment or transportation for life.

Another striking feature of the regulation was that in cases where no individual culprit could be found, collective punishments could be inflicted on villages, tribes, clans, etc. A common way to deal with a recalcitrant trans-border tribe was to "blockade" it, which meant that all members of the tribe whom the government could lay hands on in the settled districts were put in jail, their property was confiscated and the tribe itself was debarred from any contact with the settled districts.

In official circles the Frontier Crimes Regulation was regarded as essential for the maintenance of law and order and particularly for the control of the tribal areas. In non-official circles, on the other hand, it was strongly criticised owing to the large measure of arbitrariness it allowed and because innocent people could be punished for the crimes of others. In connection with the introduction of political reforms in 1932, the provisions for trial by jirga were suspended except in certain cases, in which residents of tribal areas were involved.[27]

Security considerations also made the British chary of introducing reforms which could disturb the stability of the Frontier. Instead they concentrated on preserving the existing social order. This, together with the strong conservatism of the Frontier people, made the NWFP one of the most underdeveloped parts of India. There was hardly any industrial development.[28] The achievements in education were also humble. The rate of literacy in 1931 was only 5.6 per cent and the "western-educated class" was exceedingly small, the rate of literacy in English being as low as 1.5 per cent.[29]

It was, however, in the political field that the British caution was most in evidence. When representative reforms were introduced in other provinces, the NWFP continued to be ruled in the old way by officials. Instead of entrusting any responsibilities to elected Indians, the British pinned their faith on their own administrative efficiency and the British sense of justice as the factors which would

[27] *Report on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the NWFP* 1935 p. 8 and 1940 p. 10.
[28] See below p. 62 f.
[29] *Census of India, 1931*, p. 156.

solve social and other conflicts in Frontier society. During the first eighty years of their rule, Frontier society underwent significant changes but there was no corresponding change in the governmental system. This was to have far-reaching political consequences.

Religious Communities

The vast majority, or to be exact, 91.8 per cent of the population of the settled districts were Muslims in 1931. The only other communities that mattered, apart from the Europeans, were the Hindus and Sikhs, who constituted 5.9 and 1.8 per cent respectively of the total population.[30]

Most Muslims were Sunnis but there existed pockets of Shias here and there. The strongest one was in the Hangu *tahsil,* Kohat district, where large numbers of the Bangash tribe were Shias.[31] The relations between Shias and Sunnis were often troubled.

The Muslims were mostly agriculturists of one kind or other.[32] They were strongly underrepresented in the commercial life of the province. They lagged far behind the other communities in education. The rate of literacy among the Muslims was less than a tenth of that among the Hindus and Sikhs. Thus out of a total of 117,438 literate persons in 1931, less than half, or 48,395, were Muslims.[33] As a result, the Muslims were also under-represented in occupations requiring western education, notably the professions and the higher ranks of the bureaucracy. Thus, for example, out of 295 pleaders practising in the province in 1939, 147 were Muslims and 147 were Hindus or Sikhs.[34] Out of slightly less than 200 gazetted officers employed in the province, 140 were Muslims, 49 were Hindus or Sikhs, and the rest were Europeans or Anglo-Indians.[35]

The Hindus were usually immigrants or descendants of farily recent immigrants. They were mostly shop-keepers, moneylenders, traders, etc. Sixty-five per cent of them lived in urban centres.[36] Bannu town had a Hindu majority and in Dera Ismail Khan town the Hindu share of the population was as large as 42 per cent.[37]

The distinction between Sikhs and Hindus was not sharp in the NWFP. Generally speaking, the Sikhs followed the same trades as the Hindus and they often had the same immigrant background. Their numbers were inflated by the

[30] *Op. cit.* p. 196 a.
[31] *Op. cit.* p. 191.
[32] *Op. cit.* p. 188.
[33] *Op. cit.* p. 158.
[34] Figures based on the names found in *NWFP Government Gazette* 24/2/39 Part IV. One name could not be clearly identified either as a Hindu or a Muslim.
[35] See Appendix I.
[36] *Census of India, 1931* p. 43 and p. 192.
[37] *Op. cit.* Table V.

large number of Sikh troops stationed in the province. It could also be mentioned that many Sikhs were in other kinds of government employment.[38]

The minorities were looked down upon by the Muslims as idolators and also because of their occupations. But owing to their wealth, education and occupations many Hindus and Sikhs were very influential in the life of the province.

The overwhelming numerical Muslim dominance had the effect that politics in the NWFP could not be coloured by communal rivalry to the same extent as in other provinces. However, the Muslim under-representation in commerce, the professions and the senior branches of the bureaucracy was a factor of great potential significance. Moreover, the social and cultural cleavage between the Muslims and the minorities was at least as wide as in other parts of the subcontinent.

Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns

Much more important than religious differences were, for most of the period under review, the divisions which existed between the dominant ethnic group in the province, the Pakhtuns, and the other ethnic groups.

The people, who in this work are called 'Pakhtuns', are also known under other names. 'Pathan', the term most commonly used in English, was originally their Hindustani name. 'Afghan' is an appellation widely used by the Pakhtuns themselves. I have chosen to use the term 'Pakhtun", because, together with the dialectical variant 'Pashtun', the Pakhtuns themselves use it and because it is now increasingly being used also in English, and finally because it is least apt to lead to misunderstandings or controversy.

The Pakhtuns are intensely ethnocentric and take immense pride in their Pakhtunhood. "The very name Pakhtun spells honour and glory" wrote the poet-warrior Khushal Khan Khattak in the 17th century[39] and the Pakhtuns one meets today say much the same. They also tend to show a corresponding degree of contempt for non-Pakhtuns.[40]

The term 'Pakhtun' as a definition of an ethnic group is, however, not unambiguous.[41] The most generally accepted criterion, among scholars and cen-

[38] *Op. cit.* pp. 191–195.

[39] Quoted from Caroe p. 238.

[40] Other people in the subcontinent sometimes ridicule the Pakhtuns for their ethnic pride. The following story was told to me by a Bengali. One day a Bengali and a Pakhtun were talking about the Holy Prophet and extolling his virtues. The Pakhtun said that the Prophet was perfect in every respect–except one. "What is it you are saying," exclaimed the Bengali, "do you mean that the Holy Prophet had some fault? That would imply that God is not faultless!" "Yes," replied the Pakhtun, "God does have one fault." "But what could that be," enquired the shocked Bengali. "He did not choose a Pakhtun to be his Prophet," was the answer.

[41] This discussion is based mainly on Barth pp. 22–30; Ahmed 1977 pp. 11–20; Ahmed 1980 pp. 81–88. Both Barth and Ahmed write that a Pakhtun must be a Sunni but this would exclude a

sus officials as well as all those who claim to be Pakhtuns, is no doubt that all genuine Pakhtuns can trace their descent in the male line, through one of the Pakhtun tribes, to a common putative ancestor, Qais. To this could be added two more criteria which would be prominent in any definition Pakhtuns would make of themselves. A Pakhtun must be a Muslim. Qais is believed to have lived at the time of the Prophet and to have been converted to Islam by him. The Pakhtuns take great pride in having been Muslims right from the beginning. Secondly, there is Pashto. Pashto is the language of the Pakhtuns but in this context the term also includes an entire code of behaviour usually called *Pakhtunwali*. Its most striking features to an outsider are *badal* and *melmastia*. *Badal* enjoins on a Pakhtun to take revenge for every hurt or insult and to avenge every kinsman who is killed. *Melmastia* is the obligation to offer protection and hospitality to every guest. Owing to these rules the Pakhtuns have on the one hand won wide fame for their overwhelming hospitality but on the other hand they have become notorious for their endless blood-feuds.[42] Other features of *Pakhtunwali*, which are of greater political significance, will be discussed in a different context.

A complicating factor is that there exist among the Pakhtuns groups of people, such as village artisans and various kinds of dependent cultivators, who have no place in the Pakhtun genealogies. Thus they cannot be regarded as Pakhtuns in the strict sense. They are, however, deeply imbued with Pakhtun culture and values. Moreover, as clients of one Pakhtun or other they have a place in the Pakhtun polity. If asked by an outsider, they will state their patron's tribe as theirs.[43]

The NWFP was regarded as the Pakhtuns' own province but, whatever definition one uses, far from all inhabitants were Pakhtuns. In the tribal areas the Pakhtuns constituted an overwhelming majority, in the central districts, i.e., Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat and Bannu, they occupied a dominant position, in Dera Ismail Khan their position was much weaker and in Hazara the Pakhtuns were a small minority (Tables 1 and 2). The dominant position of the Pakhtuns in the central districts was strengthened by the fact that almost all land was held by Pakhtuns.[44] In Hazara, on the other hand, the Pakhtuns had largely given up

large proportion of the Bangash tribe and the entire Turi tribe, both of which are generally recognised as Pakhtuns (see e.g. *Census of India, 1921*, p. 249 and p. 252 f.).

A modern-day, politically motivated definition can for instance be found in Khan p. 104: "... we consider all those Pakistan nationals who live in or who have any past or present association with the N.W.F.P., ex-States or tribal areas, irrespective of their original place of birth, caste, creed, language or political affiliations, as brother-Pakhtoons ..."

[42] According to Ahmed 1980 *passim*, the central features of *Pakhtunwali* are *tarburwali* (agnatic rivalry, see below p. 56 f.) and *tor* (the preservation of the honour of women). For *Pakhtunwali*, see also Spain 1963 pp. 63–69; Kieffer *passim*; Janata and Hassas *passim*.

[43] Barth p. 30; Ahmed 1977 p. 14.

[44] Thus, for example, in the 1920s 86 per cent of the total cultivated area in the Charsadda *tahsil* of Peshawar district was owned by Pakhtuns (Wylie 1926(a) p. 18), in the Mardan *tahsil* the figure was 84 per cent (Wylie 1926(b) p. 16), in the Swabi *tahsil* 84 per cent (Wylie 1927), in the Nowshera *tahsil* 77 per cent (Wylie 1929(a) p. 18), and in the Peshawar *tahsil* it was 80 per cent (Wylie 1929(b) p. 21).

Table 1. Proportion of Pakhtuns as defined for Census purposes by districts

District	Per cent
Hazara	8.14
Peshawar (inc. Mardan)	46.2
Kohat	62.68
Bannu	59.10
D.I. Khan	25.18
TOTAL	37.32

(*Source:* Census of India, 1931 p 5 and p 231.)

Table 2. Proportion of Pashto-speakers by districts

District	Per cent
Hazara	4
Peshawar (incl. Mardan)	80
Kohat	79
Bannu	84
D.I. Khan	20
TOTAL	53

(*Source:* Census of India, 1931 p 177.)

speaking Pashto and had instead adopted the language as well as the culture of northern Punjab.[45]

The Pakhtuns were usually agriculturists and lived in rural areas. Another very common source of livelihood among them was service in the armed forces.[46] In the towns non-Pakhtuns, often Hindus, played the leading role.

The non-Pakhtuns were a mixed lot. Most numerous were the Awans. Other large groups were the Gujars and Jats. In the Pakhtun-dominated areas they were usually tenants on the estates of Pakhtuns.[47] Culturally these groups tended to be oriented toward Punjab.

As already indicated, the division between Pakhtuns and non Pakhtuns was of crucial importance in provincial politics for most of the decade under review here. Pakhtun nationalism constituted the core of the political awakening in the 1930s. This meant that the appeal of the movement was confined to the Pakhtuns and those who could identify with Pakhtun culture and values. Other ethnic groups remained passive or were openly hostile.

[45] Caroe p. 339.

[46] *Census of India, 1931* p. 201. The proportion of Pakhtuns having "Agriculture and military service" as their occupation was 79.3 per cent. *Op. cit.* p. 125.

[47] *Census of India, 1931* p. 203; Wylie 1926(a) p. 19, 1926(b) p. 16, 1927 p. 21.

Brief Social and Economic History of Pakhtun Society

The Pakhtun Tribal Society

To identify the forces underlying the political developments under study in this work we must begin by giving a brief description of the social and economic history of the Frontier in the preceding four or five centuries. Our account will deal mainly with the Pakhtun areas and particularly the Vale of Peshawar. One reason is that they are best covered by my sources. Furthermore, the political awakening on the Frontier began among the Pakhtuns in Peshawar and Mardan districts and the political activities of other groups, within or without Pakhtun society, were basically only reactions to the developments there.

Little is known of the origin and early history of the Pakhtuns.[48] Today they are found mainly in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan, the NWFP and in the northern parts of Baluchistan. Although these areas have never constituted a political unit, there exists among the Pakhtuns an awareness that this is their land, the land of the Pakhtuns, for which they have the name *Pakhtun Khwa*.[49]

Most of the Pakhtun tribes of the Frontier probably came there as conquerors between 1000 and 1500 A.D.[50] They supported themselves on cattle breeding and increasingly on agriculture.[51] To begin with their society was based on tribal principles. In large parts of the tribal areas these principles have survived to our day. The essential features of a tribal society, in the sense the term is used here, are: 1.—Its composition is segmentary and based on tribes, clans, sections, etc. This segmentation coincides with the real or putative genealogy of the tribes; 2.—There is no strong central authority; 3.—It is comparatively egalitarian and there is no distinct stratification as regards wealth, status and power.[52]

The Pakhtuns are divided into a large number of tribes, which in their turn are subdivided on the basis of descent into a bewildering multiplicity of clans, subclans, sections, and so forth. Descent is counted strictly in the male line. The various tribal branches are often named after the ancestor beginning the line by adding the ending *-zai* to his name (as in Mohammadzai, a leading tribe in Peshawar district), or by putting the word *khel* after it (e.g. the Adam Khel Afridis, who control the Kohat Pass between Kohat and Peshawar), or simply by adopting the ancestor's name as the name of the tribe (e.g. the Mahsud tribe in

[48] Some believe the Pakhtuns have lived in the surroundings of Peshawar since the days of Herodotus, others that their settlement there is of a much more recent date. For a summary of the discussion of this question, see Ahmed 1980 Notes Chapter 3 Note 1.

[49] Khan p. 1.

[50] Caroe 1973 pp. 151–192; Kieffer p. 165; Gankovsky pp. 130–132.

[51] Gordon p. 6.

[52] This definition is based on Ahmed 1977 pp. 13–16; see also Ahmed 1980 *passim* and Ahmed 1976 pp. 73–83. The terms 'tribes' and 'tribal' will also be used in a different sense in this work, namely to denote the people inhabiting the tribal areas and things pertaining to them. It will be clear from the context in which sense the term is used.



Figure 1. Malik Shahzada's genealogy. From Ahmed 1977 p 15.

South Waziristan). The *kor* represents the lowest level in the tribal structure, i.e., the individual household, in which, however, three or four generations may be represented.[53] These divisions constitute the foci of the tribal Pakhtuns' loyalty. If we take the case of a tribesman living today, one Malik Shahzada, whose genealogy is shown in figure 1, his first loyalty is to the Musa Kor sub-section, his second to the Shati Khel section, then there is the Wali Beg sub-clan, and so on as illustrated by Figure 2. Unfortunately this rather simple pattern is complicated by factional divisions within the lineage groups. The significance of this will be discussed in a different context.[54] Finally it should be added that the state of Pakistan, which as Malik Shahzada's widest loyalty is symbolised by the outermost circle on Figure 2, did of course not exist in the period under review in this work. In fact, the subject of this study is to a large extent how that loyalty came into being.

Broadly speaking, there existed in the old tribal society three categories of full members of the Pakhtun community: *khans*, who were the senior chiefs of the tribes and clans; *maliks*, i.e., leading men of families (in the broader sense of the

[53] For the Pakhtun tribes, their genealogies and subdivisions, see e.g., Spain 1963 pp. 39–58 and Caroe pp. 2–24.

[54] See below p. 56 f. and p. 170 ff.



Figure 2. Malik Shahzada's political loyalties. From Ahmed 1977 p. 16.

word); and *daftaris*, the ordinary full members of the tribe. In spite of the existence of these three tiers the Pakhtun tribal community was originally markedly egalitarian. The khans and *maliks* "were in fact no more than leaders of the tribesmen in war and their agents in dealing with others; they possessed influence rather than power".[55] Decisions concerning the tribe's collective actions were taken by the *jirga*, a tribal council. The composition of a *jirga* could vary considerably and there existed *jirgas*, which could be more or less firmly established, at different levels of the tribal structure. The general idea of the system was that each Pakhtun should have a say in the tribe's affairs. The *daftaris* paid no tribute, revenue or other dues to the khans, *maliks* or any-one else. Their duties to the community were confined to participation in the military operations decided by the *jirga*.[56]

The land tenure system was one of extreme egalitarianism. Each tribe had a specified area of land which was further subdivided into smaller units for the various tribal segments down to the *bakhra*, the plot or plots of an individual Pakhtun. The *khans* and *maliks* could not lay claim to larger shares than the others. Their special position and responsibilities might be recognised by granting them some land from the tribe's common land, perhaps enough to give them some

[55] Baha 1978 p. 135.

[56] For the Pakhtun tribal society, see Baha 1978 p. 132–135; James 106 ff.; Ahmed 1976 pp. 74–76; Ahmed 1980 pp. 88–100.

semblance of power, but otherwise their shares were calculated in the same way as those of the ordinary *daftaris*.

A very special feature of the land tenure system was *vesh*, i.e., a periodical redistribution of the land. This was a very complex phenomenon, the details of which we cannot go into here. The general idea was to maintain the equality of the tribesmen. Whatever injustices had occurred on earlier occasions would in the long run be rectified by this system of regular redistribution, which was undertaken at intervals varying from three to thirty years. The question which land should go to whom was decided by casting lots. This redistribution involved large tribal segments and was not only a matter of redistributing individual shares. This meant that entire sections had to move *in corpore* to the new lands allotted to them.[57]

The khans, *maliks* and *daftaris* were the full members of the tribe but the Pakhtun tribal society also comprised other categories. First among them the religious leaders must be mentioned. Although Islam recognises no special priesthood, there existed in Pakhtun tribal society, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, a rich variety of people with a special religious status. Some of them were of Pakhtun origin and thus Pakhtuns in the full sense. Others were not but nevertheless they occupied a respected place in Pakhtun society.[58]

Another category were the dependent cultivators, usually known as *hamsayas* or *fakirs*, who cultivated land belonging to full Pakhtuns.[59]

Yet another category were the village artisans, such as weavers, barbers and potters. All these occupations were hereditary. Their status was low.[60]

The Feudalisation of Pakhtun Society

In its essential features the tribal system has survived to our day in large parts of the tribal agencies of the NWFP. Generally speaking, the more remote, inaccessible and barren the area, the less the tribal structure has changed. Conversely, in the easily accessible, fertile plains it soon underwent fundamental change and in its place a feudal society began to emerge.

The term 'feudal' is used here in rather a wide sense. By a feudal society is meant one which is dominated by a small class of landlords. Their dominance is based on two factors. The first is their control of large areas of land, through which they get power over tenants, and wealth which in turn gives them influence

[57] For a good summary of the *vesh* system, see Gordon pp. 6–11; also Spain 1963 p. 84.

[58] Baha 1978 p. 135; *North-West Frontier Province Gazetteer, Peshawar District, 1931* Part A p. 155 f.

[59] James p. 112; Gordon pp. 13–19. See also below p. 43.

[60] James p. 113. See also below p. 43.

over people living outside their own domains. Secondly, the authority of the state is not centralised but dispersed and largely delegated to landlords.[61]

Several factors contributed to the transformation of the Pakhtun tribal society to a feudal one. Many tribal leaders exploited their position to extend their powers far beyond that which they traditionally enjoyed. The most important factor, however, was probably that the Frontier was brought under varying degrees of control by the Mughals, Durranis and Sikhs. This meant that the Pakhtuns were placed under a central government, which tried to regulate their society to its own needs. Generally speaking, the interests of the government were confined to the collection of tribute and revenue, but this was a revolutionary innovation on the Frontier with far-reaching consequences. The foreign rulers did not set up any administration of their own but usually dealt with the people through the tribal leaders. The revenue was farmed to the khans and most influential *maliks* and the ordinary *maliks* became responsible for the collection of revenue from their families. In this way, rather than representing the tribe, the khans and *maliks* came to represent the state vis-à-vis the ordinary tribesmen.[62]

In return for their services and support the tribal leaders were given various favours, normally in the form of land grants such as *jagirs* on which they paid little or no revenue, or else their land could be recognised as *inam,* which meant it was made exempt from all revenue.

The tribal leaders also had ample opportunities to extend their ordinary holdings. *Vesh* fell into desuetude. At the time of the British annexation many khans possessed large private estates.

A noteworthy indication of this transformation of Pakhtun society is that the term 'khan' no longer means primarily 'chief'. Instead the word has assumed the meaning of 'landlord', though, when asked about it, Pakhtuns often stress that a khan must command respect on account of his family as well as his personality.[63]

The crucial difference between a tribal society and a feudal one, in the sense I have used the terms, is that in the former the tribal segments constitute the bases of political mobilisation, whereas in the latter the estates and their dependents are

[61] The term 'feudal' is apt to provoke disputes among scholars. I have nevertheless used it here because the alternatives which exist, such as different elaborations of the term 'peasant society', do not seem any better. The term 'feudal' is at least commonly used, by laymen as well as scholars, to denote a society of the kind described here and appears frequently in this sense in my sources and in the existing literature on the North-West Frontier.

In Pakistan the term 'landlord' is sometimes used in a derogatory sense signifying only the very biggest landowners. This is not the meaning I attach to it. In my analysis the term simply denotes a person owing enough land to let it to others and live on the rents.

[62] For this and the next few paragraphs, see Gordon pp. 5–30; James p. 108 ff.; Ahmed 1976 pp. 20–22.

[63] Based on talks with various Pakhtuns. Cf. Barth p. 73 ff. The term *malik* is today used primarily of different kinds of leading men in the tribal areas.

the key units in politics. I have stressed this distinction in order to avoid the confusion which often surrounds these terms in connection with Pakhtun politics. Politicians[64] and political analysts[65] tend to talk in terms of 'tribe', 'tribal' and so forth just because they are dealing with Pakhtuns. This can, however, often be very misleading. Although some features of the old tribal order survived, the society of the settled districts was essentially of a feudal nature in the period under review in the following chapters. The prevailing feudal conditions and the colonial administration superimposed on this society provided the basic framework for rural politics.

The British Impact

On the Frontier as elsewhere in India the British, through the so-called settlements, laid down rules concerning land ownership, rents and payment of revenue. The settlements were partly an attempt to codify existing rights but they also introduced important innovations.[66] We need not here concern ourselves with the various categories of owners and tenants which were given formal recognition. Instead we have to identify the politically significant groups, which emerged as a result of these reforms, and the factors which determined the relations between them. For this purpose the rural population in the period under review can to begin with be divided into three different classes, namely landlords, cultivating proprietors and tenants. The number of regularly paid agricultural workers was very small.[67] No sharp distinction can be made between the three above-mentioned classes. Some of the cultivating proprietors undoubtedly let part of their land to others and thus had much in common with the smaller landlords. Others no doubt rented land in addition to cultivating a small plot of their own. Table 3, however, gives a rough idea of the proportions between these classes.

Many of those who have been included among the non-cultivating proprietors in the table probably owned very small plots, which they had let to others, while they themselves found some other form of employment. However, very broadly speaking, the non-cultivating proprietors could be taken to represent the class of landlords who will play a leading part in this study.

As Table 3 shows, the cultivating proprietors were the largest group in rural society, followed rather closely by the tenants. However, only 44 per cent of the

[64] See e.g., the Nawab of Teri in Appendix II under Teri North Muslim Rural.

[65] Thus Rittenberg, although he several times stresses that land ownership was the basis of political power, for example in summing up his findings, also writes: "Even those men who made the transition from tribal chief to modern political organiser did not divert themselves entirely of their tribal heritage." (Page 7.)

[66] For a summary of the settlement operations on the Frontier, see Baha 1978 pp. 132–164.

[67] *Memorandum by the Revenue Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, and Chairman North-West Frontier Provincial Franchise Committee* ... 27 April 1932 printed in *Report of Indian Franchise Committee* Vol. III p. 437.

Table 3. Agricultural classes in the NWFP

	Total number	Per cent
Non-cultivating proprietors	36,966	8.47
Cultivating proprietors	221,032	50.62
Tenant cultivators	178,690	40.92
TOTAL	436,688	100.00

(*Source:* Memorandum by the Revenue Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, and Chairman, North-West Frontier Province Franchise Committee . . . 27 April 1932, printed in Report of Indian Franchise Committee vol. III p. 437.)

total cultivated area was cultivated by owners. The rest was under tenant cultivation and thus presumably mainly owned by the landlord class.[68]

There were two classes of tenants, tenants-at-will and occupancy tenants. The former had no permanent rights. Usually they rented their land for a year at a time at the end of which they were liable to eviction. The safety of their tenure thus depended on how they could get on with their landlords. It is obvious that this gave the landlords very wide powers over them.[69] The overwhelming majority of the tenant class, perhaps about 80 per cent, were tenants-at-will.[70]

The status of an occupancy tenant was in many ways closer to that of a proprietor than of a tenant in the usual sense of the word. The rights of occupancy were hereditary and transferable by sale. So long as an occupancy tenant fulfilled his duties toward his landlord he could not be evicted. Thus he was in a relatively strong position vis-à-vis his landlord.[71] Occupancy tenants were not common except in Hazara district.[72]

The rents were usually paid in kind. Cash rents were common only in Hazara district.[73] In Peshawar and Mardan districts cash rents were, however, becoming increasingly common, largely, it seems, as a result of the extension of irrigation, which led to more demanding cash crops being cultivated. The cash rents in these districts were not paid by the cultivators but by middlemen, who leased the land from the owners and then in their turn sub-let it to others for cultivation. This

[68] The figures are based on those given in the memorandum cited in footnote 67.

[69] For the tenants and the terms of tenancies, see Baha 1978 pp. 139–141; Gordon p. 37 ff.

[70] I have found no figures which distinguish between occupancy tenants and tenants-at-will. According to the memorandum quoted in footnote 67, one sixth of the total area under tenant cultivation was subject to occupancy rights. It has been assumed in the memorandum that occupancy tenants held as much land per capita as tenants-at-will. If that is correct, tenants-at-will constituted about five sixths of the total tenant population.

[71] Gordon p. 38.

[72] 32 per cent of the total cultivated area in this district was held by occupancy tenants at the time of the second regular settlement in 1900–1907. Watson p. 17.

[73] At the time of the second regular settlement of Hazara district 26 per cent of the total cultivated area was cultivated by tenants paying cash rents. Watson p. 17.

system was gaining ground, as it spared the owners the "trouble of management."[74]

In addition to these three rural classes—the landlords, cultivating proprietors and tenants—there was one more, namely the *kamins*. The term *kamin* has rather a vague meaning. Generally speaking it comprises the various village artisans but it could also have a wider meaning and include other categories, such as the old *hamsayas* and *fakirs*. The *kamins* were by definition non-Pakhtuns. Their status remained low.[75] In many villages the *kamins* constituted a sizeable share of the population but it is difficult to give any more exact figure.

We most now proceed to an examination of those developments under British rule, which determined the political behaviour of the rural classes in the period under review. Two features stand out. Firstly, the landlord class gained in strength vis-à-vis the others. Secondly, within the landlord class the big khans lost ground to the smaller ones.

The British ruled over the Frontier in close cooperation with the leading khans. Therefore, a corner-stone in their policy was to avoid upsetting the existing social structure, to underpin the position of the big khans and to ensure that they remained loyal to the government. This was done in a number of ways. The policy of assigning large shares of the revenue to leading loyal khans was continued and extended. As far as possible, however, these economic favours were commuted into cash grants. Services to the British, e.g., in connection with the administration of the border, were rewarded with new favours. Thus there existed a large variety of government grants, which were known under the comprehensive term 'political pensions'. Another way to attach the khans to the government was to give them and their relatives posts in the administration. Loyalty to the British was rewarded with honorific titles, such as *Khan Sahib* (abbrieviated K.S.), *Khan Bahadur* (K.B.) and *Nawab*. A few of the most prominent loyalists received knighthoods.[76]

We have seen that the position of the khans in Frontier society depended on two factors: their economic power as landlords and their functions in the state administration. While the British endeavoured to strengthen the former, the very nature of the British administrative system, even if khans were to some extent employed in it, could not but undermine the position the khans had enjoyed as state functionaries. In the period immediately after the British annexation, the khans retained wide administrative and judicial powers, but gradually they were replaced by the ordinary civil administration, courts of law, a police force, etc. In this way the khans also lost much of the day-to-day contact with the ordinary people and their influence over them. Increasingly the position of the big khans came to depend on the British rather than their own strength in indigenous socie-

[74] Wylie 1926 (a), p. 28; 1926 (b), p. 24 f.
[75] For the *kamins*, see Gordon p. 198.
[76] For the British administration, see Gordon p. 32 ff.; Baha 1978 p. 142 f.

ty. In their place the small khans, who were not favoured by the government in the same way as the big ones but who had to exert themselves to maintain their position, emerged as the leading group at the local level.

Another British measure, which must be mentioned in this context, was the extension to the NWFP of the Punjab Land Alienation Act. Under British rule a process had begun in large parts of India by which the traditional agriculturalists seemed to be losing their land to the commercial classes, notably money-lenders. One of the chief reasons was that the value of land rose. Previously land had not been accepted as security for loans, but under *Pax Britannica* it was. This resulted in increasing indebtedness among the agriculturist population. As the loans were usually not invested in productive enterprises, the debtors were often unable to pay back their loans and instead lost their land. A number of measures were taken in support of the agriculturalists. The best known was the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900, the aim of which was to make illegal transfers of land from agriculturists to money-lenders.[77]

In 1904 this Act was extended to Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts of the NWFP and in 1921–22 to Peshawar and Kohat districts. For the purposes of the Act the population of the NWFP was divided into two classes, agriculturists and non-agriculturists. An agriculturist was in principle allowed to sell land only to another agriculturist and to mortgage it to non-agriculturists only on certain conditions.[78]

As a result of this Act the activities of the Hindu money-lenders became somewhat restricted. But instead agriculturists in need of credit increasingly had to turn to other agriculturists, which usually meant a landlord. In consequence, landlord money-lenders became more and more common. These landlords were far more interested in acquiring the land of their debtors than the traditional Hindu money-lenders were. The result was that indebted smallholders often lost their proprietary rights and were reduced to mere tenants of their former creditors.[79] Even though the majority of the smallholders were able to retain their status of proprietors, the fact that they were often indebted to some landlord and dependent on him for further credit naturally meant that his hold on them was strong. Thus the position of the smallholders vis-à-vis the landlords was weakened. It must have been the somewhat smaller khans rather than the biggest ones, who benefited from this, as they lived closer to the people, were more easily accessible and were in a much better position to know the lending market. The big khans had by now often become mere rent-receivers, who squeezed their tenants to the best of their ability but otherwise took little interest in local affairs.[80]

[77] For the origin, aim and effects of this Act, see Barrier *passim*.
[78] Baha 1978 pp. 153–158.
[79] *Banking Enquiry Committee Report* pp. 86–92, 117 f.
[80] Wylie 1926 (a) p. 19.

The most important innovation introduced by the British land policy in India was perhaps the concept of ownership itself. Previous arrangements had given people different rights in the land and to its produce. But when the British idea of ownership was enforced, someone came to own the land more or less to the exclusion of everybody else. A prominent feature of these reforms was that the British endeavoured to create a landlord class in their own British image. The aim of the ideal British landlord was economic profit. To minimise his costs and maximise his profits he would strive to decrease the number of people dependent on his estate by technical improvements and innovations. But the landlord class, which came into existence in India as a result of the British reforms, was a far cry from that model. For the Indian landlords the control of land remained what it had been before, i.e., a source of economic security rather than profit, and fundamentally a basis of power. Economic profit was only a secondary consideration. As a result, the landlords were interested not so much in improving their estates as in maximising the number of people dependent on them.[81]

This was clearly seen in the developments on the Frontier. The most common system of cultivation was share-cropping, which is a very uneconomic but highly labour-intensive form of cultivation. Sales of land became very common. The small-holders sold and the bigger landowners bought.[82] In Peshawar district 17 per cent of the total cultivated area changed hands through sales between the second regular settlement (1896–97) and the third (1926–29).[83] The price of land rose out of all proportion to the value of agricultural products. The average price rise for agricultural products, with the area cultivated to the various crops taken into consideration, was estimated at between 25 and 39 per cent in the five *tahsils* of the district.[84] In the same period the price of land had risen by 169 per cent in the Swabi *tahsil*, which was the area where the price rise was smallest. In the Nowshera *tahsil*, where the price had risen most, the increase was 1169 per cent! The settlement officer made the significant comment that "capital is invested in land only, practically never in improvements."[85] Clearly considerations of security and power but not profit lay behind such purchases. It is also obvious that the transfer of such large areas of land into new hands affected the power structure in many localities and led to the emergence of new leaders.

The net result of all this was that after World War I it was no longer the big, government-supported khans but the small ones, who often belonged to cadet

[81] For a general discussion of these questions, see articles by Neale and Embree in Frykenberg.

[82] *Banking Enquiry Committee Report* p. 92; *Final Report of the Third Regular Settlement of the Peshawar District* p. 25.

[83] *Final Report of the Third Regular Settlement of the Peshawar District* p. 23.

[84] Wylie 1929 (b), p. 34.

[85] *Final Report of the Third Regular Settlement of the Peshawar District* p. 24 f. See also *Banking Enquiry Committee Report* p. 140.

branches of the leading families but who enjoyed few if any favours from the government, that constituted the social and economic centre of gravity in rural society. Among the ordinary peasantry there was growing discontent, at least with the big khans. In addition, the "educated classes were, as was inevitable, gradually acquiring more authority and were resentful of neglect." In this situation the "old theory that Government depended on the [big] Khans was no longer true; the very converse was the fact—the Khans now depended on Government." The problem was that the British had committed themselves to the big khans and there existed no political institutions through which the altered power relations could find expression in the governmental and administrative set-up. Instead tension grew between the big khans, on the one hand, and the small khans, on the other, as well as between the government and loyalist khans, on the one hand, and all the rest, on the other.[86]

The division between big khans and small khans was of pivotal importance in the following two or three decades. Before we can proceed any further, however, an elaboration is necessary of the distinction between "big khans" and "small khans". It is important to note that the distinction refers mainly to the local conditions in the villages, *tahsils* and later constituencies, but is of less validity from a wider perspective, such as that of a whole district or the province. Broadly speaking, in each locality the British would base their rule on the support they received from the most influential local khan. In return they supported him in the way described above. However, there rarely existed any place in which one man's authority was unquestioned. Instead every locality would be divided into two factions. The dominant faction was led by the "big khan" allied with the government. The other faction was led by a "small khan", who was often a close relative of the big one. The definition of a "big khan" and a "small khan" is thus based on their position in a local hierarchy rather than on a gradation of all the landlords in the province.

The picture given above is obviously a simplification. In practice the factional patterns were more complex. The important thing, however, is that at whatever level factional divisions occurred, there was a tendency for the "small khans" to gain at the expense of the "big khans". To begin with these factional division concerned only local power. There was no question of the small khans being opposed as a group to the government. In fact, the aim of a small khan would often be to gain some form of official recognition in order to acquire the government privilegies that went with it.

In the 1920s, however, the situation began to change. The tensions which had been building up were aggravated by the depression and in 1930 the Frontier exploded.

[86] Unsigned note by Cunningham n.d. called *Summary of events in NWFP* Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/17. See also Caroe p. 429 ff.

The Political Awakening in the North-West Frontier Province

By and large the NWFP remained untouched by the political developments in India till after World War I.[87] In 1919 the situation was changed and the Frontier was brought within the orbit of Indian nationalist politics. In that year the Government of India passed the Rowlatt Act, which in order to combat revolutionary crime severely restricted political freedom. The Act engendered strong protests and the agitation against it spread to the Frontier. The first Congress civil disobedience compaign launched in protest against the Rowlatt Act also had considerable impact in the NWFP. The situation was further complicated by the outbreak of the Third Afghan War. Many Pakhtuns on the Indian side sympathised with Afghanistan and gave more or less active support to their kinsmen from the other side of the border. Finally, the *Khilafat* movement, launched by Indian Muslims in support of Turkey and the Turkish Sultan, the *Khalifa* of the Muslim world, in their precarious situation after the war, evoked wide response. About 18,000 Pakhtuns took part in the *hijrat* (religiously motivated emigration from a non-Muslim country to a Muslim one), which formed part of the *Khilafat* agitation, and moved briefly to Aghanistan. Several *Khilafat* committees were formed in the province. In the end the government suppressed the movement by arresting the leaders. In 1922 the British appointed a committee to inquire into the causes of the unrest and suggest methods how to deal with it. The committee reported that the Frontier people's "aspirations for reforms have been awakened into full consciousness"[88] and recommended that the representative reforms given to other provinces by the Government of India Act of 1919 should be extended to the NWFP. However, for some time yet nothing came out of this.[89]

A provincial Congress Committee was formed in 1928. The members were either Hindus or urban Muslims. The organisation had little support in the country-side.[90] It was not until 1931, when Abdul Ghaffar Khan brought his *Khudai Khidmatgars* into the party, that it gained mass support.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan

In the late 1920s a young Mohammadzai khan emerged as the leading personality in Frontier politics. His name was Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He was destined to become one of the key figures in Indian politics in the pre-independence period as well as in Pakistani politics after partition.

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was born in the village of Utmanzai in the Char-

[87] Baha 1973 *passim*.
[88] Quoted in Spain 1963 p. 164.
[89] For this period, see Rittenberg pp. 59–65; also Spain 1963 p. 63 f.
[90] Rittenberg p. 86.

sadda *tahsil*, Peshawar district. The year of his birth was probably 1890. His father, Behram Khan, was a substantial landowner. Though an unlettered man, Behram khan wished to give his sons a modern education. His eldest son became a medical doctor. His younger son Abdul Ghaffar was, however, a more restless person and never completed any formal education. While he was studying at the Edwardes Memorial Mission High School in Peshawar, he applied for a commission in the army. His application was accepted and as the son of an important khan he was enrolled for direct commission. Shortly afterwards, however, he gave up the idea of an army career, allegedly because he had come to witness how a British subaltern insulted an Indian officer. He then spent brief spells at different schools, including one year at the famous modernist Muslim college at Aligarh, but took no degree. Plans to go to England for studies also came to nothing.[91]

In the years preceding World War I he devoted himself, among other things, to various educational experiments among the Pakhtuns. In this connection he was closely associated with the Haji of Turangzai, a Pakhtun proto-nationalist.[92] He also had contacts with the Muslim seminary at Deoband in India, which was more orthodox and less loyalist than Aligarh, and was a subscriber to the weekly *Al Hilal* published by the leading Muslim intellectual Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, who later became the most prominent Congress Muslim.

After the war Ghaffar Khan's activities began to take a more political colour. In 1919 he was arrested for the first time but was released before long. He became involved in the Khilafat movement and in 1920 he even led a party of *muhajarins* (se Glossary) to Afghanistan. Very soon, however, he became convinced of the futility of the *Hijrat* and returned to the NWFP, where he resumed his educational acitivities. For this purpose he formed the *Anjuman Islah-ul-Afaghina* (Society for the Reform of the Afghans). As the name indicates the activities of the organisation aimed at reforming Pakhtun society but their teachings also had strong political, anti-British overtones. Abdul Ghaffar Khan had by this time been elected president of the Provincial Khilafat Committee and in connection with the suppression of the Khilafat movement on the Frontier he was again arrested in December 1921. He remained in jail till 1924. On being released he went on Haj to Mecca. In 1928 he started a Pashto journal, the *Pakhtun*, which became the mouthpiece of his movement. From 1929 on his life coincides so closely with the political history of the NWFP that no special account is needed here.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan has never published any systematic account of his political philosophy, which instead has to be pieced together from his innumerable speeches and articles published in the *Pakhtun*. His autobiography also gives a

[91] For Abdul Ghaffar Khan's early life, see Tendulkar pp. 13–65; Badshah Khan pp. 9–92.
[92] For the Haji of Turangzai, see below p. 60 f.

good insight into his thinking.[93] The best key to an understanding of his philosophy, however, is his life.

Ghaffar Khan, or Badshah Khan (the King Khan), as he is usually called by his followers, or again, Fakhr-i-Afghan (the Pride of the Afghans), which is his appellation in the *Pakhtun,* is not an intellectual. He is, as his son Ghani Khan stresses, "an instinctive man."[94] Moreover, he addresses himself to an overwhelmingly illiterate population. His speeches and writings are intended to move the masses, not to convince intellectuals. They are meant to make sense politically in specific political situations but were not conceived with a view to logical consistency. Often they are confused and contradictory, which his more sophisticated opponents have been quick to point out. Many an official has regarded Ghaffar Khan either as a simpleton or a hypocrite.[95] That is unfair. In fact, his political writings and activities have shown remarkable consistency over the years and his perspicacity has often been striking. Four main tenets have been present in his speeches, writings and activities ever since he reached his pre-eminent position in Frontier politics about 1930, namely: intense Pakhtun nationalism; moral and social reform; non-violence; Islam.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan addressed himself exclusively to the Pakhtuns but, as we have seen, the term 'Pakhtun' is not unequivocal. Ghaffar Khan used it in a very wide sense comprising all those living in Pakhtun society or even in the NWFP.[96] In this way he tried to solve the dilemma posed by the existence of non-Pakhtuns on the Frontier. Actually, a prominent feature of his teachings was his endeavour to bring the low status people into the movement. This leads us on to the second main point, social and moral reform.

Ghaffar Khan liked to look upon himself first and foremost as a moral and social reformer. He described his movement as a "moral and spiritual" one[97] and claimed that he did not desire political power. His only aim, he said, was to eradicate the ills of Pakhtun society.[98] His interest in education has already been mentioned. He also wished to exterminate poverty and all forms of oppression but was very vague as to how this was to be done. Generally speaking he seems to have believed it could be achieved by a moral uplift and by getting rid of the British. He particularly stressed that the Pakhtuns must give up their internecine factional struggles, which were exploited by the British.[99]

[93] Published under the name of Badshah Khan.

[94] Interview with Ghani Khan.

[95] In his diary (p. 258 f.) Lord Wavell described Abdul Ghaffar Khan thus: ". . . large, rugged, bearded, obviously hostile, silent, in rough Khadi which he wraps over his head at times, a stupid but obstinate man." Sir Olaf Caroe on one occasion called him "that idiot Abdul Ghaffar Khan" (*Extract from Report* . . . 22/2/47 from Caroe to Wavell IOL R/3/1/93) but in retrospect Caroe writes very highly of him (see Caroe Papers).

[96] See e.g., below p. 219.

[97] E.g., *Pakhtun* 17/10/45, 1/8/39.

[98] *Pakhtun* 24/4/47.

[99] *Pakhtun* 9/5/47, 24/7/46, 1/4/39, 1/8/39.

The strongest ideological influence on Ghaffar Khan was Gandhi. As a result, the doctrines preached by this vehement Pakhtun nationalist have very little in common with the martial traditions of the Pakhtuns. The most striking example is his belief in non-violence. Like Gandhi Ghaffar Khan believed in non-violence not only as a means but as a matter of principle. Of the leading men in the AINC no-one was closer to Gandhi in his political creed, nor was anyone else's political profile so similar to Gandhi's. Outside the NWFP he was also known as "Frontier Gandhi."[100]

One of Ghaffar Khan's strongest sources of inspiration was Islam. He frequently used Islamic symbols and referred to Muslim tradition. He was, however, no theologian. There is no reason to doubt that he was a devout Muslim but his Islam appears to have been primarily of a practical political variety with little regard for orthodoxy.[101] He spoke in religious terms because he was himself a believer and because this idiom was understood by the people.

Although Ghaffar Khan spoke in a traditional religious idiom, he was essentially a "modernist." In politics he sided with the secular Congress, not with the Muslim League or any other communal organisation. It could be mentioned in this context that in Frontier society Islam could be a very effective force for "modernisation" in the Western sense. Islamic law was often much more modern and liberal than *riwaj*, the traditional tribal law.

This was Ghaffar Khan's doctrinal background. The strong resemblance to Gandhi has already been pointed out. The parallel is even more obvious if one looks at his political activities. Like Gandhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan was not only the philosopher of his movement but also its recognised leader, no matter what position he held in the organisation or even if he did not hold any official position at all. His relationship to the Frontier Congress had the same ambivalence as Gandhi's to the AINC. He left and re-joined the party according to its adherence to or departure from non-violence. But although he dissociated himself from the Congress on a number of occasions when it deviated from non-violence, he never repudiated it completely and was always prepared to throw his full weight behind it again, when for tactical reasons it returned to the path of non-violence.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan is one of the outstanding nationalist leaders in the subcontinent. His was the only Muslim nationalist movement with a mass following, which existed over a longer period of time. It was also the only Muslim mass movement, which consistently fought against British rule. Above all, Ghaffar Khan is a great nationalist in the sense that he tried and to some extent succeeded

[100] The following quote gives a good idea of the Gandhian influence on his thinking: "Gandhiji had the same respect for all religions, and he believed that they were all based on the same Truth. And that has always been my firm belief, too. I have studied both the Holy Koran and the Bhagavat Gita profoundly and reverently." Badshah Khan p. 194.

[101] In his autobiography p. 195 he says: "My religion is truth, love, and service to God and mankind."

in welding his divided people into a nation, which could act concertedly for common political and social goals.

Dr Khan Sahib

Ghaffar Khan did not take much interest in parliamentary activities. That side of politics he left to his elder brother Dr Khan Sahib, who was a very different man.[102] He was highly anglicised, he had an English degree and before World War I he had a medical practice in England. During the war he held a commission in the Indian Medical Service with which he served in France. After the war he came back to India with an English wife. He set up a practice at Peshawar but in 1931–32 he got involved in his brother's political activities. Thereafter he served for many years as the chief executive, so to speak, of his brother's movement.

Politically Dr Khan Sahib was more moderate and cautious than his brother. This difference between them should, however, not be exaggreated. The main significance of it—at least in our period—was that in times when the Congress worked constitutionally, Dr Khan Sahib was the most suitable leader and thus he came to the forefront. When the Congress stressed its revolutionary side, Ghaffar Khan dominated. In this way, the Khan brothers, as they were called, together dominated Frontier politics for many years.

The Rise of the Khudai Khidmatgars

In September 1929 Abdul Ghaffar Khan formed an organisation called the *Afghan Jirga*. The aims of the organisation were complete independence for India, Hindu-Muslim unity and reform of Pakhtun society. It soon gained large numbers of adherents in the rural areas around Peshawar. *Jirgas* owing allegiance to the Afghan Jirga were set up in almost all villages in Peshawar district and in several places in other districts. These *jirgas* were linked together through a network of *jirgas* for areas, *tappas* and the districts. At the top was the *Loi Jirga* for the whole province. Side by side with this was set up another organisation, the *Khudai Khidmatgars*, the "Servants of God", who were organised on quasi-military lines. In theory they were supposed to be subordinated to the Afghan Jirga but it is not quite clear how the two organisations were co-ordinated. Soon the Khudai Khidmatgars overshadowed the Afghan Jirga. The Khudai Khidmatgars wore uniforms dyed with red brick dust and were therefore dubbed "Red Shirts" by the British.[103]

The foundation of these organisations must be seen in the light of the all-India

[102] For a portrait of Dr Khan Sahib, see Desai *passim*.

[103] For the rise of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement and civil disobedience on the Frontier in 1930–32, see Rittenberg pp. 78–138; also Spain 1963 pp. 165–169; Brown 1977 pp. 109–111, 215, 266 f., 298.

situation toward the end of the 1920s. At the annual session of the Congress held in Calcutta in December 1928, it was decided that if by the end of 1929 the British had not accepted Dominion status for India, the Congress would demand complete independence. At the next year's session, held in December in Lahore, the demand for complete independence was adopted as the official policy of the AINC. The All-India Congress Committee was authorised to launch a civil disobedience campaign.[104]

Among those attending the Calcutta and Lahore sessions was Abdul Ghaffar Khan. In 1928 he attended in his capacity as a member of the Frontier Province Congress Committee (FPCC) and in 1929 as its vice president. When he returned to the NWFP after the Lahore session, he started making preparations for the civil disobedience campaign on the Frontier. He found a ready audience among a population hard hit not only by the depression and falling agricultural prices but also by a significantly increased revenue demand.

Civil disobedience in the NWFP was scheduled to start on 23rd April 1930 in connection with the opening of a Congress enquiry into the functioning of the Frontier Crimes Regulation. The members of the enquiry committee were, however, barred from entering the province and a number of Peshawar politicians were arrested. This led to serious rioting in Peshawar City and in the outlying parts of the district the Khudai Khidmatgars showed themselves restive. The government responded by arresting Abdul Ghaffar Khan and some of his associates but the agitation and violence continued. For more than a week the government lost control over Peshawar City. The unrest also spread to the other districts and into the tribal areas. In June members of an Afridi *lashkar* even attacked Peshawar Cantonment and in August the Afridis once more tried to invade Peshawar district. It was only after martial law had been imposed over the whole Frontier and the army units available had been reinforced from other provinces that the situation was brought under control by the government.

As we have seen, the agitation on the Frontier was closely connected with the civil disobedience campaign of the AINC but the *Afghan Jirga* and the Khudai Khidmatgars were not as yet members of the AINC. In August 1931, however, they became formally affiliated with the Congress.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan had been released from jail in March the same year. He resumed his agitation and by the end of the year the situation had become so grave that the British found themselves forced to stop him. The entire Frontier Congress was banned and the Khan brothers were imprisoned. The disturbances continued through January 1932 and in the areas around Pesahwar until April. Several thousand Khudai Khidmatgars were arrested. For the next few years the movement remained suppressed.

[104] Menon p. 36 f.

It was in the struggles of 1930–32 that Abdul Ghaffar Khan's nationalist movement took more definite shape. Ideologically the movement was perhaps primarily influenced by Abdul Ghaffar Khan himself but the conditions and experiences of these early years also left their mark on it. It was first and foremost concerned with the political emancipation of the Pakhtuns and it has ever since been confined to the Pakhtun areas. Non-violence was preached but not always practised. The resistance to the British in these years had to a considerable extent taken the form of a tax strike. In the following years the demand for a decrease of the land revenue assessment figured prominently but vaguely on the organisation's platform. The movement also became vehemently opposed to the big khans, who had given support to the British. This conflict with the big khans was interpreted by many tenants and *kamins* as presaging a redistribution of the land of the khans. In this way the organisation received a radical and even revolutionary image. The rank and file were largely tenants and *kamins* but the leaders were mainly small khans. Thus there was a latent conflict of interests between the leaders and their followers. The Khudai Khidmatgars never developed any clear social and economic programme. Independence was the important thing. Only when they had won freedom would the Pakhtuns be able to tackle their other problems effectively. The Khudai Khidmatgars drew their inspiration largely from Islam but in these years an alliance was cemented between their leaders and the Hindu-dominated Congress. From now on the NWFP served as a vindication of the Congress' claim to be a secular, all-Indian organisation with support from both the main communities of the country.

Constitutional Developments

As already mentioned, the British were very reluctant to introduce political reforms in the NWFP owing to their all-pervading concern for security. Thus the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918, while recommending constitutional reforms in other provinces, contended that the Government of India could not loosen its grip on the Frontier and that representative government was therefore out of the question in the NWFP. Instead the report suggested that some kind of advisory council be set up. In the event, however, not even this recommendation was acted upon and the Government of India Act of 1919 did not entail any change for the NWFP.[105]

The Statutory Commission on constitutional reform, the so-called Simon Commission, which was appointed in 1927 and completed its work in 1929, was also chary of constitutional changes in the NWFP. The only reform envisaged in the commission's report was an indirectly elected council with powers of taxation and voting expenditure.

[105] For a summary of the constitutional history of the NWFP up to 1932, see *Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province* 1932/33 pp. V–VIII.

The British refusal to grant representative government to the NWFP received strong support from the Hindus and Sikhs of the province, who were afraid of becoming victims of a permanent Muslim majority.[106]

The unrest on the Frontier in 1930–32, however, made it clear to the British that some drastic measure was necessary and in 1932 the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were extended in their entirety to the NWFP. Instead of a chief commissioner the province now got a governor as head of the government and a legislative council with forty members was set up. The responsibility for the so-called transferred subjects, such as education, public health and local self-government, were entrusted to a minister responsible to the legislative council. Subjects such as law and order, finance and land revenue were administered by an official responsible only to the governor.

The Government of India Act of 1935 had two main parts.[107] The first was intended to provide for the creation of an all-India federation including not only British India but also the princely states. However, the princes refused to join this federation and thus the first part of the new constitution never came into force. The second main part concerned the government of the British Indian provinces. For the first time the NWFP was treated in the same way as the other provinces. This part of the constitution, which came into operation in 1937, created an entirely new political situation in British India.

Under the new constitution the government of the provinces was placed in the hands of ministries responsible only to the provincial legislatures. These legislatures were elected on a relatively wide franchise and could therefore be expected to be reasonably representative of public opinion. However, the govenors retained vaguely defined overriding powers. A governor could for instance overrule his ministers if he considered there existed a serious threat to peace and tranquillity. He also had special powers to protect the interests of ethnic and religious minorities. Finally, if a situation should arise in which it was impossible to carry on government along normal lines he could under section 93 of the Act with the consent of the Governor-General abrogate the legislature and instead assume all responsibilities himself.

The legislature, which was set up in the NWFP, had fifty seats. There were nine General seats (i.e., for all practical purposes Hindu seats) and three Sikh seats. Thus the minorities were rather strongly overrepresented, having almost one quarter of the seats in the provincial assembly, whereas they constituted less than 10 per cent of the total population. The big landlords were another overrepresented group with two special Landholders' seats. However, the majority of the Members of the legislative assembly (MLAs), in all thirty-three, represented Muslim Rural constituencies. The remaining three MLAs came from Muslim Urban constituencies.

[106] Rittenberg pp. 71–78.

[107] For a summary of the *Government of India Act* of 1935, see Menon pp. 50–53.

In addition to age and residence the franchise qualifications were based on taxation, rights in property, education and service in the armed forces.[108] Women were not excluded from the franchise because of their sex but very few met the qualifications. Thus the electorate consisted overwhelmingly of men. In 1937 the total number of men enjoying the vote corresponded perhaps to between 40 and 50 per cent of the total adult male population.[109]

Political Elite Groups and Modes of Political Mobilisation

Rural Politics

Faction, tribe and class

The introduction of the 1935 Government of India Act meant that the political conditions in the NWFP were drastically altered. Owing to the wide franchise all politicians now had to seek mass support. From amongst those who were elected to the legislative assembly would be appointed a ministry with almost complete authority over the province. We must therefore now examine how mass support could be mobilised and what implications the modes of political mobilisation had for the contents of politics and the policies which could be pursued.

The basic units in rural politics in this part of the world still remain the village factions. Alavi writes:

> Political parties, which might identify with particular groups in the rural society, articulating their interests in opposition to those of other groups, do not operate at the village level. The pervasive mode of politics at the village level is a factional one, rather than one based on interest groups.[110]

A typical village faction consists of a landlord acting as patron for his clients, who are mostly labourers of his, tenants or people in some other position of dependence on him. The patron gives his protection to the clients, who in return give him political support.[111] It should be stressed that in Frontier society in the period under review this relationship was always, at least to some extent, based on voluntary association. A person of low status could choose his patron and was not born to life-long dependence on a particular khan. Admittedly, a poor tenant's

[108] *Government of India Act* of 1935 Part XIV Sixth Schedule.

[109] The franchise covered about ten per cent of the total population but more than half the total population were under twenty years of age. As very few women were enfranchised, the figure 40–50 per cent of the total male population seems a reasonable estimate of the enfranchised adult male population.

[110] Alavi 1971 p. 112.

[111] There exists a large body of literature on patrons and clients and the factions they form. For good summaries, see Kaufmann *passim* and Alavi 1973 p. 43 ff.

freedom of choice was very limited but he was no serf.[112] Moreover, the largest group in Frontier society were the cultivating proprietors. Thus the factional leaders, *i.e.*, the khans, had to compete for followers.

In a society, where political mobilisation takes place on the basis of factions, political cleavages run *across* class lines, not along them. Normally all factions represent similar configurations of people and interests. In consequence politics in such societies is usually highly conservative. The factions and alliances of factions, which are formed, do not strive to alter existing conditions. Instead they "fight for control over resources, power and status within the existing framework of society." Political parties are often nothing more than alliances of factions. In spite of their rhetoric about class, nation, programmes and policies, they have essentially the same characteristics as the factions themselves. They do not aim at any transformation of society but at acquiring as much as possible for themselves of what is available in the existing society.[113]

A corollary of this is that politics in such societies is often very corrupt. The parties are kept together not by common goals but by patronage. They strive for political power in order to place the resources of the state at the disposal of those groups, which make up the party.[114]

The Pakhtuns are notorious for their factionalism, or *parajamba,* as they call it themselves. Their feuds go on for generations and with each new generation new disputes arise. The causes of these feuds vary greatly. According to a local proverb, they all concern either *zar, zan* or *zamin,* i.e., gold, women or land. In the final analysis, all disputes of political significance concern power.

In this context the "vital aspect of Pathan social organisation and political behaviour"[115] known as *tarburwali* must be mentioned. The word signifies rivalry between close agnatic relatives. *Tarbur* really means 'cousin', father's brother's son, to be more exact, and *tarburwali* roughly the 'code of the cousin' but the terms have also come to mean 'traditional rival' and 'traditional rivalry'. Such rivalries often concern the inheritance of land or the leadership of a prominent family. *Tarburwali* plays a pivotal role in Pakhtun politics. It exists in the Pakhtun tribal society as well as in the feudal conditions of the settled districts. In the tribal society *tarburs* will seek allies at the higher levels of the tribal organisation, so that the pettiest dispute can get involved in disputes of international significance. Ahmed relates a case involving two agnatic rivals, who allied themselves with two different cousins, who in their turn were involved in a rivalry involving a wider tribal segment. This conflict got entangled with a religious dispute, which almost triggered off a *jehad* from Afghan territory. An international crisis was avoided

[112] Cf. Barth pp. 71–91.
[113] Alavi 1973 p. 44.
[114] See e.g., Scott *passim.*
[115] Ahmed 1976 p. 43 f. The role of *tarburwali* is a main theme in Ahmed 1980. See also Spain p. 109 f.



Figure 3. Levels of tribal conflict. From Ahmed 1980 p. 73.

only through intense diplomatic activities.[116] In this way the loyalties based on the tribal segmentation became entangled with international politics as illustrated by Figure 3.

In the period under review here, *tarburwali* became intermingled with party politics. In order to strengthen his local position a khan would often join a political party and bring his faction with him. If he joined the Congress, his local rival would join the Muslim League, and vice versa. Thus a khan's political affiliation—and that of his followers—often had very little to do with the cause he supported.

Although the village and other local factions constituted the atoms of rural politics, lineage loyalties remained strong and continued to play an important part, particularly during elections. The factions were strongly local in character and in order to widen his support over the whole constituency a candidate would often make his appeal to the people on the basis of tribe, clan etc.

Finally, class loyalties were also beginning to assume significance. As we have seen, there was in many parts strong resentment among the lower classes against the big landlords, who had become mere rent-receivers with little interest in the land or in the welfare of their dependents. This gave the Khudai Khidmatgars and other groups an opportunity to appeal to tenants and *kamins* on an anti-landlord basis.

[116] Ahmed 1980 p. 72 ff. Figure 3 reproduced by courtesy of Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.

The relations between landlords and tenants were particularly tense in Peshawar and Mardan districts. The class differences here were also aggravated by tribal divisions. In the Charsadda *tahsil* the landlords were mostly Mohammadzai Pakhtuns. In addition to the old tenants, who were mostly Awans, Gujars and Kashmiris, there was a substantial number of Mohmand Pakhtuns, who had come from the adjoining tribal territory to work as tenants on the newly irrigated land in the settled areas. The Mohammadzai khans tended to look upon these Mohmand tenants as ordinary *kamins* and expected them to render the traditional services of *kamins* to Pakhtun landowners. This was resented by the Mohmand tenants.The result was that in many villages there prevailed an atmosphere of strong antagonism between Mohammadzais and Mohmands.[117]

Religious leaders

There exist in Frontier society three overlapping but clearly discernible main groups of religious leaders. First there are the mullahs. The term 'mullah' can be used comprehensively for all categories of religious leaders but in a narrower sense it refers to the ordinary village mullahs, who lead the prayers in the village mosques and are in charge of the other day-to-day religious functions of the villages, such as *rites de passage*. The position is largely hereditary and requires little if any religious learning. The influence of such a mullah is usually confined to the village in which he is active. Secondly there are the *maulanas* or *maulvis, i.e.,* men who have received some formal theological training from a recognised teacher or seminary. By virtue of this they usually have a wider political outlook and wider contacts than the ordinary mullahs. In consequence their influence extends over larger areas. Finally there is the group of religious leaders, who are usually termed "saints" in English.[118] Of the three groups, the "saints" played the most important political role in the period under review here.

The role of such "saints" cannot be understood without reference to *sufism.* This mystic tradition in Islam is spread all over the Muslim world but is particularly prevalent in the Indian subcontinent. It is difficult to define what *sufism* really is and what is really *sufic,* nor is it easy to sum up its basic features. There exists a large variety of different *sufic* groups and traditions. Some are characterised by piety and devotion, others by the crudest forms of superstition. There is no dogma. Emphasis is on love rather than fear of God. In the following we shall confine ourselves to the features which are most relevant to the subject of this study.[119]

[117] Wylie 1926 (a) p. 19.

[118] Rittenberg pp. 40–48; Nyrop *et al.* pp. 136–143.

[119] For *Sufism* in general and in the subcontinent in particular, see Mujeeb pp. 113–167; 283–315; Ahmed 1976 pp. 84–89; Gilmartin pp. 485–493. A colourful description of the "saints" along the Indus is given by O'Brien.

First there is the belief that ordinary men need an intermediary between themselves and God. These intermediaries are men, who have been recognised as possessing special religious merit. In addition to being intermediaries between God and men, they also function as preceptors of those who choose to follow them. Among anthropologists these preceptors are often called "saints" although the term can be very misleading. A usual comprehensive term used in the Muslim world is *sajjada nashin*. Their followers are mostly called *murids*. The status of "sainthood" is largely hereditary, dating from some ancestor several generations back, who by performing miracles, leading an austere, pious life or in some other similar way gained a reputation for possessing supernatural powers. When such a "founding saint" dies, his tomb or some other building connected with him becomes a shrine, where his followers can come and seek divine assistance even after his death, as his descendants are believed to inherit at least some of his religious merit. One of them is in charge of the original saint's shrine and performs the function of intermediary between God and the *murids* and acts as their religious preceptor. The other descendants, who are not in charge of the shrine or the activities connected with it, may command a measure of respect on account of their birth but otherwise have no special position.

On the Frontier there exist a large number of different categories of hereditary saints. The most important are the *sayyids, pirs, mians* and *sahibzadas*. *Sayyids* claim descent from the Prophet. The other three categories are descendants of men, who in their life-time acquired a reputation for saintliness. They have been listed here roughly in order of precedence.[120]

The influence of a saint can often extend over much wider areas than that of a khan, as it is not based primarily on land ownership. Moreover, many saints were considerable landowners. Often they had received land from their followers. Such gifts of land would sometimes be made in politically sensitive areas, where it was hoped the status of the recipient would exercise a calming influence. In this way their religious influence would often be strengthened by land ownership.[121]

The Pakhtun ethos is intensely Muslim but normally religious leaders play no significant separate role in Pakhtun politics.[122] In an overwhelmingly Muslim society religion is not politically divisive and thus of subordinate importance. But if a threat, whether real or imaginary, should arise to the Pakhtuns as Muslims, the situation is altogether different and Islam becomes of supreme importance. In such situations religious leaders have emerged as leaders of wide Pakhtun

[120] For the different categories of "saints" on the Frontier, see *NWF Province Gazetteers, Peshawar District 1931* Part A p. 155 f.

[121] Barth pp. 92–103.

[122] Barth and Ahmed 1976 have given different interpretations of the role of religious leaders. My own view owes rather more to the latter. I have also drawn on Rittenberg pp. 40–48.

alliances. Thanks to their status they have been able to transcend tribal and factional divisions. Two notable examples are Mullah Mastun—or the Mad Mullah, as the British called him—and Hadda Mullah, who led tribal risings against the British in 1897, the former in the Malakand agency and the latter among the Mohmands. These risings were millenarian in character and took the form of *jehads* against the infidels.[123] Another religious leader, who should be mentioned in this context, was Mullah Powindah, who from 1893 to his death in 1913 led the opposition against the British among the Mashuds.[124] The Faqir of Ipi, who played a similar role in North Waziristan in the period under review, has already been mentioned. All these leaders were reactionary in the sense that they fought for the old order and rejected the new one entirely.

A religious leader of particular interest to the student of Pakhtun nationalism was the Haji of Turangzai. His response to the challenge of western civilisation was different. He, too, fought the British with all available means but he was also dedicated to reform of his own society. Fazli Wahid, as his real name was, belonged to a family of hereditary religious leaders in the Charsadda *tahsil*, Peshawar district.[125] The year of his birth was probably 1858. He was himself a very pious man and was therefore held in great respect and was very influential in Peshawar district and the adjacent tribal territory. As a young man he went to Mohmand country, where he became a *murid* of Hadda Mullah and took part in the 1897 rising. In 1908 he returned to Charsadda. He possessed very little land in his own right but was given some near Turangzai village, where he erected a mosque. He soon got into trouble with the authorities and was jailed but was released again after some leading *maliks* had furnished security that he would not preach in an inflammatory style or leave Charsadda without permission. In the years preceding World War I he established a number of independent schools and tried to induce the villagers to boycott the government schools and instead attend his own—with little success, however. In these *azad* schools the main elements of the curriculum were Islamic learning and Pakhtun culture. The Haji himself was a poet of note in Pashto. As we have seen, one of the persons involved in these educational activities was Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Another prominent nationalist, Mian Jaffar Shah, in his youth attended what he called the "Haji of Turangzai's *madrasah*."[126]

[123] Ahmed 1976 p. 106. For Haddah Mullah, see also Baha 1978, p. 69. For Mullah Mastun, see also Miller pp. 265–270.

[124] For Mullah Powindah, see Baha 1978 p. 35 ff.; Spain 1963 pp. 176–179; Howell pp. 14–60; Miller pp. 294–300.

[125] For the Haji of Turangzai, see Rittenberg p. 57 f.; *List of Leading Mullahs on the Border of the North-West Frontier Province* corrected up to the 31st December, 1936, TARC File K.W. 443–S.F.R. (P); Spain 1963, p. 76, 95, 157 f.; 165 f.; 190; Tendulkar pp. 22, 25, 73, 153 f., 237; Baha 1978 pp. 97–99.

[126] Interview with Mian Jaffar Shah.

In 1915 the Haji of Turangzai suddenly left his home for the tribal areas, where he eventually settled among the Mohmands. There he preached *jehad* against the British and in the following years he was involved in several major and minor risings. Thus, for example, he played a prominent part when the Mohmands rose against the British in connection with the Third Afghan War. It could be mentioned that the Haji received an allowance from the Afghan government. In connection with the Red Shirt unrest in 1930 he raised a *lashkar* of 2000 men, which, however, did not achieve much.

Throughout this period he retained his influence in most of the villages of Peshawar district.

The Haji of Turangzai died on 15th December 1937. The Frontier Congress as well as the Muslim League held *hartals* in his honour.[127]

For most of the period under review here religious leaders played no distinct role in politics. Many were politically active but as a group they had no separate identity. By and large their political functions were subordinated to the interests of the khans and other groups. Western-educated people, as well as many traditional khans, tended to hold the entire "mullah class" in contempt. One prominent Muslim League leader, whom I interviewed, said of them that they were "good for propaganda purposes" but otherwise he called them "a marketable commodity."[128] It seems doubtful if mullahs were more venal than many others but the statement illustrates the fact that to begin with they had no special interests to safeguard and were therefore as a political group not very strongly motivated.

After World War II the situation changed drastically. The problem of Pakistan versus India came to the forefront of politics and this was a question with clear religious implications. As a result religious leaders became the most strongly motivated group in the province.

Urban Politics

The kind of politics and political formations we have discussed so far were found in rural areas rather than in urban centres. In the towns other groups dominated, namely the commercial and professional classes.

According to the 1931 Census, 16 per cent of the total population of the settled districts lived in urban centres. Low as the figure is, it may give an exaggerated impression of how far the urbanisation process had gone. The definition of the term 'town' was very broad and many places which had been classified as towns contained considerable numbers of people who were "agricultural in character."[129]

[127] FR II Dec. 1937.

[128] Interview with Anonymous IV.

[129] *Census of India, 1931* p. 43. For the towns and the urban population, see *op. cit.* pp. 40–51 and p. 193.

The towns of the NWFP were mostly trading centres, important market places, administrative centres and military cantonments. They were not industrial centres. Had it not been for the strategic importance attached to the province which caused the government to build up administrative and military points of support, the urban population would have been even less numerous.

The proportion of the urban population to the total was nearly stagnant. In 1881 it was 12 per cent, in 1911 it was 13 and in 1931 it had only risen to 16 per cent. The expansion which had taken place was due chiefly to government initiatives. Thus, for example, the population of Abbottabad and Bannu had more than trebled since 1881. In the case of Abbottabad the main reason was that the Judicial Commissioner's Court had been placed there. Another reason was that the provincial government moved there in the hot season. In the case of Bannu the growth was largely due to the fact that the town served as a basis for the military operations in Waziristan. The newcomers to the towns were mostly immigrants from the cis-Indus tracts, often Hindus and Sikhs. The indigenous population showed very little inclination to move to the towns.

There was very little industry in the province. In 1931 the largest registered factory in Peshawar district employed 223 workers. The others had between 10 and 100.[130] In the same year there was in Peshawar district, the most developed one in the province, no joint stock company.[131] I have no information about the other districts, but presumably the situation was the same there. Local banks were unwilling to invest in industry.[132] Most of their activities concerned trade. Indeed, the provincial bankers were often as much traders as they were bankers.[133]

The strongest force in the industrial sector (see Table 4), as well as in the urban economy at large, was the government. The best way to make a fortune was to become a government or army contractor.

The main communities, the Muslims on the one hand and the Hindus and Sikhs on the other, were more evenly matched in the towns than in the rural areas. A consequence of this was that communal feeling tended to run higher in the towns than in the country-side. To begin with this was not of too great political significance in the decade under study, as the communities were kept apart by the separate electorates. Thus, while there could be intense competition within the communities during elections, there was less scope for inter-communal rivalry. However, the Hindu-Sikh over-representation in the leading urban groups was potentially of great significance as a Muslim grievance.

[130] *NWF Province Gazetteers, Peshawar District, 1931* Part A p. 221.

[131] *Op. cit.* p. 191.

[132] *Banking Enquiry Committee Report* p. 351. They were equally uninterested in agricultural development.

[133] For the banking system of the province and its connections with trade and industry, see *Banking Enquiry Committee Report* pp. 267–270, 327, 349–357.

Table 4. Details of all factories in the NWFP registered in 1938 under the Indian Factories Act of 1934

Government and Local Fund Factories	Number
Electric generating stations	5
Printing press	1
Ordnance factories	5
Waterworks	1
Forage press	6
TOTAL	18
All Other Factories	
Cotton ginning and pressing (combined with rice husking, oil pressing and ice plants)	3
Ice factories	3
Printing presses	3
Marble polishing factory	1
Grain crushing factory	1
TOTAL	11

(*Source:* Annual Report of the Working of the Indian Factories Act in the North-West Frontier Province for the year 1938 p 1.)

Businessmen

There existed a good number of prosperous Muslim businessmen of various kinds in the province[134] but in politics they played no distinct role. Their share of the total Muslim population was so small that they were entirely overshadowed by the rural khans. Moreover, many of the Muslim businessmen had strong connections with landed interests.[135]

Among the Hindus and Sikhs the situation was different. They were a commercial community and politics among them was to a large extent dominated by businessmen.

Owing to the commercial community's dependence on the government there was a strong tendency among businessmen in politics to be loyal to the British. However, just as in rural politics, rivalry for local leadership rather than wider issues tended to be the decisive factor for people's party allegiance.[136]

[134] "In the North-West Frontier Province, money-lending, banking, and trade are not confined to the Hindus alone. Quite a large number of Muslims are in the banking line". *Banking Enquiry Committee Report* p. 349.

[135] See e.g., Malik Damsaz Khan in Apendix III under Bannu East Muslim Rural and Mian Jaffar Shah, Appendix II, Nowshera South Muslim Rural.

[136] See e.g., Peshawar Sikh Rural in Appendix III.

Professionals

Professional men were very few in number.[137] The most important group among them were the lawyers. They were more independent of the government than other urban groups and in consequence they tended to be radical and opposed to the government. Prior to 1930–31 urban lawyers had been prominent in the embryonic Frontier Congress but in the turmoil of those years they became unable to assert themselves and left the party. They continued their opposition to the government but unlike the Congress they acted within constitutional limits. In the legislative council, which was elected in 1932, the Azad Party, which consisted of lawyers, at least two of whom had been Congressites, became the official opposition.[138]

Government Servants

The senior Indian government servants had a very special position. Persons in government employ were barred by law from participation in politics but nothing prevented retired senior officials from going into politics. Although they were few in numbers, their influence was great. They were well educated and above all they had more experience of administration and public affairs than any other group. The fact that they had close ties with the British added further to their weight. Thus retired government servants were an important political group.

Far more important, however, were the active officials. In the absence of political institutions deputy commissioners, assistant commissioners and other executive officers had come to occupy a central place in local politics. They retained this position even after the introduction of reforms and people continued to look upon the district officers rather than the ministry as "the government" and as the bestowers of bounty on the loyal.[139]

So long as the British were firmly in the saddle, the political interests of the senior Indian government servants were closely linked to the government. However, when after World War II the British began preparing for withdrawal, the Indian officials could not hold aloof from politics any more. If we look at the civil service from a communal point of view, there were two features, which were

[137] According to *Census of India, 1931* p. 147 f., there were in all 246 "Lawyers of all kinds, including Qazis, law agents, and Mukhtiars" in the province, 1,372 "Registered medical practitioners" and 1,951 "Professors and teachers of all kinds."

[138] *Administration Report of the North-West Frontier Province 1932/33* p. 19; Gupta p. 32. These two were Malik Khuda Baksh and Pir Paksh (see the two Muslim Urban constituencies in Appendix II).

[139] "Go into any village and you will find that the average man, when he talks of the 'Government' or the 'Sarkar', still means the British power and still thinks of the police, the magistrate and the tahsildar as its visible embodiment." *The North-West Frontier Province.* Lecture given by Cunningham to the Royal Institute of International Affairs 13/6/46. Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/25.

to have far-reaching political consequences. Firstly, the Hindus were strongly over-represented, very strongly in some branches but less so in others. Secondly, in crucial branches and in the positions giving direct influence at the local level, the Muslim position was very strong.[140] Thus while the Muslims had a grievance, they had better opportunities to take advantage of their official positions.

Owing to their position in indigenous society or their knowledge of public affairs, these groups—the landlords, religous leaders, prosperous businessmen, professional men and government servants—were able to function as a form of mediators between the ordinary people and the government. This gave to them a pivotal role in provincial politics. It was above all on these groups that the politicians depended for support and the changing political positions of these groups were the decisive factors in provincial politics. Yet another group that could be mentioned in this context were the students, who toward the end of the period under review also emerged on the political scene.

[140] See Appendix I.

Chapter II

Provincial Politics on Local Terms: The Congress, 1937–39

The 1937 Elections

Both the Congress and the Muslim League, the only two parties with serious aspirations as all-India parties, gave the 1935 Act a hostile reception. The Muslim League denounced the safe-guards retained by the British but nevertheless decided to utilise the Act for what it was worth. At this stage the Muslim League was, however, in a semi-moribund condition, and it was really only the Congress that mattered. The Congress also condemned the Act but had difficulties in agreeing on a practical policy towards it. Some Congressites would have nothing to do with it at all, but the majority were for fighting the elections. That, however, raised the question what to do in case the party should win control over the provincial assemblies. Generally speaking the leaders at the centre were opposed to the Congress accepting office in the provinces, while the provincial leaders were in favour of office-acceptance. It was finally decided to contest the elections but to leave the question whether or not to take office until the results of the elections had become clear.[1]

In December 1936 the nominations of the candidates for the Frontier Legislative Assembly took place. In all 135 candidates were nominated.[2] They represented a good number of different more or less firmly established party formations, which in the end were reduced to basically five parties and groupings.

The largest and best organised party was the Congress. Formally the Congress was still banned in the North-West Frontier Province but the ban was no longer strictly enforced. However, in order to avoid any difficulties, which might arise as a result of the ban, the party fought the election under the name of the Provincial Parliamentary Board. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was still barred from entering the province and in his absence the party was led by his brother Dr Khan Sahib. An "extraordinarily efficient organisation was built up" with local Parliamentary Boards over the whole province in subdivisions, *tahsils* and in a few large villages.

[1] Tomlinson pp. 55–64.
[2] Governor's Report 12/1/37.

Members were well disciplined and, as the governor Sir Ralph Griffith had to admit, their "loyalty to their organization and its principles and their firm suppression of individual interests compel admiration". A first inkling of the party's strength was given in October 1936, when the Congress candidates swept the polls in the Peshawar District Board election.[3]

The Congress candidates were selected partly on the basis of loyalty to the nationalist cause and partly on the basis of their general standing in society. The latter consideration was particularly important in areas where the Congress position was weak.[4] In the Muslim Rural constituencies the Congress candidates were largely small khans. Most of the Congress candidates in the Muslim Urban and General constituencies were lawyers.[5]

The Congress election platform was contained in a manifesto issued by the Congress High Command. Its most striking feature was perhaps the interest displayed in agrarian reform. The Congress promised to sponsor measures to relieve the plight of the peasantry in general, to reduce rents and land taxes, impose a moratorium on debts and to exempt uneconomic holdings from all rents and land taxes. The Congress also promised to take measures to scale down rural indebtedness and to provide facilities for cheap credit.[6]

In the NWFP the Congress candidates conducted their campaigns on a somewhat vague programme. Generally speaking they followed the outlines of the High Command's manifesto.[7] At least some of them appear to have given rather wild promises of a fifty per cent reduction of the land revenue and the water rates.[8] Further, the Congress candidates promised they would raise the standards of living in the province by improving communications and building schools and hospitals. They claimed that they represented the poor, whereas their opponents represented the rich. They promised they would endeavour to reduce the salaries of senior government officials to Rs. 500 *per mensem*. They criticised the ad-

[3] Governor's Report 9/11/36.

[4] For the Mardan municipal elections in February 1936 the Congress had only nominated candidates with strong nationalist credentials. All these candidates were defeated. Therefore this principle was abandoned in the Peshawar district board elections in October the same year. Instead traditionally influential men were given preference, wherever the Congress was weak. The result was that the Congress won twenty-eight out of thirty-five seats. The implications were clear and the Congress took the consequences. Rittenberg p. 210. Actually, the High Command had for financial reasons also suggested to provincial branches to select only such candidates as could be expected to bear their own election expenses. See Tomlinson p. 82.

The question of the financial basis of the different provincial parties is hardly discussed at all in this work, as there exists very little evidence concerning it and whatever there is, is contradictory and questionable for other reasons. It is obvious, however, that the parties depended very largely on the individual politicians and their economic situation and that party finances were very much improvised.

[5] See Appendix II.

[6] Brecher p. 226.

[7] Interview with Mohammad Zarin Khan.

[8] *Tribune* 17/9/37.

ministration of justice and promised to repeal the laws which restricted political freedom and to see that justice was administered in a fair manner, if they came to power.[9]

In some constituencies specific local grievances were taken up. Thus, for example, in the two Teri constituencies in Kohat district the Congress candidates agitated against the Teri Dues Regulation, by which the people of the Teri *tahsil* were required to pay a number of special dues to the Nawab of Teri. These dues had been thoroughly unpopular for many years and were therefore an ideal target for the Congress propaganda.[10]

A large number of khans stood as Independents. The leading one among them was the Nawab of Hoti. Like his ancestors, the Nawab of Hoti, or to give his full name and title, Major Nawab Sir Akbar Khan, was intensely loyal to the British. During World War I he had seen active service in Palestine and had become the first Indian to command a battalion. He was widely read and had the best library in the province. Sir Olaf Caroe wrote about the nawab that he "was no statesman"[11] and "unbalanced in many ways". Nevertheless he carried "a good deal of respect all round and is admitted on all hands to be the one real Khan left on the Frontier with respect for his traditions and an independent point of view."[12] He was "ultra-conservative . . . and a preserver of the land-owning tradition." He despised mullahs and hated the other leading anti-Congress politician, Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum, whom he regarded as the chief exemplar of the mullah class.[13]

Other prominent khans standing for election were the Nawab of Teri, K.B. Arbab Sher Ali Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan and Nawabzada Mohammad Said Khan.[14]

Most khans outside the Congress represented on the whole the same landed interests and the same ideology of loyalty to the British but they were unable to form any party of their own or to find some other form of cooperation during the election campaign. In several constituencies the Congress was able to benefit from the fact that the anti-Congress vote was split by rival khans.[15]

Another important loyalist group were the retired senior government servants. In this group Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum towered high above the others. He belonged to a priestly family of no special note but had made a distinguished

[9] Governor's Report 9/11/36 Enclosure.
[10] See Appendix II.
[11] Caroe Papers IOL MSS. Eur. C. 273/4.
[12] Governor's Report 9/9/46.
[13] Caroe Papers IOL MSS. Eur. C. 273/4; Caroe p. 426.
[14] For them, see Appendix II Teri North Muslim Rural, Dera Ismail Khan North Muslim Rural, Dera Ismail Khan South Muslim Rural and Tank Muslim Rural.
[15] Governor's Report 12/1/37, 22/2/37. See also Appendix II.

career in the Political Service ending up as political agent, Khyber. For many years he was the closest Pakhtun adviser to the British. Together with the Nawab of Hoti he had in the years 1919–1931 represented the NWFP in the Central Legislature as a nominated member. Unlike the Nawab of Hoti he had a distinctly modern outlook. Among other things he had together with the chief commissioner Sir George Roos-Keppel been responsible for the creation of Islamia College, the leading educational institution of the province, which was founded in 1911 on the principles of Aligarh. Sir Abdul Qaiyum had at an early stage pressed for constitutional reforms in the NWFP and was, in spite of his official position, opposed to the government's restrictive policy in this regard. He represented the NWFP at the Round Table Conference on constitutional reform in London in the early thirties, at which he spoke strongly in favour of reforms in his province. When the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were introduced on the Frontier, Sir Abdul Qaiyum became minister in charge of transferred subjects.[16] Sir Abdul Qaiyum was hated not only by the Nawab of Hoti but also by most other leading khans who in him saw an implacable enemy of their class.[17] He, in his turn, made no secret of his contempt for the big khans.[18]

The circles around Sir Abdul Qaiyum consisted mostly of officials or other persons with close ties to the government. Among those standing for election one could mention K.B. Kuli Khan, a retired publicity officer of the Frontier government, and K.B. Saadullah Khan, a retired deputy commissioner who was also a leading landlord in the Charsadda tahsil in Peshawar district.[19] Sir Abdul Qaiyum also enjoyed strong support from a number of khans in Hazara district.[20] In one constituency the leading khan stood down in his favour.[21]

The followers of Sir Abdul Qaiyum did not conduct any coordinated campaign, nor did they receive any support from their leader. Instead all of them had to shift for themselves.[22]

For a while it seemed as if the Congress success in the Peshawar district board election would bring the anti-Congress forces together and a rapprochement occurred between Sir Abdul Qaiyum and the Nawab of Hoti. Sir Abdul Qaiyum also saw some of the leading khans of Peshawar district and admitted to them that he had in the past under-valued their importance and promised he would look after their interests, if they would cooperate with him.[23] Very little or nothing came of this and the election campaign continued in the same manner as before.

[16] Caroe p. 424 ff.
[17] Governor's Report 12/1/37.
[18] Governor's Report 9/11/36 enclosure.
[19] For them, see Appendix II Teri South Muslim Rural and Peshawar Landholders.
[20] Governor's Report 9/11/36 enclosure.
[21] Appendix II Haripur South Muslim Rural.
[22] Governor's Report 9/11/36.
[23] Governor's Report 7/13/36.

Muslim politics in the towns was dominated by lawyers. The best known of them at this stage were Malik Khuda Baksh and Pir Baksh. They represented the Independent Party, which had been the only real opposition party in the old legislative council. Two other lawyers, who were later to rise to fame in Pakistani politics, were Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. At this time the former represented the Congress while the latter stood as an Independent.[24]

The Congress put up candidates in all General constituencies except one. Most of them were lawyers or doctors. Their main opponents belonged to the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party. This party was created during the election campaign by members of the provincial Hindu Sabha and the Sing Sabha. The leaders of the party were mostly prosperous businessmen, who were loyal to the British.[25] The chief plank in the party's propaganda was a demand for the cancellation of the so-called Hindu-Gurmukhi circular which had been issued by Sir Abdul Qaiyum two years earlier. This circular prescribed Urdu and Pashto as the media of instruction in girls' schools subsidised by the government. It was thus of very limited importance but had nevertheless aroused intensive communal feelings.[26]

Finally, it is noteworthy that there were no Muslim League candidates in the NWFP in these elections.

In Peshawar and Mardan districts party sympathies seem to have played a much more important part than elsewhere. According to the governor, the elections in these districts were a straight fight between the Congress and its opponents, irrespective of candidates. Elsewhere programmes and policies were of little or no importance and instead traditional following and factional considerations were usually decisive.[27]

Many candidates, within as well as without the Congress, exploited religious factors. Anti-Congress candidates accused the Congress members, particularly the Khan brothers and their families, of being under Hindu influence. In Bannu district fifteen *maulanas*, most of whom had previously been connected with the Congress, held a meeting at which a resolution was passed requesting all Muslims to keep away from the Congress as it was under the influence of the Hindu Mahasabha.[28] Under the name of *Jamiat-ul-Ulema Sarhad* another—or possibly the same—group of mullahs, who had formerly supported the Congress, without

[24] For them, see Appendix II.

[25] For the provincial Hindu Sabha and Singh Sabha, see Governor's Report 9/11/36 enclosure. For the members of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party and the Congress candidates in the General constituencies, see Appendix.

[26] FR II Feb. 1937; Governor's Report 22/2/37.

[27] Governor's Report 22/2/37.

[28] A translation of a statement issued by the participants in the meeting is found in TARC File 172–S.P.I.

stating their reasons changed sides and instead supported the leading khans. They issued *fatwas* condemning the Khan brothers for their alleged subservience to Hindus and their womenfolk for not observing *purdah*.[29] In his home constituency Sir Abdul Qaiyum distributed posters and pamphlets allegedly bearing the signatures of the local *ulema*, which declared that the Congress principles were opposed to Islam. Dr Khan Sahib was dubbed a Hindu. In another constituency anti-Congressites showed photographes of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's daughter as proof that the Khudai Khidmatgar leader had become irreligious. In yet another constituency the Congress candidate denounced all forms of law other than *Shariat* and branded his opponent a *kafir*, since the latter in his capacity as an Honorary Magistrate administered justice according to a different code of law.[30]

The election took place in the beginning of February 1937. With only a few exceptions they passed off peacefully.[31] The secrecy and freedom of the ballot were, however, very badly protected by the procedural arrangements. There was a rule which allowed the marking of a ballot paper of an illiterate voter to be witnessed by the polling agent of the candidate for whom the illiterate voter declared he wished to vote. Naturally this made a mockery of the secrecy of the ballot in very many cases and allowed the candidates to influence the voters by means fair and foul.[32] The elections are dealt with more in detail constituency by constituency in Appendix II. The results are shown in Table 5.

The Congress became the largest party but with 19 seats in an Assembly of fifty it was still far from an absolute majority. It was mainly in the Pakhtun rural areas that the Congress did well, notably in Peshawar and Mardan districts. Table 6 shows the distribution of the Muslim Rural seats by districts. In Peshawar district all Muslim Rural seats were won by the Congress, and in Mardan the Congress won three out of five. In the remaining two Mardan constituencies the Congress candidates had been disqualified, but the Congress soon captured these seats, too, by filing successful election petitions and then winning the by-elections. In the heavily non-Pakhtun district of Hazara the Congress did very badly, winning only two out of nine Muslim Urban seats.

The Congress position among the urban Muslims was very weak and no Congressite was returned from the Muslim Urban constituencies. These seats were instead won by Malik Khuda Baksh and Pir Baksh of the Independent Party and Abdur Rab Nishtar.

The General seats were evenly divided by the Congress and the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party. All Sikh seats went to the Hindu-Sikh nationalists.

[29] FR II Jan. 1937.
[30] FR I Jan. 1937.
[31] FR I Feb. 1937.
[32] FR II Feb. 1937.

Table 5. Results of the 1937 elections in the NWFP

Party	Total	Type of constituency					
		General Urban	General Rural	Muslim Urban	Muslim Rural	Sikh	Land-holders
Congress	19	1	3	–	15	–	–
Independent Muslims	21	–	–	1	18	–	2
Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party	7	1	3	–	–	3	–
Independent Party	2	–	–	2	–	–	–
Independent Hindu	1	1	–	–	–	–	–
TOTAL	50	3	6	3	33	3	2

(*Source:* Return Showing the Results of Elections in India 1937.)

Table 6. Results of the 1937 elections in the NWFP. Distribution of the Muslim Rural seats by districts

Party	District					
	Hazara	Mardan	Peshawar	Kohat	Bannu	D.I. Khan
Congress	2	3	7	1	1	1
Independents	7	2	–	3	3	3

(*Source:* Return Showing the Results of Elections in India 1937.)

The two leading anti-Congressites, Sir Abdul Qaiyum and the Nawab of Hoti, both suffered humiliating defeats. The former, however, had the consolation of winning in the Haripur South Muslim Rural constituency, which he had kept in reserve should he lose in his own rather uncertain home constituency, Utmannama in Mardan district.

The majority of the successful Muslim Independents were khans closely associated with the British.

Sir Abdul Qaiyum's Ministry

After the elections a rather confused situation arose. The Congress was the biggest party but did not command a majority. Moreover, the Congress High Command's position in regard to office acceptance was still unclear. The official position was that the Congress had participated in the elections only in order "to combat it [the 1935 Government of India Act] inside and outside the legislatures

so as to end it."[33] The other groups and parties were deeply divided and "jelaousies and feuds between individuals and families, mistrust between the khanate and the professional classes and lack of any great sense of public duty" prevented them from coming together.[34]

Sir Abdul Qaiyum soon formed a party in the assembly which was called the United Muslim Nationalist Party. Its proclaimed goal was, according to the press, "complete independence by all constitutional means"[35] but in reality it was only a patchwork of people with no common programme, who joined Sir Abdul Qaiyum for the sake of office and power.[36] As the party was far from having a majority, it had to find some partner for a coalition.[37]

With eight seats in the assembly the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party had a key position.[38] As long as the Congress refused to accept office a coalition with that party was out of the question. The idea of cooperating with Sir Abdul Qaiyum was not popular in the party because of the anti-Hindu inclinations he had shown in the past.[39]

Soon after the elections six Muslim MLAs from Hazara, i.e., all Muslims returned from that district except the two Congressites and Sir Abdul Qaiyum, formed a party of their own, called the Democratic Party. They issued a statement declaring that they would support any ministry in which their own leader was included.[40] The party's strength soon dwindled to four.[41] One of the losses was the leader, Mohammad Sarwar Khan, who was unseated through an election petition.[42]

It was widely believed that Dr Khan Sahib would in the end form a ministry, and the governor also thought that the Congress leader wanted to lead a Congress-dominated coalition.[43] The Hindu-Sikh Nationalist leader R.B. Mehr Chand Khanna approached Dr Khan Sahib and offered his support, which was accepted.[44] On 18th March the All-India Congress Committee announced that it

[33] Quoted in Menon p. 53.

[34] Governor's Report 8/3/37.

[35] FR II Feb. 1937.

[36] Interview with Sahibzada Mohammad Idris, who at this time was Sir Abdul Qaiyum's private secretary.

[37] In the beginning of March nine MLAs had promised to serve under Sir Abdul Qaiyum, if he should be appointed chief minister. Another eight had promised to join his party but would not commit themselves to support him as chief minister. Governor's Report 8/3/37.

[38] The Hindu Independent soon joined the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party thereby increasing the party's strength to eight.

[39] Governor's Report 8/3/37.

[40] FR II Feb. 1937; *Tribune* 9/3/37.

[41] Governor's Report 24/9/37.

[42] *NWFP Govt. Gazette* 29/4/38 Part I.

[43] Governor's Report 22/2/37.

[44] Statement by R.B. Mehr Chand Khanna *Tribune* 12/9/38. This statement was never denied by Dr Khan Sahib. Cf. also Governor's Report 22/2/37.

was prepared to allow the formation of Congress ministeries in case the governors guaranteed they would not use their powers to overrule the ministers. The governors in the Congress-dominated provinces, however, were not willing to give such an assurance.[45] To avoid a deadlock the British decided to delay the summoning of the provincial assemblies. Instead leading non-Congress politicians were invited to form ministries, which, it was hoped, would be able to gather enough strength to survive a session, when ultimately the assemblies had to be convened.[46]

In the NWFP this task was entrusted to Sir Abdul Qaiyum, who after a couple of weeks managed to form a coalition ministry. In this, however, he succeeded only thanks to the strong, active support he received from the new governor of the province, Sir George Cunningham.[47] On 12th March Cunningham saw Sir Abdul Qaiyum to discuss the situation. The latter informed him that he thought he would be able to form a ministry "but unless Government helped to keep it together in the future, it would probably split before long."[48] The following day Cunningham spoke "to Attai Khan and told him he must bring his Hazara party [presumably the Democratic Party] to heel."[49] Two days later Sir Abdul Qaiyum told the governor he believed his hand would be strengthened if he was officially offered to become chief minister. He said he was fairly sure of twenty-odd Muslim members but more doubtful of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalists, whose support he needed.[50] Next day Cunningham formally invited Sir Abdul Qaiyum to form a ministry.[51]

It was nevertheless difficult to bring together a working majority. After twelve days Cunningham saw the Hindu-Sikh Nationalists for two hours and the next day he had another meeting with them, which lasted for seven hours.[52] In the end he managed to make them agree to join a coalition under Sir Abdul Qaiyum on certain terms, which were highly advantageous to the Hindu and Sikh communities. The main points were: The Hindi-Gurmukhi Circular should be withdrawn; One Hindu-Sikh Nationalist should be included in the ministry and one should be appointed a Parliamentary Secretary; Grants to educational institutions should be maintained in their existing form, and no discrimination should be made against Hindu institutions; 25 per cent of the admissions to

[45] Menon p. 54.

[46] Keith p. 479 f.

[47] Sir George Cunningham (1888–1963) is generally regarded as one of the most successful British administrators on the Frontier, where he spent most of his service. In the four years immediately preceding his governorship he had as Member of the Executive Council of the province together with Sir Abdul Qaiyum borne the direct responsibility for the administration of the province and had thus been in close contact with provincial politics. For his life, see Mitchell *passim*.

[48] Cunningham's Diary 12/3/37 Cunningham Papers.

[49] *Op. cit.* 13/3/37.

[50] *Op. cit.* 15/3/37.

[51] *Op. cit.* 16/3/37.

[52] *Op. cit.* 28/3/37, 29/3/37.

technical and professional schools and colleges should be reserved for Hindus and Sikhs; 25 per cent of the appointments to the public services should be given to Hindus and Sikhs; No legislation affecting any special community should be introduced without the support of three quarters of the MLAs representing that community.[53]

A ministry was appointed on 1st April. It consisted of Sir Abdul Qaiyum (chief minister), R.B. Mehr Chand Khanna (finance minister), and K.B. Saadullah Khan (minister of agriculture). The finance minister had been elected by the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party as their representative[54] but Saadullah Khan was chosen by the governor himself.[55]

As soon as this ministry had been formed, a session of the legislative assembly was convened for the formalities of taking the oath of allegiance to the King-Emperor and for electing Speakers. The Congress tried to exploit this opportunity to embarrass the government. Cunningham was, however, on guard and did not allow any political questions to be discussed, thereby ensuring the survival of the ministry. Nevertheless it immediately became clear that the ministry's position was very weak. On the first day of the session, Dr Khan Sahib moved an adjournment motion to allow a discussion of the "interference of high Government officials" in the formation of the ministry. This motion was ruled out of order by the acting Speaker.[56] On the second day Dr Khan Sahib tabled a motion of no-confidence in the ministry but this motion, too, was disallowed by the acting Speaker.[57] Another Congress motion alleged that Cunningham had broken against his Instrument of Instructions, when the ministry was formed. That motion was disallowed by the governor himself.[58] One of the two representatives of the Independent Party, Malik Khuda Baksh, was unanimously elected Speaker[59] but for the post of Deputy Speaker the Opposition put up its own candidate, Mohammad Sarwar Khan, who defeated the ministry's nominee Malikur Rahman Kiyani, by as much as twenty-nine votes to nineteen.[60]

[53] *Tribune* 4/6/37; FR II March 1937.

[54] Cunningham's Diary 30/3/37 Cunningham Papers.

[55] "I saw KHUDA BAKSH and gave him a chance of being considered for the Ministry, but he refused... I saw the NAWAB of TERI and told him I couldn't ask him to become a Minister as he had so many ties at home (as proved by his frequent absence from sessions in the past) and did not know English well enough. ABDUL QAIYUM and SAADULLAH KHAN came in the afternoon, and I appointed them Ministers." Cunningham's Diary 30/3/37 Cunningham Papers. See also *op. cit.* 22/3/37. Saadullah Khan was chosen because he was the "only Muhammadan, apart from the Chief Minister, who knows anything about departmental work." Governor's Report 17/4/37.

[56] Governor's Report 17/4/37. The acting Speaker had been appointed by Cunningham. LAD I p. 1.

[57] LAD I p. 5 and 7.

[58] LAD I p. 7.

[59] LAD I p. 8.

[60] LAD I p. 13; Governor's Report 17/4/37.

From its first day the ministry thus had a very weak position and the Congress did what it could to undermine it even further. The four Democrats, who seem to have been prevailed upon to support the ministry by the governor, had not been given any ministership and therefore soon began to drift towards the Congress.[61] On 22nd June the Viceroy made a conciliatory statement, which the Congress High Command felt enabled them to allow Congress ministries to be formed in the provinces. Within a short time Congress ministries had taken office in six provinces.[62] This made the position of the Frontier ministry even weaker. Sir Abdul Qaiyum considered tendering his resignation without even facing the assembly, but encouraged by the governor he decided to battle on.[63]

Sir Abdul Qaiyum's ministry did not achieve much during its tenure of office, partly because it became very short-lived but also because of the passivity of the ministers. It appears as if they feared that any action on their part might alienate some of their following.[64] Only two of the measures taken by this ministry deserve mentioning. The first was the cancellation of the Hindi-Gurmukhi circular.[65] The other was to lift the ban on the Frontier Congress and to allow Abdul Ghaffar Khan to return to the NWFP.[66]

When the assembly met in September 1937, it had already been clear for some time that the ministry would not survive the session. A motion of no-confidence was passed against the ministry by twenty-seven votes to twenty-two. Among those voting for the motion were the four Democrats and two Hindu-Sikh Nationalists.[67]

The Congress Ministry

After the fall of Sir Abdul Qaiyum the Congress leader Dr Khan Sahib formed a coalition ministry. To be able to get a sufficient following he increased the number of ministers to four. The ministry included the following names: Dr Khan Sahib (chief minister), Lala Bhanju Ram Gandhi (finance minister), Qazi Attaullah Khan

[61] Governor's Report 9/6/37, 9/7/37.

[62] Menon p. 54 f.

[63] Governor's Report 9/7/37, 26/7/37, 7/8/37.

[64] Their inclination, wrote Cunningham, was "to avoid legislation of any kind as far as possible". Governor's Report 22/6/37.

[65] Governor's Report 9/7/37.

[66] The ban on the Congress had been imposed under the Public Transquillity Act of 1932. Under the same Act Abdul Ghaffar Khan was barred from entering the NWFP. The Act was valid only for five years and was due to expire in November 1937. The ministers did not believe they would be able to extend its validity and notice had already been given of a Bill aimed at repealing it even before its expiry. In this situation the ministers felt it would be better to lift all bans imposed under the Act on their own initiative rather than being forced to it. Governor's Report 23/8/37; FR II Aug. 1937.

[67] Governor's Report 6/9/37.

(minister of education), and Khan Mohammad Abbas Khan (minister for industries).The first three were Congressites while Khan Mohammad Khan belonged to the Democratic Party.[68]

Despite the Congress' long history of opposition and rebellion, good relations were right from the beginning established between the governor and his new ministers.[69] Dr Khan Sahib and Cunningham became personal friends. The ministers showed themselves to be cautious and moderate politicians and the Frontier Congress soon ceased to be the radical bugaboo it had once been to the British. Dr Khan Sahib came to be regarded as a guarantee for moderation, reason and stability and even his brother seemed to exercise a calming and moderating influence. Dr Khan Sahib, wrote Cunningham in July 1938, "has a remarkable grip over his party and with the assistance of his brother Abdul Ghaffar Khan exercises a welcome control over the wilder elements in the Red Shirt organisation."[70]

In official circles there had been fears that it would be difficult to work under Congress ministers. Many officials, particularly those who during the election campaign had openly shown their antipathy towards the Congress, were afraid they would be victimised. No such thing occurred and on the whole the ministers and the officials got on well together. In April 1938 the governor summed up the effect on the public services of seven months of Congress rule thus:

> when I compare the position as it is today with the prophecies of experienced Officers last August, when it was certain Congress were coming into power, I can only be thankful at the satisfactory turn things have taken. The relations between Ministers and Secretaries are excellent. Deputy Commissioners do not often come into personal contact with Ministers, but, here again, relations on the whole are very good.[71]

Although the position in the assembly was rather unstable in the next two years, the position of the Congress ministry was never seriously threatened. The dissensions that arose in the ministerial party were very mild compared to those within the opposition, which never managed to show a united front. Thus the ministers could devote themselves to the administration of the province in relative peace.

The Frontier Congress was above all a nationalist organisation aiming at the liberation of the country. However, as was inevitable, this question fell into the background after the assumption of office by the party.[72] In social and economic

[68] For a presentation of Lala Bhanju Ram Gandhi, Qazi Attaullah and Khan Mohammad Abbas Khan, see Appendix II Dera Ismail Khan General Rural, Bara Mohmands Muslim Rural and Manshera North Muslim Rural respectively.

[69] Governor's Report 24/9/37.

[70] Cunningham to Linlithgow 1/7/38 IOL R/3/1/45.

[71] Cunningham to Linlithgow 6/4/38 IOL R/3/1/45. See also Governor's Report 9/10/37, 23/10/37, 24/3/38, 20/4/39; Cunningham to Linlithgow 6/4/38 IOL R/3/1/45.

[72] A few measures of a vaguely nationalist character were introduced. Thus, for example, it was

questions it had a radical image but no clear programme. Congress propagandists spoke in general terms about improving the lot of the masses but were very vague as to how this was to be done. Generally speaking, the problem had been deferred pending the attainment of independence. The reason was, of course, the latent conflict which existed between the leaders, who were recruited from the landed class, and their largely landless followers. However, when the Congress took office, social and economic questions could no longer be ignored and a policy had to be devised which did not upset the balance in the party.

The programme carried through by the ministry could be described as mildly progressive. A considerable number of minor reforms were introduced, several of which were of substantial benefit to the poorer classes, but there were no far-reaching changes. The khans, particularly the big ones, were deprived of some of their old privilegies but this was not so much a question of victimising political enemies as of an overhaul of the existing system to do away with obsolete practices. These measures were mostly in line with the general administrative policy of the British and it is noteworthy that they usually had the support of the governor. Attacks on landed interests as such were firmly repulsed. At the same time the small khans in the Congress were often given preferential treatment as regarded land revenue remissions, arms licences, etc.[73]

Another notable feature of the Congress administration was that Muslims were favoured at the expense of Hindus. The fact that the communal divisions among the population to a large extent coincided with occupation meant that many reforms had communal implications. Under Sir Abdul Qaiyum the minorities had, in return for their support for the ministry, received ample guarantees that their interests would be protected, but the Congress Hindus were unable to safeguard Hindu interests in the Muslim-dominated Frontier Congress.

No exhaustive account of the Congress administration can be given here. Instead we shall concentrate on some of its most striking features and those which had wider political implications.

decided to introduce Pashto as the medium of instruction in schools situated in Pashto-speaking areas (*Khyber Mail* 9/1/38; *Pakhtun* 11/1/39; Badshah Khan p. 157 f.) but I have no information if anything came of this. A few measures were introduced in deference to religious feelings, such as the introduction of prohibition in Dera Ismail Khan district (Act XXIV of 1939).

[73] Cunningham to Linlithgow 19/11/41; also notes by Cunningham called *North-West Frontier Province. Changes under the Section 93 regime*, and *Summary*. All these documents are found in IOL L/P&J/8/588. It is noteworthy, however, that it was only long after the Congress had left office that Cunningham commented on the ministry's partiality. When the Congress was still in power, he did not attach much significance to these practices, so presumably they cannot have been on too large a scale.

Provincial Finances

The Congress budgets did not differ materially from those of previous years. The receipts increased only insignificantly.[74] In consequence the scope for reform was very limited.

The main source of income was the subsidy from the Government of India, which amounted to Rs. 10,000,000 per annum, i.e., between two thirds and half of the annual receipts in the years 1937–39. On a number of occasions the ministry requested the central government for an increase but without result.

The second largest item of receipts was the land revenue. As the Congress had pledged itself to a decrease of the land revenue, no expansion was possible under this heading and instead the receipts fell somewhat. This decrease was partly due to deliberate remissions but also to difficulties in realising the land revenue.

The Congress tapped very few new sources of taxation.[75] The budgets were on the whole balanced and to finance their reforms the ministers thus had to resort to retrenchments. In pursuance of the Congress' election programme, the ministerial salaries were reduced from Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 500 *per mensem*.[76] The Speaker's and Deputy Speaker's salaries were similarly reduced.[77] A number of other minor cuts were made[78] but the sums that were saved in these ways were far too small to allow any major reforms.

Economic Reform

Agriculturist Debtors' Relief Act

The most ambitious Act passed in these years was the Agriculturist Debtors' Relief Act. This Act provided for the discharge of usurious loans and limited the rates of interest chargeable by money-lenders. Further, all interests on loans taken by agriculturists, which were outstanding on 1st October 1937, were cancelled and only the principal remained payable. Finally all arrears of rent, which had accured before 1st October 1937, were under this Act to be regarded as discharged.[79]

[74] Where not otherwise indicated, the following paragraphs are based on the appendices enclosed with Cunningham to Laithwaite 20/11/41 IOL R/3/1/49.

[75] One new tax imposed by the Congress ministry was that on entertainment (the Entertainment Duty Act, Act XI of 1937) and another was that on tobacco (the Tobacco Vend Fees Act, Act II of 1938). Neither of these was really a Congress measure, as they had been planned by Sir Abdul Qaiyum's ministry. On their own initiative the Congress ministers introduced a tax on motor spirit (Act XII of 1939) and table water (Act XIX of 1939). The latter was introduced to compensate for the losses caused by the introduction of prohibition but it seems doubtful if the sums realised under this Act could make up for the loss of alcohol accises.

[76] Act VII of 1937.

[77] Act IX of 1937.

[78] Such as the abolition of *zaildars* and *inams*, which is discussed below p. 88 f.

[79] Act IV of 1939.

For the purposes of the Act the term 'agriculturist' was defined in such a way as to leave a large number of big landlords, perhaps in all about seven hundred, out of the purview of the Act.[80] This meant that the Act hit them quite hard, as they still had to pay their debts and their share of the land revenue, while the arrears of rent payable to them were cancelled. Moreover, if they were engaged in money-lending, they lost a good deal of the outstanding interest. So far as the rest of the landlord class was concerned, the cancellation of arrears of rent of course affected them adversely but on the other hand they benefited from the provisions cancelling debts. It seems probable that for them the advantages outweighed the disadvantages.[81]

For the money-lenders the Act entailed only disadvantages. As they were primarily Hindus, the reaction to the Bill was largely on communal lines. After being introduced in the Assembly the Bill was first circulated to elicit public opinion.[82] The Hindus of Peshawar put up "opposition to the best of their ability and [made] the position of the Congress M.L.As. of their community very difficult." According to Cunningham, the Hindu finance minister Bhanju Ram Gandhi wrote privately to Congress head-quarters soliciting advice how he should act as leader of the Hindus.[83]

When the Bill came up for consideration in the assembly, it was referred to a select committee. The two Hindu members, who both belonged to the Congress, refused to sign the report of the committee and submitted a minute of dissent in which they contended that the Bill would not benefit the small peasants. Instead the result would be that money-lenders would be unwilling to lend and in the long run poor agriculturists would therefore be forced to sell their land to big landlords and in this way smallholders would increasingly be reduced to tenants.[84]

The Bill was passed by the assembly without any division[85] and thus the Congress Hindus were saved further embarrassment. The rump which still remained of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party staged a walk-out from the assembly.[86]

[80] An agriculturist was defined as "a person whose main source of livelihood is derived from agriculture or horticulture and whose land is not assessed to more than (a) Rs. 500 annual land revenue in case of Nehri Awal and Nehri Doem [two different qualities of privately irrigated land]; and (b) Rs. 200 in any other case." 137 persons paid Rs. 500 or more *per annum* in land revenue, and 406 paid Rs. 250 or more. (Qazi Attaullah in answer to question LAD IV p. 152). These figures do not include Dera Ismail Khan district, where the land was assessed to fluctuating revenue. Thus 700 seems a reasonable guess of the total number of people excluded from the purview of the Act.

[81] See below p. 114.

[82] LAD III p. 78.

[83] Governor's Report 23/7/38.

[84] *NWFP Govt. Gazette Extraordinary* 11/11/38.

[85] LAD IV p. 1096.

[86] LAD IV p. 1087.

The Agricultural Produce Markets Act

Another economic reform with communal implications was the Agricultural Produce Markets Act.[87] The aim of this Act was to give the agriculturists more influence over the marketing of their products and limit the control of middlemen over the markets. As the producers were almost entirely Muslims and the middlemen Hindus, this Act, too, was communally divisive and again the Congress Hindus were placed in a quandary while the three Hindu-Sikh Nationalists once more withdrew in protest from the assembly, when the Bill was about to be passed.[88]

The Teri Dues Regulation Act

One of the biggest landlords in the province was the Nawab of Teri. Among the economic privilegies enjoyed by him was the right to collect certain taxes known as *bua, tirni* and *haq taluqdari*. These dues antedated the British annexation but the British had in the Teri Dues Regulation confirmed the Nawab's right to collect them. *Bua* was a house tax payable by agriculturists, *tirni* was a grazing tax and *haq taluqdari* was a land tax.[89] The total sum realised under these titles by the nawab appears to have been quite considerable.[90] They were very unpopular and their abolition had been one of the chief planks in the Congress election campaign in the two Teri constituencies. In the spring session of the legislative assembly in 1938 the Congress Member for Teri North introduced a Bill to abolish these taxes. Thus the Bill did not belong to the official legislation but it was inspired by the ministry and for all practical purposes an official Bill.[91]

For political reasons the governor was opposed to the Bill, but he was not out of sympathy with its purport. *Bua* and *tirni* were in his opinion both out of date. In the past, district officers had proposed their abolition.[92] Cunningham also felt that the nawab himself was to blame for the Bill, as he had "hardly spent a penny on his own people."[93]

An argument arose between the ministers and the governor whether *bua, tirni* and *haq taluqdari* were part of the nawab's *jagir*, in which case their abolition was *ultra vires* of the provincial assembly, or if they were some other form of due. The ministers were of the latter opinion but the governor supported the former view

[87] Act XIV of 1939.

[88] LAD IV pp. 1097–1099, 1145–1166; LAD V pp. 84–121, 1354–1401, 1414–1448. It could perhaps be mentioned that no action seems to have been taken to implement the Act. See note called *Summary* dated 11/8/42 IOL L/P&J/8/588.

[89] Cunningham to Linlithgow 23/3/38 IOL R/3/1/45.

[90] For the Nawab of Teri's finances in the early twentieth century, see Barron p. 77 ff.

[91] *Report on Congress Government in NWFP.* Note by Cunningham 19/11/41 p. 3 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/18.

[92] *Ibid.*

[93] Cunningham to Linlithgow 23/3/38 IOL R/3/1/45.

and he therefore decided to withhold his assent to the Bill.[94] When he informed Dr Khan Sahib of his intention, the chief minister threatened to resign.[95] The prospect of the ministry's resignation worried Cunningham. On the one hand he was sure that no alternative ministry could be formed, and on the other he feared that if the ministry resigned, there would occur "a recrudescence of Red Shirt trouble."[96]

In the end a compromise was found. The governor had to admit that *bua* and *tirni* were not part of the nawab's *jagir* and they were abolished but *haq taluqdari* was retained.[97]

Law and Order

Up to 1937 hostility toward various "repressive laws" and the law-enforcing authorities were prominent features of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. However, when the Congress came into power, the attitude of the Frontier leaders changed drastically and heavy stress was laid on the maintenance of law and order. Immediately on their assumption of office Dr Khan Sahib and his colleagues held a meeting at which it was laid down that so far as law and order were concerned there was no difference between the Congress government and the previous ones. The same theme was developed by Congress speakers at public meetings.[98] Abdul Ghaffar Khan toured in villages telling the people to assist the police and not to indulge in crime.[99]

Whenever the police were criticised in the assembly, they were defended by Dr Khan Sahib.[100] Police reporters continued to attend public meetings and report what was said. The chief minister defended this practice as being absolutely essential.[101] In one respect, however, there was a change. Khudai Khidmatgars were encouraged by the their leaders to be present during police investigations to look after the interests of the suspects. This had the effect that police brutality decreased considerably.[102]

During the election campaign and throughout the summer of 1937 the Congress leaders promised that they would repeal all laws restricting political freedom, if they should come into power.[103] However, when they assumed office, they took a different line. A Repeal and Amending Bill designed to repeal a number of "repressive" laws was introduced in the autumn session of 1937 but

[94] *Ibid.*
[95] Telegram Cunningham to Linlithgow 6/5/38 IOL R/3/1/45.
[96] Governor's Report 11/5/38.
[97] Governor's Report 21/11/38.
[98] FR I Sept. 1937.
[99] Governor's Report 23/3/37, 23/11/37; FR II Nov. 1937.
[100] LAD IV p. 376; LAD V p. 894.
[101] LAD V p. 894.
[102] Interview with Askar Ali Shah, who at this time was a police officer.
[103] See above p. 68 f.; Governor's Report 26/7/37.

not by the ministry but by Abdur Rab Nishtar,[104] who was an Independent allied with the Congress. The governor was highly critical of the Bill and tried to persuade the chief minister to prevail on Abdur Rab Nishtar to withdraw it. Dr Khan Sahib agreed the Bill was a bad one but would not commit himself.[105] He spoke neither for nor against it in the assembly and the Bill was passed without a division.[106]

Cunningham decided to withhold his assent to the Bill. Before making his decision public he informed Dr Khan Sahib of it. The chief minister said the governor's refusal would cause him no embarrassment.[107] In July 1938 Cunningham passed orders withholding his assent to the Bill.[108] Several Congressites and Congress Committees publicly asked the ministry to resign[109] but Dr Khan Sahib did not protest at all against the governor's action. The only thing that happened was that Abdur Rab Nishtar in protest against the ministry's attitude severed his connection with the Congress.[110]

In spite of the ministry's determination to maintain law and order the incidence of crime rose sharply. (See Table 7.) A number of different explanations were put forward. One was that after the Congress came into power it became more difficult for the police to obtain information from the public. Common people lost a good deal of their respect for the police and were unwilling to give assistance. The leading khans had previously been an important source of information, but the ministry's attacks on them caused this source to dry up and the governor believed they "even stimulated a certain amount of actual lawlessness in protest." Another explanation put forward by the governor was that the coming into power of the Congress, an organisation which for years had been opposing the police, could not but "have an unsettling effect on the uneducated masses."[111] For our purposes, however, the most interesting explanation is that there was a connection between the rise in violent crime and the introduction of the new constitution. One indication of this connection was that the increase occurred in Hazara, Mardan and Peshawar districts, where people were most actively involved in politics. In Kohat district, which by and large remained politically dormant, the figures for crime fell.[112]

[104] LAD II p. 634.
[105] Cunningham to Linlithgow 11/1/38 IOL R/3/1/45.
[106] LAD III p. 160.
[107] Cunningham to Linlithgow 30/5/38 IOL R/3/1/45.
[108] Governor's Report 8/7/38.
[109] *Tribune* 7/8/38, 9/8/38.
[110] Governor's Report 15/8/38; *Tribune* 9/8/38.
[111] *North-West Frontier Province. Changes under the Section 93 regime* . . . IOL L/P&J/8/588. See also Cunningham to Linlithgow 19/11/41 IOL L/P&J/8/588.
[112] Cunningham to Linlithgow 27/7/39 IOL R/3/1/46. Statistics for crime are always difficult to interpret. Rising figures can for example be due to increased police efficiency or better routines of reporting. However, there is no doubt that these years were unusually troubled ones in the NWFP. See Spain 1963 p. 188.

Table 7. Statement showing the number of certain crimes committed in the NWFP in the years 1934–39

Year	Murders	Dacoities	Attempted murders
1934	514	48	336
1935	576	51	483
1936	558	45	569
1937	664	118	647
1938	702	131	838

(*Source:* LAD VI p. 423. Other sources give somewhat different figures but the trend is the same.)

The politically inspired crimes were largely of a communal nature. The Muslim League, which began to get a foot-hold in the NWFP in these years, sought popular support on a rather crude form of communal propaganda. Muslim League agitators used whatever material they could find to rouse the Muslims and party politics and communal violence became intermingled in a vicious circle.

One issue which was often brought up in Muslim League propaganda was the Shahidganj Mosque. This was a small historic mosque in Lahore situated on the grounds of a *gurdwara* (Sikh place of worship), which in 1936 was demolished with the approval of the government. This aroused intensive communal and anti-government feelings among the Muslims in Punjab as well as in the NWFP and was held up by Muslim agitators, including Khudai Khidmatgars, as proof of the government's anti-Muslim bias.[113] In the next few years the dispute flared up over and over again in various political contexts. Thus, for example, when in 1938 the communal situation in Mardan district worsened in connection with a by-election, one of the main issues was the Shahidganj mosque. It was proposed to celebrate a "Shahidganj Day" but the deputy commissioner imposed a ban on political meetings and the plans came to nothing. During the election campaign one Hindu and one Sikh were killed and another four Sikhs were wounded in a shooting incident in Mayar, a small village two miles from Mardan. The offenders were three young Muslims, one of whom was the son of the president of the Mardan District Muslim League. In spite of the fact that the killings occurred in the middle of the main bazaar in broad daylight, no-one gave chase to the murderers, who made good their escape. In the subsequent investigation no Muslim witnesses came forward. According to Cunningham, the crime was partly due to personal motives but the main reason was the Shahidganj agitation. Despite the Congress' previous opposition to collective fines and the entire Frontier Crimes Regulation, Dr Khan Sahib imposed a collective fine on Mayar under this regulation.[114]

[113] Spain 1963 p. 170; also Gilmartin p. 502 f.

[114] Governor's Report 23/2/38; FR I Feb. 1938; *Summary of events in NWFP.* Unsigned note by Cunningham, Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/17.

However, the situation only worsened. Public speeches became more and more virulent, and people began to carry arms at political meetings. Dr Khan Sahib had originally been opposed to arresting offensive speakers, as it would only give them undue publicity, but in the summer of 1939 he changed his mind. A communique was issued warning public speakers that if they used provocative language, they would be arrested.[115] This, however, had no effect. In August a serious incident occurred at Baffa in Hazara district, when a group of landlords held a meeting under the auspices of the Muslim League at the same time as the Congress held a meeting only a few hundered yards away. Both meetings "consisted entirely of abuse of the opposing party." A fight broke out and when the police tried to keep the two parties apart, they were stoned. After two unsuccessful *lathi*-charges, the police opened fire, killing one bystander.[116]

To check the communal and political violence the ministry had a *Goondas Bill* passed in the autumn session of 1939. This Bill was designed to give the authorities wider powers to deal with perpetrators and instigators of communal violence. A *goonda* was defined as a "hooligan, bully rouge or badmash [bad character] and a person who publicly uses foul, abusive or otherwise indecent language likely to cause a breach of peace between different sections of the public, and abettors thereto."[117] The judicial procedure prescribed by the Bill to deal with *goondas* was very drastic. Trial was to be held *in camera;* the accused was not to be representant by counsel; names of witnesses need not be disclosed; there would be no cross-examination; the judges were only to advise the provincial government, who would pass final orders; there would be no right of appeal. The punishment for those convicted of *goondaism* was expulsion from the province.[118]

The opposition parties were strongly opposed to the Bill.[119] The Muslim League staged a demonstration outside the Assembly Hall and a few Leaguers were arrested.[120] The governor was also very critical of the Bill. The definition of a *goonda* was too broad and would in his opinion give "the party in office unlimited powers for the exercise of political repression" and he therefore decided to withhold his assent to it. The Congress raised no objections. They were by then out of office and were probably relieved that the Bill could not be used against them.[121]

In the two southern districts, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, where Hindus and Sikhs were more numerous than elsewhere, the communal situation became particularly tense. In May 1938 a bomb epidemic broke out in Bannu City. There

[115] Governor's Report 9/6/39.
[116] Governor's Report 23/8/39.
[117] *NWFP Govt. Gazette* 6/10/39 Part VI. This is how the Bill read after it had been amended by a select committee.
[118] *Ibid*; also Governor's Report 9/10/39.
[119] Governor's Report 9/12/39.
[120] Aurangzeb Khan to Jinnah 6/10/39 QAP File 329.
[121] Governor's Report 9/12/39.

was a "complete lack of public support" for the police and the culprits remained unknown. The suspicions, however, fell primarily on Hindus, some of whom were connected with the extremist organisation Naujawan Bharat Sabha.[122] In February 1939 a quarrel over the slaughter of a cow in connection with the Muslim festival *Id-uz-Zuha* resulted in riots in Dera Ismail Khan. One person was killed and sixty-nine were wounded.[123]

Even more serious was that the smouldering war in Waziristan between the Faqir of Ipi and the government forces also spilt over into Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts. Raids from tribal territory grew dramatically in number and size. Many people were killed or kidnapped and scores of houses were burnt and sacked. Most of the victims were Hindus. Previously Hindus and Sikhs had as *hamsayas* of some khan often enjoyed his protection but by this time the relationship between *naibs* and *hamsayas* (protectors and protected) had largely broken down.[124]

The most serious raid took place in July 1938, when an outlaw by the name of Khalifa Mehr Dil, who was associated with the Faqir of Ipi, attacked Bannu City at the head of a gang of between three and four hundred men. A dozen Hindus were killed, twenty were wounded and a large part of the city was set on fire.[125] The authorities received no assistance to deal with the gang. On the contrary, Muslim villagers seemed to help the raiders and "speeches in mosques and meetings [were] little short of open incitement to the raiders to intensify their efforts."[126] Mehr Dil continued to harass Bannu district for several weeks but there was no other attack on a similar scale.[127]

[122] FR I and II May 1938.

[123] For these riots, see *Report on the Dera Ismail Khan Riot of the 2nd February 1939, passim.*

[124] For these troubles, see notes by Cunningham dated 27/10/38 and 20/6/39; Norwef to Foreign 21/10/40; note 28/1/40 and note of no date (No. 13). All these documents are found in Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/13.

Between 1925/26 and 1934/35 the total number of raids into the two districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan was was never more than ten a year. But from 1935/36 the figures were as in the table:

Year	Bannu	D.I. Khan	Total
1935/36	1	12	13
1936/37	11	2	13
1937/38	34	23	57
1938/39	45	20	65
1939/40	94	25	119
1940/41	71	27	98
1941/42	29	31	60

(*Source:* Memorandum by His Excellency the Viceroy on Frontier Policy Appendix III Linlithgow Papers IOL MSS. Eur. F. 125/168.)

[125] FR II July 1938.

[126] FR II Aug. 1938.

[127] FR I and II Aug., I and II Sept. 1938.

The communal implications of the raids into the settled districts posed a delicate problem for the Congress. As Hindus were the main sufferers, the Hindu Congressites on the Frontier demanded stronger action against the tribesmen.[128] Among the Muslims, on the other hand, sympathies for the raiders were widespread. The Congress could not very well condone the killing and kidnapping of innocent people but neither could it repudiate too strongly these anti-British activities, which were so popular among a large section of the Muslim community. Instead the Congress chose to put the blame on the British, who were even accused of having instigated the Bannu raid. At a Frontier Congress Conference, attended among others by all ministers except Dr Khan Sahib, the following resolution was adopted:

> That the Bannu raid was the outcome of a conspiracy to bring the Congress Ministry into disrepute, of promoting disunity between Hindus and Muslims, and of justifying the Government's policy in Waziristan [sic].[129]

Similar views were aired by Abdul Ghaffar Khan[130] and many other more or less responsible Congressites.[131] Dr Khan Sahib, however, took a very different line. During a visit to Bannu he condemned Mehr Dil squarely, abused those who had assisted this criminal, calling them *kafirs*, and told the leading mullahs that there could be no religious justification for this raiding and killing. He also sanctioned the imposition of collective fines on a number of villages, whose inhabitants were implicated in the raid.[132] In order to come to terms with the raiding problem the ministers subsequently decided to strengthen the police in Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts considerably, among other things by recruiting a special force of five hundred men.[133]

Modernising measures

The Congress ministry also introduced a number measures of a general modernising character. All these measures had the effect of depriving the khans of some of their privileges.

First among these measures one could mention the reforms of local govern-

[128] In the spring of 1939 the finance minister Lala Bhanju Ram told Cunningham that he was being pressed to resign in protest and that the Hindu Congressites in the assembly would support him if he did. Governor's Report 9/4/39. For Lala Bhanju Ram and his attitude towards the raids into Bannu district, see correspondence between him and Asaf Ali in AICC Papers File P 16(i)/1937.

[129] Governor's Report 23/8/38.

[130] Governor's Report 3/9/38; Pakhtun 11/9/38; *Tribune* 19/9/38.

[131] Note by Cunningham dated 20/6/39 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/13; *Bannu Raids Enquiry. Reports regarding the causes for the Bannu tribal uprising and the official responsibility for it, prepared by Asaf Ali on behalf of the A.I.C.C.* AICC Papers File 29/1938.

[132] Governor's Report 3/9/38.

[133] Governor's Report 20/4/39.

ment. The old system of nominating locally influential men and representatives of the minorities to district boards and municipal committees was abolished and instead all members had to be elected. Joint electorates were introduced for all communities but the government promised to devise some system which would ensure representation for the minorities, whereas the local notables lost their old privileges.[134]

In the NWFP there existed about thirty honorary magistrates, the great majority of whom were big khans. They disposed of a significant share of the cases which were brought to trial in the province[135] but soon after assuming office the Congress ministry withdrew all powers of honorary magistrates. The governor was not too concerned about this measure and agreed that some "Magistrates had in the past misused their position and such people could well be spared."[136]

Prior to the Congress administration there was no fixed system for recruitment to the provincial civil service. Instead government servants were recruited largely on the basis of origin and family influence. This practice was discontinued by the Congress ministry and instead a system based on competitive examinations was introduced. Cunningham was sure that this was a correct step and "that on the whole the abandonment of the old method of patronage . . . [would] be for the ultimate benefit of the province."[137]

Another similar measure was the abolition of *zaildars* and a large number of *inams*. A *zaildar's* duties lay mainly in the field of revenue collection and consisted largely in supervising the work of the *lambardars*, the semi-hereditary revenue collectors. *Zaildars* were also expected to keep an eye on other village officers.[138] There were comparatively few zaildars in the NWFP, in all seventy-two. The total sum paid to them was Rs. 15,516.[139] Thus the average *zaildar* received about Rs. 200 per annum.

An *inam* was a cash grant awarded by the government. Such a grant could be given on various grounds.[140] In the NWFP there existed about 700 *inams*, the great majority of which had been awarded for services connected with the collection of land revenue. A good number of *inams* had been granted for services con-

[134] Acts VI and VII of 1938; LAD IV p. 1027.

[135] In 1933, for example, they had disposed of 18 per cent of the cases brought to trial. A few of them had shown "remarkable activity". In Dera Ismail Khan district, on the other hand, they did so little work that it was difficult to justify their retention. *Report on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the North-West Frontier Province for the year 1933. Review by the Governor-in-Council* p. 3.

[136] *Summary of events in NWFP 1937–46*. Unsigned note by Cunningham n.d. p. 2; also Governor's Report 9/10/37.

[137] Governor's Report 24/1/38.

[138] Das p. 63 and p. 67 f.

[139] Cunningham to Linlithgow 19/4/40 IOL R/3/1/48.

[140] Das p. 64.

nected with trans-border affairs. The sums involved were not large. They varied from a few rupees to a few hundred rupees a year.[141]

Zaildars and *inamdars* were selected on the basis of loyalty to the government and influence in the villages. The *zaildari* and *inamdari* arrangements were normally overhauled only in connection with settlement operations but the provincial government was entitled to reconsider them at its own discretion.[142] In the Congress ministry's opinion the *zaildars* and *inamdars* served no useful purpose and were only an unnecessary expense and therefore they decided to abolish them altogether.[143]

The abolition of *zaildars* caused no problems. As already mentioned there were rather few of them in the NWFP. Cunningham agreed their duties had become more or less nominal and in the beginning of 1938 the office of *zaildar* was abolished.[144]

The question of the *inams* was not quite so simple. For security reasons the governor would not allow the abolition of *inams* which had been granted for trans-border services. As for the rest, he had to admit that they were enjoyed by people who rendered little useful service in return. Although he thought the measure "regrettable for many reasons" he allowed orders to be passed for the abolition of these *inams* in March 1939.[145]

Yet another measure which could be mentioned in this context was the abolition of the so-called *naubati chaukidari* system. Under this system villagers were required to take turns as night watchmen. The obligation to perform *naubati chaukidari* was highly unpopular among the villagers. The system was often abused by khans to exact private services from the night watchmen. Cunningham did not object to its abolition, as the chief minister promised it would be reimposed whereever the law and order situation deteriorated.[146]

The ministry also entertained plans to introduce a new system of revenue collection. Under the existing system the revenue was collected by *lambardars*, who also had some responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. The *lambardar* was usually the biggest landlord in each village and the position was of a semi-hereditary character. The ministers felt that the *lambardars* were opposed to them and this was, according to Cunningham, one of the reasons why they wanted to abolish the office. Another reason was that they wanted to increase efficiency and reduce corruption. Cunningham was strongly opposed to the idea as he did not believe that the alternatives which the ministers proposed, such as mak-

[141] LAD IV pp. 25–63 contains a list of all *inams* in the NWFP and the grounds on which they had been granted.

[142] Das p. 61.

[143] Cunningham to Linlithgow 19/4/38 IOL R/3/1/48.

[144] *Ibid.*

[145] *Ibid.*

[146] Governor's Report 23/12/37, 10/1/38, 9/2/38.

ing the position elective or appointing a permanent revenue staff, would work any better. On the contrary, he feared that the whole administrative system might be dislocated if the *lambardari* system were abolished. He therefore decided to put every obstacle he could in the way of these plans and managed to side-track the question until the ministry had resigned.[147]

Agrarian Unrest

After freedom and independence, agrarian reform was the chief plank in Congress propaganda. With the aid of promises of rent and revenue reductions a special appeal was made to the poorer classes but, as we have seen, the assumption of office by the Congress did not entail any great change for the main body of Congress supporters. The Congress promises had, however, raised hopes among the tenantry, who began to try to assert themselves against their landlords. In consequence, the tension between landlords and tenants, which had been growing for many years, became acute. This raised a delicate problem for the Congress. As landlords the Congress leaders were wary of any general tenant unrest. Moreover, as the Congress now represented the government, they had to uphold the law. On the other hand, they could not afford to antagonise the tenants, from whom they drew much of their support.

It was above all in Hazara, Mardan and Peshawar districts that the relations between tenants and landlords became tense. In the two latter districts one of the main reasons for the disputes was that many big landlords took fixed cash rents instead of a portion of the crop in kind. This meant that the landlords lost interest in the development of thir estates and that whenever the harvest was below normal, some wrangling was bound to occur over reductions and remissions of rents.[148] In the summer 1938 these difficulties became acute. Khans complained that their position was getting impossible as their tenants, confident of the support of the ministry and encouraged by the ministry's attacks on the khans, refused to pay their dues.[149] At this time the Agriculturist Debtors' Relief Bill was being circulated to elicit public opinion. Many tenants got an exaggerated impression of the extent to which relief would be offered and some tenants even believed the land would become theirs.[150] As a result the anti-rent movement was strengthened. This inevitably had an adverse effect on the collection of land revenue. In October

[147] Governor's Report 26/5/38, 9/5/39, 26/5/39, 7/7/39, 14/9/39; Cunningham to Linlithgow 19/4/40 IOL R/3/1/48.
[148] Governor's Report 8/8/38.
[149] Governor's Report 26/5/38.
[150] Governor's Report 24/6/38.

the arrears of land revenue in Mardan district amounted to nearly half the sum payable.[151]

These disputes between landlords and tenants often assumed a political colour, as the former normally belonged to the Muslim League while the latter supported the Congress. Matters first came to a head in the Charsadda *tahsil* of Peshawar district. This *tahsil* was the backbone of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement but the big khans generally adhered to the Muslim League. In May a khan tried to have his tenants evicted but they resisted his agents and a violent clash occurred. According to the khan, the tenants were evicted because they had failed to pay their rents but the tenants alleged the khan was trying to force them to support the Muslim League instead of the Congress.[152]

The most serious difficulties occurred in Mardan district between the tenants of a village called Ghalladher and their landlord, the Nawab of Toru. Ghalladher had a tradition of radicalism, even terrorism. This radicalism was fostered above all by Hindus and Sikhs.[153] Hari Kishan, who had been executed for an attempt on the life of the governor of Punjab, came from Ghalladher. His brother Bhagat Ram was believed to lie behind these disturbances.[154] The Nawab of Toru was one of the biggest landlords in the province, owning in addition to Ghalladher twenty other villages. He had for a number of years had problems with his tenants at Ghalladher.[155] The nawab was, according to Cunningham, a "notoriously bad landlord" and in the governor's opinion there was probably "a certain amount of justification" for the attitude of the tenants.[156]

The tenants complained that they had to pay rents fixed on the prices obtaining during World War I, although prices had fallen by more than 60 per cent since then,[157] and in protest they refused to pay their rents. The nawab obtained decrees from a civil court for the eviction of the tenants but it proved impossible for him to get the eviction orders executed.[158] Red Shirt volunteers of the adjoining villages made common cause with the tenants of Ghalladher. In June a meeting was held at which it was decided to start a "civil disbedience" movement by ploughing the land the nawab had confiscated from the tenants.[159] Every time the nawab turned out his tenants they came back and turned out the new tenants installed by the nawab.[160] A "Satyagraha Committee" was formed to lead the resistance. In this

[151] Governor's Report 23/8/38.
[152] Governor's Report 26/5/38; FR II May 1938.
[153] Interview with Askar Ali Shah.
[154] *Tribune* 18/9/38.
[155] Press communique by the Frontier government, *Tribune* 30/6/38.
[156] Governor's Report 8/8/38.
[157] *Tribune* 30/6/38.
[158] Press communique by the Frontier government, *Tribune* 18/9/38.
[159] *Tribune* 30/6/38.
[160] Press communique by the Frontier government, *Tribune* 18/9/38.

committee a number of socialists figured prominently.[161] According to Cunningham they had created the problems.[162]

By August not only the nawab but also the Congress had become seriously disturbed by the situation at Ghalladher and the effect the agitation was having on neighbouring villages. The Mardan District Congress Committee convened a special meeting which passed a resolution "condemning the action of all such persons as have started civil disobedience in the village of Ghalladher". All Congress members and Khudai Khidmatgars were ordered to dissociate themselves from the people responsible for the agitation and unrest. The resolution stressed that all those who were involved in the Ghalladher civil disobedience had acted without any authority from the appropriate Congress bodies. Another resolution appealed to the socialists of the province "not to create friction between the landlords and peasants, for thereby they may create endless and dangerous quarrels among the two wings of agriculturists which in the Frontier are bound to lead to bloodshed and breach of the golden rule of ahimsa." The mover of the resolution tried to minimise the social and economic differences in Frontier society and instead stressed the uniform interests of all agriculturists by saying that the NWFP was primarily a province of peasant proprietors. The real problem of the agriculturists, he maintained, was not the uneven distribution of wealth but the high cost of production. The peasant proprietors and the landlords faced the same problems, namely lack of pasturage and high transport costs, which led to constant impoverishment of both categories. In addition there were the government taxes, which made the picture even gloomier, but the unequal distribution of land was of no significance, according to this speaker. Finally, the meeting also passed a resolution requesting the FPCC to warn the socialists that if they did not toe the line, they would be expelled from the Congress.[163] About a week later Abdul Ghaffar Khan was authorised by the FPCC to take disciplinary action against those responsible for the agitation[164] but there is no information as to what action he took.

Meanwhile Dr Khan Sahib had sent the local MLA to Ghalladher to advise the tenants to abide by the law. This earned him some unpopularity among the local Red Shirts[165] but otherwise nothing was achieved. The ministry then decided to take action against the agitators and twelve of the most prominent socialists were arrested.[166]

[161] *Tribune* 11/8/38. The *Tribune* (14/8/38) also published a report that a "Zamindars [landowners'] Association had been formed, the objective of which was to counter the propaganda of the tenants. Several influential Congressites, including the parliamentary party's chief whip Khan Amir Mohammad Khan, joined the association. I have no further information concerning this association, so presumably it was short-lived.

[162] Governor's Report 23/8/38. This is also Saadullah Khan's view (interview).

[163] *Tribune* 12/8/38.

[164] *Tribune* 19/8/38.

[165] Governor's Report 8/8/38.

[166] *Tribune* 25/8/38.

On 30th August the nawab made another attempt to hand over the land to new tenants. About 250 old tenants offered resistance. When they were arrested, about a hundred women caused a stampede by throwing themselves in front of some draught cattle. A few women and a child were injured. This incident was, according to the ministers, subsequently magnified and caused the government considerable embarrassment. The day after the incident, however, new tenants were installed without opposition.[167]

In September the ring-leaders were sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment and 161 persons received sentences of six months. Dr Khan Sahib was vehemently attacked by the socialists for claiming to represent the poor while in fact he imprisoned those who tried to improve their lot.[168]

In October a compromise between the nawab and the tenants was effected by Dr Khan Sahib. All prisoners were released within a few months.[169] The discontent continued, however, at Ghalladher as well as in other villages in Mardan district but there were no more serious outbreaks.

Another case, which attracted wide attention, occurred in the summer of 1939 at Muftiabad near Charsadda in Peshawar district. This case was somewhat different as the dispute was not between a landlord and his tenants but between a landlord and a lessee of his, who sub-let the land to tenants. After protracted litigation between the two, eviction orders were passed against the lessee,[170] who, however, refused to give up his lease. He received support from a variety of people including socialists and many Red Shirts. The resistance was led by Obeidullah Khan, son of Dr Khan Sahib and secretary of the FPCC. He and the others demanded that the lease should be given back to the old lessee and the new lessee's contract should be cancelled. Furthermore, in the future all conflicts between landlords and lessee's should be dealt with by the chief minister through the local Congress Committees.[171] To frustrate the decision of the court Obeidullah Khan encouraged the tenants to resist the eviction orders.[172] The authorities responded by arresting him along with a few other Red Shirts[173] but the agitation continued. Only after almost 300 persons had been arrested did it peter out.[174] Deterrent punishments were meted out to the ring-leaders, including Obeidullah Khan,[175] but all of them were released within a matter of months.[176]

[167] Press communique by the Frontier government, *Tribune* 18/9/38.
[168] Cunningham to Linlithgow IOL R/3/1/46.
[169] FR II Sept. and II Oct. 1938; *Tribune* 17/11/38, 1/12/38, 8/12/38.
[170] FR I June 1939; *Tribune* 10/6/39.
[171] *Tribune* 9/6/39.
[172] Governor's Report 9/6/39.
[173] *Tribune* 23/5/39.
[174] FR II May and I June 1939.
[175] FR I June 1939; *Tribune* 10/6/39.
[176] *Tribune* 16/8/39, 6/9/39.

In spite of Obeidullah Khan's involvment in the affair, the Frontier Congress was strongly opposed to the Muftiabad agitation. All front rank leaders and responsible bodies condemned it.[177] Obeidullah Khan was suspended from the FPCC[178] but in September he was reinstated.[179]

Similar difficulties arose in Hazara district. Tenants refused to pay customary dues and render customary services to the landlords. These duties were recognised by the law but landlords often exacted them beyond their legal rights. In some cases tenants also refused to pay rent. The problems were said to originate in Congress promises during the election campaign to confer proprietary rights on the tenants.[180]

In September 1938 a meeting "of several thousands of Kisans" was held at Mansehra under the auspices of the "District Kisan Committee". The meeting discussed the plight of the peasantry, the injustices *kisans* (peasant, tenant) were subjected to by the landlords, and passed a resolution requesting the government to free the tenants from the landlords. Another resolution expressed sympathy with the Ghalladher *kisans*.[181] In October the District Congress Committee held a stormy meeting at which a resolution was passed expressing no-confidence in the ministry because it had not fulfilled the election promises of the Congress election manifesto.[182]

The discontent continued. One of the socialist leaders, Maulana Abdur Rahim Popalzai, toured the district propagandising among the tenants.[183] As a result of "a number of misleading speeches by irresponsible leaders" an impression was created that the landlords had lost their proprietary rights to the tenants and in consequence tenants refused to pay rent. The main complaint of the tenants concerned the corvée and a variety of cesses they traditionally owed the landlords.[184]

To clarify the position the government published a statement explaining the rights and duties of landlords and tenants and warning them that no unlawful activities would be tolerated. The assistant commissioner, Mansehra, undertook a tour of the northern part of the district during which he, too, explained the position. The effect of his tour was, however, reduced by a parallel tour by two agitators, who advised the tenants not to pay any cesses to the landlords and who were believed by the local people to represent the Congress.[185]

[177] FR I June 1939; the relevant resolution of the FPCC is found in *Pakhtun* 1/6/39.
[178] *Tribune* 25/5/39; also *Pakhtun* 1/10/39.
[179] *Pakhtun* 1/10/39.
[180] FR II Sept. 1938 and II May 1939.
[181] *Tribune* 20/9/38.
[182] *Tribune* 1/11/38.
[183] *Tribune* 9/1/39.
[184] FR I May 1939.
[185] FR II May and I June 1939.

The Reconstruction of the Frontier Congress

After the ban on the Frontier Congress was lifted in the summer of 1937, the party started an intensive recruiting campaign. Abdul Ghaffar Khan toured the province extensively to revive his old organisation.[186]

About a year after the elections the Inspector-General of Police made "detailed enquiries" into the strenght of the Congress and found that its growth had been very impressive. Since February 1937 the number of Congress Committees had increased from 81 to 386. The total number of Khudai Khidmatgars was about 20,000.[187] In June the same year the Khudai Khidmatgars themselves put their strength at 60,000. This was, however, a mere guess, as no records were kept. In Cunningham's estimate it was a considerable exaggeration. He believed that about 40,000 persons, almost all of them in Peshawar and Mardan districts, would call themselves Khudai Khidmatgars.[188] In October the Commander-in-Chief of the Khudai Khidmatgars, Rab Nawaz Khan, claimed that his organisation had in all 100,000 members.[189]

The regular Congress organisation was never nearly as popular as the Khudai Khidmatgars. It was, however, more firmly organised, the members paid membership fees and records were kept. A census taken of the primary members taken around the New Year 1939 gave the results shown in Table 8. In Cunningham's opinion the figures indicated that the party's strength had not grown after Dr Khan Sahib took office,[190] but that seems a questionable conclusion. The party's strength depended on other factors than the number of fee-paying members. In any case, the figures do illustrate the party's difficulties in establishing itself outside Peshawar and Mardan districts.

Table 8. Number of primary members of the Frontier Congress by districts, New Year 1939

District	Number of members
Hazara	1,243
Mardan	7,562
Peshawar	7,000
Kohat	1,353
Bannu	595
D.I. Khan	730
TOTAL	18,483

(*Source:* Governor's Report 9/1/39.)

[186] *Tribune* 18/11/37, 27/11/37; Governor's Report 23/10/37, 23/11/37; FR I Dec. 1937.
[187] Governor's Report 10/3/38.
[188] Governor's Report 9/6/38.
[189] *Tribune* 13/10/38.
[190] Governor's Report 9/1/39.

From a formal point of view the Khudai Khidmatgars and the regular Congress were two separate branches with different tasks in the same national movement.[191] The regular Congress was organised in accordance with the rules for provincial branches issued by the AINC. At the top there was a Provincial Congress Committee ('Loi Jirga' in Pashto) and in each district there was a District Congress Committee under which there were *tahsil*, town, village and other local committees.[192] These committees were supposed to lay down the policy of the party units under their jurisdiction. The Khudai Khidmatgars were, as they had been before their suppression in 1930–32, a volunteer body organised on quasi-military lines. At the top was a Commander-in-Chief (Salar-i-Azam), at the district and tahsil levels there were generals, and at the lower levels there were colonels, majors and so forth.

In practice this formal organisation was of minor importance. All real power lay with Abdul Ghaffar Khan. His authority was not based on any office in the official party hierarchy but on his personal charisma. True, he was a member of the AINC Working Committee as well as of the FPCC but, significantly, for much of the time under review in this work he held no office in the Khudai Khidmatgar organisation,[193] which was the basis of the Congress' strength in the NWFP. Nevertheless he was throughout its undisputed dictator. During the Congress ministry Ghaffar Khan devoted himself mainly to recruiting Khudai Khidmatgars and organising them. His speeches from this time are full of exhortations to the Pakhtuns to improve themselve morally. At the same time, he continued to blame the British for the existing problems.[194] Otherwise his political role consisted largely in being the final arbiter in internal party disputes. Day-to-day practical politics he left to the ministers.

The regular Congress Committees played no significant role. Their policy-making consisted mostly in office work and passing resolutions approving decisions taken by others. According to Abdul Ghaffar Khan himself, the Congress organisation in the NWFP was only a "nominal" one.[195] In party work the Congress label was used at the higher levels, whereas at the lower levels people called themselves Khudai Khidmatgars. The only Congress Committee of real im-

[191] This discussion is in the main based on interviews with the following persons: Yahya Jan, Wali Khan, Ghani Khan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Saadullah Khan, Syed Makhdum Shah, Salar Yakub Khan, Jan Ali Khan, Abdul Hanan Khan, Salar Mohammad Aslam and Mahmud Khan.

[192] I am not certain how many such committees really existed and functioned. In Hazara district the Congress had difficulties in forming even a District Committee (*Tribune* 30/11/37 and 30/12/37). According to Governor's Report 9/6/38 there existed at that time about 280 village committees.

[193] In May 1938 Abdul Ghaffar Khan appointed Rab Nawaz Khan as Commander-in-Chief of the Khudai Khidmatgars (*Tribune* 10/5/38). When in 1940 Rab Nawaz resigned, Abdul Ghaffar Khan assumed the direct responsibility himself (*Pakhtun* 1/12/40). He seems to have retained it till the autumn of 1944, when he was succeeded by one Amin Jan (Governor's Report 8/11/44).

[194] E.g., *Pakhtun* 21/5/38, 21/11/38, 11/1/39, 21/1/39, 1/3/39.

[195] Interview with Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

portance was the provincial one, and even that played only a subordinate part.

After their affiliation with the Congress in 1931 the Khudai Khidmatgars had soon overshadowed the existing provincial Congress, and, as we have see, when they came out in the open again in 1937 they again became much more popular than the regular Congress. In fact, there was little support for the AINC as such among the Pakhtuns. Its ideology smacked of Hinduism and there was in any case not much sympathy between the Pakhtuns and the down-country people. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement was staunchly Muslim and vehemently Pakhtun. This constituted the basis for its mass appeal on the Frontier.[196]

The exact relationship between the regular Frontier Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgars became the subject of much discussion but was never clearly defined. Generally the Khudai Khidmatgars emphasised their autonomous position vis-à-vis the Congress, as many of them felt embarrassed by the connection between their movement and the Congress. In May 1938 the question whether the Khudai Khidmatgars ought to be separated from the Frontier Congress was discussed by the FPCC.[197] In the end the somewhat ambiguous decision was reached that "the existing Khudai Khidmatgar organisation shall comply with the orders of the Congress for the attainment of [the] Congress aims and objects" but as far as the "internal management" was concerned the Khudai Khidmatgars should be independent.[198] In August the same year the FPCC decided that Khudai Khidmatgars should be allowed to be primary members of the Congress but that they could not stand for election to any office in the regular Congress. Congress Committees should bear the expenses of the Khudai Khidmatgars but must not interfere with their internal affairs. The FPCC also appointed a committee including Abdul Ghaffar Khan to frame rules for the relations between the Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgars,[199] but this committee does not seem to have produced any lasting solution and the relations continued to be uneasy.

The function of the Khudai Khidmatgars in these years was to popularise the nationalist ideology of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Their activities consisted in recruiting new members and in different forms of social work. Inevitably the newcomers to the organisation included not only people with a real interest in the cause but also a good number of opportunists.

[196] I can think of no better illustration of the problems the Pakhtuns had in the Congress and the somewhat special position the Khudai Khidmatgars held in it than the following story. When Abdul Ghaffar Khan's eldest son Ghani Khan was sent to Gandhi's *ashram* (spiritual retreat, place where a religious community lives) to live and learn there, he, like all other newcomers, was given the task of cleaning the latrines during the first week of his stay. Ghani Khan, however, refused to do this, saying: "I am not a *bhangi* [cleaner] – I am a Pathan. I'll clean up my own muck, but I'll be damned if I'll clean up anybody else's." In the end a solution was found: Ghani Khan became a day-boy in the *ashram*. Interview with Ghani Khan.

[197] *Tribune* 10 and 11/5/39.

[198] Quoted in *Tribune* 11/5/39.

[199] *Tribune* 19/8/38.

The Frontier Ministry and the Congress Party

Dr Khan Sahib and his colleagues ran the administration of the province without much reference to the various Congress bodies in the province or the Congress parliamentary party. In consequence, the relations between the ministers and their fellow Congressites were often not the best but the difficulties which arose never got out of hand. In their dealings with the Frontier Congress and the Khudai Khidmatgars, the ministers always got Abdul Ghaffar Khan's support and thanks to him no-one was ever able to challenge the ministry seriously. Thus, for example, when at a FPCC meeting the ministers were pressed to resign in protest against the governor's refusal to give his assent to the Teri Dues Bill and the Repeal and Amending Bill, Abdul Ghaffar Khan hurried to the meeting and managed to shelve the question.[200] To charges that the ministers were not fulfilling their election promises, he replied that they did all that could be done under present conditions but that the real power remained with the *firenghis* (the foreigners, the British). The ministry was not the important thing; it was the Khudai Khidmatgar organisation that really mattered. Therefore people should stop expecting benefits from the ministry and instead concentrate on building up the movement.[201]

Naturally many leading Congressites resented the ministry's neglect of the party and opposition against the ministry grew within the Frontier Congress organisation. Generally, however, the disputes within the party were of a personal character and did not concern any fundamental differences of policy. Many conflicts were caused by the simple fact that not everybody could be given office. Once a conflict had arisen, it tended to be given an ideological colour, which originally it did not have. Mostly such a conflict was represented as being between a moderate wing, which controlled the party apparatus, and a radical opposition. However, the ministers managed to pacify several oppositionists simply by finding some post for them in the administration. As there were very few political posts—to begin with there were only the ministerships—a number of new ones had to be created.

In the spring of 1938 the ministers, and particularly the education minister Qazi Attaullah, were beginning to meet with opposition in the assembly from their own MLAs. Qazi Attaullah responded by issuing a statement that if the party did not show implicit confidence in him and his colleagues, they would resign.[202] That, however, did not calm matters for long. In June the Congress parliamentary party decided to set up, firstly, a committee to advise the ministry as a whole and, secondly, four sub-committees, one for each minister. Each committee had

[200] *Ibid.*
[201] *Pakhtun* 21/5/38, 11/10/38, 21/11/38, 11/1/39, 1/9/39.
[202] Governor's Report 11/5/38.

between five and eight members and virtually every Congress MLA belonged to one or another of these committees. Dr Khan Sahib, however, told Cunningham that the committees were meant more for show than to serve any real purpose.[203]

The discontent continued. In connection with a meeting of the FPCC in July the Member for the Khalil Muslim Rural constituency Arbab Abdul Ghafoor, who was a close associate of Abdul Ghaffar Khan but one of the most volatile characters in the Frontier Congress, demanded that the ministry should resign, as their acceptance of office had only harmed the prestige and influence of the Khudai Khidmatgars. Others demanded that all government servants and *lambardars,* who had been dismissed in 1930–31, should be reinstated.[204]

In September 1938 the Congress parliamentary party held a meeting at which bitter attacks were made on the ministers. One resolution moved by the Hindu MLA Tek Chand Dhingra requested the government to open negotiations with the socialists of Ghalladher and to release all those arrested in connection with the agitation there. Other resolutions demanded that all movable and immovable property confiscated during the 1930–31 agitation should be restored and the fines refunded. The ministers were requested to concentrate on important and constructive work and not to confine themselves to questions of appointments and promotions. The meeting also discussed a recommendation that the parliamentary party should cease holding meetings if the chief minister paid no attention to their advice. Dr Khan Sahib staved off these difficulties by appointing four parliamentary secretaries, one for each minister. One of the parliamentary secretaries was Arbab Abdul Ghafoor.[205]

The most acrimonious conflict in the Congress organisation during these years occurred when Khan Ghulam Mohammad Khan of Lundkhwar tried to challenge the established leaders. This conflict dragged on for a couple of years but Ghulam Mohammad was in no way able to threaten the position of the Khan brothers. All my sources are agreed that Ghulam Mohammad's opposition against the Khan brothers had no ideological significance but was due only to personal pique and ambition.[206]

Ghulam Mohammad had been one of the first men to join Abdul Ghaffar

[203] Governor's Report 24/6/38. Soon after their appointment the committee members began to press for travelling and other expenses but they do not seem to have got any.

[204] *Tribune* 24/7/38.

[205] *Tribune* 13/9/38; Governor's Report 23/9/38. The other parliamentary secretaries were Abdul Ghafoor Khan, a barrister who had "hitherto proved to be a recalcitrant factor in the Party" (Governor's Report 23/9/38), Chaman Lal, who had first been elected to the assembly as a Hindu Independent but now, it seems, represented the Democratic Party, and Amir Mohammad Khan, a close associate of Abdul Ghaffar Khan. *Press Information Bureau's Morgue Reference Series (2) Political Parties* NAI Home Poll. File 79/46.

[206] Interviews with Zarin Khan, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor, Aziz Khan. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that during his political career he was associated with such different groups as the Congress Socialists, the Forward Bloc and the Muslim League. See also Rittenberg p. 249.

Khan's movement in Mardan district.[207] In January 1938 he was elected president of the FPCC.[208] Before long, however, he clashed with the Khan brothers. Towards the end of the year he tabled a resolution in the committee demanding that the ministry should resign as it had not implemented the Congress election programme and no longer enjoyed the confidence of the public. After a heated discussion a committee was appointed to deal with the grievances of the MLAs and to improve the relations between the ministry and their followers. The committee was headed by Abdul Ghaffar Khan and thus there was no risk of any serious rift between the ministry and the provincial Congress.[209]

In January 1939 Ghulam Mohammad was replaced as FPCC president after a vote in which fifteen members supported Ghulam Mohammad while twenty-eight supported Pir Shahinshah, a leading Congressite from Kohat.[210]

Ghulam Mohammad soon found new grounds on which he could continue his opposition against the Khan brothers. In the conflict between Gandhi and Subhas Chandra Bose, which broke out in 1938 when Bose against Gandhi's wish decided to stand for re-election as president of the AINC, the Frontier leaders supported Gandhi's candidate Dr Sitaramayya. So did most of the other Frontier delegates. Twenty-two voted for Sitaramayya but a group of thirteen, led by Ghulam Mohammad, voted for Bose.[211] Soon after his re-election Bose ordered new elections of office-bearers to be held in the FPCC in view of the "irregularities" which had taken place when Ghulam Mohammad was unseated and of which he had complained.[212] After conferring with Abdul Ghaffar Khan the new president Pir Shahinshah and the vice-president Sardar Ram Singh simply replied to Bose that there was no time to arrange new elections.[213]

For some time it seemed as if the Forward Bloc, which Bose formed as a basis for his opposition against Gandhi, could serve as rallying point for all Frontier Congressites with a grudge against the ministry. It got strong support from Hindu circles. Dr C.C. Ghosh, MLA for the Peshawar West General Urban constituency, declared that Gandhi's dictatorship was harmful to the Congress and that a Forward Bloc was needed in the Frontier Province.[214] Several prominent socialists were also inclined to join the Forward Bloc.[215] In June 1939 Bose visited Peshawar to mobilise support for his organisation. He addressed two meetings, one of which was presided over by Ghulam Mohammad. However, compared

[207] Interview with Zarin Khan.
[208] Kewal Ram to General Secretary, AINC, 1/2/38 AINC Papers P 16(ii) 1937.
[209] Governor's Report 9/12/38.
[210] *Tribune* 15/1/39.
[211] Governor's Report 9/2/39. Other sources give somewhat different figures.
[212] *Tribune* 5/3/39.
[213] *Tribune* 6/3/39. Rittenberg (p. 254) maintains that in the end new elections were held but gives no authority.
[214] *Tribune* 21/5/39.
[215] *Tribune* 3/6/39.

with Nehru and Gandhi, who had also visited the province, Bose drew small audiences.[216] In October the Forward Bloc held a conference at Abbottabad. In the absence of Bose, who was unable to come, one Shankar Lal from Delhi presided. The main theme of his presidential address was that the Congress should stop quarrelling over offices and instead start fighting the British. The attendance was, however, very poor and the conference a failure.[217]

The conflict with the socialists has already been touched upon. In 1935 an organisation called the "Frontier Socialist Workers' League" had been formed. It had between ten and fifteen members. The socialists became affiliated with the Frontier Congress in 1937. By this time the membership had increased to between sixty and seventy. Cunningham attributed this increase to the fact that the general political interest had increased rather than to any radicalisation of the politically active classes but there was in his opinion no doubt "that the chief leaders have revolutionary instincts." Their pamphlets were "well worded" and showed "considerable knowledge of Socialist and Communist methods of propaganda."[218] It seems probable, however, that the Frontier socialists to a large extent depended on Punjab for guidance and propaganda material.[219] Their own leaders appear to have had rather vague ideas of socialism[220] and the roots of the organisation were very shallow.[221] However, when they joined the tenant agitation, they touched on one of the weakest points of the Frontier Congress. Factional disputes could always be managed but a dispute based on class would wreck the entire organisation. Therefore they must be suppressed.

In disgust with the factionalism prevailing in his organisation Abdul Ghaffar Khan by and large refrained from taking part in its activities for a long period in 1939.[222] In his speeches and writings he accused the Khudai Khidmatgars of no longer being what they had been in 1930–31. In those days there had been no rewards for the Khudai Khidmatgars, only sacrifices. There would be only two of three Khudai Khidmatgars in a village but they were loved by the people. Now that the Congress was in power, self-seekers and even criminals had joined the movement. The Khudai Khidmatgars indulged in *parajamba*. In consequence they were no longer loved by the people.[223]

In July the NWFP was visited by Gandhi, who put his weight behind the Khan

[216] FR II June 1939; *Tribune* 20/6/39.
[217] Governor's Report 25/10/39.
[218] Governor's Report 20/5/37.
[219] Governor's Report 23/4/38.
[220] A man like Mian Ziauddin did not attach much significance to their socialist creed. The most prominent of their leaders was Maulana Abdur Rahim Popalzai. His power basis was the fact that he was the mullah of a big mosque in Peshawar. He knew nothing about socialism. (Interview with Mian Ziauddin.) Maulana Abdur Rahim Popalzai had also been president of the provincial Nau Jawan Bharat Sabha. (*Tribune* 16/9/37.)
[221] Governor's Report 23/4/37.
[222] *Tribune* 25/7/39; FR II July 1939; *Pakhtun* 1/5/39.
[223] *Pakhtun* 21/1/39; also 1/4/39 and 1/5/39.

brothers. He criticised the factionalism in the party and said that it had to be purged of the self-seekers. He would not admit that the problems could be due to conflicting interests. The Congress catered to everybody's interests and thus there was no need for separate *Kisan Sabhas* and such organisations. Instead they should merge completely with the Congress, through which they would be able to achieve their aims.[224] At a meeting with the FPCC he exhorted the members to support Abdul Ghaffar Khan and let his word be law to them.[225] After they had promised to settle their differences, Ghaffar Khan promised to resume work without reserve.[226] The meeting also discussed the position of the socialists and other formations within the Congress. A request was made to the Working Committee of the AINC to "sanction such changes in the Constitution [of the provincial Congress] as will prohibit the formation of parties or groups with names other than the Congress or the Khudai Khidmatgar within the Congress or carrying on propaganda which may be detrimental to the prestige and authority of the Congress."[227] The request was granted and henceforth only the Khudai Khidmatgars were allowed to exist as a separate autonomous body within the Congress organisation and no other designations were to be used than "Congress" or "Khudai Khidmatgar."[228]

Otherwise the Congress High Command did not interfere much with the work of the Frontier ministry or the provincial Congress. Azad, Nehru and Gandhi were the ones who took most interests in Frontier affairs. In the internal disputes of the provincial organisation they consistently supported the Khan brothers.[229]

The Resignation of the Ministry

When World War II broke out, the AINC demanded constitutional concessions in return for any assistance in the war. This was a compromise between those who favoured cooperation with the British and those who regarded Britain's difficulty as India's opportunity.[230] According to Sir Arthur Parsons, who acted as governor

[224] *Tribune* 11/7/39.
[225] Tendulkar p. 291 f.
[226] *Tribune* 25/7/39; FR II July 1939.
[227] S. Ali to the Secretary, FPCC, 23/8/39 AICC Papers File P 23 (Part 1).
[228] *Ibid; Tribune* 13/9/39.
[229] Azad visited the province in February 1939 (Governor's Report 23/2/39), Nehru paid two visits to it, one in October 1937 (Governor's Report 9/10/37, 23/10/37) and one in the beginning of 1938 (Governor's Report 9/10/38, 23/10/38), and Gandhi came three times, first in May 1938 (Governor's Report 11/5/38, 26/5/38), then in the autumn of the same year (22/10/38, 21/11/38) and finally in July-August 1939. They undertook these visits largely to put their prestige on the side of the Khan brothers, but is is doubtful if Nehru and Gandhi were of much help in this regard. On the contrary, their visits tended to illustrate to the Muslims of the Frontier the Hindu character of the AINC.
[230] Menon p. 59 f.

when Cunningham went on leave in the autumn of 1939, Dr Khan Sahib belonged to the former category and even hoped that if the other provincial Congress ministries were ordered to resign an exception would be made for him in view of the special conditions in the NWFP.[231] The British refused to make any concessions to the Congress demands and in response the AINC ordered the provincial Congress ministries to resign. No exception was made for the Frontier ministry and on 7th November Dr Khan Sahib and his colleagues tendered their resignation.[232]

Concluding Remarks

From the British point of view, the introduction of the 1935 Government of India Act was a great success in the NWFP, as the Khudai Khidmatgars, who had previously been formidable enemies of British rule, now became loyal supporters of the government. The British also liked to stress the differences which existed between Dr Khan Sahib, a Muslim and a Pakhtun, and the Hindu Congress, and that the moderate Frontier premier tended to disregard instructions from the High Command if he did not like them.[233] However, for all his moderation Dr Khan Sahib was a loyal Congressite. On all important matters he followed the High Command and through him and his brother the AINC got invaluable support in this Muslim-majority province.

Actually, in these three years only two major decisions were taken by the Congress High Command. The first was the permission to accept office in 1937 and the other was the order to resign in 1939. Otherwise the Frontier Congress was on the whole left alone to run the province and manage its own affairs as it wished. Without much interference, either from the British or the High Command, the Frontier Congress was thus able to demonstrate its strong points but also revealed some of its weaknesses.

The acceptance of office created many problems for the party. During the years of rebellion and opposition it had acquired an image which it now found difficult to live up to. The problem of law and order was at least as difficult under free political conditions as it had been before. Moreover, in this violent society, politics also became a violent business. It is ironic that in the end, the ministers found themselves forced to contemplate measures against their political opponents which in many ways went further than the British had ever gone. The most serious problem for the Congress was, however, that many of its supporters became dis-

[231] Telegram Parsons to Linlithgow 21/10/39 IOL R/3/1/47.
[232] FR II Nov. 1939.
[233] See e.g., *Quarterly Survey of the Political and Constitutional Position in British India No. 3* 1/2/38–30/4/38 IOL Linlithgow Papers MSS. Eur. F. 125/142.

appointed when the ministry proved unable to meet their expectations. The latent conflict between the landed leaders and their landless followers began to come out into the open. Factional disputes began between the leaders. But the acceptance of office also entailed very significant advantages. The party gained prestige and control over patronage which attracted new people to it. The Khudai Khidmatgar organisation was rebuilt and expanded to an extent that would hardly have been possible had the Congress remained in opposition. Finally, it must be stressed that in spite of all difficulties it is the unity and strenght of the party in these years that stand out—particularly if one compares the Congress to its opponents. This was no doubt largely due to Abdul Ghaffar Khan's personal authority and the way he worked during these years. By not being in the ministry himself and instead concentrating on organisational work and by continuing to preach against the British, he could retain his revolutionary image. Thus he was still in a position to make a plausible appeal among those who were not in the running for office. On the other hand, as a loyal member of the AINC he endorsed its policy of working the constitution and therefore also supported the ministry. Furthermore, there can be little doubt that as a realistic politician he appreciated the advantages of this policy. In any case, thanks to his unique position and authority, the discord in the organisation remained under control.

The events in the NWFP and the policies pursued by Dr Khan Sahib's ministry were very similar to those in other Congress provinces. In those provinces, too, the ministries faced problems of law and order as well as tenant unrest. The same kind of factionalism, based on person, not principle arose, and there, too, personal differences were given ideological colours. Just as in the Frontier Province, the ministers in the other provinces allied themselves with the circles around Gandhi and Nehru, whereas those who came to be opposed to the ministers supported the opposition at the centre, notably Bose and his Forward Bloc. However, there was one striking difference between the Hindu-majority provinces and the NWFP. In the former the Congress, through its system of selecting candidates and even more by its running of the ministries, managed practically to monopolise provincial politics. When the Congress assumed control of the government, the Congress became the only road by which power could be attained. All aspiring politicians had to join the Congress and the Congress organisation became the arena where local and factional disputes were solved. The modern Congress boss and the "dominant party system" known from post-independence India began to emerge. The Muslims, however, stood aside and chose to operate not through the Congress but the Muslim League.[234] In the NWFP the situation was fundamentally different in this regard. Here it was the Hindus, who faced problems within the Congress. The overwhelming Muslim predominance and the fact that the

[234] For other Congress provinces and the central Congress organisation, see Tomlinson pp. 65–136; also Coupland pp. 86–207.

Khudai Khidmatgars had pre-empted the Islamic appeal meant that there was not the same scope for Muslim separatism as elsewhere. On the other hand, the Frontier Congress never managed to monopolise provincial politics. Large and important sections of the population remained hostile. Moreover, here the Muslim League was a possible alternative also for dissatisfied Congressites and thus the Congress position was potentially much more insecure. However, for the time being it remained the unquestionably strongest force in the province.

For the old loyalist classes, particularly the big khans, the Congress ministry was a threat and a trial. They no longer enjoyed the support of the government, on which they had come to depend. On the contrary, the reins of government were now in the hands of their old enemies. Thus they had to find some new ally.

Chapter III

Provincial Politics on Local Terms: The Muslim League, 1937–39

In the early 1930s the All-India Muslim League had fallen into decay. The leading Muslim politician, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had in despair gone to England and set up a law practice there. In 1935, however, Jinnah was persuaded to come back to India to lead the Muslim League under the new conditions created by the 1935 Act. From now on he was the League's dictator and under his supremely skilful leadership the League was in the next decade transformed into a mass party with the same appeal among the Muslims as the Congress had among the Hindus and with equal say in the counsels where India's future was decided.

At its annual session in April 1936 the AIML condemned the 1935 Act but decided to participate in the elections to the provincial assemblies. Jinnah was authorised to form a central parliamentary board with powers to affiliate provincial boards which would represent the League in the coming elections. At this early stage Jinnah's efforts were not directed primarily against the Congress but against all provincial and local Muslim parties which split the Muslim vote. He wanted to unite all Muslims under the banner of the Muslim League and then reach an agreement with the Congress for the solution of the communal problem, whereafter the Congress and the Muslim League would work together for the attainment of freedom. In May Jinnah nominated a central parliamentary board consisting of fifty-six members. It is doubtful, however, whether he had consulted all those whom he appointed about their preparedness to sit on the board. In any case many of them, particularly among the more prominent ones, did not join the Muslim League but preferred to fight the elections for some provincial party or other. Thus Jinnah's strategy had suffered its first serious set-back.[1]

The Muslim League fared very badly in the elections, winning only 109 seats out of a total of 482 Muslim seats in the various provinces. In the NWFP there were no Muslim League candidates at all, and the same was the case in Sind, Bihar and Orissa. But if the League had done badly in the Muslim constituencies, the Congress' performance was even worse. Only twenty-six Congressites were returned from Muslim constituencies. Nineteen of these were in the NWFP. Thus,

[1] For the Muslim League at this stage, see Zaidi in Philips and Wainwright pp. 246–260; Sayeed 1968 pp. 80–86; Waheed-uz-Zaman pp. 77–80.

with the exception of this province, the Congress could not claim to speak for the Muslims.

After the elections the League made a few attempts to approach the Congress but their offers were spurned by their more powerful rival. Jinnah then changed his strategy. "No settlement with the majority community is possible," he said. "Honourable settlements can only be achieved between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for any settlement."[2] Accordingly, instead of seeking cooperation with the Congress, he set out to make the League into the Congress' equal. All other questions were subordinated to this aim and all other problems were deferred till this goal had been achieved.

The Foundation of the Frontier Muslim League

In 1936 Jinnah made an attempt to form a Muslim League branch in the NWFP. In view of the League's subsequent history in the province it is worth pointing out that it was above all on progressive men like Pir Baksh and Khuda Baksh from the Independent Party that he pinned his faith at this time. In May 1936 he appointed these two together with two members of the Peshawar Khilafat Committee as members of the AIML Parliamentary Board in the hope that they would take up the cause of the Muslim League on the Frontier.[3] His hopes did not materialise, however. In September Khuda Baksh wrote to Jinnah that there had been "little or no scope for organising a Muslim League Parliamentary Board" in the NWFP. At the same time he stressed that his party had always "been working on lines, which are to all intents and purposes identical with those now laid down by the Muslim League." Nevertheless the Independent Party had decided to keep its old name, "because certain traditions have gathered up around it." Jinnah was at this time planning to visit the NWFP but Khuda Baksh did not believe that the visit would "result in the formation of a new Party to be known as the Muslim League".[4] Presumably Khuda Baksh was unwilling to see his party subordinated to outsiders and anxious that no rival should appear for the progressive Muslim votes, *i.e.*, he represented the kind of provincial thinking Jinnah wanted to put an end to.

In October Jinnah paid a visit to Peshawar in an attempt to organise a provincial Muslim League. At a meeting in Peshawar held under the auspices of the Independent Party, he appealed to the Frontier Muslims to unite into one party in order to be able to take full advantage of the new constitution. He urged the

[2] Quoted by Zaidi in Philips and Wainwright p. 258.
[3] Rittenberg p. 217.
[4] Malik Khuda Baksh to Jinnah 19/9/36 QAP File 233.

Muslims as well as the Hindus to send their best men to the assembly "so that all may unite in cementing Hindu-Muslim unity and paving the way for Swaraj."[5]

As a result of Jinnah's visit a consultative board was set up to prepare the ground for the formation of a provincial Muslim League. Pir Baksh was elected convenor.[6] However, almost half of those appointed had never been consulted. Several of them instead joined the Congress.[7] As we have seen, both Malik Khuda Baksh and Pir Baksh represented the Independent Party in the election and there was no Muslim League candidate.

A provincial Muslim League was formed at Abbottabad in the beginning of September 1937. The constituent meeting passed resolutions opposing the partition of Palestine, supporting the Communal Award, demanding the return of the Shahidganj mosque to the Muslim community and appealing to the Frontier assembly to take measures to reduce the land revenue. *Maulvis* played a prominent part in the formation of this Muslim League branch. Maulana Shakirullah of Nowshera, president of the Frontier Jamiat-ul-Ulema, acted as president at the constituent session, while the secretary of the Jamiat, Maulana Mohammad Shuaib, became president of the Frontier Muslim League. Another founding member was Maulana Mohammad Ishaq Mansehrvi.[8] These men were, however, never able to play any leading role in provincial politics and were soon overshadowed in the League by other more influential leaders. Maulana Mohammad Shuaib could in no way assert himself as president,[9] and in December 1938 he found himself forced to resign.[10]

In the districts, too, local Muslim League branches began being formed in the autumn 1937. A Peshawar District Muslim League was formed in October,[11] and

[5] *Khyber Mail* 25/10/36.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Rittenberg p. 218.

[8] *Tribune* 4/9/37; FR II Aug. 1937; *Khyber Mail* 5/9/37. According to Rittenberg p. 225 f., this move was inspired by Sir Abdul Qaiyum. This is, however, disputed by Mian Ziauddin, who says that if Sir Abdul Qaiyum had really wanted a Muslim League to be formed at this stage, he would not have entrusted the task to such insignificant people as the founders of this Muslim League; if there was any connection between Sir Abdul Qaiyum and this Muslim League, it must have been very weak (interview). Rittenberg refers to two sources, a forthcoming work by Aziz Javed (*Tehrik-i-Azadi ke Namvar Mujahidin*) which I have not been able to consult, and Khaliq (the relevant pages are 303–307). The version given by the latter book, which, however, is not an overtly scholarly one, is that the initiative for the formation of this Muslim League came from a contractor by the name of Qazi Hakim Jalozai and an engineer, for whom he worked, H.F. Khan. Qazi Hakim sought Sir Abdul Qaiyum's blessing for the formation of a provincial Muslim League, which he received on condition that no khans were invited to join. Qazi Hakim then brought Maulana Shakirullah of Nowshera and Maulana Mohammad Shuaib to Abottabad, where a meeting of 10–12 people was held and the formation of a provincial Muslim League announced.

[9] See e.g., *Tribune* 14/6/38.

[10] *Tribune* 6/12/38.

[11] Telegram Mohammad Saleem Khan to Jinnah, date illegible, QAP File 574; FR II October 1937; *Khyber Mail* 27/10/47.

in November League activities were reported from Hazara, Mardan and Bannu districts.[12] A Kohat branch was started in July 1938.[13]

There were two basic reasons why people now began to flock into the Muslim League. First, at the Lucknow session of the AIML in October 1937 Jinnah had adopted a more bellicose attitude than before and this was now beginning to yield results, not only in the NWFP but in other provinces, too. In the two largest Muslim-majority provinces, Punjab and Bengal, the premiers Sir Sikander Hayat Khan and Fazl-ul-Haq joined the Muslim League and advised their Muslim followers to do the same. The premier of Assam, Sir Saadullah Khan, also adopted this course, as did many other less prominent Muslim politicians.[14]

Secondly, there were the developments in the province. The assumption of office by the Congress and the ministry's policy were beginning to bring home to the anti-Congress forces the need for unity and organisation. In this situation the Muslim League became the natural rallying point for a variety of people with little in common except their opposition to the Congress.

To begin with, the progress of the Muslim League was slow but in January 1938 Cunningham reported that the League had "made some headway lately, particularly among the Khans and big landowners, who are becoming more and more conscious of the attack which is being made on them by Congress." The khans complained to the governor and other officials that they were being let down by the government, but Cunningham had nothing to offer them except the advice "to maintain a dignified attitude and do everything they can to show that they are true Khans and as such the real fathers of their people."[15]

Although the Congress attacks on them intensified, the big khans were slow to take effective measures to defend their position and instead they continued seeking the governor's aid and blaming him and his officials for doing nothing to break the Congress.[16] Gradually, however, they realised "that 'Government', in the old sense of the British official, could no longer be the fountain of all appointments, benefits and favours".[17] The situation which had arisen could perhaps be described thus: There existed a party—the Muslim League—which needed a following, and a class—the big khans—in need of a party. Although the big khans were not greatly interested in the programme of the AIML there was nothing in it which they were particularly opposed to either, and so they joined the League. The big khans of Peshawar and Mardan districts, where the Khudai Khidmatgars had their roots, were the ones who reacted most strongly against Congress rule[18]

[12] FR I and II Nov. 1937.
[13] FR II July 1938.
[14] Sayeed 1968 p. 87.
[15] Governor's Report 24/1/38.
[16] Governor's Report 9/2/38.
[17] *Summary of events in NWFP.* Unsigned note by Cunningham n.d. Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/17.
[18] Governor's Report 9/11/37, 9/4/38, 9/5/39.

and they also tended to be the most prominent in League affairs.[19]

A good illustration of how local League branches were formed is otherwise provided by the Bannu District Muslim League. Muslim League activities were first reported from Bannu in November 1937. The prime mover was one K. S. Alijan, a retired inspector of police.[20] However, this branch had difficulties in finding office-bearers who were "representative of Muslim opinion in the district."[21] The movement got off the ground only after it had been taken over by more powerful people. On 1st February 1938 a meeting was held to which "all the leading men" of the district had been invited. It was unanimously decided to start a District Muslim League. K. B. Ghulam Haider Khan was elected president and Nasrullah Khan, MLA for the Bannu East Muslim Rural constituency, became secretary.[22] The following letter gives a good idea how this League branch was organised.

> As far as I know Muslim League is started in nearly all the districts of N.-W.F. Province, but Bannu District is leading to all in this respect. This is all due to K.B. Ghulam Haider Khan, who is the head of the Bannuchi tribe, and my father K.S. Mirjan Khan, Chief Rais of 70 thousand Wazir tribe.
>
> We appointed K.B. Ghulam Haider Khan to be the President of District League and myself as Secretary. At the same time we also compelled my father to be the President from Wazir tribe. He sent for the Heads of all the branches and convened a meeting in which they all agreed to become the members of Muslim League and were asked to give him 100 volunteers from each section. I was there in Bannu When a list of about 300 volunteers reached me besides the Members . . . Today I met some of my country men and enquired about the Muslim League propaganda. They told me that meetings after meetings are going on there by your father. The other day he sent for the molvis of the District who publicly pronounced that to keep intimate relations or association, do good or expect good from infidels, *i.e.*, Hindus etc. is to commit a great sin. [sic][23]

In this way the Muslim League became based on the big khans and their personal following, servants and tenants, who, sometimes after receiving a green or grey uniform, passed for the rank and file of the party.[24] The fact that the local branches were formed in this way meant that the provincial League never built up any proper party organisation. Instead it remained but a social network or at best a loose alliance of khans. Once a visitor to the province described the Muslim League as the "Calling League", because the work of the leaders consisted only in "travelling by car to the places where the meetings are convened, taking tea, and

[19] Thus, for example, K.B. Saadullah Khan, who was a very big landlord in Peshawar district and who often acted as the spokesman of the khans in this district, also became president of the provincial Muslim League.

[20] FR II Nov. 1937.

[21] FR I Dec. 1937; also FR I Jan. 1937.

[22] Nasrullah Khan to Jinnah 4/2/38 QAP File 574. For K.B. Ghulam Haider Khan, see Appendix III Bannu East Muslim Rural.

[23] Nasrullah Khan to [?] 4/3/38 NAP AIML Papers Vol. 206.

[24] Interview with Mian Ziauddin.

returning to their houses."[25] Another consequence of the way in which the League was organised was that right from the beginning its work was bedevilled by traditional rivalries and factionalism.

The Muslim League Parliamentary Party

In the summer and autumn of 1937 Sir Abdul Qaiyum increasingly leaned toward the Muslim League.[26] Jinnah invited him to the session of the AIML at Lucknow in October. For reasons of health he was unable to come but he promised Jinnah to "try to send as many M.L.As. and other representatives from this Province as I can get hold of."[27] In December 1937 Sir Abdul Qaiyum died.[28] After his death there was no undisputed leader around whom the opposition could rally. In the spring session of 1938 the twenty-seven non-Congress MLAs were divided into six different groups. Some of them had formally agreed to support the ministry and others were Independent. Only the remnants of Sir Abdul Qaiyum's United Muslim Nationalist Party consistently opposed the ministry, but the party's strength was by now only seven. One of them, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, was elected leader of the opposition. His election could not, however, take place without arousing considerable jealousy.[29] His leadership was never undisputed. It was above all K.B. Saadullah Khan, former minister under Sir Abdul Qaiyum and a leading khan from Charsadda, who challenged Aurangzeb over and over again. In December 1938 Saadullah Khan was elected president of the provincial Muslim League,[30] which he felt ought to give him precedence over Aurangzeb. The latter, however, remained leader in the assembly.[31]

In the spring session of 1938 the Muslim League label was not yet used in the assembly but Aurangzeb Khan stated that the opposition represented "mainly the Muslim League".[32] In the autumn session it adopted the name of the "Muslim League Coalition Party." The opposition had by now grown more numerous but the members were "incapable of thinking in terms of party, as opposed to individual, aspirations." In consequence it was ineffective.[33]

[25] Governor's Report 26/5/38.
[26] Governor's Report 23/8/37, 6/9/37.
[27] Sir Abdul Qaiyum to Jinnah 10/10/37 QAP File 25 (p. 60).
[28] Caroe p. 426.
[29] Governor's Report 24/3/38. For Aurangzeb Khan, see Appendix II Landholders NWFP.
[30] Rittenberg p. 257. For K.B. Saadullah Khan, see Appendix II Landholders Peshawar.
[31] Interview with Mian Ziauddin.
[32] LAD III p. 318.
[33] Governor's Report 9/11/38. See also Governor's Report 21/11/38.

The Muslim League in By-Elections

In the 1937 general elections the Muslim League ran no candidates in the NWFP but in the by-elections, which soon became necessary, the League was represented by leading candidates. Generally speaking, however, these candidates did not have much contact with any central League organisation or any particular interest in the programme of the AIML. They simply adopted the Muslim League label in their capacity as opponents of the Congress or the Congress candidate in their constituency.

In 1937 the Congress candidates in two Mardan constituencies had been disqualified and instead two Independents were returned. The Congress candidates filed election petitions protesting against their exclusion, the petitions were upheld, the Independents unseated and in the spring 1938 by-elections were held. In one of these constituencies, Razzar Muslim Rural, the contest was between the former incumbent Mian Ziauddin and one Kamdar Khan. According to the then governor, Mian Ziauddin had before the 1937 election sought the Congress nomination for this constituency,[34] but when he failed to get it, he stood as an Independent. In the assembly he joined Sir Abdul Qaiyum's party and now in this by-election he represented the Muslim League. Kamdar Khan was the Congress candidate, who had previously been rejected. He was an old Red Shirt. In the other constituency, Amazai Muslim Rural, the Congress candidate Allah Dad Khan was opposed by his brother-in-law and cousin Shah Pasand Khan. The latter was an old Khudai Khidmatgar, who had suffered imprisonment for his involvment in the 1930–31 disturbances. He had sought the Congress nomination for this by-election. When he was not accepted by the Congress, he stood as a Muslim Leaguer.[35] Mardan was a Congress strong-hold and in both these constituencies the Congress candidates polled about eighty per cent of the votes, thus easily defeating their Muslim League opponents. The Congress "organisation was perfect whereas the efforts of the Muslim League were spasmodic and ineffective through the usual personal differences between the Khans."[36] Unlike many others Mian Ziauddin continued to work for the Muslim League. He was elected general secretary of the provincial Muslim League and for the next seven or eight years he was one of the leading personalities in the Frontier Muslim League.

In Hazara district three by-elections had to be arranged. In the Haripur North Muslim Rural constituency a Muslim League candidate narrowly defeated a Congressite by a majority of 13 out of the 3,565 votes polled. The voting was partly on tribal and partly on class lines. The Muslim Leaguer drew most of his support from the Tahirkheli tribe, while the Congress candidate, who was a

[34] Appendix II Razzar Muslim Rural.
[35] *Tribune* 2/2/38; interview with Mian Ziauddin.
[36] Governor's Report 10/3/38.

Tanawali, got the support of his tribe. The majority of the peasantry supported the Congress whereas the landed aristocracy gave their votes to the Muslim League.[37]

In the Haripur South Muslim Rural constituency Raja Manocher Khan, who was the brother of one of the biggest landowners of the district,[38] defeated the Congress candidate Pir Sultan-ul-arifin.[39] Raja Manocher Khan was at the time of the election either an Independent or a Muslim Leaguer.[40] He was in any case a political wind-crow. Soon after having defeated a Congress candidate he joined the Congress, later he joined the Muslim League and then the Congress again.[41]

Finally a by-election had to be arranged in the Haripur Central Muslim Rural constituency owing to the death of the previous incumbent. He had in 1937 won the seat as an Independent but had subsequently joined the Muslim League. The by-election was won by the Muslim League candidate Sardar Bahadur.[42]

Ideology and Programme

The Frontier Muslim League had come into existence as a reaction against Congress rule and this fact was reflected in its programme and ideology, in so far as one can talk of any. Whatever the Congress stood for was opposed by the Leaguers and their aim was to create as many difficulties as possible for the ministry. They delivered their speeches and passed their resolutions "solely to stir up trouble with no regard for the consequences."[43] Their main point was that the Congress was a Hindu organisation and that no honest Muslim could ally himself with it. Every issue and every incident which could be given a communal colour was exploited by the League leaders to rouse communal feelings and every action taken by the ministry to check the growth of communalism was represented as proof of the ministry's anti-Muslim bias. Thus, for example, the Muslim Leaguers alleged that the Dera Ismail Khan riots had taken place in consequence of the ministry's pro-Hindu policy and the measures taken against the offenders proved that the ministers were only puppets of the Hindus.[44] The Muslim League propagandists also attacked the British. They criticised the British policy in

[37] *Tribune* 6/7/38.

[38] Governor's Report 23/2/38.

[39] *Tribune* 2/2/38; Governor's Report 23/2/38.

[40] According to Governor's Report 23/2/38 and *Tribune* 2/2/38, he stood as an Independent but according to Aurangzeb Khan to Liaqat Ali Khan 26/4/45 Archives of Freedom Movement, Muslim League Records Vol. 344 and Telegram from Government of India, Information and Broadcasting Department, to Secretary of State 17/8/43 IOL L/P&J/8/659, he stood on the League ticket.

[41] See below p. 143 f.

[42] Governor's Report 14/9/39; *Pakhtun* 11/9/39.

[43] FR II Aug. 1938.

[44] Governor's Report 23/2/39.

Palestine and likened it to the "Forward Policy" in Waziristan and even encouraged people to support the Faqir of Ipi.[45] In view of the composition of the Frontier Muslim League, this anti-British propaganda may appear surprising but it did not really reflect any anti-British sentiments in the Muslim League leadership. Privately, leading Muslim Leaguers told Cunningham that the anti-British propaganda was only meant for mass consumption and had nothing to do with the Muslim League creed.[46]

The policy of Aurangzeb Khan and the other Leaguers in the assembly was characterised above all by their consistent defence of the landlord interests under attack by the Congress. Only a couple of the most striking examples will be cited here. The Teri Dues Bill was rejected lock, stock and barrel by the Muslim Leaguers. From Aurangzeb's passionate speech in defence of the retention of the Teri Dues one could quote the following lines as an example of his art of argumentation and style of oratory:

> When the future historian comes to record the history of this golden age he will say that this was the age where the robbing of the rich takes place. The clan is poor and the clan must be rich by robbing the Khan. I say: God save me from this age! I for one will enter my strong protest against this broad day-light robbery. I will request the Khattak clan to be up and doing and not be thinking of robbing the poor Khan. [I say to the Khattaks:] Go and earn your living and don't think of robbing the poor Khan.[47]

Another important Congress measure which affected the interests of the landowning classes was the Agriculturist Debtors' Relief Act. As we have seen,[48] the biggest landlords were excluded from the provisions cancelling debts, while the arrears of rents owed to them were cancelled. Thus the Act was altogether disadvantageous to them. As for the rest of the landlord class, the provisions cancelling debts were advantageous to them but the cancellation of arrears of rent was disadvantageous. I have no information whether the advantages outweighed the disadvantages or whether the opposite was the case with this class. To the rest of the agriculturist population the Act brought genuine relief.[49] The Muslim League chose to support this Bill. This, incidentally, is an indication that the majority of the landlord class benefited from it.[50] But, significantly enough, Aurangzeb demanded that the Bill should be amended so as to include even the biggest landlords in its benefits.[51]

[45] Governor's Report 26/5/38.
[46] Governor's Report 3/9/38.
[47] LAD III p. 245.
[48] See above p. 80.
[49] "One undoubted result of the Act has been a considerable reduction in the number of suits brought by money lenders to recover their debts, and in this respect the Act seems to be achieving its purpose." *Report on Congress Government in NWFP.* Note by Cunningham 19/11/41 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/18.
[50] Cf. above p. 80.
[51] LAD III p. 753.

When the Congress ministry resigned, the governor invited Aurangzeb Khan to try to form a new ministry. There were fourteen Muslim Leaguers in the assembly, four Hindu-Sikh Nationalists, three Independents and, according to Aurangzeb there were seven waverers. The rest supported the Congress. Aurangzeb wired Jinnah to seek his advice how he should proceed.[52] Jinnah replied: "Form Ministry any cost, even interim Ministry, waverers and others will come afterwards".[53] Aurangzeb was, however, in no way able to bring together a working majority and informed Jinnah in somewhat euphemistic terms that "local league and party opinion" was not in favour of accepting office.[54] Jinnah wired back: "Great mistake, form Coalition Ministry, make every sacrifice, let others be Ministers".[55] But at best Aurangzeb could hope for the support of twenty-one MLAs and Parsons, the acting governor, had no choice but to proclaim governor's rule under Section 93 of the constitution.[56]

By the time World War II broke out Jinnah had established himself as the leader of the Muslims at the all-India level, whose leadership was recognised by the most prominent provincial Muslim leaders, in the Muslim-majority provinces as well as in the minority provinces.[57] The only really important exception was the NWFP, where the Congress still commanded the allegiance of most leaders as well as the people. Although the Muslim League had by now managed to get a foot-hold in the province, its provincial branch had as yet not become a real alternative to the Congress. Men like Saadullah Khan, Aurangzeb Khan and Mian Ziauddin had managed to give to the Frontier League a semblance of a modern political party with office-bearers and party committees but this formal structure had very little substance.[58] The Frontier Muslim League was as yet only a loose alliance of leading loyalist khans with a sprinkling of prosperous lawyers and retired government servants in it. Few of these people had any wider political outlook, let alone a nationalist or other ideology which could compete with that of the Khudai Khidmatgars. This was recognised by the party's general secretary Mian Ziauddin, who in a letter to Liaqat Ali Khan summed up the reasons for the League's failure in the following points. First there was the fact that the Khudai Khidmatgars presented their struggle against the British as a struggle for Islam long before there had been any Muslim League to counteract their movement. The "majority of the present ardent Muslim Leaguers were people who had connec-

[52] Telegram Aurangzeb Khan to Jinnah ?/11/39 QAP File 329.
[53] Governor's Report 12/11/39. See also draft telegram n.d. QAP File 329.
[54] Telegram Aurangzeb Khan to Jinnah 9/11/39 QAP File 329.
[55] Governor's Report 12/11/39. See also draft telegram 9/11/39 QAP File 329.
[56] Governor's Report 12/11/39.
[57] Tomlinson pp. 102–106; also above p. 109.
[58] See further p. 138 ff.

tions with the Government as big landlords, lambardars, Honorary Magistrates etc. They were naturally suspect in the eyes of the public." These "people woke up only after their complete collapse in the elections and as there was no alternative for them, for the sake of self-preservation, they flocked into the Muslim League." Unlike other Congress ministries, the Frontier ministry had not been biassed against the Muslims.[59] On the contrary: "If the Congress Ministers showed any undue favour that was also for a set of Muslims . . . The Hindu remained the underdog even under the Congress regime."[60]

[59] In other Congress provinces a variety of Muslims took umbrage at different aspects of Congress rule. The Muslim League claimed that the Congress was guilty of a number of irregularities and even "atrocities" on Muslims in these provinces. The Congress was no doubt insensible in some respects but most of the League's charges appear to have been wild exaggerations or distortions. Whatever the virtues of the League's case, the alleged sufferings of Muslims under Congress rule became one of the League's chief arguments against the Congress. An exhaustive account of the League's case is given in Qureshi pp. 87–113. For a more detached analysis, see Tomlinson p. 102–106.

[60] Mian Ziauddin to Liaqat Ali Khan 27/11/40 Archives of Freedom Movement Muslim League Records Vol. 342.

Chapter IV

Politics Suspended: Governor's Rule, 1939–43

Before the outbreak of World War II the foremost concern of the British in India was the implementation and smooth running of the 1935 Act. When the war broke out, their overriding concern instead became to ensure that the Indian contribution to the war effort became as effective as possible. The long-term problem of India's future was subordinated to the immediate needs of the war. This meant that they cared less for what measure of popular support the nationalists might enjoy than for the contributions different groups could or would make to the war effort and on what terms they were made.[1]

So far as the Congress was concerned, it demanded in return for any support for the war effort, firstly, that after the war India should be given freedom, and secondly, that for the duration of the war the Congress leaders should be given real power and control over the Indian government. The former the British might have been willing to concede but not the latter. In the years that followed the Congress leaders saw to nothing but their struggle against the British and ignored the League entirely. Their policy combined far-raching demands, which the British could not accept, with an unwillingness or inability to apply effective sanctions. The only sanctions which they tried were the resignation of the Congress ministries in 1939, the individual civil disobedience campaign in 1940, both of which were entirely ineffectual and harmless, and the Quit India movement in 1942, which, although a very serious affair, the British managed to quell without too much difficulty. This policy placed the Congress outside the main stream of events and gave the Muslim League the opportunity it had been waiting for.

Jinnah had by now realised that the Congress, not the British, were the main obstacle to the League's aspirations and made his plans accordingly. All Muslim League policies were designed to establish the League as the Congress' equal, which would enable the League to veto any constitutional proposals or agreements. The League was prepared to cooperate with the British but not unconditionally. Jinnah, however, never allowed himself to be pinned down to any definite commitments. As the Congress was not cooperating at all with the British,

[1] For the general political developments in India during World War II, see Tomlinson, pp. 136–158; Menon pp. 57–166; Hodson pp. 76–110; Qureshi pp. 138–194.

he was in this way able gradually to increase the price for the League's cooperation. At its annual session at Lahore in 1940 the AIML raised the demand for a separate Muslim state and from now on the question of partition or no partition increasingly dominated the domestic political scene. Every concession to the Muslim League meant that India was one step nearer partition.

The outbreak of war, the Congress ministry's resignation and the failure of the Muslim League to form an alternative ministry created a political lull in the NWFP. Little resentment was expressed at the proclamation of governor's rule and instead a feeling of political apathy set in.[2] There was an "almost universal hope" that the war would bring more employment.[3] Many people were delighted at the end of Congress rule[4] but the "Deliverance and Thanksgiving Day" arranged by the Muslim League to celebrate the resignation of the Congress aroused very little enthusiasm.[5]

Throughout the war the North-West Frontier remained on the whole calm. The attitude of the people varied but it never gave the British cause for serious alarm. The following description, given by a deputy commissioner in 1941, is in its basic features valid for the entire province and the whole war:

> Generally speaking the middle and higher classes hope for and wish a British victory and are more or less keen in giving assistance in War efforts. The lower classes are apathetic. So far as Political parties are concerned, the Congressites, the Ahrars, and the Socialists and their allies do not desire either a British or a German victory. They hope that Germany and England will eventually exhaust themselves and out of the ensuing chaos will emerge 'free India'. They trust German Wireless news. The Muslim League and the minority communities in the Province wish for a British victory and assist in War efforts. They clearly see destruction in any political change in India. They place more reliance on the British Wireless news. British successes in Africa have been well received.[6]

Many benefited economically from the war. Prices went up and this put an end to the depression in agriculture. The war also gave employment in the armed services and otherwise.

British Policy

In order to associate the public in some way with the war effort after the imposition of governor's rule, the Frontier government formed so-called District War Committees. The members of these committees were mostly loyalist khans but

[2] Governor's Report 23/11/39, 9/12/39, 23/12/39; Cunningham's Diary 16/12/39 Cunningham Papers.
[3] Governor's Report 14/9/39.
[4] Governor's Report 23/12/39.
[5] FR II Dec. 1939.
[6] FR I April 1941.

there was also "a good sprinkling of pleaders, members of the professional classes and others who have a distinctly political tinge."[7] The idea was that these committees should spread propaganda, counteract false rumours and to assist in the collection of war funds.[8] During a tour of the province Cunningham found the attitude of the committees "excellent".[9] At least some of the committees seem to have been quite active. In Mardan, for example, the District War Committee published a bi-weekly news pamphlet which was distributed in the villages. The committee also decided that all *jagirdars*, pensioners and others in receipt of government benefits should contribute a share of these to war funds,[10] but I have no information whether they actually did so.

Although they were no longer cooperating, Cunningham was careful not to antagonise the Congress by leaning too heavily on the big khans. At the end of April the government began considering precautionary measures in case the Congress should start civil disobedience. The idea of arming the leading khans and their followers and giving them semi-official responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, as had been done in 1931, was ruled out. Cunningham felt that a civil disobedience campaign should be met "with properly enlisted and disciplined civil forces" and therefore he decided to increase the police forces instead.[11]

Throughout the war the government conducted anti-Axis, Muslim propaganda through a secret net-work of mullahs in government pay.[12] This idea seems to have been born in a discussion between Cunningham and Iskander Mirza, one of the leading Indian officials, before the former went on home leave in August 1939.[13] The scheme was started by Sir Arthur Parsons, who acted as governor in Cunningham's absence. He entrusted the task of organising this propaganda to a retired Indian government servant, K.B. Kuli Khan. To ensure the utmost secrecy, as little as possible was put on paper and instead Kuli Khan received verbal instructions from the governor.

Kuli Khan established a net-work of mullahs, who in return for doing propaganda in favour of the British and against the Germans and Russians received payment from the government through him. The line taken by Kuli Khan was that Bolshevism was the arch-enemy of Islam and that the Germans were

[7] Governor's Report 9/7/40.
[8] Governor's Report 23/6/40.
[9] Governor's Report 9/7/40.
[10] Governor's Report 23/7/40.
[11] Governor's Report 9/5/40.
[12] This was such a sensitive subject that the papers relating to it were kept in Cunningham's personal custody. The file, which is called "Correspondence with the External Affairs Department regarding Propaganda through Mullahs, etc." is now available among the Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/19. It contains seven notes, A–G, of different dates and by different authors. Where not otherwise indicated, my account is based on these notes.
[13] Cunningham's Diary 5/8/39 Cunningham Papers.

cooperating with the Bolsheviks against Islam and religion in general. There were some temporary difficulties when Britain and the Sovjet Union became allies but they were overcome without too much difficulty.

One of Kuli Khan's first associates in this scheme was a certain Mullah Marwat. Politically Mullah Marwat was a Khaksar[14] but Kuli Khan persuaded him to give up his Khaksar activities and instead preach *jehad* against the enemies of all religions. Through him Kuli Khan also managed to establish contact with other religious leaders, including those in the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Sarhad.[15] This organisation had previously been strongly anti-British but now its members began to speak and write against the Germans and Russians. They maintained that for the first time the interests of Islam and Britain now coincided and therefore they also encouraged enlistment in the Army.

In May 1941 Cunningham started another similar scheme. Mullahs in the settled districts as well as in tribal territory were paid by a number of officials and other men trusted by the government for doing Islamic propaganda against the Germans. In August a Colonel Robinson was put in charge of this scheme. From then on Kuli Khan appears to have worked almost exclusively through the Jamiat-ul-Ulema.

I have no information how many mullahs were involved in these schemes but it is evident that the number was quite considerable. A list of those working for Robinson in Mardan and Peshawar districts contains fifty-eight names. Among those working for the government in this way either through Kuli Khan or Colonel Robinson a few deserve special comment. One was Fazal Din, the son of Mullah Powindah and "the biggest potential source of trouble among the Mahsuds".[16] Another was Badshah Gul, the son of the Haji of Turangzai. Yet another was the Pir of Manki Sharif, who, wrote Cunningham, seemed "ready to do whatever we want." Through Kuli Khan and his contacts in the Jamiat-ul-Ulema the government even approached the Faqir of Ipi, but there is no evidence that he allowed himself to be influenced by the Jamiat's emissaries while there is plenty of evidence to the contrary.

Only very incomplete accounts remain of these activities but it is obvious that large sums were spent on them. The political agent of South Waziristan received Rs. 12,000 annually to be used for this work and K.S. Mohammad Sarwar, who was responsible for the work among the North Waziristan tribes, the Bhittanis in the Bannu Frontier Region and among the nomad Ghilzais as well as for the work in the Kurram agency, got Rs. 19,600.

[14] The Khaksars were an all-India Muslim semi-military organisation with very obscure aims. See Smith pp. 235–245.

[15] This Islamic political party was otherwise also favourable to the Congress.

[16] One reason why Fazal Din was prepared to give a measure of support to the British was his rivalry with the Faqir of Ipi. *Political Agent South Waziristan. Nov. 1943–April 1946* p. 32 Curtis Papers.

It was only natural that these activities should also have an anti-Congress edge. In September 1939 when the former FPCC president Ghulam Mohammad and other Congress agitators went to Tirah in the Khyber agency, Kuli Khan's agents were busy counteracting the Congress propaganda. The Jamiat-ul-Ulema condemned the Quit India movement. Badshah Gul "was a great help in spreading anti-Congress and anti-Japanese propaganda in Tribal Territory."[17]

In Cunningham's estimate the work of these organisations had "an enormous effect". In 1941 informers were sent out to spy on the mullahs and their activities in the mosques. The governor found the results "most encouraging." On the *Id-uz-Zuha,* for example, no less than seventeen speeches were reported from Peshawar district in "which Islamic preaching was mixed with good strong stuff against the Japanese, and pro the British." This propaganda also seems to have helped the British in other contexts. When they invaded Iran, attempts to exploit Muslim feeling fell flat. In this connection the Afghans sounded Muslim opinion as to what would be the reaction, if the British should invade Afghanistan, too. When the Jamiat-ul-Ulema discussed the question, they decided not to make any religious pronouncement on it, as there appeared to be no immediate danger to Islam.[18]

This Islamic propaganda also appears to have had a considerable effect on the political situation in the province by strengthening the Muslim League and weakening the Congress. In the summer of 1943 the Muslim League, in addition to three expected successes, won an unexpected victory in a by-election in Mardan district. This League success in the Red Shirt heartland was a remarkable event. Cunningham did not believe it would have been possible, if the ground had not been prepared by the government-sponsored Islamic propaganda. As a result of this propaganda "the Yusafzai Mullahs of Mardan, who used to be professionally anti-Government became first anti-Russian and anti-German, then anti-Japanese, and so by natural sequence anti-Hindu and anti-Congress." Cunningham noted with satisfaction "that the Muslim League successes in these by-elections are generally accepted as being a victory for the British Government over the subversive elements in the country."[19]

A remarkably large share of the Indians involved in these schemes were or became known for their Muslim League Sympathies. Kuli Khan was only one of them. Other prominent Muslim Leaguers were K.B. Ghulam Haider Khan of Sherpao, Nawab Zafar Ali, Taj Ali Khan and above all the Pir of Manki Sharif, who in 1946–47 was the outstanding Muslim League leader on the Frontier. The Pir of Zakori was another prominent divine who was approached in this context

[17] *Border Administration Report of the Peshawar District for the Year 1942–43* and *Border Administration Report of the Peshawar District for the Year 1943–44* TARC File 3/4–F.R.P. Vols. XIII and XIV (Part B).

[18] Governor's Report 23/11/41.

[19] Governor's Report 24/8/43.

and subsequently played a prominent part in the Frontier Muslim League, but I have no information whether he actually worked for either Robinson's or Kuli Khan's organisation. Two officials, who were involved in this work as well as in the Muslim League, were Sheikh Mahbub Ali and Iskander Mirza.[20]

The government also used the press for its *sub rosa* propaganda. Practically the whole vernacular press received subsidies in return for publishing anti-Axis articles. The publicity officer of the Government supplied the newspapers with articles, which were published in the name of people who were not known to be connected with the government. In addition to the provincial press some Lahore newspapers were also involved. The press propaganda as well as that of the mullah organisations appears to have been directed not only against the Axis but also against the Congress. In connection with the Quit India movement Cunningham reported to the Viceroy:

> The tone of the press has been very satisfactory. Editors have complied readily with all the advice we have given them regarding both news and comment, and have published anything that we have asked them to print.[21]

The Frontier Congress during the War

After the resignation of Dr Khan Sahib's ministry there followed a period of indecision in the Frontier Congress. Relatively few public meetings were held and the attendance at them was poor. Nothing was done to embarrass the government.[22] The internal difficulties, which had arisen when the Congress was in power, continued. In protest against the factionalism prevailing in the party Abdul Ghaffar Khan resigned from the FPCC in the spring of 1940. Instead, he announced, he would devote himself entirely to the Khudai Khidmatgars.[23] Nevertheless he continued to take some part in the work of the committee.[24] In June the president Mian Jaffar Shah and the general secretary Arbab Abdul Ghafoor, who had been elected to their offices in February the same year,[25]

[20] For K.B. Kuli Khan, see Appendix II and III Teri South Muslim Rural. K.B. Ghulam Haider Khan of Sherpao was a leading landlord in Peshawar district, who, for instance, subsequently became a member of the ad-hoc committee in charge of the District Muslim League (see below p. 139 f.). For Nawab Zafar Ali, see Appendix II Lakki West. He supported the Muslim League in the assembly. For Taj Ali Khan, see Appendix III, Bannu East Muslim Rural; the Pir of Manki Sharif, below p. 165 f.; the Pir of Zakori, Appendix III, Bannu West; Sheikh Mahbub Ali, below p. 186 ff.; and Iskander Mirza, below pp. 162 ff.

[21] Governor's Report 23/9/42.

[22] Governor's Report 24/11/39; FR II Nov. and II Dec. 1939; Cunningham's Diary 16/12/39 Cunningham Papers.

[23] *Pakhtun* 21/4/40.

[24] Governor's Report 23/7/40.

[25] *Khyber Mail* 18/2/40.

resigned from the FPCC along with some other office-bearers.[26] The reasons are obscure but appear to have been largely of a personal nature.[27]

The Individual Civil Disobedience Movement

In 1940, after the fall of France, the Working Committee of the AINC made overtures to the British in order to find a formula which would enable the Congress to support the war effort. This was unacceptable to Gandhi, as it meant a deviation from non-violence. In consequence the Working Committee in somewhat cryptic terms absolved Gandhi from further responsibility for the Congress programme and policy.[28] Abdul Ghaffar Khan took the same line as Gandhi in regard to cooperation in the war effort and in protest against the new Congress policy he resigned from the AINC Working Committee.[29] His resignation led to a large number of resignations by Khudai Khidmargars from the Frontier Congress.[30] In the end a serious rift was avoided and after a meeting of the FPCC a compromise was reached. The meeting expressed full confidence in Ghaffar Khan but at the same time it was made clear that there was no reflection on the AINC.[31]

In response to the Congress overtures the British made the so-called August offer. This was, however, turned down by the Congress, as it did not go far enough to meet their demand for real power and as it implicitly recognised the possibility of Pakistan. In this situation Gandhi resumed the leadership of the Congress and launched a civil disobedience campaign. Unlike his previous campaigns this one was not a mass movement and only particularly well qualified persons were selected to court arrest by making anti-war speeches. On 17th October 1940 the first arrest was made. However, this individual civil disobedience campaign met with very little response in Congress ranks and the public remained apathetic. Politically the movement was entirely ineffective.[32]

In the NWFP this civil disobedience movement was a complete fiasco. On 14th December Dr Khan Sahib and some others began shouting anti-war slogans but the response they evoked was so poor that in most cases the government did not even bother to arrest them.[33] The campaign remained half-hearted and entirely ineffectual. The governor, who toured the province extensively, was

[26] *Pakhtun* 11/7/40; Governor's Report 23/7/40.

[27] When I interviewed Mian Jaffar Shah, he said that the reason for his resignation was that Abdul Ghaffar Khan was against him. Arbab Abdul Ghafoor said he resigned because he and Mian Jaffar Shah did not get on. Their differences were of a personal nature and did not concern policy.

[28] Menon p. 87.

[29] Tendulkar p. 325; *Pakhtun* 1/8/40; Governor's Report 23/8/40.

[30] Abdul Qaiyum Swathi, Gen. Secy. FPCC, to Nehru 15/8/40 Jawaharlal Nehru Papers Subject File 63; Tendulkar p. 326; *Khyber Mail* 8/9/40; see also Governor's Report 9/8/40 and *Khyber Mail* 29/9/40.

[31] Governor's Report 23/8/40.

[32] Menon p. 91 ff; Hodson p. 84 ff.

[33] Governor's Report 23/12/40.

"everywhere greeted with cordiality and assurances of loyalty and support for the war effort." If people complained, it was usually because "of insufficient opportunity to serve in the armed forces or of purely parochial matters".[34] Toward the end of February the campaign had almost died out, even Abdul Ghaffar Khan made "practically no effort to stimulate Congress activity"[35] and Dr Khan Sahib resumed his medical practice.[36] In March Ghaffar Khan made a last attempt to revive civil disobedience but without any success at all.[37] On 25th April he suspended the movement altogether, ostensibly because of the harvest,[38] but it never revived.

The Quit India Movement

After the Japanese successes in the war in early 1942, the Congress and the British once more tried to find a formula for cooperation. A prominent member of the British War Cabinet, Sir Stafford Cripps, was sent to India to seek agreement on a plan which had been worked out in London. But again the British proposals were turned down by the Congress, as the British insisted on retaining ultimate control of the Indian government for the duration of the war and because the plan openly recognised the possibility of Pakistan.

When these efforts had foundered, the Congress again decided to challenge the government and this time they did it in earnest. They demanded immediate British withdrawal from India. In case the British should refuse, as of course they were bound to do, the Congress announced it would start "a mass struggle on the widest possible scale" under Gandhi's leadership. The government responded sternly. On the morning of 9th August, the day after this policy had been officially adopted by the AICC, Gandhi and all members of the AINC Working Committee were arrested. Congress Committees were declared to be unlawful associations. Serious disorders followed, which the government met by mass arrests. By the end of 1942 about 60,000 persons had been arrested and about a thousand had lost their lives in the disturbances. This was the so-called "Quit India movement", the most serious threat to British rule in India since the 1857 rising.

In the NWFP, however, the Quit India movement never assumed the same proportions as down-country. Unlike other provincial branches, the Frontier Congress was never banned and the arrests were on a more moderate scale.[39]

[34] Governor's Report 9/2/41.
[35] Governor's Report 23/2/41.
[36] Governor's Report 25/3/41.
[37] Governor's Report 9/4/41.
[38] Governor's Report 9/5/41.
[39] For a week by week account of the Quit India movement in the NWFP, see *Congress Disturbances in the N.W.F.P., 1942–43* IOL R/3/1/366.

Before the campaign was started in the NWFP, the Khaksars, Ahrars and the Muslim League proclaimed themselves neutral in the struggle to come. The Mohmands and Afridis issued "more or less spontaneous" manifestos declaring that Congress agents would not be welcome to them. Mullahs in the secret government networks made anti-Congress speeches in mosques. A subject which they particularly dilated on and which caused Dr Khan Sahib's political stock to fall seriously was the marriage of his daughter to a Christian. Ghaffar Khan suffered similar embarrassment at about the same time from his eldest son Ghani's marriage to a Parsee lady.[40]

In the latter half of July Abdul Ghaffar Khan held a number of meetings to prepare his people for the expected clash with the government. He did not, however, divulge what the plans were.[41] According to Rittenberg, there were none except that the leaders expected to be arrested, thus getting a *casus belli* from the government. When the government left Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his colleagues at large, the Frontier Congress did not know what to do.[42] The arrests in the other provinces provoked only a moderate reaction in the NWFP. *Hartals* were held all over the province but for the most part only Hindus participated. A large number of meetings were arranged but attendance was poor. On 16th August the FPCC decided to give Abdul Ghaffar Khan full authority over the campaign but it remained desultory.[43] On 22nd August, i.e., almost two weeks after Gandhi and the members of the AINC had been arrested, Cunningham reported that the situation was "satisfactory". Except for some public meetings, at which the speeches had "been less objectionable than might have been expected", the Congress activities had been confined to picketing of liquor shops in some towns. The picketing was half-hearted and the proprietors were often able to carry on back-door trade. Cunningham attributed the failure of the campaign so far to "a distinct hardening of Muslim opinion all over the North-West Frontier against the Congress." Far from remaining neutral, as they had said they would, the Muslim League leaders arranged several meetings to counteract the Congress campaign. Individual khans also came out openly against it.[44]

For a few days in September Cunningham was a little worried when the police had to arrest pickets of schools in Bannu and in Charsadda a small police force had to disperse some pickets. The situation was, however, in no way serious and the arrests in Bannu were made only because of the proximity of Waziristan and the fear of a conflagration there. The calm soon returned.[45]

[40] Governor's Report 8/8/42; *Congress in NWFP. Nov. 1942* Note by Cunningham dated 4/11/42 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/18.

[41] Governor's Report 8/8/42.

[42] Rittenberg p. 281.

[43] *Congress Disturbances in the N.-W.F.P., 1942–43* IOL R/3/1/366.

[44] Governor's Report 22/8/42.

[45] Governor's Report 10/9/42; Telegram Cunningham to Linlithgow 22/9/42 IOL R/3/1/50.

On 13th September the Congress leaders decided to begin picketing law courts but after a day or two they changed their minds. Dr Khan Sahib visited Cunningham on the 14th, dined with him and played bridge. The governor found the Congress leader "extremely friendly".[46] However, in October the Congress leaders changed their mind again and once more decided to picket law courts, but this picketing was never on such a scale as to worry the authorities. The picketers were simply cordoned off from the courts and in the evenings they were allowed to return home again.[47]

In Mardan district the campaign became more serious than in the other districts. On 10th October three persons were killed in Mardan town when the police opened fire on a crowd which had begun throwing stones at them. When the movement seemed to catch on in the rural areas of the district, the government arrested all the main leaders.[48] On 27th October Abdul Ghaffar Khan was arrested when he went to Mardan to address a meeting in defiance of an order forbidding him to go there. Following his arrest another twenty-three Red Shirt leaders in the Charsadda *tahsil* were also incarcerated. In two or three towns protest *hartals* were held but otherwise there was little stir.[49]

In the following weeks the campaign grew more and more spasmodic and in spring 1943 it petered out altogether.[50]

The Frontier Muslim League and the War

In the NWFP the political apathy which set in after the proclamation of governor's rule was particularly marked in Muslim League circles.[51] As we have seen, the Frontier Muslim League was not really a party fighting for specific political goals but a conglomerate of various people who felt their position to be threatened by Congress rule. With the Congress out of office this threat disappeared and furthermore, with the assembly prorogued party politics for them lost its *raison d'être*. Instead the best way to safeguard one's interests was once more to gain favour with the British.

The attitude of the Frontier Muslim League leaders was much more unequivocally pro-British than that of the AIML leadership. This was particularly the case with Aurangzeb Khan. In connection with the Italian attack on Greece, for instance, he wrote in the *Khyber Mail*:

[46] Governor's Report 23/9/42.
[47] *Congress Disturbances in the N.-W.F.P., 1942–43* IOL R/3/1/366.
[48] *Ibid;* Governor's Report 23/10/42.
[49] *Congress Disturbances in the N.-W.F.P., 1942–43.* IOL R/3/1/366; Governor's Report 9/11/42.
[50] *Congress Disturbances in the N.-W.F.P., 1942–43.* IOL R/3/1/366.
[51] Governor's Report 9/1/40, 23/11/40.

> Will Indians now take a warning from these signs and rally under the flag to offer resistance to the enemies of Great Britain in this War and realise that this war is in fact a war of freedom or slavery not of England alone but of India and other Dominions as well?[52]

Cunningham was, however, not impressed by such professions of loyalty to the common cause. When the British made the August Offer, the Frontier League leaders told the governor that now the Muslim League would be able to support the war effort whole-heartedly. But, wrote Cunningham,

> Our local Muslims . . . appear at present to look little further than the question of how many members there are to be in the extended Executive Council and the Advisory War Committee, and what proportion of Muslims are to be included in them.[53]

Throughout the war Aurangzeb and his colleagues showed themselves eager to take advantage of the situation and tried to get a foot in wherever possible. In spite of orders to the contrary,[54] Aurangzeb Khan and K.B. Saadullah Khan attended a meeting of the Peshawar District War Committee on 2nd June 1940. They used this opportunity to plead the cause of the big khans. One of the questions discussed was how a Civic Guard could be raised. The two Muslim Leagues leaders argued in favour of doing this through the old system of handing out arms to the big khans and letting them arm their personal following. This system had been used in 1930–31 but Cunningham was strongly opposed to trying it again, as he believed it had seriously aggravated the Red Shirt agitation.[55]

In July 1941, owing to the grave British set-backs in the war, the Viceroy decided to appeal for support over the heads of the all-India leaders and instead invite provincial leaders to join a National Defence Council. One of those who accepted to sit on the council was the Punjab premier Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, who in addition to being leader of the Unionist Party in Punjab was also a member of the Muslim League. Sir Sikander had not consulted Jinnah, who after a short intense controversy managed to force the Punjab premier to resign from the council. While the dispute between Jinnah and Sir Sikander was going on, Aurangzeb and the other Frontier Muslim League leaders supported Jinnah, but privately Aurangzeb wrote to Cunningham expressing his approval of Sir Sikander's line of action.[56]

[52] *Khyber Mail* 3/11/40.

[53] Governor's Report 23/8/40.

[54] On 15th June the Working Committee of the AIML had decided that pending further instructions from Jinnah no Muslim Leaguers were to serve on war committees. Menon p. 87.

[55] Cunningham's Diary 22/6/40 Cunningham Papers.

[56] Governor's Report 8/8/40.

When 1943 arrived, the deadlock between the AINC and the British was complete. The Quit India movement had been suppressed and the Congress in the NWFP and other provinces for the big time being rendered powerless. The British were as anxious as ever to get all support they could, so long as the terms did not include surrender of any real powers at the centre. The Muslim League, for its part, did not at this stage bother much about what powers the British retained but was mainly interested in gaining as wide recognition as possible, from the Indian public as well as the British. The vacuum left by the Congress gave them their chance.

Chapter V

Politics on British Terms, 1943–45

The Muslim League Ministry

So long as the Congress dominated the NWFP, the party could with a measure of justification claim to represent not only the Hindus of India but also an important section of the Muslims. It was therefore essential for Jinnah to break the Congress domination on the Frontier and instead establish the Muslim League as the leading political party. We have already seen how anxious he was after the resignation of the Congress to see a Muslim League or Muslim League-dominated ministry installed in Peshawar.[1] He failed in this but his efforts continued. In an interview with the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow he asked for assistance from the governor in these efforts. A non-Congress ministry in the NWFP, said Jinnah, would show the world what the real position was in India. The Viceroy promised to communicate Jinnah's views to Cunningham,[2] but this led to no substantial results.

There were many obstacles in the way. One problem was the Muslim League label itself. The Frontier League needed support from the Hindu and Sikh MLAs but obviously they fought shy of allying themselves with a party with that name.[3] Naturally their antipathy increased after the Muslim League had adopted the Pakistan resolution.[4]

Another obstacle was the factionalism prevailing in the Frontier Muslim League. The struggle between Aurangzeb Khan and K.B. Saadullah Khan went on. Each of them regarded himself as the natural choice for the premiership.[5] In addition, there were "too many selfish, ambitious and private feuds" in the party to allow the formation of a Muslim League ministry.[6]

Soon after the Quit India movement had begun, Lord Linlithgow again took up the question of a "Muhammedan Government" in the NWFP with Cunningham[7] but the latter did not think the prospects were favourable.[8] The question was,

[1] See above p. 115.
[2] Menon p. 76 f.
[3] See e.g., Governor's Report 9/1/40.
[4] Governor's Report 9/4/40.
[5] Governor's Report 9/1/40; interview with Mian Ziauddin.
[6] Governor's Report 9/1/40. See also Governor's Report 22/2/40.
[7] Telegram Linlithgow to Cunningham 28/8/42 IOL R/3/1/50.
[8] Telegram Cunningham to Linlithgow 29/8/42 IOL R/3/1/50.

however, kept alive through the autumn.[9] In January 1943 the Muslim League leader in the assembly, Aurangzeb Khan, began trying in earnest to mobilise a majority for a ministry under his leadership. His position in the assembly had by now been drastically strengthened owing to the Quit India movement. Seven Congress MLAs had been imprisoned for participating in the campaign. Another seven seats had fallen vacant through deaths and for other reasons. Thus the total strength of the assembly had been reduced to only thirty-six.[10] In May Aurangzeb managed to convince Cunningham that he had a sufficient following to command majority[11] and on 25th May a Muslim League-dominated ministry under Aurangzeb Khan was sworn in.[12] The new ministry consisted of the following members: Sardar Aurangzeb Khan (chief minister), Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (finance minister), Mohammad Samin Jan (education minister), Abdur Rahman Khan (information minister) and Sardar Ajit Singh (minister for public works).[13]

Sir Abdul Qaiyum's ministry had three members, Dr Khan Sahib's four and now Aurangzeb's had five. Aurangzeb had insisted on a fifth minister because of all extra work connected with the war but this was in Cunningham's opinion sheer nonsense.[14] The reason was of course that in the absence of a party organisation and a real programme only patronage could attract a sufficient number of supporters.

It is not clear how much support this ministry actually had in the assembly at the time of its formation.[15] It seems doubtful if it ever had a majority, and even if it did, this majority was never stable. Factionalism was rampant in the party and waverers were all the time waiting to cross the floor, should that prove more advantageous.

Owing to the absence of a real party organisation, ideology and programme the ministerial party could be held together only through a liberal exercise of

[9] Linlithgow to Cunningham 23/9/42; Cunningham to Linlithgow 12/10/42 and 9/11/42. All documents in IOL R/3/1/50.

[10] Governor's Report 23/1/43.

[11] Cunningham's Diary 13/5/43 Cunningham Papers; Telegrams Cunningham to Linlithgow 13/5/43 IOL R/3/1/51.

[12] Telegram Cunningham to Linlithgow 25/5/43 IOL R/3/1/51.

[13] Abdur Rab Nishtar had been elected to the assembly as an Independent. To begin with he had supported Dr Khan Sahib but had soon broken with the Congress. Samin Jan was an old Red Shirt and had been elected to the assembly as a Congressite. In 1938, however, he left the Congress. According to Cunningham the reason was that he had not been given any ministership (Governor's Report 9/11/38). Abdur Rahman Khan represented the Hazara bloc in the Muslim League parliamentary party. About half of the members of the parliamentary party came from Hazara. Sardar Ajit Singh had in 1937 stood as an Independent but soon after being elected he joined the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party and now, finally, he joined Aurangzeb's ministry. See also Appendix II Sikh Southern Districts.

[14] Cunningham's Diary 25/5/43 Cunningham Papers.

[15] See telegram from Government of India, Information and Broadcasting Department, to Secretary of State for India 17/8/43 IOL L/P&J/8/659; Aurangzeb Khan to Jinnah 1/5/43 QAP File F. 329; Governor's Report 24/8/43.

patronage. But this inevitably led to the provincial Muslim League being split into two factions—those who benefited from the party's assumption of office and those who did not.[16] The latter faction was led by Saadullah Khan, Aurangzeb's old rival for the premiership, who had not been given any portfolio at all in the ministry. Saadullah Khan never accepted Aurangzeb as chief minister and throughout endeavoured to undermine his position in the assembly and in the party. He did this among other things by appealing to the landlord element in the assembly. As already mentioned, Saadullah Khan was himself one of the leading landlords of Charsadda, who constituted something of the hard core of the provincial Muslim League. In the autumn session of 1943 he tabled a private motion recommending the government to give back with retrospective effect to the former beneficiaries all *inams* and similar stipends which had been abolished by the Congress ministry.[17] Aurangzeb assured that he was in sympathy with the motion, promised that he would look into the matter and then prevailed on Saadullah Khan to withdraw the motion.[18] In the next session the chief minister was reminded of his promise. His parliamentary secretary answered for him that the question "was receiving the attention" of the government,[19] but nothing was ever done about it.

Pakistan was another sensitive question for the ministry, as it was bound to cause problems with the Sikh minister Ajit Singh. Aurangzeb tried to lie low but Saadullah Khan would not let him. He urged the ministers "to declare their policy about Pakistan". Aurangzeb, he said, had been called the "Lion of the Frontier" and had been "heard roaring whenever there was a meeting [where] he pleaded the cause of Pakistan and that is why I wish that he should declare his policy on this point." But this time, too, Aurangzeb managed to side-track the delicate issue raised by his rival.[20]

These skirmishes continued. In November 1944 Saadullah Khan informed Jinnah that he could no longer support the ministry and that if a no-confidence motion was tabled, he would vote in favour of it.[21]

Aurangzeb's position was weak not only in the parliamentary party but also in the provincial Muslim League organisation, such as it was. At a meeting of the provincial League Council on 24th October 1943 a resolution was tabled expressing no confidence in the ministry. The mover was Arbab Mohammad Ayub Khan, "a very important League worker." In the end he withdrew the motion and

[16] This point was stressed by Mian Ziauddin, when I interviewed him.

[17] LAD VIII p. 83. According to Taj Ali Khan to Jinnah n.d. NAP Shamsul Hasan Collection File 29, Aurangzeb had promised the khans that if he became chief minister his first action would be to restore to them their old *inams* and similar rights, which they had previously enjoyed.

[18] LAD VIII p. 87.

[19] LAD IX p. 161.

[20] LAD VII p. 107.

[21] Saadullah Khan to Jinnah 9/11/44 NAP Shamsul Hasan Collection File 29.

instead a resolution was passed requesting Jinnah to come to the province to take stock of the situation.[22]

To be able to stay in office the ministers had to resort to increasingly desperate methods and this coloured the whole Muslim League administration. It gained notoriety for its obsequiousness to the British, lack of achievement, corruption and political repression.

In a preliminary talk with the governor before the revocation of governor's rule, Aurangzeb "agreed in the first place to include in his first public statement an assurance that he would wholeheartedly support the war effort of the Province ... [On] general administrative questions, his desire would be to do nothing embarrassing to the Governor or his officers and to rely for technical advice on the Government Secretaries."[23] About two months later Cunningham wrote in his diary:

> Aurangzeb is extremely amenable and anxious to do as I want. He seems to have forgotten that the function of a Minister is to advise the Governor. Nearly every file comes from him with a note: "I solicit the advice of H.E. the Governor"![24]

And in August 1944 the governor wrote that "Aurangzeb is so embarrassingly friendly and complimentary to all British Officers that it is sometimes difficult to remember his failings, which are only those of weakness and nothing else."[25]

Very little constructive work was done by the Muslim League ministry. During Dr Khan Sahib's twenty-six months in office forty-two Acts were passed by the assembly. Aurangzeb remained in power for twenty-two months but in that period only ten Acts were passed. Most of them were amendment Acts of very minor importance. The ministry did introduce one Bill betokening an interest in social reform, namely the Trade Employees Bill of 1943. The aim of this Bill was to limit the working hours of persons employed in shops and commercial houses and to secure for them "holidays, leave without pay, and prompt payment of wages."[26] In the spring session of 1944 the Bill was referred to a select committee.[27] As there was no session in the autumn of 1944 and the ministry fell in the spring session of 1945, the ministers never got any opportunity to see the Bill passed under their aegis. It is clear, however, that they did not really take much interest in this Bill. After the Congress had assumed office in the spring of 1945, it fell on the new chief minister Dr Khan Sahib to present the report of the select committee. He had, however, no report to submit, as no meeting of the committee had been called by his predecessor. The new government, said Dr Khan Sahib, was not prepared

[22] Mian Ziauddin to Jinnah 25/10/43 with enclosure QAP File 574. Arbab Mohammad Ayub Khan of Landi was one of the most important pro-government khans in the province.

[23] Governor's Report 24/5/43.

[24] Cunningham's diary 19/7/43 Cunningham Papers.

[25] *Op. cit.* 15/8/44.

[26] LAD VIII p. 29.

[27] LAD IX p. 111.

"to adopt too many illegitimate children of the previous Government" and the Bill was dropped.[28]

What little legislation was passed under the Muslim League regime concerned largely the interests of the ministers and the MLAs. Even before the revocation of governor's rule, Aurangzeb had approached Cunningham requesting him to pass a Governor's Act to increase the ministerial salaries.[29] The governor would not do this and the ministers had to deal with the matter themselves. The first Act passed after the Muslim League had come into office, the Ministers' Salaries (Amendment) Act, raised the salary of the Chief Minister to Rs. 1,750 per mensem and those of the other ministers to Rs. 1,500 per mensem.[30] The Speaker's and Deputy Speaker's (Amendment) Act raised the salaries of the Speakers,[31] and the Legislative Assembly (Members' Allowance) (Amendment) Act increased the allowances of the MLAs.[32] True, the war had led to a very high rate of inflation, but nevertheless the proportion of legislation devoted to increasing the emoluments of the ministers and the legislators was remarkably large.

Patronage was the only means by which the ministerial party could be held together and the ministers soon made themselves known for their generous dissemination of largesse among their followers. Not long after their assumption of office Cunningham complained of "a certain laxity of conscience" on the part of his ministers. They cared little for the public good and saw only to their party. He had already had to take them to task for using an excessive amount of petrol on canvassing tours and for using subordinate government officials for purposes of election propaganda.[33] Such complaints are common in Cunningham's reports from this period. In February 1944 he wrote:

> I am not happy about the way my ministers—particularly the Chief Minister—sometimes allow party or personal considerations to colour their official action. They are constantly trying to please their partisans by doing them favours.[34]

Taken individually these favours were usually of no great importance. They could concern the appointment or transfer of a relative, the grant of an export permit for *gur* or potatoes, the allotment of funds to a particular village and so forth. The total sum of these favours had, however, brought the ministry into disrepute. On a few occasions the chief minister had also allowed himself to be swayed by party considerations in really important matters such as communal riots and the exercise of his powers of clemency. There was, in Cunningham's opinion, "no

[28] LAD X p. 142. In 1946 Dr Khan Sahib's third ministry prepared a new Trade Employees Bill. *NWFP Govt. Gazette Extraordinary* 20/11/46.

[29] Telegram Cunningham to Linlithgow 20/5/43 IOL R/3/1/51.

[30] Act I of 1943.

[31] Act II of 1943.

[32] Act VI of 1943.

[33] Governor's Report 9/7/43.

[34] Governor's Report 9/2/44.

question that the Muslim League Ministry has far less sense of duty to the public than their Congress predecessors had."[35] About a year after the Muslim League had taken office Cunningham wrote in his diary:

> There is no doubt that the name of the Muslim League administration is simply mud nowadays owing to the scandalous way in which they buy votes.[36]

The most difficult problem the administration had to deal with during the war was the shortage of food, cloth and other essential commodities. This problem arose over the whole of India and in many parts it was far worse than in the NWFP. In Bengal there occurred a famine which claimed more than a million lives.[37]

Prices began rising in the NWFP long before the Muslim League took office.[38] The governor and his officials made arrangements to meet the crisis and these arrangements were accepted *in toto* by Aurangzeb, when he came into power.[39] However, the price rise continued and new measures became necessary. On the whole the Frontier government's arrangements were the same as those in other provinces[40] and will not be dealt with in detail here. In April 1944 a limit was imposed on the prices chargeable on the chief food staples.[41] This led to an artificial shortage as many hurried to sell their stocks at the rates obtaining before the controls were introduced, and then withheld what they had left in the hope that the government would find itself forced to lift the control.[42] The government responded by importing grain from Punjab but had to pay a higher price than the maximum price imposed in the NWFP. This was common knowledge among the hoarders, who continued to hold back their stocks and the market remained sluggish.[43] Cunningham hoped that the situation would improve as soon as the spring crop was harvested,[44] but his hopes failed to materialise.[45] In this situation the governor called a meeting of about a hundred leading *zamindars* and grain dealers to try and convince them that there was no possibility of the government allowing prices to rise further and that there was no point in trying to choke the ordinary channels of the grain trade.[46] He wrote personally to some of the bigger landholders in every district telling them how much he expected them to sell to government agents or traders.[47] A campaign, in which government officials as

[35] *Ibid.*
[36] Cunningham's diary 27/5/44 Cunningham Papers.
[37] *Famine Enquiry Commission Report on Bengal* p. 1.
[38] The price fluctuations are shown in each FR.
[39] Governor's Report 23/6/43.
[40] For this, see *Famine Enquiry Commission Report on Bengal* p. 42 ff.
[41] FR I April 1944.
[42] Governor's Report 21/4/44, 11/5/44.
[43] Governor's Report 9/8/44.
[44] Governor's Report 11/5/44.
[45] FR I June 1944.
[46] Governor's Report 24/6/44.
[47] Governor's Report 9/7/44.

well as the ministers themselves and their supporters took part, was launched to persuade people to market their stored crops.[48] It was all to no avail, and in July the government found itself forced to issue an order under the Defence of India Rules empowering the government to requisition grain compulsorily from the bigger grain producers.[49] Such procurements began in August but progress was slow.[50] In September, however, the situation began to improve, largely as a result of food allotments from the central government.[51]

A political dispute arose over the question who was responsible for the food shortage, the producers or the dealers. Muslim League supporters claimed that the shortage was caused by a conspiracy between the Congress and the Hindu traders with a view to discrediting the Muslim League ministry. In Congress circles, on the other hand, the big khans in the Muslim League were accused of having created the shortage.[52] The various controls and their administration became one of the chief targets for the Congress propaganda. Congress speakers tried to sabotage the effect of the control measures by exhorting producers to keep their grain in the villages for local consumption instead of delivering it to the government.[53] On one occasion the son of Dr Khan Sahib, Obeidullah Khan, even announced that he would sell grain at a price above that fixed by the government and actually managed to sell some "to about forty persons, all Redshirts or their supporters."[54] People were advised to return their ration cards in protest against the quota allotted to them. After one meeting a Congress leader managed to collect about four hundred sugar ration cards.[55]

Generally speaking, it was the governor who was in actual charge of the food administration and the ministers just followed his advice. It could be argued, however, that in this field the ministers did show a measure of political courage. Although the control measures were extremely unpopular in wide circles, they never made any attempt to dissociate themselves from them. On the contrary, they were so emphatic about their determination to keep prices down that Cunningham believed they were to some extent responsible for creating the shortage, as people who heard about it hurried to sell before statutory prices were imposed.[56] Furthermore, the price controls and compulsory procurements entailed direct political risks for the ministry. It was the biggest landlords who could gain

[48] FR I July 1944.
[49] Governor's Report 9/7/44, 23/7/44.
[50] FR II Aug. 1944.
[51] Governor's Report 26/9/44.
[52] See e.g., FR II Sept. 1943 Appendix.
[53] See e.g., FR I and II July 1944.
[54] FR II July 1944.
[55] FR I Feb. 1944. Simultaneously with this campaign the Congress also tried to prevail on people not to pay land revenue or any other taxes but it seems without much success. See e.g. FR I Dec. 1944.
[56] Governor's Report 23/10/43.

most from hoarding but instead they were subjected to coercive measures. On the other hand, the government controls increased the amount of patronage at the disposal of the ministry, a commodity they needed badly. Those who were put in charge of the purchases and distribution of food grains were as far as possible recruited from the ministry's own supporters and in this way the ministers propped up their weakening position.[57]

Cunningham had invited Aurangzeb Khan to form a ministry on the assumption that it would have a majority in the assembly even if, or as the governor saw it, when the detained Congress MLAs were released.[58] That was an overoptimistic assumption and to be able to stay in office Aurangzeb had to keep his opponents incarcerated. After the Quit India movement had petered out, Cunningham had ordered a gradual release of the political prisoners. When the Muslim League came into power, the pace at which they were released slowed down considerably. Cunningham felt disturbed by this and urged the ministers to release all political detenus. Eventually the ministers decided to release all prisoners except the most dangerous ones. However, all detained Congress MLAs fell within the category excluded from the amnesty.[59]

The governor continued to press the ministers to release the detained MLAs but, fearing a defeat in the assembly, Aurangzeb was not willing to comply with his requests unconditionally. To protect his position he tried to get an undertaking from the prisoners that if they were released, they would not oppose him but instead form a new "People's Party". As an extra attraction they were offered "a rather vague chance to start some co-operative stores". Cunningham told Aurangzeb "in terms not usually used to a Prime Minister" that he refused to be a party to this cat and mouse policy. At this Aurangzeb "seemed rather perturbed" and "said rather plaintively that he thought he was doing really useful work by getting an undertaking out of them, but as soon as I [Cunningham] thought he was not being any use he was quite ready to resign." Cunningham told Aurangzeb that he did not want him to resign "but that he should make a real success of his Ministry."[60]

The first two MLAs were released in the beginning of July 1944. In return for their release they had, according to the governor, promised, firstly, to cooperate fully in the war effort, secondly, to support the government's food policy, and finally, not to vote against the ministry in the next session.[61] Three more MLAs were released in the next few months after, it seems, having given similar promises.[62] But then the releases stopped for some time again. The five relased

[57] Interview with Mian Ziauddin; Governor's Report 22/6/45.
[58] Governor's Report 10/4/44.
[59] Governor's Report 13/9/43.
[60] Cunningham's Diary 10/7/44 Cunningham Papers.
[61] Governor's Report 23/7/44.
[62] Governor's Report 23/10/44.

MLAs rejoined the Congress and attended a meeting of the Congress parliamentary party at which a resolution of no-confidence was passed against the ministry.[63] In January 1945 one more MLA was released.[64] By now, however, it was obvious that the ministry was practically doomed.

Actually, Aurangzeb had been able to stay in power only thanks to the help he received from the governor. When before the spring session of 1944 it became clear that the ministry's position was unsafe, Cunningham told some of the waverers privately that he did not want a ministerial defeat. This, he believed, prevented them from going over to the Congress.[65] After the releases of the Congress MLAs had begun, the ministry's situation became critical. In the autumn of 1944 Cunningham saved it by simply not calling the assembly. The ministry had in any case not prepared any business to be put before the assembly. When Cunningham announced his decision, the secretary of the Congress parliamentary party sent a letter signed by twenty MLAs to him requesting him to convene the assembly to discuss a motion of no confidence in the ministry.[66] The governor replied that he did not think that was sufficient reason to rescind his decision.[67]

In the spring of 1945 a session could no longer be avoided and on 12th March a no-confidence motion was passed against the ministry by twenty-four votes to eighteen.[68] One of those supporting the motion was K.B. Saadullah Khan.[69]

The Frontier Muslim League came into power in 1943 and managed to stay in office until 1945 not because of the party's inherent strength but because of the deadlock between the Congress and the British. The Congress not only refused to cooperate with the British but also incapacitated itself through the Quit India campaign. The British, for their part, were anxious to get whatever support they could get and in addition to the NWFP Muslim League ministries came into being in Assam (August 1942), Sind (October 1942) and Bengal (April 1943). These ministries had the same official backing as the Frontier ministry and were supported by the same landlord or other pro-British interests. Their records were also similar or even worse.[70]

[63] *Tribune* 30/10/44.
[64] Governor's Report 23/1/45.
[65] Governor's Report 10/4/44.
[66] Governor's Report 9/10/44; note by Cunningham called *Summary of my fortnightly reports March 1937–February 1946* p. 30 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/17.
[67] Governor's Report 23/11/44.
[68] Governor's Report 23/3/45.
[69] *Tribune* 13/3/43.
[70] Smith p. 276 f.; Menon pp. 148–151.

The Attempts to Reorganise the Frontier Muslim League

We have seen that the Frontier Muslim League, which took shape in the years 1937–39, was no real party with a firm organisation and a common programme. Instead it was but a conglomerate of people who were united by their opposition to the Congress but otherwise were hopelessly divided among themselves. The situation in other provincial Muslim Leagues was often not much better. But the Congress policy during the war enabled the AIML to take the offensive and between 1942 and 1945 Jinnah through a variety of measures managed to turn the party into a mass movement.[71] Only in the NWFP was there no improvement. The confusion there continued despite repeated attempts from 1943 on by the High Command to put the organisation on a sounder basis.

In connection with some by-elections in 1943 Nawab Ismail Khan, Chairman of the AIML Civil Defence Committee, and Syed Zakir Ali, the secretary of the Committee, paid a visit to the NWFP. They found the provincial League to be in a deplorable condition. The relations between Aurangzeb Khan and K.B. Saadullah Khan were much worse than they could have imagined. The latter's behaviour was particularly reprehensible. Owing to his enmity with Aurangzeb he intrigued against the official League candidate in one constituency. According to the two emissaries he even intrigued with the Hindu leader R.B. Mehr Chand Khanna. They were also very critical of Aurangzeb Khan. His high-handedness in the selection of candidates had led to serious discontent in the party. Even the president of the provincial Muslim League, it seems, kept aloof from the election campaign. These personal difficulties apart, the party organisation was highly defective. In fact, with the exception of the Peshawar City Muslim League, the party existed only on paper. Finally, the reputation of the provincial Muslim League was very bad. "The League is regarded here", wrote Nawab Ismail Khan, "as a citadel of a few ambitious individuals who utilize it for their own purposes." To remedy the situation he suggested that an organising committee controlled by the League High Command be set up.[72]

In June 1944 the Committee of Action of the AIML visited the NWFP. This visit took place in the face of "considerable opposition" from Aurangzeb Khan.[73] The committee toured in the districts and met League leaders at different levels. The picture they got was depressing. There was still total chaos in the party organisation. No statement could be more devastating than that of Mian Ziauddin himself, the general secretary of the Frontier Muslim League. On paper there were district branches in every district but from some districts he had never had any

[71] For this transformation of the Muslim League, see Zaidi in Philips and Wainwright pp. 267–271; Hardy pp. 233–235.

[72] Nawab Ismail (to ? date ?) NAP AIML Papers Serial No. 1400 Vol. No. 310 ML/35. The text is partly corrupt.

[73] Governor's Report 24/6/44.

communications. There were no two-anna members of the Muslim League in the entire province. The only body of the provincial League which met regularly was the provincial League Council but the members of it had not been properly elected. Instead district presidents had at Mian Ziauddin's request only sent in names of the representatives of their districts. The Organising Committee headed by Aurangzeb Khan which the Defence Committee of the AIML had set up had never met. The provincial League had no office and no staff. To Mian Ziauddin's knowledge none of the Muslim League MLAs were members of any primary League.[74]

Equally serious charges were made from every direction. The most important points were: The ministry was thoroughly corrupt and even the premier himself accepted bribes; the big khans dominated the League and this prevented the League from becoming a mass party; the ministers took no interest in the problems of the masses; the enmity between Aurangzeb and Saadullah Khan caused the League great harm; the ministry was controlled by the bureaucracy.[75]

At the end of their visit, the Committee of Action held a meeting at which "the unsatisfactory state of affairs of the League organisation throughout the province" was discussed. The committee decided that a complete overhaul of the Frontier Muslim League must be undertaken. This task was entrusted to Qazi Isa, a prominent Pakhtun Muslim Leaguer from Baluchistan. He was instructed first to make arrangements for the enrolment of primary members and the establishment of primary Leagues. When primary Leagues had been formed, he was to arrange elections of office-bearers to the city and district branches. Finally, after these elections had been held, he was to arrange elections of office-bearers in the provincial Muslim League and of representatives to the Council of the AIML.[76]

In April the Frontier Muslim League and all its branches were dissolved. The reason given was that the work of enrolling primary members had been completed and that elections of office-bearers were soon to be held. Qazi Isa was given plenipotentiary powers to do this as he thought best.[77] It seems doubtful whether he had really enrolled any significant number of primary members. In any case, it is obvious that his reorganisation failed. The elections of office-bearers were never held and the organisational problems of the Frontier League continued. In June 1945 Qazi Isa decided that, as "it would take some time" before the new League bodies could assume their responsibilities, ad-hoc committees, one for each dis-

[74] Statement by Mian Ziauddin 22/6/44 Archives of Freedom Movement Muslim League Records Vol. 343.

[75] *Proceedings of the visit of the Committee of Action of* [sic] *N.W.F.P.* Archives of Freedom Movement Muslim League Records Vol. 343.

[76] *Proceedings of the Meetings of the Committee of Action 1944–45* Vol. I (the meeting of the 27th and 28th June 1944) NAP All-India Muslim Record Vol. No. 193 Index No. 20.

[77] *Resolution passed by the Committee of Action* at their meeting 13/4–15/4/45 Archives of Freedom Movement Muslim League Records Vol. 344.

trict and one for Peshawar City, should be appointed to be in charge of League affairs. By and large these committees consisted of the same people as had previously been in control of the provincial League. Of the old leaders it was only Saadullah Khan, who was not included in any committee.[78] Not surprisingly there was no improvement.

After a visit to the province by two leading members of the central League, Chaudhri Khaliquzzaman and the Nawab of Mamdot, the ad-hoc committees were replaced by yet another organisation in October 1945. In view of the fact that "no regular Muslim League organisation" existed in the province it was decided to set up a new machinery to run the forthcoming elections for the Muslim League. Three different boards were constituted for this purpose: 1. – the Election Board, which was given the rather vague task of "organising and making all necessary arrangements for contesting the Elections"; 2.–the Finance Board, which was made responsible for the "collection of funds and maintenance of regular and proper accounts"; and 3. – the Selection Board which was to select the Muslim League candidates.[79]

Of these boards it was only the Selection Board which managed to fulfill its function. The other two were so faction-ridden that they were unable to do any real work. When Abdur Rab Nishtar, the chairman of the Election Board, requested the members of his board to prepare budgets for their respective districts, only the members from Hazara were able to do this. The others were so divided among themselves that they appeared unable to sit together at all.[80] The work of the Finance Board was equally difficult. Mian Ziauddin, who was the convenor of the board, wrote to Liaqat Ali Khan that his board contained

> some people whom I consider most dangerous for the League and who will oppose us the moment their relatives fail to obtain the league ticket. In such circumstances the expenditure will have to be kept secret from them. What am I to do if they are still members of the election board?[81]

The work of the Selection Board went more smoothly. Presumably the fact that of its nine members all but two received tickets contributed to the relative peace in that committee. Of the two, who failed to get nominated by their colleagues, one broke with the Muslim League.[82]

In December 1945 these boards were replaced by a seven-man Committee of

[78] The list of the members is found in *Khyber Mail* 22/6/45.

[79] *Extracts from the proceedings of the Central Parliamentary Board's meeting held at Delhi on the 8th and 9th October, 1945.* Jalaluddin Papers.

[80] Abdur Rab Nishtar to Liaqat Ali Khan 2/11/45 Archives of Freedom Movement Muslim League Records Vol. 344.

[81] Mian Ziauddin to Liaqat Ali Khan 2/11/45 Archives of Freedom Movement Muslim League Records Vol. 344.

[82] See below p. 147 f.

Action, which was to be responsible for the Muslim League election campaign in the NWFP.[83]

Elections were held in the beginning of 1946. The League captured only seventeen seats, which was a bad disappointment for the party. In April 1946 another attempt was made to reorganise the Frontier League. A forty-man Organising Committee was charged with the task of enrolling primary members, forming primary Leagues and holding elections of office-bearers.[84] But when the AIML decided to resort to "Direct Action" the elections were postponed. Instead it was decided to set up Committees of Action in the provinces, districts and at the local level, which were to exercise all powers and functions of the executives of the corresponding Leagues.[85]

I have gone into these organisational questions in some detail to show that the Frontier Muslim League remained in disarray throughout the period under review in this study. The ultimate victory of Pakistan in the NWFP was due to other factors than the work of the provincial Muslim League.

[83] *Resolution of the All-India Muslim League Central Parliamentary* [Board] *passed at Peshawar on the 7th December, 1945.* Jalaluddin Papers.

[84] *Proceedings of the Committee of Action 1945–47* Vol. II (the meeting held 11–18/4/46) NAP Vol. No. 193 Index No. 20.

[85] *Proceedings of the Committee of Action 1945–47* Vol. II (the meeting held 8–9/9/46) NAP Vol. No. 193 Index No. 20.

Chapter VI

Interlude: The Congress Resumes Power

Dr Khan Sahib's Second Ministry

In 1945 the political situation in India became drastically altered. The war came to an end and thus the question of Indian independence could no longer be deferred. The victory of the Labour Party in the British general elections meant that a government which was committed to granting India independence came into office. The only problems which remained were how and to whom power was to be transferred.

The approach of independence and the problems connected with it increasingly coloured all levels of politics. The over-riding issue was whether India should stay united or whether she should be partitioned. Naturally this question was particularly acute in the Muslim-majority provinces. In this chapter, we shall, however, as far as possible confine ourselves to a provincial perspective. The all-India developments and their consequences for provincial politics will be dealt with in the next chapter. The reader must, however, keep in mind that the provincial politicians operated in an atmosphere of growing tension owing to the all-India developments, and in which events in other parts of the country increasingly impinged on provincial politics.

In the spring of 1945 it was obvious that the Congress was beginning to reconsider its policy of non-cooperation. This also meant that the position of the Muslim League became weaker. In four of the five provinces claimed for Pakistan by Jinnah, Muslim League ministries were in power, the only exception being Punjab. In all these four provinces ministerial changes took place. To be able to stay in office the premier in Assam had to accept a number of conditions laid down by the provincial Congress. These did not include membership of the ministry but all non-Muslim ministers were replaced by men acceptable to the Congress and all political prisoners were released. In Bengal the Congress leader approached the Muslim League premier in the hope that a coalition might be formed. Owing to defections from the ministerial party the plan fell through and in the end the governor had to take over the administration. In Sind the ministry was defeated in the assembly on a revenue demand. After many manoeuvres, however, the chief minister managed to reconstruct his ministry.[1]

[1] Menon p. 180 f.

In the NWFP, as we have seen, the Muslim League ministry of Aurangzeb Khan fell in March and was succeeded by a Congress ministry under Dr Khan Sahib. The formation of this ministry was, however, no foregone conclusion. It was preceded by much mystery-making to conceal the political horse-trading that became necessary before a ministry could be formed, and, as non-cooperation, particularly in regard to the war, was still the official policy of the AINC, the British would not allow Dr Khan Sahib to take office without first receiving guarantees of cooperation.

Before the decisive vote in the assembly, twenty-one MLAs had signed a pledge to vote against the Muslim League ministry[2] but that was still no majority. Moreover, as the policy of non-cooperation officially remained in force, a deadlock followed by governor's rule was as likely as a Congress ministry if Aurangzeb should fall.[3] This weakened the position of the Congress, as it had no certain advantages to offer waverers in the way of patronage. In February the Frontier Congress sent a deputation to Gandhi to seek his permission for the formation of a Congress ministry in the NWFP. Gandhi would not give any definite instructions except that he was opposed to a return to governor's rule. Otherwise he left the decision to the Khan brothers.[4] However, on their return to Peshawar the deputation did not disclose what Gandhi had said and the public as well as the governor were left in the dark about the Congress plans.[5] Soon before the assembly was convened, a few defections took place from the ministerial party. Among the defectors were two parliamentary secretaries. One of them, Raja Manocher Khan, joined the Congress.[6]

If the Congress should turn out to be willing to accept office, the governor intended to make it clear to them that they would be allowed to do so only on condition that they declared they were prepared to "co-operate whole-heartedly in the administration of the province." Cunningham doubted if they were prepared to do that.[7] The Viceroy, on the other hand, did not consider such a promise sufficient and insisted they must pledge "to co-operate whole-heartedly in the prosecution of the War". Unless Cunningham was satisfied they were prepared to agree to that, he must not let the Frontier Congress form a ministry.[8]

On 12th March the no-confidence motion was passed and the ministry resigned. The governor sent for Dr Khan Sahib and informed him of the terms on which he would be invited to form a ministry. Dr Khan Sahib asked for time to

[2] *Tribune* 13/2/45.

[3] Governor's Report 9/2/45, 9/3/45.

[4] Dr Khan Sahib told Cunningham afterwards that this was what Gandhi had said. Governor's Report 23/3/45. See also *Tribune* 15/3/45.

[5] Governor's Report 23/2/45, 9/3/45.

[6] *Tribune* 9/3/45, 7/4/45.

[7] Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State 11/3/45 containing the text of a telegram from Cunningham to Viceroy 9/3/45 IOL L/P&J/8/659.

[8] Telegram Viceroy to Cunningham 11/3/45 IOL L/P&J/8/659.

consider his position.[9] The following day a party of Congress MLAs visited Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Haripur Jail to hear his opinion. He had previously been known to be opposed to the Congress assuming office again but now he consented to it.[10] In view of Gandhi's instructions and the fact that the Muslim League ministry had already fallen, he did not have much choice, whatever his real feelings may have been. Dr Khan Sahib gave Cunningham the necessary assurances privately[11] and on 16th March a new Congress administration took office.[12] It is noteworthy that one of the new parliamentary secretaries was Raja Manocher Khan.[13]

The assumption of office by the Frontier Congress raised the question how far the AINC was prepared to go to meet the British. In reply to a question in the House of Commons the Secretary of State for India, L.S. Amery, said among other things that Dr Khan Sahib's ministry was supporting the war effort. This statement aroused the interest of the Indian press. When Dr Khan Sahib was asked by journalists about the circumstances surrounding his acceptance of office, he claimed that he had not given any assurance of support for the war effort; the question had simply not arisen.[14] The acting Viceroy, Sir John Colville, found this answer disturbing and called Cunningham's attention to Dr Khan Sahib's evasiveness.[15] Cunningham defended his chief minister, who claimed he had been misrepresented by the newspapers and once more assured the governor of support for the war effort. Cunningham wished to leave the matter at that, as a public statement would only embarrass the chief minister and himself.[16] Colville, was, however, of a different view and wanted Dr Khan Sahib to clarify his position publicly.[17] In the end Dr Khan Sahib issued a statement saying that

> when I accepted office I did so with full intention of running the administration for the benefit of India in general and the people of the Province in particular, and ... at present this involves participation in the general war effort.[18]

The events in connection with the formation of Dr Khan Sahib's second ministry provide a good illustration of how he and Cunningham worked together. Neither of them was greatly interested in formal technicalities, nor did they care much for all-India issues. As long as Frontier politics retained this informal,

[9] Telegram Cunningham to Viceroy 12/3/45 IOL L/P&J/8/659.
[10] Governor's Report 23/3/45.
[11] Cunningham to Viceroy 2/5/45 IOL L/P&J/8/659; Telegram Cunningham to Viceroy 14/3/47 IOL L/P&J/8/659.
[12] Telegram Cunningham to Viceroy 16/3/45 IOL L/P&J/8/659.
[13] *Tribune* 7/4/45.
[14] *Hindustan Times* 25/4/45; also *Civil & Military Gazette* 27/4/45.
[15] Telegram Amery to Viceroy 27/4/45 and telegram Viceroy to Amery 30/4/45 IOL L/P&J/8/659.
[16] Telegram Cunningham to Viceroy 2/5/45 IOL L/P&J/8/659.
[17] *Extract from Private and Secret Letter* ... Colville to Amery 7/5/47 IOL L/P&J/8/659.
[18] Telegram Cunningham to Viceroy 7/5/45 L/P&J/8/659.

almost parochial character, the NWFP remained a model of political calm and tranquillity.

Soon after the assumption of office by Dr Khan Sahib, a Frontier Congress conference was held to paper over all cracks and to rally the party behind the new policy. This was, incidentally, the first lawful Congress meeting since the Quit India movement. It aroused considerable interest, the daily attendance being as large as between eight and ten thousand. It was also attended by prominent Congressites from outside the province, such as Bhulabhai Desai, Sheikh Abdullah and Dr Syed Mahmud.[19] The last-mentioned presided over the proceedings. Resolutions were passed expressing complete faith in Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan; demanding that the Government of India release all political prisoners and that a "National Government" be formed at the centre; and finally approving the assumption of office by the Frontier Congress.[20] Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who by now had been released from jail together with the other political prisoners, gave a speech in which he explained his own attitude. Complete independence remained the final aim but the tactics to achieve it could change according to the situation. As for himself, he said

> I am only a revolutionary, and not a parliamentarian. So I do not attach much importance to the formation of a Ministry. I am not in favour of assembly elections. I have already declared that I am not enamoured of the present constitution under the 1935 Act.

He did not believe a ministry with such limited powers could function properly. Nevertheless, he said

> When I was told that a parliamentary party can serve the people of the N.W.F.P. in a better way, I did not like to stand in the way ... As I myself believe in social service, let them also have their chance to serve the people.[21]

Dr Khan Sahib's second ministry consisted of the same men as his first and pursued the same cautious policies. Despite his political differences with the Congress, Cunningham was glad to see Dr Khan Sahib and his colleagues back in office. He found them on the whole "much more sensible and business-like than the late Ministry."[22]

The shortage of food and other essential commodities remained a serious problem. The arrangements previously introduced by the Muslim League were retained and extended by the Congress. To meet the acute food shortage a system

[19] Bhulabhai Desai was the leader of the Congress parliamentary party in the central assembly. Sheikh Abdullah was the leader of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, which was closely associated with the Congress, and Dr Syed Mahmud was a prominent Congress leader from Bihar.

[20] FR II April 1945; *Civil & Military Gazette* 24/4/45; Governor's Report 9/5/45.

[21] *Civil & Military Gazette* 24/4/45.

[22] Cunningham's Diary 20/4/45 Cunningham Papers.

was introduced whereby government syndicates were given a virtual monopoly of the right to purchase the wheat, which previously had been sold to whole-sale grain dealers.[23] In some parts the system functioned well whereas in other parts the producers did not bring in their crops to the government buyers.

Like their predecessors the Congress ministers used their çontrol of the procurement and distribution of essential commodities for purposes of party patronage and appointed Congress sympathisers as members of the government syndicates and the other bodies in charge of the controls. The governor was of course critical of this but he admitted that the men appointed by the Congress were probably more honest than those appointed by their Muslim League predecessors.[24]

Abdul Ghaffar Khan urged his followers to have nothing to do with the demoralising distribution of food and cloth[25] but, it seems, without much success. Even some of his own relatives appear to have been engaged in lively competition for control over the distribution. On 8th June 1946 a joint meeting was held at Shabqadar in the Charsadda *tahsil* by Muslim Leaguers and Congressites to discuss the distribution problem. The Muslim Leaguers objected to the fact that the local Congress Committee had ben put in charge of the distribution. The meeting ended in fisticuffs and shots being fired. A Congressite by the name of Ata Ullah Khan, nephew of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's wife, was killed, and a leading landowner of the *tahsil*, one Mukarram Khan, was charged with murdering him. In a cross-case three of Ata Ullah Khan's associates were charged with attempted murder. Five of Mukarram Khan's servants had received bullet wounds in the skirmish.[26]

One of the measures taken by Dr Khan Sahib's second ministry was to appoint a committee to investigate charges of corruption against officials. In order to avoid the risk of political victimisation, the committee had no non-official members but consisted exclusively of officials. The chairman was British.[27] Nevertheless Cunningham was not happy about the investigation. He told the chief minister and the members of the committee that he would not allow any "promiscuous vilification of the Services". It was decided that before embarking on inquiries into individual cases the committee would submit an interim report to the governor and the chief minister.[28] After about two months the committee submitted this report. Among other things it contained a number of allegations against some senior Indian officials. Most of the charges concerned transactions in connection with the food and cloth distribution.[29] However, neither Cunningham nor Dr

[23] Governor's Report 9/6/45.
[24] Governor's Report 22/6/45.
[25] *Pakhtun* 15/9/45, 1/8/46.
[26] *Khyber Mail* 5/7/46.
[27] Governor's Report 9/4/45, 9/5/45.
[28] Governor's Report 9/5/45.
[29] Governor's Report 9/7/45.

Khan Sahib showed any eagerness to take action on the report and for the time being it was shelved.[30] Some attempts were subsequently made to revive interest in the question but nothing came of them. Probably the most important consequence of the committee's work was that it strained the relations between the Indian officials and the Congress.

The 1946 Elections

By the end of 1945 the demand for Pakistan had begun to gain considerable support on the Frontier but the provincial Muslim League was unable to benefit from this. The party was dominated by the same people as before and they remained as bitterly divided among themselves as ever. The fact that new elections were due in February underlined the differences in the party rather than united the members.

The Muslim League candidates were selected by the provincial Selection Board. The president of the board was the Nawab of Mamdot from the League High Command, but the selection work was dominated by the convenor of the board, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan from Peshawar.[31] Six of the board's nine members were themselves nominated as Muslim League candidates.[32] Of the three who were not, the Nawab of Mamdot was one. The only members from the Frontier who failed to obtain tickets were Khan Sohbat Khan from Mardan, "an illiterate non-entity", according to Arbab Abdul Ghafoor,[33] and Arbab Abdul Ghafoor himself. He represented the Afghan Jirga, an organisation which had become affiliated to the Muslim League in October, 1945.[34] Toward the end of November, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor temporarily broke with the Muslim League. During a meeting of the Selection Board he got up and declared that the Muslim Leaguers had not fulfilled their part of the pact and that the Afghan Jirga would therefore put up eight candidates of its own. Thereupon he left the meeting.[35] The reason was presumably that he had not been given any ticket himself.[36] Nothing came of his threat that the Afghan Jirga would run its own candidates but Arbab

[30] *Ibid.* and Governor's Report 9/8/45.

[31] Interviews with Arbab Abdul Ghafoor, Malik Damsaz Khan, Mian Ziauddin and Malik Tahmasp.

[32] Abdul Qaiyum himself was nominated for one of the two Peshawar Muslim Urban seats, Arbab Noor Mohammad for the Bara Mohmand Muslim Rural seat, M.R. Kiyani for Hangu Muslim Rural, K.B. Jalauddin for NWFP Towns Muslim Urban, Habibullah Khan for Lakki East Muslim Rural and Abdul Latif Khan for Lakki West Muslim Rural.

[33] Interview with Arbab Abdul Ghafoor.

[34] *Khyber Mail* 6/10/45. For Arbab Abdul Ghafoor and the Afghan Jirga, see also below p. 160 f.

[35] Handwritten note from a meeting of the Selection Board 26/11/45, Jalaluddin Papers.

[36] He denied this, however, when I interviewed him.

Abdul Ghafoor refused to support the Muslim League candidate in his own constituency and took no part in the election campaign.[37]

It is usually claimed that in the selection of candidates Abdul Qaiyum was guided only by one principle—who would support him and who would not.[38] It could, however, be argued that the board just purged the party of those who had given the party a bad name when it was in power. The old leaders, Aurangzeb Khan, K.B. Saadullah Khan and Mian Ziauddin were all denied nomination. All appealed to the Central Selection Board to rescind the decision but only Mian Ziauddin's appeal succeeded. Abdur Rab Nishtar was able to get renominated for his old seat but only with great difficulty.[39]

The Muslim League candidates conducted no coordinated campaign and each candidate canvassed only for himself.[40] To many aspiring politicians the Muslim League was but a label, which might help them win a seat if they could get nominated by the League, but if they could not, they were just as ready to try their luck on their own. Those who applied for the League ticket had to sign a pledge not to stand in case they were not nominated.[41] In Hazara district, the League's stronghold on the Frontier, twenty-three persons applied for the nine constituencies available. Of the fourteen persons who failed to get nominated, six nevertheless decided to stand against the official League candidate.[42] There were also several other disgruntled Muslim League leaders who worked against the League or the official League candidates. In Hazara district, Ghulam Jan Tahirkheli, (the editor of a newspaper and secretary of the Haripur Muslim League), Qazi Asadul Haq (a member of the provincial Election Board who for many years had been battling against Aurangzeb Khan and the League's strongman in Hazara K.B. Jalaluddin), Khan Abdul Jaffar Khan and Abdullah Jan (two League leaders in Mansehra) and K.S. Atai Khan of Battal (MLA for Upper Pakkli) were all expelled from the party for their anti-League activities during the campaign.[43]

The only issue raised by the Muslim League in the election campaign was Pakistan. The election posters in Hazara district read in English translation.

> This election is only for Pakistan. The arrogant Jawaharlal Nehru's announcement that they [the Congress] will crush the Muslim League is a challenge to the faith

[37] Interview with Arbab Abdul Ghafoor.

[38] Arbab Abdul Ghafoor, Mian Ziauddin and Malik Tahmasp all maintained this was the case. See also Mian Ziauddin p. 72.

[39] Mian Ziauddin p. 72 f.

[40] Governor's Report 27/2/46; Mohammad Abbas Khan to the Nawab of Mamdot 6/1/46 NAP Shamsul Hasan Collection File 29; Pir of Manki Sharif to Jinnah 16/1/46 NAP Shamsul Hasan Collection Vol. II. See also Appendix III.

[41] Copies of the application forms are available among the Jalaluddin Papers.

[42] K.B. Jalaluddin to Mian Ziauddin 6/3/46 Jalaluddin Papers.

[43] Secretary, Committee of Action, to Ghulam Jan Tahirkheli, Qazi Asadul Haq, Khan Abdul Jafar Khan, Abdullah Jan and K.S. Atai Khan 15/1/46 Jalaluddin Papers.

and honour of every Muslim. Give him an effective reply for the success of the Muslim League and for the achievement of Pakistan. Cast your precious vote for [name of candidate] who is the candidate selected for the [name] constituency.

This is a dreadful collision between right and wrong. It is the Muslim League's message that in your constituency you should vote for [name of candidate].[44]

The exact meaning of Pakistan was, however, left undefined. In Cunningham's opinion few people were thinking in terms of complete separation from India. What the supporters of Pakistan were interested in was getting some safeguards of Muslim interests in the central government. In November Jinnah visited the NWFP to give a fillip to the League's campaign. So far as Pakistan was concerned, however, it appeared to Cunningham that he was "deliberately vague" on this subject. The governor had asked "several educated and intelligent people" what Jinnah had said about it, but no-one could give a clear answer.[45]

The Congress election campaign was very different from that of the Muslim League. The party was well organised and by and large the campaign was not disturbed by any internal disputes. The Frontier Congress contested all General and Sikh seats, twenty-four out of thirty-three Muslim Rural seats, one Muslim Urban and one Landholders' seat. In some constituencies the Congress had come to an agreement with either the Ahrars or the Jamiat-ul-Ulema that only the party with the best chances of winning the seat should field a candidate and that the other party should support that candidate.[46]

Generally speaking the Congress avoided the question of Pakistan and instead tried to concentrate on social and economic questions. The AINC issued an election manifesto, which in its main features was the same as that issued for the 1937 elections. Emphasis was on social and economic questions, where the manifesto had a vaguely socialist tinge. Only very indirectly did the manifesto take up the communal problem and Pakistan. Independent India would be a democratic and secular state with equal rights for all. It would be a federation "with autonomy for its constituent units". All groups and communities would be free to develop "according to their own wishes and genius". Provincial boundaries would as far as possible be drawn on the basis of language and culture.[47] In the NWFP the Congress candidates by and large also ignored the question of Pakistan. Instead they focussed on the corruption of the Muslim Leaguers and the officials. The Muslim Leaguers were accused of being nothing but British stooges. The election,

[44] Copies of the posters are found among the Jalaluddin Papers.

[45] Governor's Report 8/12/45.

[46] Appendix III; Interview with Yahya Jan. The Ahrars were a Muslim organisation whose programme was similar to that of the Congress but more radical. For the Congress' alliance with the Ahrars and Jamiat-ul-Ulema, see also *Tribune* 11/12/45, 21/9/45, 29/9/45, 5/10/45.

[47] *Election Manifesto.* AICC Papers File P 1/1945–46; also published in Sitaramayya Vol. II Appendix I.

said the Congressites, was a struggle between rich and poor and the choice was between freedom and foreign rule.[48]

Abdul Ghaffar Khan's attitude towards the election was ambivalent. To begin with he said he would have nothing to do with it.[49] The ministry, he said, had very little real power.[50] Only the Khudai Khidmatgar movement could achieve freedom, not the ministry. Therefore he was interested only in the Khudai Khidmatgars and not at all in the ministry. The Pakhtuns must be united but elections only led to a lot of factional feuds.[51] In spite of what Nehru, Azad and others had told him, he was not convinced the Congress should take part in the elections. The truth was, he averred, that those who had been elected before had not been up to the mark but had forgotten their duties to the nation. He criticised the Congress for having done nothing to eradicate corruption but letting it go on as before. The ministry had no policy at all and discussed their programme neither with each other nor with the party. The Khudai Khidmatgar movement was a moral and spiritual one but now people were beginning to think it was an election board.[52]

After some time, however, he overcame his doubts and decided to take part in the Congress election campaign. He was forced to do this, he said, because of the wickedness of the government and its lies about the Khudai Khidmatgars. The struggle was between the Nation and the *Firenghis*. There was no third force. Those who were opposed to the Khudai Khidmatgars were those who had always supported the British.[53]

Two parties, which had previously played a prominent part in provincial politics, had by now dissolved. The first was the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party, which in 1937 had won half of the Hindu and Sikh seats. Faced with the prospect of Pakistan, most Hindus and Sikhs supported the Congress. The other party which had disappeared was the Independent Party, the small urban-based party which had been lead by Pir Baksh and Malik Khuda Baksh. The groups which had previously supported this party now supported either the Congress or the Muslim League, mostly the latter. In addition to the Congress and the Muslim League, several other parties, the Ahrars, the Khaksars, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Sikh party the Akali Dal, took part in the elections, but almost all leading candidates belonged either to the Congress or the Muslim League. Thus the NWFP had been drawn more closely into the orbit of all-India affairs and all-India issues would seem to have set their imprint decisively on provincial politics. However, this development must not be exaggregated. Traditional rivalries and loyalties

[48] For examples of such Congress propaganda, see *Tribune* 5/10/45, 1/10/45, 18/9/45. The elections are dealt with constituency-wise in Appendix III.

[49] *Pakhtun* 1/8/45.

[50] E.g., *Pakhtun* 25/9/45.

[51] *Pakhtun* 8/11/45.

[52] *Pakhtun* 17/10/45.

[53] *Pakhtun* 1/1/46, 9/1/46, 1/3/46.

continued to determine people's political affiliation and voting patterns. According to Cunningham, the main feature of the elections was that they were "fought, not on any kind of party programme (neither party has any programme intelligible to the electorate), but on grounds of personal faction-feeling." In Bannu district, where he spent a few days soon before the elections, "the results in the voting for the Muslim seats seem likely to be decided by the number of sheep each candidate can kill to feast his supporters", the general estimate being ten votes per sheep.[54]

The franchise qualifications were the same as in 1937 but, probably owing to the inflation and the good times in agriculture, those enfranchised constituted twice as large a share of the total population as in 1937, or about twenty per cent as compared with about ten per cent. In fact, the electoral rolls for 1946 included virtually the whole adult male population.[55]

The elections took place between 26 January and 14 February. The results are shown in Table 9. The Congress won an absolute majority, or in all 30 out of 50 seats, while the Muslim League suffered a humiliating defeat in this Muslim-majority province, winning only 17 seats. In the Pakhtun-dominated areas the Congress victory was almost total, whereas the party had failed conspicuously in the non Pakhtun areas. In Dera Ismail Khan district, however, this failure was compensated for by the success of the Congress' ally, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. Table No. 10 shows the distribution of the Muslim Rural seats by districts. All General and Sikh seats except one went to the Congress. Seven out of nine General seats were uncontested.

Table 9. Results of the elections to the NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1946

Party	Total	Muslim Rural	Muslim Urban	General Rural	General Urban	Sikh	Land-holders
Congress	30	18	1	6	3	2	–
Muslim League	17	13	2	–	–	–	2
Jamiat-ul-Ulema	2	2	–	–	–	–	–
Akali Dal	1	–	–	–	–	1	–
TOTAL	50	33	3	6	3	3	2

(*Source:* See Appendix III.)

[54] Governor's Report 24/1/46. See also Appendix III.

[55] "The introduction of adult franchise in the North-West Frontier Province is no longer a practical difficulty but an official acceptance in the existing election machinery under the existing state of affairs . . . If it is considered that there is a small percentage of women among these voters, it is clear that practically every male in the Frontier Province has been registered as a voter." *Report on the General Election to the Indian Legislative Assembly (N.W.F.P. constituency) and the N.W.F.P. Legislative Assembly in 1945–46* quoted in *Civil & Military Gazette* 13/11/46.

Table 10. Distribution of Muslim Rural seats by districts in the Legislative Assembly elections in the NWFP 1946

District	Congress	Muslim League	Jamiat-ul-Ulema
Hazara	1	8	–
Mardan	4	1	–
Peshawar	6	1	–
Kohat	4	–	–
Bannu	2	2	–
D.I. Khan	1	1	2

(*Source:* See Appendix III.)

The Muslim League failed dismally in all districts except Hazara, where it won all Muslim Rural seats except one. The party also won two of three Muslim Urban seats. Thus the division between the Congress and the Muslim League by and large coincided with the geographical distribution of Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns. It could also be mentioned that both the Landholders' seats went to the Muslim League.

The 1946 election results represented a considerable improvement for the provincial Congress as compared with the results in 1937, when the party had won only 19 seats and was far from an absolute majority. There were several reasons for the party's success in 1946. First, there was the difference between the performance of the Congress ministries and that of the Muslim League. Another reason was that the Congress had in the past decade built up a strong organisation, which, as we have seen, the Muslim League had failed to do. Finally there was the franchise. The Congress made a special appeal to the poorer classes and they had to a large extent become enfranchised in 1946, whereas in 1937 they were not.

Afterwards, as the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan grew more and more vociferous, the Congress claimed that the people of the NWFP had in these elections rejected the idea of Pakistan. That interpretation of the results was hardly correct. The elections were mainly fought on other issues and the appeal of Pakistan among the masses was not really put to the test.

Dr Khan Sahib's Third Ministry

After the elections there was some dissension in the Frontier Congress concerning the desirability of forming a new ministry. The opposition was, however, overcome without too much difficulty thanks to Abdul Ghaffar Khan's ability to act as the revolutionary leader of the movement, while in fact he endorsed constitutionalism but gave the executive power to his brother. In spite of some opposi-

tion against him, Dr Khan Sahib was again elected leader of the parliamentary party. After a brief visit to Peshawar by the AINC president Maulana Azad on 23rd February, it was decided that no ministry would be formed until Azad could come back in the beginning of March. A communiqué was issued to the effect that Abdul Ghaffar Khan would select the ministers, in case the Congress should decide to accept office, and that he would lay down the programme of the ministry. He would also appoint a board to advise the ministers and with powers to order them to resign, should that question arise.[56] This board was, however, only a symbolic device, designed to placate those opposed to office-acceptance. It never had any real power.[57] On 3rd and 4th March the newly elected MLAs held a meeting together with about three hundred Congress and Red Shirt workers. Ghaffar Khan stressed that the interests of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement were paramount and that the question of the ministry was subordinate to them. The meeting approved the decision to give him full authority over the formation of a ministry.[58] When Azad returned to Peshawar, he sanctioned the formation of a new Congress ministry in the province.[59] Actually the outcome had never been in question. Azad's role was merely to lend more authority to a decision which had already been taken.[60]

The new ministry consisted of Dr Khan Sahib, his old colleague Qazi Ataullah (revenue minister) and two newcomers, Yahya Jan (education minister) and Mehr Chand Khanna (finance minister). A noteworthy feature of this ministry was that it was by and large a family affair. All except the Hindu member Mehr Chand Khanna were related to Abdul Ghaffar Khan. The chief minister was his brother, the education minister was his son-in-law and the revenue minister's daughter had been married to one of his sons.[61] The fact that the new representative of the NWFP in the central legislature in Delhi, Ghani Khan, was his eldest son further underscored the dominance of Ghaffar Khan's family in the Frontier Congress.[62]

Mehr Chand Khanna was the leading Hindu politician in the province. He had been president of the provincial Hindu Sabha. He had also been a leading member of the provincial legislative council 1932–37, and in 1937 he was elected to the

[56] Governor's Report 27/2/46.

[57] Interview with Yahya Jan. Actually, I have no information if any such board was ever formed.

[58] *Civil & Military Gazette* 5–6/3/46.

[59] FR I March 1946.

[60] Interview with Ghani Khan.

[61] Governor's Report 9/3/46.

[62] The election to the seat in the central assembly took place in December 1945. Abdul Ghani Khan, Congress, defeated Mohammad Akbar Qureshi, who represented the Khaksars, by 8,159 votes to 5,386. The Muslim League boycotted this election because it was held under a system of a joint electorate including Muslims as well as Hindus and others. Many Muslim Leaguers must have voted for the Khaksar candidate for his result was out of all proportion to the real strength of the Khaksars in the province. FR I Dec. 1945.

legislative assembly. As leader of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party he had been one of the Congress' severest critics, but when the Muslim League began to challenge the Congress in earnest, he joined the Congress and became first parliamentary secretary to Dr Khan Sahib, and now he became finance minister. He became the chief target in the ministry for the Muslim League's propaganda, which alleged that through him the Hindus dominated the Frontier Congress.[63]

On 10th March the Muslim League held a meeting under the presidentship of the Nawab of Hoti. Abdul Qaiyum Khan was elected Leader of the Opposition and the Nawab of Tank Deputy Leader.[64]

The new Congress administration started an impressive programme of social and economic reform.[65] However, its activities in this field were soon overshadowed and hampered by the problems which arose owing to the approach of independence.

At about the same time as Dr Khan Sahib formed his third ministry, Cunningham's term of office expired and a new governor, Sir Olaf Caroe, took over. Caroe had served for many years in the NWFP but since 1934 he had been employed mainly in Delhi.[66] His knowledge of Frontier politics was therefore not as intimate as Cunningham's had been in 1937, when be became governor. Nor did Caroe have any experience of ministerial government. By temperament he was very different from his predecessor. Cunningham was a sanguine man, who saw to the practical results of a measure and cared less for formal niceties and theoretical questions. Caroe, on the other hand, tended to adopt a more long-term perspective. He had no particular gift for politics but his knowledge of history was both wide and deep. This was perhaps why he was always more alive to strategic

[63] For Mehr Chand Khanna's conversion to the Congress, see Rittenberg p. 296 ff.

[64] *Civil & Military Gazette* 12/3/46.

[65] The following examples could be mentioned: The Punjab Tenancy (North-West Frontier Province Amendment) Act (Act X of 1946) by which all cesses due from occupancy tenants to their landlords were abolished and all services renderable by occupancy tenants to their landlords were commuted into a sum in cash to be added to the rent; the abolition of *Haq-i-Tora*, i.e., the right of a landlord, *lambardar* or proprietor of a house to realise a sum from a tenant in connection with betrothals, marriages or other ceremonies in the tenant's family (Act III of 1947); the Industrial Loans Act which aimed at facilitating loans for industrial development (Act XIV of 1946); Act XI of 1946 aimed at preventing the fragmentation of holdings through inheritance. Preparations were also begun for the implementation of a very ambitious five-year development plan for the province including the tribal areas (*Five-Year Post-War Development Plan*). The old question of the *lambardari* system (see above p. 89 f.) was taken up again and it was decided to abolish it in Mardan district with effect from spring 1947 (*Khyber Mail* 28/3/47). There were also advanced plans for the establishment of a university in the province (*Tribune* 17/3/47; interview with Ghani Khan). Finally, historians must pay tribute to this administration for the creation of a provincial record office (*Tribune* 3/12/46).

[66] For Caroe's career, see Caroe Papers IOL MSS. Eur. C. 273/4.

requirements than political realities. Caroe had played a prominent part in the suppression of the Khudai Khidmatgars in 1930–32. This, however, does not seem to have been seriously held against him when he became governor. Nor was he prejudiced against the Khan brothers. In his first report to the Viceroy he wrote: "Dr Khan Sahib is as impressive as ever: in fact I think he is the most impressive Indian I have ever met."[67]

Very soon, however, difficulties began to arise between Caroe and the ministers. One conflict concerned the administration of justice. According to Caroe, the ministers were in the habit of trying to influence the courts. They ordered cases which were legally uncompoundable to be compounded and instructed public prosecutors to withdraw prosecutions, not on judicial but executive grounds. Sometimes they also directed courts to set aside orders of discharge.[68] They also interfered with the work of the police, who could be ordered to cancel cases before they came into court.[69] According to Caroe, this interference with the law was often politically motivated.[70] The ministers would, for example, withdraw cases of political import from the ordinary courts and instead under the Frontier Crimes Regulation commit them to *jirgas*, to which their own supporters were nominated.[71] Caroe tried to put an end to all this but was resisted by the ministers.[72]

The governor also clashed with his ministers over the way they ran the distribution of essential commodities. In his opinion it was too often taken out of the hands of the ordinary administration and instead entrusted to partisans.[73] He also felt that the ministers took undue and partial interest in all sorts of petty appointments.[74]

It is difficult to know how much truth there was in Caroe's charges. In any case, Cunningham had not bothered much about these matters and the ministers probably looked upon the new governor's protests as an attempt to curb their powers. The relations became further strained, when Caroe tried to protect officials who, according to Dr Khan Sahib and his colleagues, were disloyal in the performance of their duties and favoured the Muslim League. By the autumn of 1946 the ministers and the other Frontier Congress leaders had become convinced that Caroe himself covertly supported the Muslim League. In consequence the relations grew very bitter and came close to breaking-point.

[67] Governor's Report 9/3/46.

[68] *Ibid.*

[69] Governor's Report 9/7/46.

[70] Though not always. Caroe himself admitted that Dr Khan Sahib was often actuated by a desire to simplify a judicial procedure unsuited to the people of the Frontier (Governor's Report 23/9/46).

[71] Governor's Report 22/7/46. The provisions of the Frontier Crimes Regulation providing for trial by *jirga*, which had been suspended in 1932, were revived in November 1939 (*Report on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the North-West Frontier Province* 1940 p. 10).

[72] Governor's Report 10/4/46, 9/7/46, 23/9/46, 11/10/46.

[73] Governor's Report 10/4/46.

[74] Governor's Report 9/6/46.

Chapter VII

The Victory of Pakistan: Provincial Politics on All-India Terms, 1945–47

The Change of Scenery

In the period 1945–47 Indian politics was no longer a struggle for freedom. Independence was clearly close at hand and no longer at issue. The questions that remained to be answered were how and to whom power was to be transferred. Should India remain united or should she be partitioned? Pakistan or no Pakistan–this was the overriding issue.

Previously the Muslim League had had its main strength in the provinces where the Muslims were in a minority. But the battle for Pakistan could only be won in the Muslim-majority provinces. No matter how strong support the League enjoyed from the Muslims in the minority-provinces, if those in the majority-provinces were indifferent, Pakistan was out of the question. On the other hand, if the Muslims of Bengal, Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the NWFP gave their support to the Muslim League, Pakistan would be theirs, no matter how strong support the Congress had in other parts. As a result, the centre of gravity in Muslim communal politics moved from the minority provinces to those where the Muslims had a majority.

During the war the overriding concern of the British had been the war effort. All political problems had been shelved until after the war. With the approach of peace a new situation arose. The premises on which British policy had been based were no longer valid and a fresh approach had to be adopted. In June 1945 the Viceroy Lord Wavell invited the Indian political leaders to a conference at Simla. His main aim was "to ease the present political situation and to advance India towards her goal of full self-government."[1] The immediate aim of the conference was to reach an agreement between the two major parties enabling the Viceroy to set up a new Executive Council, which would be more representative of Indian public opinion. The new council would with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief consist only of Indians and would also have much wider powers than the old one. However, after a couple of weeks of negotiations the Simla conference failed,

[1] Quoted in Menon p. 183.

as Wavell could not accept Jinnah's conditions for letting the League join the Executive Council.[2] Wavell reconstructed his Executive Council but without the cooperation of the political parties.[3]

The fact that it was Jinnah's opposition to the Viceroy's proposals and that Wavell was not prepared to go ahead without the cooperation of the Muslim League had far-reaching consequences. The outcome of the conference showed that Jinnah was now the key figure in Indian politics. Moreover, Jinnah had shown that for Muslim politicians there was really no road to power except through the Muslim League. As a result Muslim waverers increasingly chose to support the League.[4]

In spite of the failure of the Simla Conference it was evident that independence was coming nearer and nearer. The victory of the Labour Party in the British general elections meant that a government, which was committed to granting India independence, came into power and after the surrender of Japan no ground remained to delay a solution of the Indian problem. As a first step towards a solution general elections were held to the central Indian legislature and the provincial legislatures in late 1945 and early 1946. The elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Congress in the General constituencies and, with the exception of the NWFP, an equally impressive victory for the Muslim League in the Muslim constituencies. However, the Muslim League was able to form ministries only in Bengal and Sind. In Assam, which was claimed for Pakistan by the Muslim League, although the Muslims did not constitute a majority there, a Congress ministry was formed. More importantly, in Punjab the Unionist leader Sir Khizr Hayat Khan managed to form a coalition with Congress and Sikh support, although his party had won only ten seats.[5] Finally there was the NWFP, where the Congress, as we have seen, won an absolute majority and Dr Khan Sahib formed his third administration. Having failed to gain power through elections in Punjab and the NWFP, it was essential for the League to find some other means to take over these provinces.

In the spring of 1946 the British took a new initiative. Three members of the cabinet were sent to India to negotiate an agreement with the principal Indian parties. During their stay in India they worked out a plan, the so-called Cabinet Mission Plan, which seemed to represent an ingenious compromise between the conflicting demands of the Congress and the Muslim League. This plan envisaged a three-tiered Indian union consisting of a centre, three "groups", and

[2] Jinnah's most far-reaching demands were that the Muslim League be given equal representation not with the Congress alone but with the Congress plus all other parties; no other party than the Muslim League must nominate any Muslim members; the Muslim members should have the right of veto.

[3] For the Simla Conference, see Menon pp. 183–217; Sayeed 1968 pp. 129–133.

[4] Menon p. 216 f.

[5] Menon p. 232 ff.; Hodson p. 132; Sayeed 1968 p. 135.

finally the provinces. The authority of the central government would be confined to foreign affairs, defence and communications. All residuary powers would vest in the provinces. The functions of the three "groups" were for the time being left undefined. First a constituent assembly, consisting of representatives of the newly elected provincial assemblies, would be called for a preliminary meeting. Then the members would meet in three separate groups. Group A would be composed of the representatives of the Hindu-majority provinces, Group B of those the Muslim-majority provinces in the north-west, Punjab Sind and the NWFP, and finally Bengal and Assam would form Group C. The three groups would decide separately the constitutions of each province within their own group and if a constitution should be drawn up for the whole group. After these constitutions had been agreed on, the whole constituent assembly would reassemble for the purpose of framing a constitution for the whole union. Finally, when these constitutions came into force, each province would have the right to opt out of the group it had originally belonged to. Pending the implementation of this plan, it was proposed to set up an interim government with the support of both the major parties.[6]

Both the Congress and the Muslim League gave qualified support to this plan. The Congress objections concerned above all the terms for the formation of the interim government and the procedure envisaged for the grouping of provinces. Only the Muslim League would be allowed to nominate Muslims to the interim government, a provision which the Congress could not accept. The grouping of provinces was regarded by the Congress as optional. Nehru even said publicly that probably no grouping would take place. The Muslim League, on the other hand, looked upon the grouping as the essential feature of the plan, an interpretation which was confirmed by the British. In the end the Muslim League withdrew its acceptance of the plan and decided to participate neither in the constituent assembly nor in the interim government.[7]

The Congress' prevarication was largely motivated by the reaction the plan provoked in the Frontier Congress.[8] Abdul Ghaffar Khan was strongly opposed to the idea of his province being grouped together with Punjab as he feared this would lead to the Pakhtuns being dominated by the Punjabis. The FPCC discussed the plan at a meeting late in May. Wehn Abdul Ghaffar Khan had explained the significance of the negotiations in Delhi, the idea of compuslory grouping was unanimously condemned.[9]

[6] Menon pp. 238–282; Noorani in Philips and Wainwright pp. 104–106; Sayeed 1968 pp. 134–153.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Azad to Wavell 25/6/46 Enclosure Mansergh Vol. VII No. 603. The reaction in Assam, where a somewhat similar situation obtained, was the same and also contributed to the Congress' hesitancy.

[9] *Pakhtun* 9/6/46. This was one of the few occasions when the special interests of the Khudai Khidmatgars had a distinct influence on the policy of the AINC. Abdul Ghaffar Khan seems to be

After rejecting the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Muslim League raised the demand for Pakistan again. To give force to its demand the party for the first time in its history decided to jettison constitutionalism and instead resort to unconstitutional methods. Muslim League members were exhorted to renounce titles and other honours awarded by the government. The 16th of August was to be celebrated over the whole country as "Direct Action Day" by holding meetings to explain the party's new policy.[10]

In Calcutta Direct Action Day led to communal violence on an unprecedented scale. Within a matter of days about five thousand people were killed, fifteen thousand were wounded and roughly a hundred thousand rendered homeless. The communal situation deteriorated in other parts of the country, too. In October Muslims rioted against Hindus in East Bengal. This triggered off reprisals by Hindus on Muslims, particularly in Bihar. Bombay, where there lives many Pakhtuns, was also hit by serious riots.

Meanwhile negotiations were still going on for the formation of an interim government. On 2nd September a government composed mainly of Congressites but also including members of other parties took office. Nehru, who took charge of the External Affairs portfolio, became the recognised head of the government.

In October the Muslim League reversed its policy in regard to the interim government and decided to join it. This, however, did not signify any fundamental change of policy on the part of the League. It entered the government only in order not to allow the Congress to consolidate its position. The aims of the Congress and the Muslim League remained incompatible and the work of the interim government was from now on bedeviled by the fact that all questions were seen from a party point of view. Moreover, the Muslim League still refused to join the constituent assembly.

Up to about 1945 the political choice open to the people of the NWFP had been between the government and the Congress. The provincial Muslim League was but an adjunct of the alliance between the British and the big khans, which constituted the government on the Frontier. The provincial League had no ideology or programme which could appeal to wider sections of the population. The leaders took little or no interest in national issues, including Pakistan. But after the war this attitude was no longer possible. Pakistan, which had hitherto been an empty slogan on the Frontier,[11] came within the reach of the Muslim

aware that he made a mistake. In his autobiography he claims that he was not opposed to the grouping clause because he thought that any scheme would be better than partition. Badshah Khan p. 178.

[10] For this and the next few paragraphs, see Menon pp. 283–335; Sayeed 1968 pp. 151–164.

[11] To begin with the Frontier Muslim League leaders had extremely vague ideas as to what they really meant by the demand for Pakistan but clearly they did not envisage any severance of all ties with Hindu India. In a rather confused article, which Aurangzeb Khan wrote soon after the adop-

League. It was no longer possible to depend on the British. Those who had done so now had to come to terms with some Indian political group. Moreover, since Pakistan had now become a viable alternative, everybody had to choose between Pakistan and India, a choice which simply had not existed before. As a result a drastic realignment occurred of the political forces in the province. Many defected from the Congress to the Muslim League. People who had previously been allied with the British now sided with the Muslim League and Pakistan. Finally, people who had so far taken no part in politics now came out on the side of Pakistan.

Defections from the Congress to the Muslim League

Reports of defections from the Congress to the Muslim League become increasingly common in my sources from 1945 on. To a large extent the defectors were actuated by religious motives. They felt that if India was to be partitioned on religious lines, the NWFP must join the Muslim state. Others simply trimmed their sails according to the wind.

The most prominent ideological convert was perhaps Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan. He had for many years been one of the most volatile personalities in Frontier politics. In the 1930s he was one of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's closest associates. In 1937 he was returned to the assembly as a Congressite and later became a parliamentary secretary in Dr Khan Sahib's first ministry. For some time he also served as general secretary of the Frontier Congress.[12] When the Congress launched the individual civil disobedience campaign in 1940, he was the first to be arrested in the Frontier Province. After being released in 1942, he broke with the Congress and the Khan Brothers. When I interviewed him, he claimed that he had done so because he was dissatisfied with the conduct of the 1940 civil disobedience campaign. There is no doubt, however, that another reason was that as a Muslim zealot he took strong exception to Dr Khan Sahib allowing his daughter to marry a Christian. After leaving the Congress he formed an organisation called the Afghan Jirga after the parent body of the Khudai Khidmatgars. The goal of this new Afghan Jirga was the establishment of an independent Pakhtun state run in accordance with *Shariat*. The Afghan Jirga promised to cooperate with other

tion of the Lahore Resolution, he explained the Pakistan idea thus: "... presently you can have ready models in the United States of America or the cantonal system of Switzerland which will be the best pattern for the future United States of India and the Muslim League proposals formulated at Lahore will give you exactly this alternative solution." *Khyber Mail* 21/4/40. This attitude survived very long. Cunningham wrote that the "issue of Pakistan came to the forefront very markedly after the failure of the Simla conference, although my impression was that few people in the N.W.F.P. really believed in extreme Pakistan in the sense of dismemberment from the rest of India." Unsigned note called *Summary of events in NWFP* Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/17. See also p. 7 of Cunningham's lecture on *The North-West Frontier Province* to the Royal Institute of International Affairs 13/6/46 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/25.

[12] See above p. 122 f.

organisations having similar aims and to support the cause of Muslims all over India.[13] In 1945 Arab Abdul Ghafoor together with the Afghan Jirga joined the Muslim League.[14] Although the membership of his organisation was insignificant, this meant a considerable reinforcement, because Arab Abdul Ghafoor, though a difficult customer, was a sincere worker of the kind desperately needed by the Muslim League. In 1946–47 he was one of the most prominent leaders of the Pakistan movement on the Frontier.

Another, very different convert to the cause of the Muslim League was Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan. He had in 1937 succeeded Dr Khan Sahib as the NWFP's representative in the central legislative assembly in Delhi, where he had subsequently risen to become deputy leader of the Congress parliamentary party. He had no taste for revolutionary activities and did not participate in the Quit India movement. Later he became involved in the Desai-Liaqat Ali Pact.[15] For these reasons he lost the confidence of the Frontier Congress leaders. He tried desperately to regain it[16] but secretly he also approached the Muslim League. When he realised he would not be renominated for the seat in the central assembly, he instead, in August 1945, joined the Muslim League.[17] In 1945 he was returned on the League ticket from the Peshawar Muslim Urban constituency. After the elections he was elected leader of the Muslim League party in the assembly.[18]

Yet another prominent Congressite, who defected to the Muslim League, was Ghulam Mohammad Khan, the former FPCC president. After being ousted from the presidentship he had for several years been seeking a new political platform. He, too, became one of the leaders of the Pakistan movement.[19]

[13] *Khyber Mail* 6/10/42; *Congress Disturbances in the N.-W.F.P., 1942–43* IOL R/3/1/366; interview with Arbab Abdul Ghafoor.

[14] *Khyber Mail* 5/10/45. According to Arbab Abdul Ghafoor, they never joined the Muslim League, only the Pakistan movement. If that was so, the difference was exceedingly fine.

[15] Towards the end of 1944 the leader of the Congress party in the central legislative assembly Bhulabhai Desai came to an agreement with his opposite number in the Muslim League Liaqat Ali Khan concerning the formation of an interim coalition government at the centre. This plan fell through, however. As this pact was very unpopular in wide Congress circles—many Congressites were still in jail—it also led to the political extinction of Desai. Menon pp. 176–179; Sayeed 1968 pp. 126–128.

[16] Among other things he published a booklet called *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier.* The preface is signed by Abdul Qaiyum as late as 31st March 1945. The work is dedicated to Dr Khan Sahib. The author pays glowing tribute to the Khan brothers and the Congress in general while the Muslim League is vehemently attacked, and with regard to Pakistan Abdul Qaiyum writes (p. 70): "The only way it [the question of Indian freedom] can be effectively tackled is through real unity among the Hindus, Muslims and others who inhabit this great land of ours. The problem of Indian unity is therefore the bedrock on which we shall have to raise a structure consecrated by the joint sacrifices of the sons and daughters of India, Hindu as well as Muslim. In Hindu-Muslim unity lies our strength, and without unity and sacrifices there can be no freedom."

[17] Mian Ziauddin p. 71 f.

[18] See above p. 154.

[19] Interview with Fida Mohammad.

Finally one could mention Rab Nawaz Khan, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Khudai Khidmatgars. After defecting to the Muslim League, he was given the task of organising the Muslim League volunteers, the so-called Muslim National Guards.[20]

Government Servants

Government servants were by law excluded from participation in politics. In their official capacity they were of course expected to observe strict neutrality. However, far from doing this, many of them took a very active interest in party politics and used their official position to influence the course of events. Like other political groups the officials naturally endeavoured to safeguard and promote their own interests. To begin with this meant that they were staunchly loyal to the British, from whom they earned their living. Hence they were hostile to the Congress, a feeling that was reciprocated by the nationalists, who accused them of being British toadies and bad patriots. With the growth of communal politics and with the approach of independence the officials divided more and more on religious lines. Since the majority of the Indian government servants were Muslims and since at this time all key positions were held by Muslims, the influence of the bureaucracy increasingly worked in favour of the Muslim League. A leading theme in this chapter will be that Muslim officials played a crucial role in the conversion of the Frontier to the cause of Pakistan.

In the first few years under review in this work the animosity between the officials and the Congress was of little political consequence. On the whole, the Congress ministers cooperated rather harmoniously with the officials under them.[21] Nevertheless it is clear that right from the beginning many officials did what they could to make things difficult for the Congress, which often meant that they helped the Muslim League. Many stories are told today—by old Muslim Leaguers as well as former Congressites—about officials who worked for the Muslim League and against the Congress. Although these stories are difficult to verify, it is evident that many of them contain a good deal of truth. For obvious reasons there exists hardly any documentary evidence of these activities. I have, however, found one document, which is revealing. This is a letter, written in June 1937 by Iskander Mirza, who at this time was deputy commissioner of Mardan district. The letter is addressed to one Lawley, of whom I have otherwise no information. It begins by referring to a conversation the two men had had some time before. There is no mention of what was said on that occasion and this, unfortunately, makes many passages difficult to understand. However, it seems as if

[20] *Civil & Military Gazette* 10/5/46.
[21] See above p. 77.

three khans, two of whom had previously supported the Congress, had at the instance of Iskander Mirza opposed the Congress in the elections earlier that year. A Hindu *zilladar* complained about this saying that the khans had become the deputy commissioner's creatures. The khans in their turn complained about the *zilladar's* attitude. Iskander Mirza was angered by the zilladar's behaviour. In his letter to Lawley he admitted that officials were not allowed to take part in politics but nevertheless, he wrote, as "the Congress is clearly out to destroy the present Government of India Act, *I am of the opinion that it is the clear duty of a Government servant to do what he can to oppose the Congress Party.*" And he continued:

> It is only recently we have been able after [an] infinite amount of trouble and persuasion to start a rival organisation which is barely making any head way. If Subordinate Government officials are not prepared to help the District Administration in its efforts to reduce Congress influence in the District, I have at least a right to expect strict neutrality on their part . . .[22]

Thus the deputy commissioner did all he could to oppose the Congress and had been instrumental in the formation of a rival organisation. It is unlikely that this was a branch of the Muslim League, as such branches appear to have been formed only in the autumn of 1937,[23] *i.e.*, several months after this letter was written. Most probably, however, it was based on the same kind people as later the Muslim League. Nor is there any doubt that when a Muslim League branch was formed in Mardan district, Iskander Mirza used his influence in its support.[24]

Iskander Mirza was probably the official who was most deeply involved in League affairs. The party's general secretary Mian Ziauddin says that he "supported the Muslim League throughout by all legal means at his disposal." He was, however, strongly opposed to the leadership of Aurangzeb Khan.[25] In the spring of 1943 Iskander Mirza, who by now had become deputy commissioner of Peshawar district, according to Aurangzeb Khan tried to prevent the formation of a Muslim League ministry by canvassing against him in the Muslim League High Command.[26] When in June 1944 the AIML Committee of Action visited the Frontier League, Qazi Isa stayed with Iskander Mirza, Liaqat Ali Khan with Mian Ziauddin and the other members with Aurangzeb Khan. Iskander Mirza took a very active part in the discussions during the visit. In the evenings he would go to Mian Ziauddin's house where "Liaqat Ali Khan would ask us [i.e., Mian

[22] Iskander Mirza to Lawley 3/6/37 TARC File 172–S.P.J. Emphasis added.

[23] See above p. 108 f.

[24] Among other things he tried to prevail on the Muslim members of the Bar to join the Muslim League. This he did through the president of the Bar Association of Mardan, with whom he had close contacts. Interview with Salim Chaudry, an old advocate of Mardan and an old Muslim Leaguer.

[25] Interview with Mian Ziauddin. According to him the dispute between the two concerned the controls of the food and cloth distribution and Aurangzeb Khan's wish to use them for party purposes.

[26] Aurangzeb Khan to Jinnah 11/3/43 QAP File 239.

Ziauddin and Iskander Mirza but not Aurangzeb Khan] about the background of the people he had met during the day, and we used to give him the necessary information."[27] In the end Iskander Mirza was removed from Peshawar and the NWFP.[28]

Another official who at this stage took an active part in League affairs was Major Abdur Rahim. He was, however, a bitter enemy of Iskander Mirza[29] and therefore, it seems, initially in favour of Aurangzeb Khan.[30] But soon after the Muslim League had taken office, he fell out with the premier[31] and in October 1944 he left the NWFP for Baluchistan.[32]

Thus Muslim officials were even at an early stage deeply involved in the Frontier Muslim League. After the war, however, when Pakistan came within reach, the political involvment by officials assumed entirely different proportions and much greater significance. In the following we will see how in almost every context senior and junior officials used their position and influence to further the cause of Pakistan.[33] The reasons were no doubt partly religious and cultural but there was also a more mundane side to it; if Pakistan should come into being, their chances of promotion would be doubly improved, as not only the British officials but also the Hindu ones would have to be replaced.

The turning point for the senior officials was the Simla Conference. In October 1945 Cunningham reported that

> communal feeling at a high level, has been growing steadily worse and worse since the breakdown of the Simla conference, and is in my opinion now more serious than I have ever known it. Well educated Muslims of the senior official type, who never took much interest in politics before, are becoming almost rabidly anti-Hindu, and therefore pro-Muslim League.[34]

[27] Mian Ziauddin p. 67 f.

[28] Note by Cunningham called *Summary of my fortnightly reports March 1937–Feb 1946* p. 31 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/17. The ministers claimed to have forced through his removal but according to Cunningham he went of his own accord.

[29] "N.W.F.P. is a strange land. The Muslim League besides its natural enemies, has to fight additional enemies in Moslem officials. In N.W.F.P. there are factions in [sic] officials—one faction is led by Major Iskander Ali Mirza . . . and the other is led by Major Abdur Rahim." Aurangzeb Khan to Jinnah 11/3/43 QAP File 239.

[30] Aurangzeb Khan to Jinnah 7/2/43 QAP File 239. Abdur Rahim also appears to have been influenced by Cunningham to help Aurangzeb. See Cunningham's Diary 7/8/43, Cunningham Papers.

[31] Cunningham's Diary 10/7/43, 7/8/43 Cunningham Papers.

[32] *Op. cit.* 7/10/44.

[33] In my interview with Sardar Abdur Rashid he insisted that I must stress that the officials had nothing to do with politics, but I think the evidence presented here and in the following speaks for itself. However, Sardar Abdur Rashid's view probably reflects the fact that it was above all the junior officials that worked actively for Pakistan.

My account could be compared to that of Abdul Rashid (pp. 89–116), who at this time served as city and sub-divisional magistrate, Peshawar. Although his account is very different from mine, I feel one can find in it a good deal of support for my version between the lines.

[34] Governor's Report 9/10/45.

A few words should perhaps also be said about the Hindu and British officials. Just as Muslim officials supported the Muslim League, Hindus supported the Congress. During the Quit India movement, for example, Hindu officials helped the Congress by passing on information about what the government planned to do.[35] In the period 1945–47 they were, however, in no way able to counterbalance the influence of their Muslim colleagues.

There is no doubt that most British officials sympathised with the Muslim League rather than the Congress. This was only natural. The Congress was traditionally anti-British and anti-government, while the Muslim League was led by those who had always been close to the British. I have found no instance where British officials exceeded their powers by supporting the Muslim League but this need not mean their political sympathies were without consequence. They were undoubtedly more prepared to accept the Muslim League point of view than the Congress one.[36]

A special case is that of the governor, Sir Olaf Caroe, whose alleged Muslim League sympathies became the subject of a serious controversy. His role will be discussed in a subsequent context. It should be mentioned, however, that not only Congressites but also Muslim Leaguers felt the League had support at top level.[37] If nothing else, this probably made them a good deal bolder.

Religious Leaders

Prior to 1945 religious leaders had played no significant separate role in politics since, as a group, they had no special interests of their own. But when Pakistan came to the forefront, the situation changed and the religious leaders became a powerful, strongly motivated group with a crucial role. They had a much stronger hold on the rural population than the urban lawyers in the League leadership could ever hope to get. The influence of "saints" often extended over wider areas than that of khans. Finally, religious leaders could move much more freely in the tribal areas than the politicians of the settled districts.

An outstanding role among the religious leaders was played by the Pir of Manki Sharif. He was at this time a young man of about twenty-five. Before attaining eminence in the Pakistan movement, he had not been widely known in political circles. He had, however, inherited large numbers of *murids* from his ancestors, who had been important religious leaders, and therefore had great potential political power. The fact that he was personally a very pious and sincere man added greatly to his inherited authority. He had followers all over the province but his influence was particularly strong in the Pakhtun areas around

[35] Interview with Amir Nawaz Jalia. One Doar Kanath even asked Amir Nawaz Jalia to rob some bank and promised he would clear the way for him.

[36] The Curtis Papers and Lydall Papers give a good idea of the feelings among British officials.

[37] See below footnote 240.

Peshawar. Thus he was a very effective counter-balance to Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who also had his main support in that area.[38]

The Pir of Manki Sharif began taking an active part in politics after the Simla Conference. To begin with he concentrated on organising the religious leaders of the province, particularly the *sajjada nashins*. In October he founded an organisation of his own, the *Anjuman-us-asfia*. The organisation promised to support the Muslim League on condition that *Shariat* would be enforced in Pakistan. To this Jinnah agreed. As a result the Pir of Manki Sharif declared *jehad* to achieve Pakistan and ordered the members of his *anjuman* to support the League in the 1946 elections.[39] In the autumn of 1946 and the spring of 1947 he emerged as the League's leading personality on the Frontier. To him, more than any other single person, goes the credit for the success of the Pakistan movement there.

Students

Another group which came into prominence at this time were the students. The leading personality among them was one Malik Tahmasp, a non-Pakhtun of an ordinary family in Hazara. He had developed his political interest when he was at college at Rawalpindi. Most of the professors and students there were Hindus and supported the Congress. They always spoke ill of Jinnah. As a result, Malik Tahmasp became interested in this man, began to sympathise with him and in the end came to love him. In 1942, when he was studying at Islamia College in Peshawar, Malik Tahmasp and a friend of his founded the Frontier Muslim Students Federation. They were helped by two or three Punjabi professors at the college.[40] Gradually the federation developed into an umbrella organisation for all students sympathising with the Muslim League. Most of the members, however, came from Islamia College.[41]

The politics of these youths were very different from those of the Frontier League leadership. They were highly idealistic and dreamed of the establishment of an Islamic state.[42] In consequence they were vehemently anti-British. One of them today recalls how during the war they used to listen to German propaganda and news broadcasts eagerly waiting to hear of British defeats.[43] They despised the leaders of the provincial Muslim League and right from the beginning tried to avoid getting involved with them. Instead they aspired to be under Jinnah's direct leadership.[44]

[38] Interview with Askar Ali Shah.
[39] Rittenberg pp. 314–317.
[40] Interview with Malik Tahmasp.
[41] Interview with Mohammad Anwar.
[42] Interview with Anonymous II.
[43] Interview with Anonymous III.
[44] Interview with Malik Tahmasp; Inayat Kibriya to Jinnah n.d. NAP Shamsul Hasan Collection Correspondence of Qaide Azam ... File 14 North-West Frontier Province.

As we have seen, the prime movers behind the federation were non-Pakhtuns but this did not mean that there was the same division between Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtuns in student politics as in provincial politics. Pakhtun students were as active as non-Pakhtuns. Thanks to the efforts of the federation, it was not uncommon for students from the Congress strongholds in Peshawar and Mardan districts to support the Muslim League even if their fathers were Congress supporters.[45]

The teachers at Islamia College were by and large favourable toward the federation and helped the activists by giving them leave and doing them other similar favours. Several teachers, including the principal Sheikh Mohammad Taimur, took an active part themselves. Professor Sahibzada Mohammad Idris was particularly closely associated with the federation in an advisory capacity.[46]

It was after the fall of the Muslim League ministry in the spring of 1945 that the Frontier Muslim Students' Federation began taking a more prominent part in provincial politics. The students felt they were untainted by the League's misrule and that now the time had come for them. During the election campaign they tried to give a measure of cohesion to the League's work, and after the elections they became a dominant group in the Pakistan movement. They sent out teams of students all over the province to do propaganda for Pakistan with slogans of an Islamic state, Islamic laws etc. The also had a Finance Committee which collected funds for the movement. On Professor Idris' advice the committee turned primarily to poor people. When they contributed to the federation, however small the sum, they, too, became committed to the cause of Pakistan.[47]

Dormant Areas Become Politicised

In the new situation which arose after the war, several areas which had previously been politically dormant for the first time became involved in provincial and national politics owing to the religious appeal of Pakistan. A good example of this is provided by Bangash Valley in Kohat district. The developments in that area were described to me by one of the leaders of the Pakistan movement there, Maulana Sahib Jafar Ali of Sherkot.[48]

Bangash Valley is one of the areas in the NWFP where Shias predominate. According to Maulana Jafar Ali, the British gave the Shias more religious freedom than they have ever enjoyed, before or since. As religion means everything to the Shias of these parts, they took little interest in politics under the British. There

[45] Interview with Mohammad Anwar.

[46] Interviews with Anonymous III and Sahibzada Mohammad Idris.

[47] *Ibid.*; interviews with Malik Tahmasp, Mohammad Anwar and Anonymous II.

[48] My interviews with Haji Rajab Ali Khan and Sargand Ramzy Bangash, two old school teachers of Ustarzai, a village a couple of miles to the east of Sherkot, support the general picture given by Maulana Jafar Ali.

was, however, a tendency in favour of the Congress, in Bangash Valley as well as Kohat district as a whole. There was no Muslim League in the district.[49] The political indifference, together with the pro-Congress tendency, survived until the autumn of 1946, because people were not aware of the impending British withdrawal.

Maulana Jafar Ali and almost all the other inhabitants of Sherkot had supported M.R. Kiyani in the elections of 1937, when he stood successfully as an independent, as well as in 1946 when he lost his seat as a Muslim Leaguer. They voted for him because he was a Shia and because he was a good man. The voting in this constituency, Hangu Muslim Rural, was largely on communal lines, i.e., Sunnis versus Shias.

With the approach of independence, devout Muslims began to feel that it was necessary to do something about the situation. On 13th September a meeting was held at Kachai village. The main organiser was M.R. Kiyani. It was decided to form a Muslim League for the Hangu tahsil.[50] M.R. Kiyani was elected president and Maulana Jafar Ali became the general secretary. The leadership of this Muslim League branch was by and large the same as that of the Kohat District Shia Conference, where Kiyani was also president, but the two organisations remained separate.

After the foundation of this Muslim League branch, Maulana Jafar Ali and one Nasir Ali of Ustarzai, who was the agitation secretary, began taking out processions and arranging demonstrations against Dr Khan Sahib.[51] From now on the area became solidly pro-Muslim League. Although the Hangu Tahsil Muslim League had been founded by Shias, there was no difference between Shias and Sunnis in the struggle for Pakistan.

The *maulana* stressed that the Pakistan movement sprang to life very suddenly. The way he put it is significant: "We woke up to the danger of Hindu domination."

The Muslim National Guards

The Muslim National Guards must also be mentioned in this context. This was a volunteer organisation reminiscent of the Khudai Khidmatgars. Muslim National Guards had already existed in the province for a couple of years but it was only in

[49] This is not correct; there was one. But the fact that the *maulana*, who had an extremely good memory and acute mind, made a mistake on this point illustrates how weak the Muslim League organisation was prior to this.

[50] Maulana Jafar Ali said this was the Kohat District Muslim League, but as already pointed out, there already existed one. According to M.R. Kiyani this must have been the Hangu Tahsil Muslim League. Interview.

[51] Another important way of spreading Muslim League propaganda was through mullahs, who told the people what M.R. Kiyani had told them to say. Interview with Sargand Ramzy Ali.

1946–47 that they began to play an important role in politics. The members wore uniforms, were organised on military lines and were also usually armed with spears or *lathis*. They performed guard and other such duties but their most important function was to popularise the Muslim League through demonstrations and other propaganda activities. The Muslim National Guards did not represent any special group but were recruited from all sections of society. Their main significance in this context is that their coming into prominence at this stage illustrates how widespread the support for Pakistan had become and how people of all classes became politically activated by the Pakistan idea.[52]

The Tribes[53]

In 1930 there had been a good deal of tribal unrest in connection with the Red Shirt agitation[54] but since then the tribes had taken little interest in politics. The war was popular among them and the Congress advances during the Quit India movement were spurned.[55] The approach of independence, however, made a reconsideration of their position necessary. The British wished and advised the tribes to stay clear of party politics until a general agreement concerning India's future had been reached at the centre. The governor promised they would "be fully consulted over any new arrangements" and told them to "wait for me before they rush to any conclusions."[56] Gradually, however, the tribes became more and more involved on the side of the Muslim League. There were several reasons. The tribesmen were moved by the same religious feelings as people in the settled districts. The Pir of Manki Sharif had many followers in the tribal areas and used his influence in favour of the Muslim League. A key role was also played by Muslim officials.

The support the tribes gave for Pakistan was of immense importance. It meant

[52] The evidence concerning the Muslim National Guards is conflicting. Sairab Hayat Khan, who was the commander of the National Guards in Mardan district, stresses that they were disciplined, well organised and under unified command (interview). Others, like Abdul Qaiyum and Fida Mohammad (interviews) as well as Rittenberg (Rittenberg p. 341 f.), say that the organisation was rather confused; after the war many different groups calling themselves Muslim National Guards to some extent coalesced into a more formal organisation. From the brief references, which appear in British sources, one gets the same impression. The most exhaustive one is found in FR II Jan. 1947.

[53] For the tribes and individual tribesmen that appear in this chapter, see Appendix IV. For the geographical distribution of the tribes, see Map 2.

[54] Rittenberg pp. 112–135; also Spain 1963 p. 166.

[55] For the tribes during World War II, see the *Border Administration Reports* of the relevant years, which are available in manuscript in TARC.

[56] Caroe to Sahibzada Khursid 14/5/46 TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I). The Viceroy told them very much the same; see the drafts of the speeches Wavell gave to the Afridi Jirga at Landi Kotal and the Ahmadzai Wazirs at Wana during his visit to the Frontier in the autumn of 1946, which are found in IOL R/3/1/92; also Wavell p. 377.

a large increase in man-power for the Muslim League. Moreover, the tribal areas were outside the reach of the provincial government and when the leaders of the Frontier Muslim League were arrested, the tribal leaders remained in freedom. Most importantly, the tribes were feared and respected as no others by the British and were therefore the best possible leverage the Muslim League could get into its hands.

In theory there existed a difference between the Congress' policy toward the tribes and that of the Muslim League. The Congress wished in some way to unite the Pakhtuns of the tribal areas with those of the settled districts, although usually they stressed that this unification would have to be voluntary.[57] The Congress leaders often spoke disparagingly of tribal allowance-holders.[58] The provincial Muslim League, on the other hand, does not seem to have had any policy at all vis-à-vis the tribes but when Jinnah took up the matter, he promised the tribes that Pakistan would not interfere with their freedom.[59] The Congress' attitude no doubt alienated many tribal leaders but, generally speaking, this difference of policy does not seem to have been of any great practical significance. The political affiliations of the tribes were instead determined by other factors.

At this point it becomes necessary to make a digression in order to give a more exhaustive picture of tribal politics.[60] Naturally the tribes, clans, sections etc. were more important in the tribal areas as bases of political mobilisation than in the settled areas. However, as *tarburwali* and rivalry for local leadership were at least as intense in the tribal areas as among the Pakhtuns of the settled districts, there was usually the same division of the tribal segments into two opposed blocs. To defeat its local rival, each bloc would seek allies at the higher levels of the tribal structure as well as outside it. In this way tribal rivalry became intermingled with and exploited by the powers which competed for the control of the tribal areas, Britain and Afghanistan. Even Russia and Germany had a finger in the pie. This was the "Great Game" romanticised by Kipling. The tribal leaders also understood to turn the rivalry between these states to their own advantage by playing them off against each other. Finally, in the period under review here the nationalist parties also joined in and tried to exploit the tribes for their own purposes and were themselves in their turn exploited by the tribal leaders.

The fundamental features of tribal politics were thus *tarburwali* and rivalry for

[57] See e.g., Governor's Report 23/4/46, 23/12/46; also below p. 211 ff.

[58] See e.g., *Civil & Military Gazette* 21/12/46; *Tribune* 14/1/47. However, at the time of the Cabinet Mission Abdul Qaiyam held exactly the same views concerning the tribal areas as the Frontier Congress. See Mansergh Vol. VII No. 40.

[59] *Tribune* 18/6/47; Governor's Report 9/7/47.

[60] This discussion is in the main based on my own reading of my source material and on an interview with Faridullah Shah who, among other things, has twice served as political agent in Khyber and once in North Waziristan. See also Ahmed 1977 pp. 47–51; Ahmed 1980 pp. 71–78, 311–317.

local leadership. Their mechanism ensured that tribal society remained relatively egalitarian. However, in order to be able to control the tribal areas, the British endeavoured to create a class of chiefs loyal to them which, as we have seen, was done by giving leading *maliks* cash grants of varying size. There were two basic problems connectedd with this system. It was difficult to keep the government allowances on a level that corresponded to the real position the different *maliks* held in tribal society, which was in a constant state of flux. Thus there was often a discrepancy between the hierarchy officially recognised by the British and the real power structure in the tribe. The other problem was connected with this. As these allowances affected people's position in the tribe, men aspiring to political leadership competed for them, and in this way they could sometimes increase tension within a tribe. Moreover, there were two ways to obtain a government allowance. First, there was the obvious one, *i.e.*, by showing loyalty to the government. The other way was the opposite, namely by creating disturbances. By adopting the latter course a disgruntled *malik* could show his influence and prove the advisability of granting him a larger allowance. To make matters even more complicated, Afghanistan used the same system. As the interests of Afghanistan tended to be opposed to those of the British, the two governments also tended to support opposing factions. Moreover, if a *malik* was not satisfied with the position accorded to him by the British, he could turn to Afghanistan. An experienced political agent, whom I interviewed,[61] described the policy of the tribes vis-à-vis outsiders thus: "As long as the cow gives milk, they'll milk it. The moment the cow is dry, they'll leave it." When finally the nationalist parties became involved in tribal politics, the same principles were applied to them. The tribal leaders supported the party from which they could hope to gain most. As the Congress was opposed to the British, those hostile to the government tended to support the Congress. Those friendly to the British tended to echo the views of the government or else they would side directly with the Muslim League, the opponents of the allies of their enemies. The structure of the two blocs which came into existence in this way is illustrated in the two columns below:

Bloc A.	Bloc B.
Tarbur A.	*Tarbur* B.
Pro-govt.	Anti-govt.
Govt. allowances.	Afghan allowances.
Pro-Muslim League.	Pro-Congress.

The picture which I have given here is of course very much simplified but the propensity to divide into two blocs of this kind will be clearly visible in the following. At the individual level there was another tendency, one or two examples of

[61] Faridullah Shah.

which will be cited: as independence approached, men who wanted to improve their position in the tribe took a more active part in party politics than others. The idea was that they wanted to be allied with the future rulers of the country. Naturally the most perspicacious ones supported the Muslim League.

A few more features of tribal politics must be mentioned. There existed in the tribal areas two kinds of *jirgas*. The first was a deliberative institution where policy was decided. Decisions were always unanimous, no votes were taken and instead some, often rather vague, form of consensus emerged. This kind of *jirga* was usually called a *marakka*, a term which will also be used in this account to avoid confusion. A complicating factor is that the authority of a *marakka* was rarely recognised by all those supposedly under its jurisdiction. On the contrary, there was a strong tendency that for each *marakka* that was held, another was convened consisting of the enemies of those in the first one but claiming to represent the same tribal unit. Naturally this *marakka* arrived at very different decisions.

The other kind of *jirgas* were those which represented the tribes vis-à-vis the government. They were therefore also the institutions which spoke for the tribes on the constitutional questions which arose after World War II. These *jirgas* consisted of *maliks* and elders who were officially recognised by the government and who normally also enjoyed allowances from the government. Naturally the government wished to obtain as wide support as possible in the tribal areas. Thus it could not deal with people whose only quality was their malleability but had to deal with the tribes through men of influence. This meant that people who were far from favourably disposed toward the government were also represented on the *jirgas*. The Kuki Khel *jirga* (the Kuki Khel are a section of the Afridi tribe) could be cited as an example of how a *jirga* could be composed and how it would function. First there would be one or two *maliks*, who had received this title from the government together with considerable allowances. Then there were between forty and sixty elders, who received smaller sums. Six or seven of them would be Afghan allowance-holders. Whatever was agreed between the *jirga* and the government was supposed to be binding on the entire Kuki Khel section and the members of the *jirga* were responsible for the good behaviour of the section. However, those in enjoyment of Afghan allowances would, immediately after an agreement had been reached with the government, send word to mullahs in Tirah who would start preaching against the agreement.[62]

The dealings between the *jirgas* and the government were usually very much down-to-earth. They concerned allowances, breaches of agreements, outlaws taking refuge in tribal territory, etc. However, the problems the *jirgas* had to deal with after World War II obviously had much wider implications. First there was the religious aspect but the new situation also gave ample opportunities for the

[62] This is how Faridullah Shah described the Kuki Khel *jirga*.

subtle form of bargaining at which the tribal leaders excelled.

A key role in determining the political affiliations of the tribes was played by the political agents and their assistants. They could present the problems posed by the political developments in the light they wished and put the questions that arose in terms which suited their interests. Moreover, they interpreted and conveyed to the government the often rather delphic answers given by the *jirgas* to their questions. Finally most tribal leaders naturally wanted to be in the good books of the political agent. Thus, although they could not in any way go against the wishes of the tribes, the political agents were able to exercise a very strong influence over the political decisions of the tribes. Almost all officials in the tribal areas were Muslims and here their influence in favour of the Muslim League was probably even more important than in the settled districts.

In the following our account will deal mostly with the Afridis and the Mahsuds. The Afridis were the most powerful tribe owing to their number as well as their strategic importance, while the Mahsuds were perhaps the tribe which gave the most open and active support for the Muslim League. Other tribes than these will be dealt with more in passing if at all. Broadly speaking, however, the developments were the same among them.

The Khyber and South Waziristan, where the Afridis and the Mahsuds live, were for many years the most disturbed areas on the Frontier. However, by the time under review here the Afridis had become comparatively manageable. The Mahsuds, on the other hand, retained the reputation they had gained as the wildest of all tribes in their external as well as internal affairs. The reasons for this contrast were both historical and economic. The Khyber was the most important of all passes on the Frontier and at an early stage the British established direct contact with the tribes in whose territory it was situated. Gradually communications through the pass were improved—in 1926 the British could even open a railroad up to the Afghan border—and fortifications were built to protect them.[63] Thus, in addition to large allowances to the various tribal sections as well as their leading *maliks*, many tribesmen received work and wages from the government. In this way the government was able to penetrate the land of the Afridis with a measure of approval from the tribesmen themselves and to exercise a strong influence in the internal affairs of the tribe. During World War II the Khyber tribes were "not only peaceful and friendly but also helpful". They cooperated wholeheartedly in the construction of defence works in the pass, contributed in all Rs. 52,000 to various war funds and supplied a battalion of infantry which saw service overseas.[64]

Thus the government, with the aid of the *jirgas* and *maliks*, was able to control Afridi affairs to a relatively large extent. This did not mean there were no

[63] Davies 1932 *passim*; see also Baha 1978 pp. 51–67.

[64] *Who's Who in the Khyber Agency. Corrected upto 1st January 1950* p. iv. TARC.

problems. There existed among the Afridis a faction, the so-called *Sarishta* party, the members of which were opposed to the government and did not take part in *jirgas* with the government. They were pro-Afghan and received subsidies from the government of Afghanistan. Often they also showed pro-Congress leanings.[65]

The picture presented by the Mahsuds was more chaotic. The Mashud tribe is divided into three different main branches, the so-called *Dre Mahsud*, the Shaman Khel, the Alizai and the Bahlozai. These sections are further subdivided in the usual fashion.[66] However, the sections and sub-sections are distributed over wide areas throughout South Waziristan and geographically intermingled with each other to such an extent that "few valleys can be pointed out in which there are not living side by side representatives of at least a dozen sub-sections of entirely different main sections." As a result the operative political units are usually very small. Moreover, Mahsud *maliks* exercise very little influence over their tribesmen and there are "no leaders who in influence can be said to equal, e.g., those of the Afridis".[67] In consequence Mahsud politics is highly anarchic. The British never managed to devise any viable system for their dealings with this turbulent tribe.[68] A gruesome illustration of how vehemently the Mahsuds resisted government penetration is provided by the fact that between 1895, the year the South Waziristan Agency was created, and the coming of independence in 1947, three political agents—almost one out of ten—were assassinated. A fourth, the last Briton to hold the post, was killed by a Mahsud soon after independence.[69]

The situation in South Waziristan was thus more fluid than in Khyber and Mashud politics more unpredictable than Afridi politics. However there existed among the Mahsuds the same division between those who were pro-government and those who were pro-Afghan and this division by and large also coincided with the Muslim League and Congress sympathies which emerged. The leading pro-government *malik* was Captain Mir Badshah, who had fought for the British in France in World War I, later became a government contractor, and during World War II served as Assistant Recruiting Officer among the Mahsuds. After the war Captain Mir Badshah became one of the leaders of the Pakistan movement among the Mahsuds. Another leading Muslim League activist was Malik Gulab Khan. At this time he was not one of the senior-most Mahsud *maliks* but since

[65] According to *The Border. (N.-W.F.P.) 1939–40* TARC p. 9, the Afridi *Sarishta* was originally "a body of leading men, who tried to settle cases between families and sections by imposing truces and forcibly collecting fines if they were violated." Attempts to revive it had been made in recent years but without much success. A prominent Afridi *malik*, whom I spoke to, maintained it was still a living institution, whose members were appointed on a temporary basis.

According to Faridullah Shah, it was mainly a religious party consisting largely of *maulvis* inclining toward Afghanistan and in Afghan pay.

[66] For the Mahsud genealogical subdivisions, see table in Afridi.

[67] *Who's Who in the South Waziristan Agency corrected up to 1st May 1934* p. ii TARC.

[68] Howell *passim*; Afridi pp. 41–46; Baha 1978 pp. 33–51.

[69] See Akbar S. Ahmed's foreword to Howell p. vi f.

then, thanks to his work for Pakistan before independence and his political acumen and astuteness afterwards, he has risen to become perhaps the most influential of all Mahsud *maliks*. Among the Congress sympathisers one could mention N.S. Musa Khan, who had been prominent in the fighting against the British in 1919 as well as in 1930, and was also an Afghan allowance-holder.

The contrast between the Mahsuds and the Afridis was also reflected in their attitudes toward party politics. The Afridis were rather cautious, followed the government closely and remained peaceful throughout. The Mahsuds, on the other hand, showed none of these inhibitions. Leading government *maliks* came out openly on the side of the Muslim League and did not even refrain from using violence to achieve their ends. But more significant than this difference are the similarities. In both tribes there existed two blocs. As we have seen, these blocs were not based on party sympathies but nevertheless had implications for party politics. However, thanks to the nature of the *jirgas* and the influence of Muslim officials, this division did not find direct expression in the party politics of this period. Instead it was only the Muslim League which could benefit from the growing tension in the tribal areas.

At the time of the Cabinet Mission there was still little interest in politics among the tribes. In so far as there was any, the general attitude was one of concern that independence might entail problems. The tribal leaders were on the whole happy with the existing agreements with the British. Where political divisions along Congress and Muslim League lines were discernible, they were due to traditional rivalries rather than any real preference for one party or the other. Nevertheless, there was an undercurrent of sympathy for the Muslim League.[70]

According to Jos Donald, the political agent in South Waziristan, the Mahsuds did not take any great interest in the mission's negotiations but the leaders of the tribe watched the developments closely and would be able to rouse the tribesmen quickly, if they should find it necessary. There already existed a group in the tribe, who were strongly in favour of the Muslim League. In the elections about a month earlier they had helped the Nawab of Tank, who stood successfully on the Muslim League ticket.[71] The most active among them seems to have been Malik Gulab Khan. On 20 April 1946 he wrote to Jinnah:

> Dear Qaid-e-Azam
>
> I on behalf of all the Mahsuds of South Waziristan Agency beg to assure you of our armed help for the achievement of PAKISTAN whenever so ordered by the Muslim League High Command. We have full faith in your leadership in the [sic] critical time. Wish you long-life and health.
>
> I am also ready to send MAHSUD ARMED ESCORT as your BODYGUARD if so ordered.
>
> PAKISTAN ..... Zinda bad.[72]

[70] See correspondence on this subject contained in TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I).

[71] Donald to Latimer (date ?) TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I).; also Packman to Weightman 11/4/46 TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I), and interview with Gulab Khan.

[72] Gulab Khan to Jinnah 20/4/46 NAP Shamsul Hasan Collection Correspondence of Qaide Azam ... Vol. 2.

Jinnah replied:

> Dear Sir,
>
> I am in receipt of your letter of the 20th April, and thank you very much for your sympathies and your confidence in my leadership.
>
> With regard to my staff, I have my own arrangements.
>
> While thanking you for your kind offer, there is no need just now to trouble you.[73]

The first reaction to the Cabinet Mission among the Afridis was given at their annual *jirga* with the governor on 4th April. Apart from the usual questions, which were always raised on these occasions, notably the demand for an increase of the allowances, which Caroe refused, their spokesman Malik Abdul Latif Khan also said the tribes must be kept informed of the political developments and that no decision should be made concerning their future without consulting them. If after independence they continued to be under the Agent to the Governor-General, all would be well, but if they were placed under the central assembly, they would have to reconsider their position. Caroe replied that they were the door-keepers of India. If they fulfilled this function satisfactorily, he would see that they got the wages which were their due and then political questions would be of small import.[74]

The political agent, Colonel Sahibzada Mohammad Khurshid, was of the opinion that the majority of the tribesmen in his charge were happy with the existing arrangements with the British and did not look forward to any change at the centre. If a change must come, however, they were naturally with their co-religionists and were "definitely against Hindu rule". According to Khurshid, the *Sarishta* party was bribed by the Congress and occasionally said and did what the Congress told them, but he doubted if they would be able to go against the wishes of the majority in a matter of this kind, between Hindus and Muslims.[75]

The attitude of the agency was thus rather non-committal but nevertheless a Shinwari *malik* by the name of Bawar Khan, who claimed to represent all *maliks* in the agency, wrote a telegram to the members of the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy saying:

> Khyber Agency Tribes have full confidence in Jinnah. Muslims cannot accept anything except Pakistan.[76]

When Caroe summed up the situation a couple of weeks after the arrival of the Cabinet Mission, he wrote that the general impression was that the tribes were

[73] Jinnah to Gulab Khan 27/4/45 NAP Shamsul Hasan Collection Correspondence of Qaide Azam ... Vol. 2.

[74] Governor's Report 10/4/46; also S.M. Khursid to O.C.B. St. John 5/4/46 and a note by Caroe concerning this jirga, both of which are found in TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I).

[75] Khursid to Latimer 10/5/46 TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I).

[76] *Khyber Mail* 5/4/46. Bawar Khan does not appear anywhere else in my sources.

"very much on the Muslim League side" but as for himself he accepted this appraisement only "with a good deal of caution":

> I fancy that if, for instance, Dr. Khan Sahib were to sit in *jirga* with me they would be more cautious of what they said, and we have to remember that there is sometimes an element in a tribe, such as the *sarrishta* party in Afridi Tirah, which does not attend our *jirgas* and has been inclined to flirt with Congress, mainly on the ground that Congress in the past has provided a convenient focus for anti-Government activity.[77]

Direct Action

The Settled Districts

The Direct Action campaign on the Frontier was led by a "Committee of Action". The president of the committee was the Pir of Manki Sharif. Another leading member was Arbab Abdul Ghafoor.[78] It it noteworthy that Abdul Qaiyum, much to his chagrin, was not made a member.[79]

Direct Action Day passed off without any outbreak of violence in the NWFP.[80] *Hartal* was observed in Peshawar and other towns, meetings were held and processions taken out, but the demonstrations remained peaceful.[81]

The Direct Action campaign continued the whole autumn. In September an attempt was made to broaden the basis of the Pakistan idea beyond its purely religious appeal. At a meeting of the Committee of Action in the beginning of the month, three resolutions were adopted concerning the programme of the campaign. Firstly, it was decided to prepare a list of all Muslim preachers in the province with a view to sending them in groups all over the Frontier to do propaganda for Pakistan. Secondly, in order to make the Muslim community economically self-sufficient, all Muslims were urged to buy from Muslim shopkeepers instead of Hindus. Thirdly, Muslim lawyers were called upon to devote their spare time to the propagation of Pakistan and to form "defence committees" to defend Muslim Leaguers in the courts of law.[82]

In response to the third resolution, fifteen "prominent Peshawar Muslim lawyers" held a meeting at Mian Ziauddin's house. They "unanimously decided to place their services at the disposal of the Frontier Provincial Muslim League in connection with any programme the Council of Action may adopt for the achieve-

[77] Governor's Report 10/4/46.
[78] *Dawn* 7/9/46.
[79] Abdul Qaiyum to M. Jalaluddin 2/9/46 Jalaluddin Papers.
[80] FR II Aug. 1946.
[81] *Khyber Mail* 16/8/46.
[82] *Civil & Military Gazette* 7/9/46; *Dawn* 7/9/46.

ment of Pakistan."[83] The "Frontier Muslim Chamber of Commerce" held a meeting to discuss the problem of Muslim economic self-sufficiency. The president of the Peshawar District Muslim League, Mian Abdullah Shah, said that it was regrettable that the producers, i.e., the Muslims, were not in control of the marketing of their products and that the fruits of their labour therefore went to others, i.e., Hindus. He appealed to the Muslim businessmen for their help in making the Muslim community self-sufficient. Another speaker was Mian Ziauddin, who said that "commerce and industry were the backbone of a nation" and that the lead the Hindus had in other fields was due to their control of these spheres.[84]

Very little came out of these activities.[85] But these plans are indicative of the change provincial politics had undergone. Previously, and particularly at election time, politics had been a question of local, factional rivalries within the communities. But in the choice between Pakistan and united India factional disputes were entirely irrelevant and political mobilisation could take place on a much broader basis. Both Muslim traders and professionals had much to gain from the establishment of a Muslim state, where Hindu competition would be eliminated. Thus by and large they adopted a communal political stance and supported Pakistan. The fact that they were not very prominent in the Pakistan movement was due to their being overshadowed by other groups, notably religious leaders, rather than any lack of interest.

The Direct Action campaign meant that the Muslim League had for the first time abandoned its traditional constitutionalism. This drove the old loyalist Leaguers into a corner, from which they could escape only by deserting either the Muslim League or the British. The governor received

> many rather pathetic letters from old friends who have staunchly upheld the administration in the past and are very unhappy now. Some have resigned their titles and others not, but all are unhappy and keep asking me to tell them how they can continue to do service in the present conditions.[86]

By the end of September seventeen *Khan Bahadurs* and twenty-seven *Khan Sahibs* had renounced their titles.[87] As the Pakistan campaign spread and intensified, the old loyalists came out increasingly openly and defiantly on the side of the Muslim League. Naturally they could not afford to antagonise the party which was clearly going to become the new rulers of the country.[88]

[83] *Civil & Military Gazette* 13/9/46.

[84] *Civil & Military Gazette* 4/10/46; also *Civil & Military Gazette* 27/9/46 and *Khyber Mail* 27/9/46. Jinnah had since 1943 been working for the establishment of Muslim chambers of commerce but had faced great difficulties. See Zaidi in Philips and Wainwright p. 270 f. The first mention of any Muslim chamber of commerce on the Frontier, which I have come across, is in the *Khyber Mail* 20/4/45. It seems doubtful, if any such organisation ever really functioned.

[85] Interview with Mian Ziauddin.

[86] Governor's Report 9/9/46.

[87] *Civil & Military Gazette* 29/9/46.

[88] A very different course was, however, chosen by the Nawab of Hoti, who resigned both from

By far the most important aspect of the Direct Action campaign was the religious-cultural appeal of Pakistan as a homeland for the Indian Muslims. The communal violence in other parts of the country, particularly in Bombay and Bihar, had a deep impact on the Frontier. Many Pakhtuns had relatives who worked in Bombay and heard from them of the events there. The provincial Muslim League did everything in its power to spread awesome stories of Hindu atrocities on Muslims. A delegation was sent to Bombay to investigate the situation. Its report blamed the Congress government of Bombay for having allowed the situation to get out of control.[89] The massacres in Bihar attracted particular attention. Missions of various kinds were sent there to aid the Muslim sufferers and to find out what was going on. Once, when a medical relief mission was taken in procession to Peshawar railway station, a fracas occurred in which one Hindu and one Sikh woman were injured.[90] When about ten days later another medical mission went to Bihar, they were stopped at Attock and allowed to proceed only after they had surrendered their weapons and agreed to discard uniforms.[91] The members of missions like these sent back hair-raising reports or came back personally and reported at League meetings of what they had seen. These stories were flashed by the Muslim press and circulated in every possible way. Collections were arranged for the Muslims of Bihar[92] and the party even prepared a scheme to settle two hundred Muslim widows and about five hundred orphans from Bihar in Peshawar.[93] A "Muslim Minority Provinces Protection Board" was constituted to deal with "all questions relating to relief, resettlement, employment, and rehabilitation of Muslims of Hindu-majority provinces, including exchange of populations."[94] Through these activities the provincial Muslim League managed to focus the attention of the public on the events in Bihar and a strong sense of all-India Muslim solidarity was conjured up. Communal tension grew dramatically in the province.[95]

Throughout the Direct Action campaign the Pir of Manki Sharif and other League leaders toured all over the Frontier. A large number of meetings, or "Pakistan Conferences", were held, usually with Pir Manki in the chair. A typical

the Muslim League and the assembly. He told the governor that it had always been his family's tradition not to oppose the government of the day and that he intended to uphold that tradition. Governor's Report 9/9/46. See also *Civil & Military Gazette* 3/10/46.

[89] Rittenberg p. 345 f.; also Sir A. Clow (governor of Bombay) to Wavell 3/10/46 Mansergh Vol. VIII No. 399.

[90] FR I Nov. 1946.

[91] FR II Nov. 1946.

[92] See e.g., *Civil & Military Gazette* 16/11/46.

[93] *Civil & Military Gazette* 6/12/46.

[94] *Civil and Military Gazette* 12/12/46.

[95] Abdul Ghaffar Khan also went to Bihar, where he together with Gandhi tried to temper the communal feelings. Tendulkar pp. 402–406; Badshah Khan p. 196.

meeting of this kind, held in Peshawar in the middle of October, passed in the following way. Abdul Qaiyum gave a speech in which he said:

> When the Hindus talk about the Muslims, their words are sweet and soft but in their hearts they are nursing hatred and dislike for the Muslims and are out to dominate them.

Addressing the tribals, he said:

> The Hindu Congress is on the war path. In the Tribal belt we have an immeasurable reservoir of strength. You must organise and unite from Gilgit to Quetta.
>
> The hour of trial is coming. Be prepared! Islam in India needs your help in this hour of trial. Tell Pandit Nehru that if he wants to talk, he should go to Mr. Jinnah. There is no sense in talking to the Tribals.[96]

Pir Manki in his address urged the Muslims to unite under the banner of the Muslim League and to work earnestly and in a disciplined manner for the achievement of Pakistan. The Hindus and the British, he said, "had joined forces to crush the Musalmans and through their conduct they had proved to the world that they were not well-wishers of the Muslims." He dwelt at length on the communal riots in the Hindu-majority forces and the "brutal, murderous attacks on Musalmans" by Hindus, the enemies of Islam. Thereupon "two prominent Ahrars" declared their resignation from the Ahrar organisation and instead joined the Muslim League. Sixteen Congressites did the same. Some Mohmand representatives assured that the Mohmands were with the rest of India's Muslims in the struggle for Pakistan and were prepared to sacrifice everything for that goal. A resolution was adopted condemning the installation of the interim government in Delhi without the concurrence of the Muslim League. Another resolution assured Jinnah of the fullest support.[97]

The Tribal Areas

Party politics among the tribes remained in abeyance in the summer of 1946. The Afridis were quiet, while the South Waziristan scene was dominated by altogether different events: on 21st June the political agent Jos Donald was kidnapped by a gang of Bromi Khel tribesmen.

The Bromi Khel are a sub-section of the Shabi Khel section of the Shaman Khel clan. The Shabi Khel had for some time been demanding a sixth share of the government allowances to the Mahsuds as well as of the allotments of food-stuffs, cloth etc. This demand was resisted by the rest of the Mahsuds as being in excess of the traditional share to which the Shabi Khel were entitled. Without the

[96] *Dawn* 13/10/46. For Nehru's visit to the tribes, see below p. 181 ff.
[97] *Dawn* 13/10/46.

knowledge of the rest of the Shabi Khel, the Bromi Khel conceived the idea to kidnap a British official to give weight to their demand. The official they decided on was the garrison engineer at Razmak, but by mistake they instead kidnapped the political agent, who happened to pass the place where the gang was lying in ambush. After about two weeks the authorities managed to secure Donald's release, whereafter they demanded indemnities. The Shabi Khel refused and the government managed to force them into submission only after resorting to aerial and artillery bombardment.[98]

To begin with the Direct Action campaign had little impact in the tribal areas. However, in October the situation was drastically altered, when Nehru decided to pay a visit to the NWFP including the tribal areas. Nehru undertook this visit in his capacity as head of the External Affairs Department, a portfolio which also included responsibility for the Frontier tribes. Many, even in the Congress High Command, were sceptical of the wisdom of the visit and both Maulana Azad and Sardar Patel tried to prevail on Nehru to abstain.[99] Caroe raised no objections to the visit to the settled districts but was strongly opposed to Nehru's plans to go to the tribal areas. Nehru intended to travel in the company of the Khan brothers but not to bring any Muslim Leaguers with him. This would in Caroe's opinion imply a party approach to the problem of the tribes, which would be extremely dangerous.[100] Caroe even went down to Delhi in an attempt to persuade Nehru not to go, but without success. Wavell was not happy about Nehru's plans either but felt that it was not possible to prevent the visit, if Nehru insisted.[101] Both Caroe and Wavell hoped that the negotiations for the League's entry of the Interim Government, which were near a break-through, would be concluded before the visit, so that Nehru could bring a representative of the Muslim League with him.[102] On 13th October the Muslim League agreed to join the Interim Government and on the 26th a Muslim League-Congress coalition took office.[103] But on the 16th Nehru had gone to Peshawar without any companion from the Muslim League.

Nehru's visit provided the Muslim League with excellent ammunition for its propaganda, particularly among the tribes. The General Secretary of the Frontier Muslim League issued a statement that Nehru was coming

[98] *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 22/6/46 and 6/7/46 IOL L/P&S/12/3200; *STATEMENT ON BOMBING IN WAZIRISTAN* ... dated 18/9/46 IOL L/P&J/5/223.

[99] Azad p. 169 f.; Wavell p. 361.

[100] Telegram Caroe to Wavell 30/9/46 IOL R/3/1/92; Governor's Report 11/10/46 and 23/10/46.

[101] Telegram Wavell to Caroe 30/9/46 IOL R/3/1/92.

[102] Governor's Report 11/10/46; Wavell to Lord Pethick-Lawrence 9/10/46 Mansergh Vol. VIII No. 422.

[103] Menon p. 319 and 324.

> in order to persuade the tribesmen to accept the yoke of the new Hindu Government . . . The Frontier Tribesmen have never accepted British domination. They will not submit to Hindu Raj either. If Pandit Nehru is bent upon meeting them, he should bring Islam Bibi with him. Without Islam Bibi neither the Faqir of Ipi nor any Waziri tribesman would care to meet him.[104]

A large number of public meetings were held at which the Muslim League leaders harped on similar themes. In Kohat Arbab Abdul Ghafoor also said that Nehru's visit was an attempt to bring the tribesmen under Hindu domination. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, he said,

> was a mere tool in Pandit Nehru's hands. The Khan brothers for their personal interests have brought Pandit Nehru to the N.-W.F.P. despite the fact that the people of N.-W.F.P. and the Tribal Belt did not like Nehru coming into their midst as [they] believe him to be a murderer of one hundred thousand Muslims and responsible for the destruction of 12 villages, men, women, children and property and all.[105]

At a meeting in Peshawar the Pir of Manki Sharif warned Nehru against coming, saying that if the visit should take place, Nehru and the government would be responsible for the consequences. The meeting was also addressed by tribesmen, who promised to do everything in their power, should there be any trouble.[106] Immediately before Nehru's arrival the Pir of Manki Sharif went on a tour of the Khyber Agency, Mohmand country and Malakand. Other mullahs were also busy touring.[107]

Nehru arrived in Peshawar by plane on 16th October. At the airport he was met by a hostile crowd of several thousand including more than a thousand Muslim National Guards in uniform. The authorities had shut the cantonment gates to keep them out but the demonstrators forced their way through. To save Nehru the police had to slip him out by a back way. The reception became an entirely one-sided affair, because in order to avoid any possibility of a clash the Congress had refrained from organising a demonstration of greeting.[108]

The next day Nehru, accompanied by Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Dr Khan Sahib, flew to Miranshah in North Waziristan, where they saw a *jirga* representing the tribes of that agency. First Dr Khan Sahib addressed the *jirga*, saying that they had come only to inquire into the grievances of the tribes, to put matters right and to establish friendly relations. Ghaffar Khan said the tribes were not free yet but the Congress would help them attain freedom. The *jirga* members answered

[104] *Civil & Military Gazette* 13/10/46. For Islam Bibi, see above p. 28.
[105] *Dawn* 20/10/46.
[106] *Civil & Military Gazette* 16/10/46.
[107] Governor's Report 23/10/46; *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 19/10/46 IOL L/P&S/12/3200.
[108] This and the following paragraphs on Nehru's visit are based on Governor's Report 23/10/46 and *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 19/10/46 and 26/10/46 IOL L/P&S/12/3200.

that they did not consider themselves as anybody's subjects, they did not want to be ruled by the British, the Congress or the Muslim League but wanted to be independent. Nevertheless their sympathies were with the Muslims and they threatened reprisals on those guilty of persecution of Muslims in India. Hearing this Abdul Ghaffar Khan got up and accused them of being pawns of the Political Department and only repeating what they had been told to say. At this the *jirga* members became so angry that they simply left without hearing Nehru. From Miranshah Nehru flew to Razmak in South Waziristan. The camp and the picquets around it were sniped at before and when his plane landed. The Mahsud *maliks* gave Nehru a very hostile reception telling him that if the Mahsuds should have any grievances, they would turn to Jinnah. They would have nothing to do with the Congress. Nehru struck an unfortunate note in his reply by asking why they were so uncooperative in spite of liberal allowances and accusing them of being slaves of the British. To this K.B. Mehr Dil Khan, Shah Pasand, Qutab Khan and Malik Khaisor[109] angrily replied that they were not slaves; they had never been dominated by any-one in the past and would not let any-one dominate them in the future either. Their allowances, they maintained, were only taxes for roads and land used by the government. However, not all Mahsuds showed themselves as hostile as this *jirga*. Before Nehru's visit, when rumours of Nehru's plan to come to Waziristan reached the Shabi Khel, they expressed their satisfaction because they hoped they would receive compensation for the losses they had suffered during the recent bombing of their villages. While he was at Razmak, Nehru received a written invitation from Mullah Fazal Din, Parmana Khan and N.S. Musa Khan to see them separately outside Razmak. He seems to have declined this invitation but on the morning of the 18th he saw Hayat Khan Nazar Khel with 40–50 other Mahsuds in the Residency at Razmak. Hayat Khan was, however, not as amenable as Nehru might have hoped and said that the Mahsuds wanted complete freedom, i.e., much the same as the other Mahsuds.

After this meeting Nehru left for Wana to see the Ahmadzai Wazirs. The tribesmen who had been told to come to the *jirga* lined the road Nehru was coming waving black flags at him. When they became refractory, a company of infantry were ordered to control them. This interference annoyed the tribesmen, who in protest refused to attend the *jirga* and thus Nehru had to leave without seeing them. At Tank Nehru was again received by hostile Muslim Leaguers, who threw stones at him and his convoy of Red Shirts. A fracas occurred in which sixteen Congressites and four Muslim Leaguers were injured. From Tank he went on an impromptu visit to Jandola, where he was received by a small but friendly Bhitanni *jirga*.[110]

[109] For them, see Appendix IV.

[110] According to Caroe, this "friendly gathering of Bhitannis, a tame little tribe many of whom are subjects [i.e., residents of Dera Ismail Khan district] and not real tribesmen," had been brought there by a dismissed naib tahsildar (Governor's Report 23/10/46). According to *Weekly*

On the 20th Nehru motored through the Khyber. The Afridis refused to see him at all. There was a section among them who were willing to meet him but, overawed by the main body of the tribe, they abstained from doing so. On the way up the pass the convoy was sniped by tribesmen, and on the return journey the political agent found himself forced to order the escort to open fire when the party was stoned by a crowd. The same afternoon Nehru proceeded to Malakand where he stayed till the following day. He did not see any representative tribal jirga here either, and on both days there were angry demonstrators with black flags along his route. On the way back his convoy was again stoned and Nehru himself as well as the Khan Brothers sustained minor injuries. By changing his route Nehru managed to avoid further demonstrations awaiting him on the way to Mardan. His tour ended with a meeting at the Khudai Khidmatgar centre at Sardaryab, which unlike the other events of the visit was an unqualified success.

The Congress leaders accused the officers of the Political Service and other officials of being responsible for the demonstrations against Nehru. These charges were repudiated by Caroe, who said that Nehru himself was to blame and that by undertaking this visit Nehru "had done more to strengthen communalism and the party approach on this Frontier than anything else could possibly have done."[111] These questions subsequently became the subject of a heated controversy between Caroe and the Congress. The relations between the governor and the ministry, which already were under strain, deteriorated further. In addition, Nehru and the Congress High Command also became suspicious of the Frontier governor.

I have been able to make a few interviews with people who were involved in the demonstrations. By and large they confirm the Congress' charges. These interviews in addition to giving a picture of the circumstances surrounding Nehru's visit also give a good idea of the political atmosphere among the tribes and the channels through which party politics was brought to them. In the following I have therefore given rather a detailed account of the stories my informants told me.

Of the events in South Waziristan Gulab Khan gave the following account. After a Congress ministry was installed in the spring 1946, the Muslim League movement began to gain momentum in South Waziristan. The Pir of Manki Sharif had some followers among the Mahsuds and it was mainly thanks to his in-

Intelligence Summary 26/10/46 IOL L/P&S/12/3200, he was "a local Bhitanni [and] ex-Political Tehsildar, who had left the service with an alleged grievance during the Muslim League Ministry." In the 1946 elections he had been an unsuccessful Congress candidate for the provincial assembly. Curtis maintains the Bhitanni jirga actually consisted of Kundis, who had been brought there in lorries by a Hindu assistant commissioner (*The Prime Minister of India's visit to the North-West Frontier Province* ... p. 8 Curtis Papers). The Kundis were a small pro-Congress tribe settled in Dera Ismail Khan district.

[111] Governor's Report 23/10/46.

fluence that the Mahsuds began to support the Muslim League. Another important factor were the events in Bihar. Six or seven Mahsuds were sent to Bihar, from where they brought back stories of Hindu atrocities on Muslims.

Dr Khan Sahib had told Nehru that all Pakhtuns were with him and did not want Pakistan. The Muslim League sympathisers wanted to demonstrate that this was not true. Gulab Khan paid some men Rs. 200 to snipe at Nehru's plane when it landed at Razmak. Nehru and his companions were received by sixty Mahsud *maliks*, who had been invited by the Resident, Waziristan,[112] Colonel Packman. Dr Khan Sahib told Nehru not to go near the tribesmen but Nehru insisted. Contrary to the convention, they did not get up to greet him. In the end, however, Malik Khaisor rose and shook hands with Nehru but not with Dr Khan Sahib. The latter asked him why. Malik Khaisor replied: "I dont't want to shake hands with you, because you have given your daughter in marriage to a Sikh, but Nehru has done service to his people." There followed an uproar and the British officers interposed between the angry tribesmen and the Congress leaders. Nehru let fly at Packman, accusing the Resident of having insulted him, whereupon Packman ordered his men to leave. Fortunately the Mahsuds did not have their weapons at hand, as they were not allowed to carry arms in the cantonment. Nehru told them: "The British are just about to be thrown out. When they have left, I will squeeze you." Gulab Khan replied: "Not even the British could squeeze us." Another Mahsud told Nehru: "Your job is to measure cloth and you are a shopkeeper. Mind your own business. You are not a warrior." Yet another Mahsud wanted to hit him, but was prevented by an Englishman.

The Muslim League activists received moral and other support from Muslim officials throughout. The junior officers were for all practical purposes in league with them. The assistant political officer, one Abdul Manan, was particularly helpful and would encourage and guide them secretly. After the demonstrations against Nehru he told them he was very pleased. The British officers, on the other hand, were not in favour of the Muslim League and tried to check it. Their efforts were, however, thwarted by the Muslim officials, who told the Muslim Leaguers what the British planned to do.

The background of the events in the Khyber were described to me by Faridullah Shah who just a short time before these events had served as assistant political officer in the agency. Even before Nehru's visit the Afridis were in favour of a Muslim state. The reason was that Muslim officials had built up a strong hatred of the Hindus among them. They did not use bribes. Such methods would not have succeeded. Instead they would ask the Afridis if they wanted to be with the Hindus or their Muslim brothers and give hints like that. They began building up these feelings against the Hindus when the Interim Government came into power in Delhi. In the following I quote Faridullah Shah verbatim.

[112] The Resident, Waziristan, was the immediate superior of the two political agents.

At that time Colonel Khurshid was the Political Agent of the Khyber Agency. Two or three days before Nehru's arrival Khursid sent for me and told me Nehru was coming to Khyber. He said that if the tribesmen should receive him in a docile way, all Musalmans of this part of the country will go under the suzerainty of the Hindus; as a Musalman I should do something, but at the same time he warned me not to tell him of the action I would take. Do you know why? He was a religious man and if he was asked anything, he could say he did not know.

I went straight to Jamrud. I contacted a certain Kuki Khel *malik* called Swatai Khan. The only question he asked was as to what would be the reaction of the Political Agent. And I told him: "Don't worry." I very strongly told him that nobody was to be killed. They should resort to heavy sniping.

On return from Jamrud I contacted Mullah Sahib of Manki Sharif. He had then a lot of disciples among the Shinwaris and Mullagoris. So he also went on tour to Landi Kotal and the Mullagori area.

The incident in the Malakand agency was that which caused the most acrimonious controversy in the aftermath of Nehru's visit. The political agent, Nawab Sheikh Mahbub Ali, was widely accused either of direct complicity in arranging the demonstrations or at least of negligence in the performance of his duty, when he failed to protect Nehru against the demonstrations.[113] A High Court Judge from Madras, one Justice Clark, was appointed to conduct an enquiry into Sheikh Mahbub's conduct. Caroe and Dr Khan Sahib agreed that the charge of instigation should not be included in the enquiry. Thus it was confined to the question of negligence. Justice Clark acquitted Sheikh Mahbub on this charge.[114] However, there were many who were not convinced by his report. One of them was the Viceroy Lord Wavell, to whom the charges of negligence seemed true,[115] and on his suggestion Sheikh Mahbub was retired.[116]

As regards the charges of complicity, I have met several persons with experience of the tribal areas, including former political agents, who are certain that Sheikh Mahbub was responsible for the demonstrations.[117] Their argument is that this sort of thing does not happen without the political agent's knowledge and approval. They also stress that Sheikh Mahbub was an extremely clever and shrewd man, who would never have allowed this to happen, had he not wanted it. Colonel Sharif made a private investigation of the problem, when soon after independence he became political agent in Malakand. He found that Sheikh Mahbub had told

[113] Sheikh Mahbub was known as a strong supporter of the Muslim League. He was also one of the senior officials under investigation by the anti-corruption committee, so there was no love lost between him and the Ministry. Governor's Report 9/11/46. See also above p. 146.

[114] Justice Clark's report dated 28/2/47 is found in IOL R/3/1/92.

[115] Handwritten comment by Wavell on a note by I.D. Scott dated 20/3/47 IOL R/3/1/93.

[116] I must also say that the report is most unsatisfactory. It is strongly biassed against Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other Congress witnesses, while witnesses favourable toward the political agent are taken at their word without question. The three who arranged the demonstration were not questioned at all.

[117] Faridullah Shah is one of them.

the members of the jirga that Nehru was an important person and that they should receive him in a friendly manner, but at the same time he inserted a word about Hindus here and there. In the end the khans did not know what message the political agent wanted to put across and if they should give Nehru a friendly reception or not. Colonel Sharif's own view is that Sheikh Mahbub did not want them to welcome Nehru, but if he was directly implicated in the demonstration, he must have proceeded extremely skilfully.[118]

Those directly responsible for the demonstrations were three young graduates in the agency, Fazal Sattar, Majidullah Khan and Mohammad Nawaz Khan. I have interviewed the two former. Their leader was Fazal Sattar. He belonged to an influential family at Thana. He was a B.Sc. and had done a diploma in engineering in Lucknow. While he was in Lucknow he had become acquainted with Indian politics, sympathetic to the Muslim League cause and an ardent supporter of Jinnah, the Qaid-e-Azam. He and his friend Majidullah Khan felt that the British had created many problems in their part of the world and dreamt about establishing the sort of regime which had existed in the Golden Age of Islam.

Before Nehru's visit the Malakand agency had not been touched by Indian politics. The people of the agency had never taken any part in the nationalist movement of the Khan brothers or in any other political activities. Because of their amenable attitude toward the British they were held in some contempt in other parts of the Frontier.[119] Fazal Sattar and Majidullah Khan felt unhappy about this. When they heard on the wireless how Nehru was received in Waziristan and Khyber, they felt they could do something about the reputation of their agency by showing where their sympathies lay. On the eve of Nehru's visit they decided to stage a demonstration against him. Both my informants insist very strongly that this was their own idea and nobody else's. The events in Waziristan and Khyber, stressed Fazal Sattar, were the igniting spark. If Nehru had started his tour in Malakand, nothing would have happened.

On the morning of the 20th they announced with the aid of the village herold that a meeting was to be held to discuss a matter of religious importance. At this meeting it was decided to march to the air-field in Dir State, where Nehru was expected to land. The marchers were mostly youngsters. The old people stayed at home. At Chakdarra the demonstrators were joined by Nawaz Khan.

On the way there they were informed by one Murat Khan that Nehru and his party had already arrived at Malakand by road. The three leaders were driven there by Murat Khan in his car. The others came later in trucks and so they managed to stage their demonstration. They had planned it to be entirely peaceful but unfortunately things got out of hand and they began to throw stones. Majidullah Khan even slapped Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the face.

[118] Interview with Col. Mohammad Sharif Khan.

[119] Caroe wrote afterwards: "I had not expected trouble actually in the Malakand, where the people are generally peaceful." Governor's Report 23/10/46.

Although a few obscure points remain, it would seem from Fazal Sattar's and Majidullah Khan's version that Sheikh Mahbub was not responsible for the demonstration. Majidullah Khan admitted, however, that the political agent did not protect Nehru and his party as he could have done. If Sheikh Mahbub had wanted to, he could have prevented the whole mêlée by using force but instead he did nothing.

After this episode the three friends formed a Muslim League branch for the Malakand agency. Fazal Sattar became president, Majidullah Khan vice-president and Mohammad Nawaz Khan general secretary. For the subordinate branches they appointed generals, colonels, etc. But the organisation was entirely improvised and had no firm, formal structure. Mohammad Nawaz Khan used to laugh at the appointments they made to the party hierarchy and the people who received them. Nevertheless the Malakand Muslim League was able to serve its purpose of mobilising support for Pakistan. According to Majidullah Khan, 1,500 Muslim National Guards were sent from Malakand to participate in the demonstration in April 1947, when Mountbatten visited Peshawar.[120]

As a result of Nehru's visit the tribal areas were definitely drawn within the orbit of Indian politics. Both parties, but particularly the Muslim League, stepped up their activities there. The change should perhaps not be exaggerated—much continued as before—but the tribes now had to evolve their own policy in regard to the constitutional future of India. Their religious sentiments, fanned by officials, students and regular Muslim Leaguers, weighed heavily in favour of the Muslim League and Pakistan. Those who had previously inclined toward the Congress found that position increasingly difficult. Many of them instead began to stress the Afghan connection or talk in terms of independence.

In the middle of November the Viceroy paid a visit to the Frontier in order to smooth over the feelings Nehru's visit had aroused. As was to be expected, the tribes of the Khyber agency were the most cautious but also the shrewdest ones. They pointed out to the Viceroy that their treaties were with the British government and if the British should leave, the Khyber Pass should be returned to them. They would then decide among themselves whether to remain independent or link themselves with Afghanistan. They stressed that as long as the tension and violence between Hindus and Muslims continued in India, they would have nothing to do with the Interim Government.[121]

According to Faridullah Shah, the idea to stress the independence of the tribes

[120] Cf. *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 3/5/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3200: "A large contingent of Muslim League National Guards from the Malakand Agency participated in the demonstrations at Peshawar on April 28th". For this demonstration, see below p. 201 ff.

[121] *Representation to be made* [to the Viceroy] *by the tribes of the Khyber Agency on Friday 15th Nov, 1946.* IOL R/3/1/92; Wavell p. 377.

really originated from the government officials. They were as yet not certain that India would be partitioned and wanted the Muslims to be as strongly represented as possible in any unified government. The demand from the tribes for independence was intended as a lever for the Muslims in this connection.[122]

Wavell told the *jirga* that they did right in staying out of Indian politics and assured them that their freedom would be respected and that they would get every opportunity to state their case and make their own terms to any future Indian government.[123]

In South Waziristan the Viceroy confined himself to seeing an Ahmadzai Wazir *jirga* at Wana. He found this *jirga* "more communal and less dignified in their outlook" than the Khyber tribes. Their spokesman, K.S. Hafta Khan, presented Wavell with an address of welcome, in which the tribes also raised the demand for Pakistan. Thereupon Hafta Khan made a speech in favour of Pakistan. Wavell told this *jirga* much the same as the Khyber one.[124]

When Wavell went to Malakand, Fazal Sattar and his friends wanted to make a representation to him on behalf of the local Muslim League. The political agent, Sheikh, Mahbub, told them that if they wanted their views to carry more weight, they should ask the tribal *jirga* to make it for them. They did so, and the *jirga* members agreed. In this way the demands of the three young Muslim League enthusiasts came to be presented as those of the tribal *jirga*.[125] The statement ran as follows:

> Our religious, cultural, economic, social and political interest are at variance with those of the non-Muslims. 'United India' only aims at obliterating Muslims. Muslims are unsafe in Hindu Majority provinces, where no stone is left unturned to crush them from the face of the earth. The massacre of Muslims in Bihar, Bombay, U.P. and other Congress provinces of India is a clear proof of the genuineness of our fears. The safety of 10 crores of Muslims lies only in the establishment of Pakistan. We have full faith in our great leader Qaide Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

The statement concluded: "Our demand is Pakistan. Give us Pakistan. Pakistan Zinda Bad! Muslim League Zindabad! Long live our beloved Qaide Azam."[126]

[122] Interview with Faridullah Shah.

[123] Wavell p. 377. See also the draft of Wavell's speech to this *jirga* in IOL R/3/1/92.

[124] Wavell p. 377. See also *Welcome Address from the Ahmadzai Wazirs of Wana to His Excellency the Viceroy* 15/11/46 and the draft of Wavell's speech to this jirga in IOL R/3/1/92.

[125] Interview with Fazal Sattar.

[126] *Khyber Mail* 22/11/46.

Civil Disobedience

The Settled Districts

By the end of 1946 the formerly moribund Frontier Muslim had been transformed into a formidable rival of the Congress. In the assembly, however, Dr Khan Sahib still had a comfortable majority and the province thus remained under Congress control. The only way the Muslim League could challenge the Congress was through extra-parliamentary means. Young leaders like Fida Mohammad, president of the Peshawar City Muslim League, had long been advocating some form of civil disobedience as a means to get rid of the image of a "Calling League" and now more and more Leaguers supported the idea.[127]

In the NWFP there was no large-scale violence in the autumn of 1946 but the communal situation became very tense. The tension was aggravated by the extreme shortage of food and cloth. Muslims accused Hindu shopkeepers of diverting their supplies to the black market.[128] Hindus and Sikhs began moving to the relative safety of the towns.[129] In December the situation deteriorated rapidly. On the night between the 7th and 8th, trans-border tribesmen attacked the village of Battal in Hazara district and burnt the bazaar. The following night the village of Oghi suffered the same fate. These raids "were well organised and instigated by Mullahs working on fanatical tribes in retaliation for events in Bihar."[130] A few days later a lorry evacuating Hindus from the area was attacked by tribesmen, probably with the aid of local villagers. Fourteen evacuees were killed and twenty-seven wounded, most of them women and children. "Axes, not firearms, were used." Further similar atrocities followed, though on a smaller scale, resulting in an exodus of Hindus and Sikhs to Kashmir and Punjab.[131]

The government responded by prohibiting public speeches, processions and assemblies of more than five persons in Abbottabad and some other towns in Hazara district under section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The governor also issued a public ordinance giving the authorities wider powers to check the spread of rumours and allowing them to enforce collective security for the protection of evacuee property. The deputy commissioner of Hazara was empowered to use those sections of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which related to security and collective fines, without previous reference to the provincial government.[132] The so-called Black Mountain tribes, who were responsible for the raids, were ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 75,000, surrender seventy-five .303 rifles and to give

[127] Interview with Fida Mohammad. See also Rittenberg p. 360 f.; *Khyber Mail* 10/1/47.
[128] *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 16/11/46 IOL L/P&S/12/3200.
[129] *Civil & Military Gazette* 20/11/46, 27/11/46, 1/12/46; *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 23/11/46 IOL L/P&S/12/3200.
[130] FR II Nov. 1946; also FR I Dec. 1946.
[131] FR I Dec. 1946.
[132] FR I Jan. 1947; *Khyber Mail* 10/1/47.

forty hostages as a guarantee for good behaviour in the future. If they should fail to comply with these orders, a punitive expedition would be sent against them.[133] Numerous residents of the district were arrested and sentenced to pay fines or ordered to furnish security, and several villages were subjected to collective fines.[134]

The provincial Muslim League exploited this situation to start challenging the authority of the government. Prominent Muslim Leaguers toured Hazara telling people not to pay any fines.[135] The ministry was accused of pursuing a repressive policy aimed at crushing the Muslims and the Muslim League. It was well known, said Abdul Qaiyum,

> that thousands of Muslims in Bihar were butchered in cold blood yet no one ever thought of levying punitive fines on the Hindus of Bihar or of leading military expeditions against them.

He opposed the plans for an expedition against the Black Mountain tribes saying ominously that it might "very easily lead to a conflagration all along the Frontier."[136]

In the beginning of January 1947 a pregnant Sikh woman, whose husband had been killed by Muslim marauders, was converted to Islam and married to a Muslim, who according to some reports had been a member of the gang that killed her husband. The case caused an outcry among the Sikhs in the NWFP as well as in Punjab.[137] To find out whether her conversion was voluntary or not, the authorities brought the woman to Peshawar, where she was put up in Dr Khan Sahib's house. At the end of her stay with the Premier she stated in the presence of her Muslim husband as well as her Sikh family that she wanted to return to Sikhism. She was sent back to Hazara, where she had to be placed in protective custody in jail.[138]

The Muslim League claimed the woman had of her own free will converted to Islam but had been pressed by the government to return to Sikhism. The case was cited as an example of the governor's anti-Muslim bias and a parallel was drawn between this case and that of Islam Bibi, which had led to the Faqir of Ipi's uprising in the thirties.[139] The communal and political tension increased even further.

[133] FR I Jan. 1947; *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 11/1/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3201.
[134] *Khyber Mail* 24/1/47.
[135] *Khyber Mail* 10/1/47, 24/1/47.
[136] *Khyber Mail* 10/1/47.
[137] FR II Jan. 1947.
[138] *Ibid.*; Governor's Report 22/2/47.
[139] Governor's Report 22/2/47; interviews with Fida Mohammad, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor and Sairab Hayat Khan. Muslim Leaguers still maintain that the woman returned to Sikhism under Congress pressure. However, as Rittenberg has shown, there can be no doubt that the top leadership of the provincial Muslim League knew that "no kind of compulsion or coercion had been used." *Pakistan Times* 20/2/47 quoted in Rittenberg p. 362. Rittenberg (p. 362 f.) also gives some quotations from the Urdu press, which provide a vivid illustration how the case was presented to the public by the Muslim League.

On 20th February a protest demonstration was held at Mardan. The demonstration took a violent turn and a number of Muslim League leaders, including Abdul Qaiyum and the president of the Frontier Muslim League Samin Jan, were arrested.[140]

This opportunity was seized upon by the Muslim League to start a civil disobedience campaign. In the evening of the same day, the provincial League council held a meeting at which a "war council" was formed to "carry on the struggle which has been forced upon them".[141] The members of the war council were instructed to go underground to avoid arrest.[142] It is unclear what exactly their role was in the subsequent agitation and how far they actually led it.

The same day, the British Prime Minister announced that the British would leave India by June 1948. If there should be no agreement between the Indian parties by that date, His Majesty's Government would "have to consider to whom the powers of the central Government in British India should be handed over... whether as a whole to some form of central Government... or in some areas to the existing provincial Governments, or in such other way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the Indian people."[143] There was no connection between this statement and the launching of the Muslim League civil disobedience campaign on the Frontier. No orders were issued from the League High Command. The provincial Muslim League had simply been waiting for a *casus belli* and seized on the case with the Sikh woman.[144] However, the Prime Minister's statement obviously made the toppling of Dr Khan Sahib's ministry even more urgent for the Muslim League.

The following day the League held a large meeting in Peshawar to protest against the return of the Sikh woman to her family, the arrest of the League leaders, the "black laws in Hazara" and the government's methods in dealing with the Black Mountain tribes. The meeting formed itself into a procession, which forced its way through the cantonment gates and the police cordons on towards Government House and the premier's residence. The police were ordered to fire but refused. Tear gas was used but without effect. When the crowd reached Dr Khan Sahib's house, they started throwing stones and smashed windows and furniture. From there they marched on to the district jail, where they dispersed after some of the leaders, including Arab Abdul Ghafoor and Fida Mohammad, had been arrested.[145]

Soon the unrest spread over the whole province. The government responded by

[140] FR II Feb. 1947. There exist many versions of what really happened on this occasion but at least this much they are agreed on.

[141] *Pakistan Times* 22/2/47 quoted by Rittenberg p. 364.

[142] Interview with Fida Mohammad; Rittenberg p. 363 f.

[143] The prime minister's statement is found in Menon as Appendix IX.

[144] Interview with Fida Mohammad; Rittenberg p. 360 ff.

[145] Governor's Report 22/2/47; FR II Feb. 1947; *Tribune* 23/2/47.

banning meetings, processions and so forth, these bans were defied by the Muslim League and before long most of its leaders were in jail. The Pir of Manki Sharif remained at large for about a month, as the government hesitated to take action against him. While he was still free, he toured incessantly in the settled districts as well as the tribal areas.[146] On 28th March he, too, was arrested.[147]

There had been little or no planning for the campaign but nevertheless it continued after the arrest of the leaders. Their place was taken by other, often self-appointed leaders and in this way the campaign continued largely spontaneously and without much need for central directives. Moreover, the imprisoned leaders were never entirely cut off from the outside world but remained able, mostly with the connivance of the prison officers, who sympathised with the Muslim League, to keep in touch with those outside and give whatever guidance was necessary.[148]

According to Abdul Qaiyum and Fida Mohammad, the Muslim League High Command were at first sceptical of the campaign but then changed their minds. They supported the campaign financially and morally. Abdur Rab Nishtar and Nawab Ismail as representatives of the AIML even visited the provincial leaders in jail, but neither they, nor anybody else seem to have interfered with the conduct of the campaign.[149] Nor was there any need for that, things taking the direction they did.

In the neighbouring province of Punjab a similar campaign had already been going on for some time. Punjab had up till now been by far the most important Muslim-majority which was still under a non-League ministry. However, on 2nd March the premier Sir Khizr Hayat Khan found himself forced to resign. This was a great triumph for the League, but no alternative ministry could be formed and instead the province came under governor's rule. There followed a communal frenzy resulting in heavy casualties.[150]

After the resignation of the Punjab ministry, the NWFP came to occupy the central position in Indian politics. It was as essential for the AINC to retain the control of this province as it was for the AIML to wrest it out of the hands of the Congress. The fear that the communal rioting in Punjab might spread into the NWFP put the provincial as well as the central government under even greater pressure than before.

To begin with there was relatively little violence in the NWFP but gradually it increased. On 10th March a demonstration was held to disrupt the opening of the spring session of the provincial assembly, which was to take place the same day.

[146] For his activities, see *Weekly Intelligence Summaries* for March 1947 IOL L/P&S/12/3201.

[147] *Tribune* 29/3/47.

[148] Interviews with Fida Mohammad, Abdul Qaiyum, Sairab Hayat Khan.

[149] Interviews with Fida Mohammad and Abdul Qaiyum.

[150] Menon p. 350 f.

The army, which had been called in, opened fire. Two persons were killed and several were wounded. In the evening and the following days League sympathisers took revenge by killing more than twenty Hindus and Sikhs and looting and burning their houses.[151] Soon the violence spread from Peshawar to the other districts. Usually it was confined to more or less spontaneous outbursts leading to isolated acts of murder and arson but occasionally more serious incidents took place. On 2nd April, for example, a train was stopped near Kohat and attacked by men in Muslim League uniforms. Seven Hindus were killed and thirteen wounded.[152]

We cannot here go into the details of how the campaign developed. A general idea of the form it took can be gained from the following report from the end of April:

> The general picture has been one of processions, picketing and interference with the running of trains, accompanied by lathi-charges, the use of tear-gas, and the arrest of a substantial number of people. Occasional murders of Hindus and Sikhs, apart from the more serious communal trouble described below, bomb explosions by night in and around Peshawar City, cutting of telegraph lines, and sabotage on a small scale of road bridges and railways have all contributed to maintain an atmosphere of uneasiness everywhere and fear in the case of the minorities. One serious outrage took place on the night of April 28th, when unknown culprits from outside the perimeter wire threw bombs on the house of the General Officer Commanding, Peshawar Area, and fired a number of shots into the house itself.[153]

The "more serious communal trouble" referred to in this quotation occurred in Dera Ismail Khan district. On 14th April a large meeting was held in Dera Ismail Khan town, at which vehement speeches were held. The following morning a number of minor incidents took place, which led to general communal rioting. The situation was brought under control only after the arrival of military assistance on the 17th. By then eighteen persons had been killed and forty-five, including eleven policemen, had been injured. About nine hundred shops and several government and private buildings had been destroyed by fire. From Dera Ismail Khan the disturbances spread to Tank, which also became the victim of an attack by Mahsud tribesmen. Here the dead numbered thirty-three, seventeen of whom were Mahsuds. Most of the city was burnt down. In numerous villages similar outbreaks occurred on varying scales. As a result Hindus and Sikhs began to leave the villages and seek the relative safety of Dera Ismail Khan town, where the authorities had taken measures for their protection. On one occasion a lorry evacuating refugees was attacked, suffering twenty-eight casualties, ten of whom died. In the end the authorities managed to give a measure of peace to the district by reinforcing the Civil Armed Forces, increasing the military presence and con-

[151] FR I March 1947; *Khyber Mail* 14/3/47; *Tribune* 2/4/47; Rashid p. 104 ff.
[152] FR I April 1947.
[153] FR II April 1947.

stantly patrolling the country-side.[154] But in the first ten days of the disturbances 118 persons had lost their lives. Three quarters of them were Hindus or Sikhs.[155]

Although the campaign was largely spontaneous and the leadership highly decentralised, some groups were obviously more important than others. Behind the scene Muslim officials continued to play a key role. Among those who played their role in the open, the Muslim students were perhaps the most prominent. While it has been difficult to find any informants among the former group, the picture given by my informants from the Frontier Muslim Students' Federation of their own activities also reveals the crucial importance of the officials.

During the campaign members of the federation were sent out over the whole province to spread propaganda for Pakistan. A large number of demonstrations were organised and some students were even involved in small-scale terrorism. My informants from the federation stress the importance of the support which they received from officials and particularly the police. Thanks to the attitude of the police, illegal demonstrations were dealt with very leniently if at all. The deputy superintendent of police, Peshawar cantonment, one Faizullah Khan,[156] figures prominently in this context. Mohammad Anwar remembers how on one occasion when Faizullah Khan ordered a *lathi*-charge, the policemen with his approval beat only the ground and their own busses. Faizullah Khan also used to attend meetings where the measures to be taken against the activists were discussed and then he would inform the students what the government proposed to do.[157]

This support from the police and other officials often made the demonstrations, and even the atmosphere of crisis they were supposed to create, somewhat artificial. On one occasion the Muslim League High Command wrote to the Frontier Muslim Students' Federation ordering them to take out a procession, get arrested and sent to jail. The idea behind it was that some sacrifice was needed. Mohammad Anwar arranged a demonstration of some forty students. Normally the police did not send arrested processionists to jail but instead transported them by truck six or seven miles away, dropped them and let them get back as best they could. On this occasion, however, the students insisted on getting properly arrested. The police obliged them and sent them straight to jail. They were subsequently sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment. They were, however, treated very well in prison and were given all sorts of facilities. The most influential among them could even go on leave in the day-time on the understanding that they would come back in the evening.[158]

[154] *Ibid.*
[155] *Tribune* 8/5/47; FR I May 1947.
[156] According to Rashid p. 110, he was deputy superintendent, additional police.
[157] Interviews with Mohammad Anwar, Anonymous II and III.
[158] Interview with Mohammad Anwar.

Thus, as long as the demonstrations were met by the police, there was no need to worry about the consequences. However, if they were met by the army, it was a different matter, for the army was officered mainly by Englishmen. One such occasion was the opening of the assembly session. The students took out a procession, which was joined by followers of the Pir of Manki Sharif. Khurshid Anwar, one of the top leaders of the All-India Muslim National Guards, also took part in this demonstration. They were met by a unit of Hindu troops under British command and were warned not to cross a certain line, or else the troops would open fire. Khurshid Anwar told the leaders of the demonstration to put Manki's followers in front and let them cross the line. They did so, the troops fired and some of the demonstrators fell. Then Khurshid Anwar said: "The mission is completed. We wanted to shed Muslim blood. Now it has been done." So the leaders told the people to stand back. After the demonstration a few Hindus were killed and their houses set on fire in Peshawar City. Many of the students were arrested. Faizullah Khan scolded them but in secret he told them they had done well. The principal of Islamia College came to the police station to enquire if any of the students had been hurt and to arrange for their transport back to the college. Faizullah Khan put them in a police truck and sent them back.[159]

Together with the students the Muslim National Guards also came to the forefront by leading demonstrations, supplying volunteers and taking a prominent part in the League activities in general. As we have seen, one of the top leaders, Khurshid Anwar, came to the province to participate in the campaign. It is not quite clear, however, what his role was. He does not seem to have come with any special mandate from the High Command. Throughout the campaign his contacts with the regular League leaders appear to have been entirely informal. According to Rittenberg, he had brought with him a supply of explosives and was the first leader to advocate the use of sabotage in the campaign.[160] He was possessed of remarkable ingenuity and surrounded himself with an aura of mystique. During the campaign he lived in complete secrecy but now and then he appeared publicly in disguise. Many youths were captivated by this romantic figure.[161]

Khurshid Anwar also recruited a group of young men from the Muslim Students' Federation and the National Guards, who were organised in a small underground movement. They ran a small wireless transmitter, which was maintained and re-charged by Muslim signal troops, and published a secret cyclostyled paper called *Sadae Pakistan*, Voices of Pakistan. They also devoted themselves to minor terrorist activities, such as throwing bombs at people and buildings. Some

[159] Interview with Anonymous III. This must have been the demonstration on 10th March when the assembly opened. Cf. this account with Rashid p. 104 ff.

[160] Rittenberg p. 365 and 370.

[161] Interviews with Sairab Hayat Khan, Anonymous III and Abdul Qaiyum.

of their explosives they got from the police school at Hangu through the chief drill instructor of the school, Alam Khan, who also instructed them in the use of explosives. The group also received help from a chemistry professor at Islamia college, who taught them how to make explosives. The Pir of Manki Sharif gave them financial aid.[162]

A remarkable feature of the civil disobedience campaign was that large numbers of women came out of their seclusion to participate in the agitation.[163] This was particularly the case in Peshawar, where women's demonstrations were taken out almost daily after the campaign had gained momentum in March. In this context, too, Khurshid Anwar played an important role by helping to organise the women.[164]

These demonstrations caused the government considerable embarrassment, as the Pakhtun ethos prevented them from taking stern action against women. The Congress tried to ridicule the Muslim Leaguers for allowing their womenfolk to forget their modesty and disregard the rules of *purdah*, but without much success.

The Tribes

During the civil disobedience campaign the pressure from the tribes grew dramatically. Most active were the Mahsud Muslim Leaguers. The Mahsud attack on Tank has already been mentioned. The background of the attack was that on 20th March a *marakka* was held at Spinkai Raghzai by pro-Muslim League Mahsuds. In strong terms they demanded the establishment of Pakistan, the resignation of the "Hindu-hired agent" Dr Khan Sahib and the installation of a Muslim League ministry in Peshawar. The committee on tribal affairs which the Interim Government had appointed[165] must not come to South Waziristan. These demands, accompanied by threats of grave consequences if they were not conceded, were forwarded to the Viceroy, the governor of the NWFP and leading

[162] Interviews with Anonymous III and Alam Khan.

[163] For the women's agitation, see Rittenberg pp. 376–381; also Rashid pp. 109–111.

[164] Interview with Fida Mohammad.

[165] In accordance with paragraph 20 of the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Interim Government had appointed a committee to deal with various minorities and areas which enjoyed a special status. The chairman of the committee was Sardar Patel. This committee appointed a sub-committee to be in special charge of the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier. The members of this sub-committee were Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Abdus Samad Khan who was a prominent Pakhtun Congressite from Baluchistan, and Mehr Chand Khanna. Thus there were no Muslim Leaguers on the committee but the reason seems to have been that they refused to accept nomination. For this sub-committee, see Weightman to Caroe 6/3/47 TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I). Plans were entertained that Patel and this sub-committee should visit the NWFP including the tribal areas but these plans were soon dropped (Weightman to Caroe 17/3/47 TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I).) but by then rumours of the impending visit had already reached tribal territory, where the case was presented as a parallel one to Nehru's visit and as another Hindu attempt to dominate the Pakhtuns.

politicians.[166] About a month later, soon before a visit to the province by the Viceroy, the Mahsud Muslim Leaguers attacked Tank and also Kulachi. A plan to attack D.I. Khan came to nothing, as the city had been forewarned and was defended. They also planned to attack Bannu City but these plans ended in a complete fiasco. The elders of the tribe went in advance to Bannu, where they waited in Damsaz Khan's house for the *lashkar*. They waited in vain, however, for on the way to Bannu the trucks, in which the *lashkar* travelled, were stopped by the militia and the tribesmen were disarmed and put under arrest. This came a surprise to them, for they had expected the militiamen, who were Pakhtuns, to be on their side, but instead they obeyed their British officers.[167]

According to Gulab Khan, the assistant political officer Abdul Manan knew all about the plans to attack Tank and the other towns but did nothing to stop the tribesmen. On the contrary, he appeared very pleased about the whole affair.[168]

N.S. Musa Khan and other pro-Congress elements, such as Parmana Khan and Pir Rakhman, tried to emulate the Muslim Leaguers by arranging a *marakka* of their own, to which they also invited the Faqir of Ipi. He kept aloof from party politics, however,[169] and in the end no Congress *marakka* was held. Instead Musa Khan and his associates had to confine themselves to assuring Dr Khan Sahib that the meeting at Spinkai Raghzai had been held by *maliks* in the pay of the Political Department and that the Patel committee would be welcome to South Waziristan.[170]

According to Gulab Khan, the Mahsud Muslim Leaguers were also in communication with the northern tribes, the Afridis, Shinwaris and Mohmands.[171] The attitude of these tribes, and particularly of the Afridis, was, however, much more cautious. The Afridis stressed, just as they had been advised by the governor, that they would have nothing to do either with the Congress of the Muslim League until some agreement was reached by the two parties. Nor would they have any dealings with the committee on tribal affairs, which they regarded as a purely Hindu body.[172] However, neutral statements such as these were mixed with others, which weighed heavily in favour of the Muslim League. For example, when toward the end of March, Caroe saw the whole Afridi *jirga*, the maliks added:

[166] Lieutenant Sher Badshah Khan to Jinnah n.d. (?) NAP QAP File 574 folios 30–31. See also Shahzada to Caroe dated 26 Rabi-ul-Sani 1366 Hijri TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I) and *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 22/3/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3201.

[167] Interview with Gulab Khan. Cf. FR II April 1947. For Damsaz Khan, see Appendix III, Bannu East Muslim Rural.

[168] Interview with Gulab Khan.

[169] Political agent, South Waziristan, to Packman 2/4/47 TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I) and *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 29/3/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3201.

[170] *Tribune* 3/4/47.

[171] Interview with Gulab Khan. Their contact among the Afridis was Khalifa Khan. For him, see Appendix IV.

[172] Caroe to Weightman 17/3/47 TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I).

> Though we belong to no Indian political organisation and do not take part in Indian politics, our sympathies are with our Moslem brothers, and we wish the tension between the communities in India to be brought to an end. Otherwise it must have a reaction on the tribal areas and set the Frontier ablaze.[173]

Even in the *Sarishta* party pro-Pakistan feelings were growing. On 21st March a meeting was held at Bagh in Tirah, at which the same views were expressed as those of the official *jirga*. However, among the signatories to the document forwarded to the authorities the name of Khushal Khan, who was perhaps the most prominent of the *Sarishta* leaders, was conspicuous by its absence.[174]

Throughout the spring of 1947 efforts were made, primarily, it seems, on the initiative of pro-Muslim League elements among the Waziristan tribes, to arrange an all-Frontier tribal *marakka* to decide a common policy for all the tribes.[175] No such *marakka* materialised. The nearest to it was a meeting on 12th May of Afridi, Mohmand, Wazir, Turi, Bangash, Orakzai and Mahsud representatives at Murghan in the Kurram agency. The following decisions were taken: 1.—All tribes of the tribal areas should unite into one bloc and negotiate with the new Government of India as one bloc; 2.—If any tribe disregarded this agreement, it would be subjected to reprisals by the others; 3.—The tribes would use all their power, even force if necessary, to bring about similar unity among the Pakhtuns of the settled districts; 4.—They would take no part in Indian politics on the other side of the Indus, but nevertheless they declared themselves to be in favour of Pakistan. The validity of these decisions was, however, questionable, as the Afridi representatives left before the Mahsuds had arrived.[176] No united front or anything approximating it was ever achieved.

Both the Muslim League and the Congress made several attempts to bring the Faqir of Ipi within their fold but without success.[177] After the end of civil disobedience, when it was practically certain that the NWFP would go to Pakistan, the tribal areas settled down. The Faqir of Ipi, who proved to be as opposed to Pakistan as to British rule, remained the only disturbing element. The increasingly desperate Hindus and Sikhs now began to woo their former tormentor. In July a complete *hartal* was observed in Bannu City as a mark of respect for the *faqir* on account of his brother's death. About three hundred Hindus and Sikhs held a meeting in the city, at which they decided to send their condolences to him.[178]

[173] Note by Caroe forwarded by Latimer to Weightman 27/3/47 TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I).

[174] Translation of three resolutions passed by the Afridi *Sarishta* at Bagh, Tirah, 21/3/47 TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I).

[175] See e.g., *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 1/5/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3201.

[176] *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 24/5/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3201.

[177] *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 26/4/47, 10/5/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3201.

[178] *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 5/7/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3201.

The NWFP and the 3rd June Plan

In March Lord Wavell was succeeded as Viceroy by Lord Mountbatten.[179] The new Viceroy was directed to seek an agreement with the Indian leaders on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan. It was made clear, however, that if no such agreement could be reached in time for a transfer of power by June 1948, the British government would have to consider other solutions, including partition. After meeting with the principal Indian leaders, Mountbatten felt that the chances of an agreement on the basis of the Cabinet Mission Plan were slim. In secret he therefore began to work out an alternative plan. In the beginning of May it was ready. This plan conceded the fundamental demand of the Muslim League – Pakistan. All provinces would be given the choice of joining either India or Pakistan or even becoming separate independent states. The decision for each province would be taken by its legislative assembly. The assemblies of Punjab and Bengal would be notionally divided for the purpose of this vote, so that Muslims and Hindus voted separately. In practical terms this meant that the plan envisaged a partition of these two provinces, the Muslim parts going to Pakistan and the Hindu parts to India. So far as the NWFP was concerned, Caroe had become convinced that new elections had to be arranged in the province to stop the violence and find out the real will of the people,[180] and this proposal was included in the Viceroy's plan. Thus new elections were to be held in the NWFP before the assembly made its choice. As for the tribes, they would be free to conclude new treaties with whomever they wished.[181]

On 15th and 16th April the Viceroy held a meeting in Delhi with the provincial governors to acquaint them with his plan. The reception of the plan was mixed. The governors of Bengal and Punjab were opposed to the partition of their respective provinces. As for Caroe, he still favoured the Cabinet Mission Plan as a means to avoid partition at all. He felt that the question of the future of the NWFP and the Frontier tribes had so far been neglected. In his opinion, the Frontier problem could be used as a forceful argument to make the political discussions more realistic. A stable Frontier was under any circumstances essential for the subcontinent. In addition to the strategic problem, there was the economic aspect. Neither the tribes, nor the province proper "could possibly subsist economically under a real Pakistan partition scheme." The tribes annually cost the central government about Rs. 25,000,000 and the provincial government received an annual subsidy of Rs. 10,000,000. These costs were far too large to be borne by a Pakistan government. "A recognition of this fact by all parties, and particularly

[179] For the background events at the centre during Mountbatten's Viceroyalty, see Menon pp. 355–410; Qureshi pp. 286–302; Hodson pp. 189–398.

[180] Viceroy's Personal Report 9/4/47 IOL L/PO/433.

[181] For this plan, see *FINAL DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT–11TH MAY 1947* Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/21.

by the League Command, would do a great deal to put all-India questions between Congress and the League in a proper perspective". Caroe wanted something to be done about this "before all hope of securing a compromise on the basis of the Cabinet Mission plan was abandoned." Fresh elections should be held in the NWFP. He admitted there were risks involved in this but he preferred them to just letting things go on as they were.[182] It is noteworthy that Caroe did not propose to dismiss the ministry and impose governor's rule before the elections. That was otherwise a course which many officials around him advocated.[183] Instead Caroe intended to dissolve the assembly but to ask the ministers to remain in office during the elections.[184]

After the governors' conference Mountbatten arranged a meeting between Dr Khan Sahib, Caroe and himself. As a result of this meeting, the Frontier government offered to release all political prisoners not charged with violence and to lift the ban on public meetings. The League leaders, however, refused to avail themselves of the amnesty, unless the ministry resigned and new elections were held.[185]

Another result of the Viceroy's meeting with the Frontier governor and premier was that Mountbatten decided to go to the NWFP to see for himself what the situation was like.[186] This visit took place on 28th and 29th April. The day before the Viceroy's departure Jinnah informed him that he had arranged for a huge demonstration of about a hundred thousand people to take place during the visit. Jinnah wished the demonstrators to march in procession to Government House to present their resolutions to the Viceroy. Mountbatten "absolutely forbade" this but agreed to receive a small deputation. Jinnah promised to issue the necessary orders.[187]

On arrival in Peshawar, Mountbatten and his party immediately found themselves confronted with a crisis. Caroe informed them that a crowd of Muslim League supporters numbering over seventy thousand was marching toward Government House and was now less than a mile away. After consulting the governor and the chief minister, Mountbatten decided to forestall the demonstrators by going to meet them. When he met the demonstration, he and Lady Mountbatten climbed a railway embankment to show themselves to the crowd. To address the demonstrators was out of the question. The Viceroy and Vicereine

[182] *Extract of Minutes of Governor's Conference, First Day, dated 15th April, 1947* IOL L/P&S/3280.

[183] See below p. 212.

[184] *Extract of Minutes of Governors' Conference, First Day, dated 15th April, 1947* IOL L/P&S/12/3280.

[185] Menon p. 362. According to Dr Khan Sahib, there were at this time in all about five thousand political prisoners in the province. *Tribune* 21/4/47.

[186] Campbell-Johnsson p. 67.

[187] *Extract from Viceroy's Personal Report No. 5* 1/5/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3280.

could do nothing but wave their hands at them but this was enough. Soon the hostile crowd turned friendly and for the slogan "Pakistan Zindabad" they substituted "Mountbatten Zindabad!" After a while they dispersed and returned home.[188]

Later that day Mountbatten had a number of interviews with various people. All officials whom he spoke to, Englishmen as well as Indians, were "absolutely convinced" that in order to avoid a catastrophe fresh elections had to be held as soon as possible. They also believed it was necessary to proclaim governor's rule before the elections or else the ministry would be able to put undue pressure on the voters.[189]

At another meeting the Viceroy saw the ministers and the governor together. Afterwards he wrote that this "must surely have been one of the craziest meetings ever held with any Ministry." Dr Khan Sahib made vehement allegations against Caroe and his subordinates, saying that the Frontier Muslim League was not under Jinnah's control; instead it was run by the governor and his officials. Mountbatten regarded such talk as "fantastic" and could not repress his laughter. The ministers told the Viceroy that they were strongly opposed to the idea of new elections. Mountbatten, however, warned them that he felt he had to ascertain the will of the people and that probably governor's rule would have to be imposed before the elections.[190]

From the Muslim League side the Viceroy first saw a deputation representing the demonstration which he had met earlier that day. He asked them, if they had anything to do with Jinnah. "Of course", they replied, "he is our leader"; they implicitly followed his orders.[191] Mountbatten also received a delegation consisting of Abdul Qaiyum, Samin Jan and the Pir of Manki Sharif. They were still in jail and had insisted they should come as prisoners under escort. Mountbatten refused to allow this and instead they had to come on parole. The Viceroy asked them to stop the violence saying that as long as it continued there was nothing he could do. On the other hand, if it stopped, he was sure he could arrive at a fair solution, although he could not disclose what he had in mind. He urged them to avail themselves of the amnesty they had been offered and leave jail. They replied they would do this only if governor's rule was proclaimed and new elections arranged. In the end the three were given parole to go to Delhi for consultations with Jinnah.[192]

[188] Campbell-Johnson p. 74 f.; Viceroy's Personal Report 1/5/47 IOL L/PO/433.

[189] *Impressions gained from talks with 16 senior officials and officers in the N.W.F.P. on the 28th April at Peshawar.* Unsigned note by Mountbatten IOL R/3/1/151.

[190] *Extract from Viceroy's Personal Report No. 5* 1/5/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3280; also *MEETING OF H.E. THE VICEROY WITH THE GOVERNOR, NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE AND THE FOUR MINISTERS.* Note by I.D. Scott 28/4/47 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/21; Campbell-Johnson p. 75.

[191] *Extract from Viceroy's Personal Report No. 5* 1/5/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3280.

[192] *MEETING BETWEEN H.E. THE VICEROY AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE*

The following day Mountbatten visited Khyber, where he saw a *jirga* representing the Afridis and the other tribes of the agency. They again demanded that if the British left India, the pass should be returned to them and stressed that although they did not belong to any Indian party, their sympathies were with their Muslim brothers.[193] On return to Peshawar the Viceroy met another *jirga* representing the tribes of North and South Waziristan. They demanded the establishment of Pakistan and the resignation of Dr Khan Sahib's ministry and threatened to use force, if their demands were not conceded. Mountbatten assured them that he had taken note of what they had said.[194]

The result of this visit must no doubt have been that the Frontier Muslim League's stock rose in the Viceroy's assessmend whereas that of the Congress sank.[195]

Meanwhile Mountbatten's partition plan was making progress. It was still secret but the Indian top leaders knew in which direction the Viceroy's mind was working. Nehru and his colleageus in the Congress High Command, with the exception of Gandhi, were beginning to accept the idea of partition, if, as the plan envisaged, Bengal and Punjab were partitioned. The prospects of success therefore seemed good and on 2nd May Mountbatten sent his Chief of Staff Lord Ismay to London to seek the cabinet's approval of the plan.

LEADERS ... Note by I.D. Scott 28/4/47 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/21; *Extract from Viceroy's Personal Report No. 5* 1/5/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3280; *Memorandum submitted to H.E. the Viceroy on behalf of the representatives of the N.W.F. Provincial Muslim League* Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/21.

[193] *Address by the Afridi Jirga to His Excellency the Viceroy at Landi Kotal on Tuesday the 29th April, 1947* TARC File 735–S.T.B. (I); also Campbell-Johnson pp. 77–79.

It could, however, be mentioned that at least three deputations of pro-Congress Afridis visited Dr Khan Sahib in May. They assured him that, with the exception of a few *maliks* in government pay, all Afridis supported him and his colleagues. To these assurances they added requests for various favours. See *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 10/5/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3201; *Tribune* 22/5/47, 1/6/47.

[194] Campbell-Johnson p. 79. TARC File 735–S.T.B.(I) contains three different addresses presented to the Viceroy by the Waziristan tribes in connection with this visit. The first (dated 28/4/47), whose signatories claimed to represent "all Waziristan tribes", is relatively moderate. The second (n.d.), from "representatives of North and South Waziristan", is much more menacing. The third (n.d) is from "the Wazirs and Mahsuds of the South Waziristan Agency" who had "unanimously" passed resolutions to the effect mentioned above; if the authorities should refuse to listen, they themselves would be responsible for all "mis-happennings, lawlessness and disastrous consequences" which might follow.

[195] In the report he wrote immediately after the visit, he only said that he would "watch this Province very carefully." Viceroy's Personal Report 1/5/47 IOL L/PO/433. In the report which he wrote on 25/7/47, i.e., after the referendum results had been declared, he said: "My visit to the N.W.F.P. confirmed me in the view that they would join Pakistan." See also footnote 197.

The fact that the AINC now seemed prepared to accept the principle of partition drastically altered the entire political outlook in India. At long last a solution seemed within sight. But for the Frontier Congress the acceptance of partition by the High Command was a catastrophe, from which it proved unable to recover. Once the principle of Pakistan had been accepted by the AINC, its alliance with the Khudai Khidmatgars had no substance. Not only religion but also geography made it unrealistic. Thus the Khudai Khidmatgars had to find a new political platform, they must redefine their ideology and immediately reconsider their relations with the AINC.

Nehru and his colleagues, who naturally must have been acutely aware that they were letting down their old comrades-in-arms, made a few attempts to salvage the Frontier Congress but soon their efforts to retrieve the situation became empty gestures designed only to save the face of the High Command. Nehru consistently opposed the plans for fresh elections as they implied yielding to force.[196] To meet Nehru's objection it was suggested to arrange a referendum instead of an election. The first time the idea was discussed seems to have been on 3rd May at one of Mountbatten's "Staff meetings". Before the referendum was held, the province would be placed under governor's rule and after it new elections would be held. This procedure would have many advantages. First of all Mountbatten believed it would meet the objections Nehru had raised. It would also remove the over-representation of the Hindus and Sikhs in the provincial assembly and thus it would give a better picture of people's feelings. Furthermore, the referendum would be held on a clear-cut issue, Pakistan or India, and would be less confused by party considerations than an election to decide the same question. If Pakistan won the referendum—and it is obvious that this was the outcome Mountbatten expected[197]—the Congress would probably either not contest the election which was to follow, or if they did, they would probably lose it. Even if they should win the election, the main issue would already be decided "and they would have go to ahead and join Pakistan."[198]

However, these plans, too, soon had to be altered, as the Congress was opposed to the imposition of governor's rule when the ministry still had a working majority in the assembly. Mountbatten had to admit there were no legal grounds for governor's rule and feared that if it was nevertheless enforced in the NWFP, the AINC would oppose the entire partition plan. Instead of holding the referendum under governor's rule, he therefore proposed setting up a special referendum

[196] Gopal p. 346; Pyarelal p. 159.

[197] In his opinion the Congress had "a really weak case in the N.W.F.P." Telegram Viceroy to Secretary of State 3/5/47 IOL R/3/1/151. It is also noteworthy that the third alternative of independence, which Mountbatten still proposed to offer the provinces, does not seem to have been considered for the referendum. Presumably Mountbatten and his staff never thought of this alternative as anything but a formula to bring about partition in the smoothest possible way.

[198] *Ibid.*

machinery consisting of hand-picked officers under his own control and not under the provincial government.[199]

On 6th May Mountbatten wired to the Secretary of State that Nehru was prepared to accept a referendum provided it was not held under governor's rule and the ministry was allowed to stay in office.[200] Two days later, however, he had to inform the cabinet that after having discussed the matter with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other Frontier leaders, Nehru was again raising objections. Ghaffar Khan and his colleagues had pointed out that the plans for a referendum meant that the government was yielding to force. Moreover, a referendum under the present conditions might lead to serious disorders. With this Nehru concurred and therefore suggested that the referendum be postponed till the constituent assembly had drafted a constitution or at least the essentials of a constitution. This would in Mountbatten's opinion be dangerous and lead to unacceptable delay. He emphasised that there could be no question of independence, which the Congress wanted as soon as possible, until the question where the NWFP was to belong had been decided. Apparently the Viceroy did not take Nehru's objections too seriously and requested the cabinet to include the proposal for a referendum on the Frontier in the plan.[201]

The cabinet accepted the idea of a referendum and, with a few minor alterations, approved Mountbatten's plan. On 10th May their decision was communicated to the Viceroy. Before convening the Indian leaders, Mountbatten had an "absolute hunch" that he must first show the plan to Nehru. When Nehru saw the plan, he turned it down flatly. The crux of the matter was the provision giving the provinces the option of independence. This would in Nehru's opinion encourage the fissiparous tendencies in the country and might ultimately lead to the balkanisation of India. With regard to the NWFP, Nehru said the Congress accepted that this province like the others must be given the opportunity to express its own will, but this must be done in the proper context. The present proposal for a referendum meant a surrender to violence and was thus unacceptable. Furthermore, the provision giving the tribes the right to conclude new treaties with whomsoever they wished was dangerous not only to India but to the whole region.

In great haste a new plan was worked out by Mountbatten's staff. The Viceroy went personally to London, where he received the cabinet's sanction of the new proposals. We need not concern ourselves with all aspects of this plan here. For our purposes the crucial difference as compared to the old plan was that this one did not give the provinces the option of independence. As regards the NWFP, this plan, too, proposed a referendum held under the Governor-General. So far as the

[199] Telegram Viceroy to Secretary of State 4/5/47 IOL R/3/1/151.
[200] Telegram Viceroy to Secretary of State 6/5/47 IOL R/3/1/151.
[201] Telegram Viceroy to Secretary of State 8/5/47 IOL R/3/1/151.

tribes were concerned, it was laid down that new treaties would "have to be negotiated by the appropriate successor authority." Finally, an important feature of the new plan was that the date for the transfer of power was put forward to 15th August 1947. Thus the sense of urgency was greatly increased.[202]

On 2nd June Mountbatten acquainted the principal Indian leaders, Nehru, Patel and Kripalani on the Congress side, and Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan and Abdur Rab Nishtar from the Muslim League, with the contents of the new plan. Although some objections were raised from both sides, they agreed to the plan in general. Nehru and Jinnah promised to do their best to persuade their respective parties to accept it.

The AINC Working Committee met the same day and decided to accept the plan and to recommend the All-India Congress Committee to do the same. Of the regular members only Gandhi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan spoke against acceptance. The latter pleaded with his colleagues to see if at least the alternative of independence could not be included in the referendum. Only token support was offered for that idea.[203] The Congress president Kripalani raised it tentatively in his letter of acceptance of the plan. In reply Mountbatten pointed out to the Congress leaders that it was on Nehru's own request that the provinces had been denied the alternative of independence. It could not now be re-introduced for only one province. With this the Congress leaders had to agree.[204]

The plan was made public on the next day, 3rd June. Hence it came to be known as the "3rd June Plan" (or "June 3rd Plan").

On 10th June the Council of the AIML gave Jinnah full powers to proceed with the implementation of the 3rd June Plan. The All-India Congress Committee met to discuss the plan a couple of days later. Opposition to it was offered mainly by Muslims and Hindus from the future Pakistan provinces. In spite of his previous opposition to the plan, Gandhi now spoke in favour of acceptance as a rejection at this stage would lead to an untenable situation. That clinched the issue and the plan was approved by an overwhelming majority. This meant that the AINC had definitely deserted their brothers-in-arms on the Frontier.

Pakhtunistan

We have seen how the Muslim League's civil disobedience campaign on the Frontier spread and intensified and how the campaign yielded higher and higher

[202] For the full text of this plan, see Menon Appendix X.

[203] Tendulkar p. 424; Gopal p. 356.

[204] Menon p. 382 f. At a press conference on 4th June Mountbatten said that if the Congress could make the Muslim League agree to the alternative of independence being included, he would of course also agree to it. *Op. cit.* p. 387 f.

dividends in Delhi. This did not mean that the Frontier Congress had become a negligible force. The party still commanded wide support and could probably have created serious difficulties. On the whole, however, they showed remarkable restraint. Although they were not "immune from the temptation to resort to fire-arms and steel . . . their conduct in the cause of peace and toleration [was] surprisingly good." Their eagerness in this regard even caused the authorities some embarrassment. One day in the middle of March Red Shirts dressed in uniform arrived "in their thousands" in Peshawar without forewarning. They did "good work, although the feeding of them . . . imposed a very considerable strain on Supply Organisations."[205] On 7th April they left again.[206]

In May, when it was becoming clear which way the wind was blowing, the Frontier Congress increased its activities. A number of largely attended meetings were held. Thus, for example, on "Martyr's Day" (which was celebrated in memory of those killed in the disturbances in 1930) nine thousand Congressites gathered for the celebration. The Muslim League had by now also taken to commemorating the victims of 1930 but only three thousand persons collected for the League's celebrations.[207]

The Frontier Congress was thus far from moribund. The problem was that its political programme—freedom from the British and social reform—had became irrelevant. The latter had to be deferred till after independence and so far as freedom from the British was concerned, it was no longer at issue. The question now was: Hindu rule or Muslim rule? The answer of the Frontier Congress, rule in unison with the Hindus, begged the question. Moreover, it was an answer with little appeal among to the Pakhtuns. All the Frontier Congress could do was to lie low in the hope that the all-India situation might change. When finally the AINC accepted partition, the Frontier Congress was placed in a hopeless position. The communal ideology of the Muslim League had been vindicated while the secular ideology of the Congress had not stood the rest of reality. Nor had the alliance with the AINC been strong enough to save the Khudai Khidmatgars in their hour of need. After these failures Ghaffar Khan and his movement ought, logically, to have joined the Muslim League or at least to have supported Pakistan. The enmity between the Frontier Congress and the Muslim League had little to do with Pakistan. The reasons for the Frontier Congress' opposition to Pakistan were historical rather than ideological. Pakistan had been advocated by their enemies on the Frontier, while their allies in the AINC had opposed it. Thus the Khudai Khidmatgars also opposed it. Originally Ghaffar Khan's alliance with the AINC

[205] FR II March 1947. Caroe estimated their number at 6000–7000 but otherwise he took a less favourable view of their activities than this report. See *Governors' Conference. Second Day. Minutes*. p. 11 IOL L/PO/433.

[206] FR I April 1947.

[207] FR II May 1947.

had been mainly a marriage of convenience, though admittedly the mutual feelings had grown very warm over the years. His movement was essentially a Pakhtun one, not Indian. Throughout the period under review in this work, more or less sincere invitations were made to the Khan brothers to join the Muslim League and break with the Congress.[208] They stuck to their alliance with the AINC, however, until it became clear they were getting deserted by their old allies.

When Abdul Ghaffar Khan realised that his old stand was becoming untenable and that the Muslim League would be victorious, there were basically two things about Pakistan that worried him. The first was that in Pakistan he and his Khudai Khidmatgars would get outmanoeuvred by their old enemies in the Muslim League. No matter how strong they were in their own province, the NWFP was so small that they would not be able to withstand the pressure from the other provinces, notably Punjab, which were dominated by the Muslim League. Secondly, Ghaffar Khan was desperately anxious to see the British out of his country. He was afraid that Pakistan would not be genuinely independent but would remain under British domination.

The course the Frontier Congress chose to follow in this difficult situation was to restate their commitment to Pakhtun nationalism and put increased emphasis on Pakhtun values. An interesting illustration of this is provided by the *Zalme Pakhtun*. This organisation was founded by Khan Abdul Ghani Khan, eldest son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and the Frontier's representative in the central legislative assembly. The foundation probably took place toward the end of December 1946[209] but it was not until May 1947, in the unsettled conditions then obtaining, that it began coming into prominence. The information as regards membership varies greatly. In July the British put the figure at about 2000,[210] whereas the publicity officer of the organisation gave the figure 25,000.[211]

The *Zalme Pakhtun* were meant to serve as an auxiliary body to the Khudai Khidmatgars[212] but their creed differed significantly from that of the parent organisation. The *Zalme Pakhtun* did not believe in non-violence and the members were armed. Ghani Khan claimed their arms were meant only for self-defence and for the defence of the ordinary poor, peaceful citizens; they were, he said, a form of "national police".[213] The *Zalme Pakhtun* laid even more stress on

[208] See e.g., Governor's Report 23/7/38 and *Civil & Military Gazette* 8/8/45.
[209] Interview with Ghani Khan; FR I Jan. 1947.
[210] FR II July 1947.
[211] *Tribune* 18/7/47.
[212] Interview with Ghani Khan.
[213] *Hindustan Times* 24/6/47. Abdul Ghaffar Khan obviously felt uneasy about this lapse from the path of non-violence and his attitude toward the *Zalme Pakhtun* was somewhat ambivalent. In a speech quoted by Tendulkar (p. 418) he claimed that there was no connection between the Khudai Khidmatgars and the *Zalme Pakhtun*. That is clearly wrong, as is evident from the same speech as well as a speech quoted in *Tribune* 30/5/47. Moreover, at most important meetings of the Frontier Congress the *Zalme Pakhtun* were represented in the same way as other branches of the party, such as the FPCC, the parliamentary party and the Khudai Khidmatgars.

Pakhtun nationalism than the Khudai Khidmatgars and were much more vociferously Muslim. They disclaimed any connection with the AINC and were openly scornful of its Hindu-tainted ideology. In a fiery manifesto, published in May 1947, Ghani Khan declared that the *Zalme Pakhtun* was a movement of the youth, "meant for the Pakhtun nation alone". It had nothing to do with any central Hindu organisation. The goal was "Freedom and Prosperity". On its flag there were two swords and the words "Allah-o-Akbar". Its only message was *Pakhtunwali*. The members wore smart red uniforms, but their real uniforms were their Darra-made guns and fearless eyes; a pistol on a Pakhtun was as beautiful as bangles on a girl from Delhi. The handloom, on the other hand, was nothing for a man. As for *ahimsa* (the Hindu doctrine of non-violence) it would be understood by the Pathans only when the offspring of lions learnt to bleat like sheep.[214]

The course of events prevented the *Zalme Pakhtun* from playing any significant role. After independence the organisation was disbanded. It could be mentioned that in response to the *Zalme Pakhtun*, the Muslim League formed a similar organisation of their own, the *Ghazi Pakhtun*. In July the British estimated their membership at six hundred.[215]

Pakhtun nationalism was thus the platform on which the Khudai Khidmatgars decided to fight back. Finally, when in June the AINC's acceptance of partition became definite, the Khudai Khidmatgars decided to go the whole way and demand independence for the Pakhtuns in a separate state of their own, *Pakhtunistan*. However, the demand for Pakhtunistan was raised mainly for bargaining purposes and no real independence was envisaged. The Congress leaders *were* prepared to accept Pakistan and were only trying to ensure a place for themselves, their movement and their province in the new state.[216] As a bargaining counter the demand for Pakhtunistan had two main advantages. Firstly, it was in keeping with the old Pakhtun nationalism of the Khudai Khidmatgars. Secondly, it was a demand which could be expected to be popular among the highly ethnocentric Pakhtuns and thus it put the League leaders under heavy pressure. The disadvantage was that it placed the Khudai Khidmatgars under suspicion even among people who might otherwise have taken a relatively friendly view of them. Since it was first raised the demand for Pakhtunistan has taken many different forms but throughout it has in wide circles been taken as proof of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's, his son Wali's and their followers' fundamental disloyalty to Pakistan.

[214] *Pakhtun* 17/5/47. Darra is a place in tribal territory famous for manufacturing arms.

[215] FR II July 1947.

[216] On the basis of a letter from Dr Khan Sahib to Nehru dated 17/6/47, which I have not seen, Gopal (p. 357) argues that behind the demand for Pakhtunistan lay an idea that the NWFP would enjoy full provincial autonomy within the Indian Union, not Pakistan. The name of India was bandied about a lot in the Pakhtunistan agitation but I have never seen it in a context which would support Gopal's interpretation. However, I think Gopal is right in stressing that the situation was so confused that very few, even among the leaders, had any clear idea of what partition would really mean.

The first time the demand for Pakhtunistan was raised in a wider public context[217] by a responsible leader seems to have been at a press conference given by Qazi Attaullah on 13th May 1947. On this occasion the revenue minister said:

> First of all we want to have an independent sovereign state of Pathans, and then we will visualise a joint 'jirga' . . . which will ultimately negotiate on equal footings either with Hindustan [i.e., India] or Pakistan whichever offers us better terms.[218]

A few days later Dr Khan Sahib also gave a press conference at which he further elucidated the position of his party:

> Pathans will never be dominated by anybody but in a sovereign state of N.W.F.P. we shall join hands with others having due regard to their interests as well as those of India as a whole [presumably Pakistan plus Hindustan]. The present day world conditions are such that even big powers cannot exist individually. Similarly a small state like N.W.F.P. cannot but associate itself with others for defence and other purposes.[219]

Thus the Pakhtunistan idea had now been launched but as these quotations show, the Khudai Khidmatgar leaders were right from the beginning open for negotiations. When the education minister Yahya Jan gave a press conference, he stressed this even more strongly:

> the Frontier would be willing to join hands with other other parts of India on a clear understanding that there would be no outside interference in its internal affairs and that no constitution would be forced on them by mere brute majority [*i.e.*, presumably "by the other provinces"] against the free wishes of the people.[220]

In the following weeks Congress activities increased. Largely attended

[217] In private discussions the idea had been put forward much earlier. On 4th April 1946 Dr Khan Sahib stressed to the members of the Cabinet Mission that the people of the NWFP were different from their neighbours in Punjab and said that they would never join Pakistan. If India were to be partitioned, the NWFP should become independent. Mansergh vol. VII No. 34. According to Campbell-Johnson p. 76, Dr Khan Sahib also raised the question during Mountbatten's visit to the Frontier.

As a curious fact could be mentioned Amir Nawaz Jalia's version of the origin of Pakhtunistan. In 1942, when the war was going very badly for the British and Japan was threatening India, a deputation from Kabul came to Ghaziabad, the village where the Haji of Turangzai had lived, where they met about thirty people. They discussed what should be done in case of a British defeat. It was decided to send a message to the British that they should not defend the Frontier; the Pakhtuns would defend themselves. A resolution was adopted to the effect that from the Indus to the Oxus and then to Quetta all Afghans were the same people. Later the Pakhtunistan protagonists also had a meeting at Shabqadar. One Haji Mohammad Amin was in the forefront of this Pakhtunistan movement and received money for it from Afghanistan. Amir Nawaz Jalia claims that this Pakhtunistan movement was closely connected with the reconstituted Afghan Jirga but this is denied by Arbab Abdul Ghafoor. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was, according to Amir Nawaz Jalia, very much opposed to this concept of Pakhtunistan and said: "We don't want to be with those naked people." Interviews with Amir Nawaz Jalia and Arbab Abdul Ghafoor.

[218] *Tribune* 15/5/47.

[219] *Tribune* 17/5/47.

[220] *Tribune* 26/5/47.

meetings were held at which the ministers and other leaders demanded independence and the creation of Pakhtunistan.[221] However, while his lieutenants were conducting this campaign for Pakhtunistan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan made repeated attempts to reach an agreement with the Muslim League. Towards the end of May he was approached by the principal of Islamia College Sheikh Taimur, who urged him to accept a compromise. It is not clear what compromise Sheikh Taimur suggested but in any case Ghaffar Khan agreed to accept his good offices. As a result the Muslim League leaders Abdul Qaiyum and Samin Jan were released on parole to go to Delhi together with the Khan brothers. However, nothing came out of the negotiations there.[222]

While he was in Delhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan also put forward his own proposals to "a very responsible Muslim Leaguer". His terms for an agreement were: 1.—If Pakistan remained in the Commonwealth, the Pakhtuns should be allowed to secede and form an independent state of their own; 2.—the Pakhtuns of the settled districts and those of the tribal areas should be allowed to unite; 3.—the Pakhtuns should enjoy an autonomous status in Pakistan. These proposals were not accepted by the Muslim League.[223]

As we have seen Abdul Ghaffar Khan also failed to prevent the AINC from accepting the partition plan and the proposal for a referendum. The Frontier Congress opposed the idea of a referendum on a number of different grounds. The people had decided against Pakistan only sixteen months ago. To hold a referendum now would be equal to yielding to force. The 1935 Government of India Act did not provide for plebiscites; thus the referendum would be challengeable in the civil courts.[224] The most common argument was that since for religious and geographical reasons there was no question of the NWFP joining India, there was no need for the referendum at all.[225] The basic reason why the Khudai Khidmatgar leaders opposed the referendum was obviously that it placed them in a hopeless position. They do not seem to have seriously considered fighting the referendum for the Indian alternative.[226] A victory for India, in any case an unlike-

[221] FR II May 1947.

[222] Afterwards Abdul Ghaffar Khan claimed that the terms put forward by the Muslim League leaders and to which he had agreed were: 1.—the NWFP should form an independent Pakhtun state; 2.—the Muslim League should be represented in the ministry; 3.—an assurance should be given to the Pakhtuns against Hindu domination. The Muslim League leaders denied ever having agreed to this. On the contrary, they claimed, Abdul Ghaffar Khan had agreed to Pakistan. For these negotiations, see telegram Caroe to Viceroy 31/5/47 IOL R/3/1/151; *Hindustan Times* 14/6/47, 17/6/47; *Tribune* 14/6/47, 18/6/47.

[223] This is the version Abdul Ghaffar Khan himself gave in a speech quoted in *Hindustan Times* 14/6/47. See also *Tribune* 14/6/47.

[224] This was an argument which worried Caroe among others. See correspondence in IOL R/3/1/151.

[225] For Congress arguments against the referendum, see *Tribune* 6/6/47; 15/6/47; FR I June 1947; also interview with Yahya Jan.

[226] Though Nehru was in favour of participation (Tendulkar p. 431). According to Ghani Khan (interview), Dr Khan Sahib was also in favour of fighting the referendum and was sure of winning it

ly outcome, would have led to an absurd situation. In the far more probable eventuality of a defeat, having to the last sided with India and the Hindus, they would have been in a very difficult position in the Muslim state of Pakistan. Nor did they wish to support Pakistan in the referendum, a course which would otherwise have made their position in Pakistan easier. At the time, however, it probably seemed like an unconditional surrender.[227] Instead they decided to boycott the referendum. They continued their agitation for Pakhtunistan and declared that only if the alternative of independence was included, would they fight the referendum. They cannot have had much hope that the Muslim League would yield on that point. Pakhtunistan remained but a bargaining counter and Abdul Ghaffar Khan continued his endeavours to reach a settlement with the Muslim League.

After the AINC Working Committee had accepted the 3rd June Plan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan returned to Peshawar to discuss with his colleagues what line of action they should now adopt. On 11th June the FPCC, the Congress parliamentary party and the commanders of the Khudai Khidmatgars held a meeting. According to Ghaffar Khan, those convened all agreed that the Frontier Congress should boycott the referendum, unless the issue was changed to Pakistan versus Pakhtunistan.[228] After a long discussion a resolution was passed vesting "Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan with all the powers to decide and take whatever actions he thinks best."[229] Having received this mandate, Ghaffar Khan returned to Delhi.

On 14th June the All-India Congress Committee accepted the partition plan. A couple of days later Mountbatten managed to arrange a meeting between Jinnah and Abdul Ghaffar Khan at the Viceroy's House. Mountbatten was not able to be present himself but was represented by Lord Ismay. According to Mountbatten, "Jinnah refused to have any discussion at all with Abdul Ghaffar Khan beyond extending an invitation to him to come to his house." This meeting did not produce any results, either. Jinnah afterwards told Mountbatten that Abdul Ghaffar Khan had in fact already decided to boycott the referendum since the alternative of independence was not included.[230] According to sources close to the Congress, Abdul Ghaffar Khan during these talks once more showed himself willing to accept Pakistan. His terms were the same as before: Pakistan should leave

on whatever issue it was held. Caroe, too, maintained that Dr Khan Sahib was certain he could win the referendum. *Extract from Report* ... 8/6/47 Caroe to Mountbatten IOL R/3/1/151.

[227] Salar Mohammad Aslam Khan, the MLA for Teri North Muslim Rural, maintains that he and Khair Mohammad Jelali, the propaganda secretary of the Provincial Congress, wrote a letter to the leaders recommending that they should accept Pakistan, but in the tense atmosphere which obtained at that time their proposal fell on deaf ears (interview). This is supported by Mian Jaffar Shah (interview). Yahya Jan also says that some of the leaders had their doubts but that Ghaffar Khan's opinion prevailed (interview).

[228] Abdul Ghaffar Khan to Gandhi 11/6/47 quoted in Tendulkar p. 433 f.

[229] For the full text of the resolution, see FR I June; also Caroe to Mountbatten 12/6/47 IOL R/3/1/151.

[230] Viceroy's Personal Report 27/6/47 IOL L/PO/433.

the Commonwealth; the NWFP should enjoy complete provincial autonomy; the settled districts of the province and the tribal areas should be allowed to unite and form one administrative unit. Jinnah agreed to the demand for provincial autonomy but insisted that the other questions must be left to the constituent assembly of Pakistan.[231] This version of the talks is probably the more accurate one.[232]

On return to Peshawar, Ghaffar Khan discussed the situation with the ministers. On 21st June a party meeting was convened at Bannu. The following resolution was adopted:

> A joint meeting of the Provincial Jirga [FPCC], [Congress] members of the Assembly, Commanders of the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Zalme Pakhtun was held on the 21st of June 1947 at Bannu with Khan Amir Mohammad Khan in the chair. This joint session unanimously decided that here in this country an independent government of all the Pakhtuns should be established, the constitution of which should be based on Islamic principles, democracy, equality and social justice. This session appeals to all Pakhtuns to come together on one platform to achieve this noble aim and not to bow before the power of anybody except that of the Pakhtun.[233]

Thus the attainment of Pakhtunistan had now officially been declared to be the aim of the Frontier Congress. At a big public meeting the following day Abdul Ghaffar Khan declared that the Frontier Congress would not take part in the referendum.[234] A couple of days later he issued a long statement appealing "to all Khudai Khidmatgars and others who believe in a free Pathan State not to take part in the referendum". The statement continued:

> A new struggle has been forced upon us. After bringing to a successful conclusion our 18 years' struggle against the British domination we are now faced with a new danger. Not only [the] liberty of the Pakhtuns but their very existence is at stake. I therefore, call upon all Pathans who have love for their motherland at heart to unite and work for our cherished ideal.[235]

In the following weeks, while the Muslim League conducted a campaign for Pakistan, the Congress leaders campaigned for Pakhtunistan and for a boycott of the referendum. However, in spite of their defiant attitude they still did not en-

[231] Interview with Mian Jaffar Shah, who was with Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Delhi; also Tendulkar pp. 436–439; *Tribune* 19/6/47, 24/6/47, 9/7/47; *Hindustan Times* 9/7/47.

[232] Mountbatten must have got his version of the first meeting from Lord Ismay, who had no reason to be biassed for or against either of the two leaders. This version puts the blame for the failure of the meeting on Jinnah rather than Abdul Ghaffar Khan. No outsider was present at the second meeting. One reason why the Congress version seems reasonably reliable is that Mian Jaffar Shah never got on with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and later joined the Muslim League. Thus he had no reason to support a version unduly favourable to Abdul Ghaffar Khan.

[233] A copy of a poster with the Bannu resolution was given to me by Mian Jaffar Shah. A slightly different translation is given in Pyarelal 1958 p. 275 and Tendulkar p. 439.

[234] Caroe to Mountbatten 23/6/47 IOL R/3/1/151.

[235] *Tribune* 25–26/6/47.

visage any real independence but were only trying to strengthen their negotiating position. During the referendum campaign and the referendum itself they made repeated attempts to achieve a rapprochement with the Muslim League on the terms Abdul Ghaffar Khan had already stated: The Pakhtuns should be allowed to unite and not be divided as they now were; they should enjoy a wide measure of autonomy; Pakistan should leave the British Commonwealth.

The distance between Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Jinnah was actually not so wide. As far as autonomy was concerned, Jinnah agreed to it. In fact, it was embedded in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940. The second point Jinnah presumably felt he had to leave to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. One difficulty was that Jinnah had already promised the tribes continued freedom under the old arrangements. Finally, Jinnah was unwilling to leave the Commonwealth.[236] He knew that Pakistan would be desperately short of experienced civil servants and military officers and for the time being he wished to employ British personnel. The fundamental reason why Jinnah refused to yield to Abdul Ghaffar Khan's demands, however, was probably that there was no need to. The NWFP was clearly coming into the fold of Pakistan. An agreement with the old Congress leader would only give him back the power he was on the point of losing. By agreeing to a compromise with Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Jinnah would have recognised him as the leader of the NWFP. There was no reason why he should concede that position to his old enemy in a situation where his own supporters were about to take over. Moreover and most importantly, Abdul Ghaffar Khan demanded the right to secede if he was not satisfied with the arrangements of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. Such a right of veto would set an extremely dangerous precedent, which would threaten the integrity of the emergent state. Thus it was better to let the referendum take place, have a clear verdict in favour of Pakistan and see the Khudai Khidmatgars thoroughly defeated.

The situation became further complicated by the attitude in Kabul where the press and radio had started a campaign for the return of the NWFP to Afghanistan. Early in June the Afghan government approached the Government of India as well as the British government with this demand, which naturally the British refused to consider.[237] It must be stressed that the Afghan position did not coincide with that of Abdul Ghaffar Khan since the latter demanded independence for the NWFP but did not advocate accession to Afghanistan. However, the Afghans subsequently also supported the demand for Pakhtunistan.[238] The Afghan attitude obviously increased the bargaining value of

[236] Viceroy's Personal Report 1/5/47 IOL L/PO/433 shows how very anxious Jinnah was that Pakistan should remain in the Commonwealth.

[237] *Weekly Intelligence Summary* 5/7/47 IOL L/P&S/12/3201.

[238] *Tribune* 21/7/47; *Hindustan Times* 24/6/47; also Abawi p. 60.

Pakhtunistan and the Congress leaders seem to have exploited it. On the other hand, this association, however indirect, with a foreign power must have made the Frontier Congress leaders even more suspect in the eyes of the future rulers of the country. It also gave their enemies a weapon which they did not hesitate to use.[239]

Caroe's Role

Among old Frontier Congressites and in Indian historical writing on the last phase of the nationalist period Sir Olaf Caroe is often presented as one of the last villains in the long line of imperialists. He is held responsible for the Muslim League's activities in the NWFP, for its success there and thus also to a large extent for the partition of India, which of course in Indian eyes was a great tragedy. His aim, it is maintained, was to divide in order to allow the British to continue to rule.[240] This interpretation, however, is a complete distortion of Caroe's real role.

We have seen how the relations between the governor and his ministers became strained soon after Caroe's assumption of office. Gradually the leaders of the Frontier Congress became convinced that the governor in the execution of his duties was biassed in favour of the Muslim League. One reason for this was the support given to the League by officials. The Congress leaders believed Caroe connived at this and even encouraged it. In connection with his visit to the NWFP, Nehru, too, became hostile to Caroe. Thus the governor had by the end of 1946 fallen into disfavour with the provincial Congress as well as the Congress High Command.

There are certainly many bitter and hostile remarks about the Congress leaders, particularly Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Nehru, in Caroe's reports but they must be seen in the light of what the Congress leaders said about him. I have not come across any documentary or other convincing evidence of partiality against the Congress on his part. In fact, an analysis of his reports and standpoints shows that his views and aims were basically the contrary to what he has been accused of. He was not in favour of Pakistan; he was opposed to partition. Moreover, he preferred the Khan brothers to the Muslim League leaders.

The reasons for Caroe's opposition to partition were strategic and economic. A

[239] Soon after the referendum Abdul Qaiyum said that in Pakistan "no person or party will be allowed to intrigue with a foreign Government". Qazi Attaullah commented on this by saying that the Government of Afghanistan was not a foreign one; Afghanistan was a Muslim state and the Pakhtuns had more in common with that country than with Punjab. Therefore there was nothing wrong in the Afghan support for the Pakhtunistan movement. *Tribune* 24/7/47.

[240] Roughly such a view was expressed to me by Yahya Jan and Wali Khan, when I interviewed them. See also Badshah Khan p. 184, 201 f; Pyarelal pp. 259–262; Tendulkar p. 384 ff; Gopal p. 346 ff. It is not so peculiar that the Congressites got this impression. Both Anonymous III and Faridullah Shah believed that Caroe was on the Muslim League side. Interviews.

solid Frontier, he stressed, was essential for the defence of the subcontinent. He did not believe that Pakistan would be able to afford the subsidy to the provincial government and the costs of the tribal administration. Thus partition might lead to a disintegration of the Frontier.[241]

Caroe thought very little of the leaders of the Frontier Muslim League. With the exception of the Pir of Manki Sharif, he called them a "miserable crew". In his opinion, the strength of the Frontier Muslim League lay in its appeal to "the Ismalic and Pathan culture" and in the League's determination to liberate the people "from any regime that can be represented as financed or dominated by Hinduism."[242] He felt that the Congress was "not natural here" and believed that the pressure from the tribes on the one hand and Punjab on the other would sooner or later squeeze the Congress out of the province.[243] He thus had to find a way first to prop up the forces which wanted India to remain united, i.e., the Khan brothers and their movement, and secondly to take the wind out of the sails of the Pakistan movement on the Frontier.[244] On 8th March he met the ministers to discuss the Muslim League civil disobedience campaign "in the light of the alarming developments in the Punjab." He outlined several possible courses open to them to meet the situation. One was to appeal to the people and hold new elections. The ministers would, however, on no account agree to new elections until a new constitution had been drawn up. Caroe told them he was sure they would have to seek a new mandate long before that but for the time being, he said,

> the best course would be to maintain the law with one hand but with the other make overtures ... for a settlement [with the Muslim League], on the ground that the time had more than come when Pathans should give up their internecine squabbles and begin to consider how the various parties could at least co-operate in constitutional disagreement to find the proper place for the Pathan race in the new India.

The ministers, however, refused to open any negotiations on these lines.[245] Nevertheless Caroe continued to press for a solution of this kind and went even further by suggesting to the Khan brothers that they should sever their connection with the AINC. Instead they should stress the Pakhtun character of their movement. They should also drop Mehr Chand Khanna from the ministry and find a new representative of the minorities.[246]

[241] See above p. 200 f.

[242] Governor's Report 7/4/47.

[243] Governor's Report 22/3/47.

[244] See particularly the note of 28/3/46, which Caroe submitted to the Cabinet Mission and which is reproduced in Mansergh Vol. VII No. 16.

[245] Governor's Report 8/3/47.

[246] "I believe the best course of all would be if Khan Sahib would make overtures for a coalition under himself, and the League might well come in under him on a guarantee that the Ministry would be a Pathan one and severed its connection with Congress. He would have to choose a new Hindu Minister. I have often told him that this is what I should like to see". Governor's Report 7/4/47.

It is ironic that the course proposed by Caroe was very nearly that which in the end was adopted by the Khan brothers to retrieve their position. But by then they had been deserted by the AINC and the success of the Pakistan movement on the Frontier was already certain. At the time the advice was given, the Khan brothers refused to listen to it. Instead Caroe's attitude was taken as proof of bias against the Congress and in favour of the Muslim League. As a result the Congress began to press for Caroe's removal.

On 14th April Mountbatten warned the Frontier governor that to be able to reach a solution he might have to order Caroe to leave his office. Caroe then offered to resign immediately but the Viceroy told him to stay on for the time being.[247] Nevertheless he seems to have made up his mind at about this time and to have promised Nehru to find a new governor for the Frontier.[248] Soon after the 3rd June plan had been made public he informed Caroe that he had again "been bombarded . . . by representations from your detractors . . . to the effect that there is no hope of peace, nor of a fair and orderly referendum, in the NWFP so long as you hold the reins of office" and that Caroe therefore had to give place to a new governor.[249] Caroe went on indefinite leave and Lieutenant-General Sir Rob Lockhart took over as acting governor.

The Referendum

On 4th June, the day after the partition plan was made public, the civil disobedience campaign on the Frontier ceased entirely and the "forces of law and order were able for the first time in more than three months to draw breath." The jails were emptied of political prisoners and gradually the Muslim League started its referendum campaign.[250] Jinnah appointed a committee to be in charge of the campaign. The Pir of Manki Sharif was the only member from the Frontier. The other members, I.I. Chundrigar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Syed Waji Ali, came from the central organisation.[251]

The Muslim League's campaign was on the usual Islamic lines. The Pakhtunistan issue caused the party concern. The student activists ridiculed their opponents by saying that the Red Shirts had been asked if they wanted a buffalo or a cow and they had answered they wanted a goat.[252] Jinnah issued a lengthy statement in which he vehemently denounced the Pakhtunistan idea. The AINC had accepted the 3rd June Plan. Thus, Jinnah

[247] Hodson p. 283 f.
[248] Mountbatten to Nehru 6/5/47 IOL R/3/1/170.
[249] Mountbatten to Caroe 6/6/47 IOL R/3/1/170.
[250] FR I June 1947.
[251] *Tribune* 18/6/47.
[252] Interview with Anonymous II.

claimed, as a branch of the AINC the Frontier Congress also had to honour the terms of the plan. But instead they had chosen a course which constituted an open breach with the agreement. The demand for Pakhtunistan was only a stunt "invented to mislead the people of N-WFP." He stressed that in Pakistan the NWFP would be an "autonomous unit". The people of the Frontier would "be their own masters regulating their social, cultural and educational matters besides the general administration of the Province, as a unit of the Pakistan Federal Government like any other Province or unit in Pakistan." The claim that in Pakhtunistan the constitution would be based on "Islamic conceptions of democracy, equality and social justice" was "disingenuous and calculated to mislead the Pathans" since by this claim the Frontier Congress insinuated that the Pakistan constituent assembly, in which the Muslims would have an overwhelming majority, would disregard these Islamic principles. Jinnah appealed to the Muslims of the province to remember they were "Muslims first and Pathans afterwards" and warned them that the NWFP would meet a "disastrous fate" if it did not join Pakistan. It was a deficit province and would not be able to support itself, if it became independent. Moreover, he said, owing to its geographical position it would be reduced to a negligible status. So far as the tribes were concerned, Jinnah assured them that Pakistan would respect their freedom and would "always be ready to come to a brotherly understanding with them which would be to the advantage of both."[253]

The Congress continued to campaign for Pakhtunistan and against Pakistan and the referendum. Abdul Ghaffar Khan said that a vote for Pakistan was a vote for continued British domination.[254] The British wanted the NWFP included in Pakistan in order to establish military bases against Russia there. If they should succeed in this, the risk would increase that the province would get involved in a new war.[255] In the other provinces of the future Pakistan, political power was in the hands of the rich. They would frame a constitution to their own advantage and retain the British governmental and administrative system.[256]

Another line of attack touched on a very fundamental question, the idea of a Muslim nation. If all Muslims should unite in Pakistan, why, then, were Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan etc. separate independent states? Why could not Pakhtunistan

[253] *Khyber Mail* 4/7/47.

[254] *Tribune* 14/6/47.

[255] *Tribune* 24/6/47; *Pakhtun* 24/7/47; Tendulkar p. 441. As a matter of fact, Mountbatten, who was vehemently opposed to Pakistan, as late as in May thought that it would be out of the question to allow Pakistan to remain in the Commonwealth, if it should come into being. At this stage it was not yet clear whether India would remain in the Commonwealth and the Viceroy feared that British officers serving in Pakistan might be placed in an impossible situation. Viceroy's Personal Report 1/5/47 IOL L/PO/433.

[256] *Pakhtun* 24/7/47.

enjoy the same place in the wider Muslim world community as these states? Why did the Pakhtuns as Muslims have to join Pakistan?[257]

Ghaffar Khan changed his tactics in regard to the Frontier Muslim League. In order to bring the Leaguers over to the Pakhtunistan camp he no longer stressed the differences between them as members of the privileged classes and the Khudai Khidmatgars, the supposed representatives of the poor. Instead he emphasised what they had in common—their Pakhtun nationality— and appealed to the Muslim Leaguers to give up serving the British and instead serve the nation.[258]

He also tried to bridge the chasm his Pakhtun nationalism had created among the Frontier population by giving his own definition of the term Pakhtun: "All those", he said, "who belong to the N.-W.F.P., whether rich or poor, Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs, are Pakhtoons."[259]

According to the Frontier Congress, Pakhtunistan would be a progressive and even radical state, whereas Pakistan would be dominated by reactionaries. The Pakhtuns, said Mehr Chand Khanna, had now freed themselves from the British yoke and would therefore "not tolerate to play a second fiddle to the Mamdots, Tiwanas, Noons and Daultanas of the Punjab". The people of the NWFP, he claimed, were more politically advanced than the Punjabis. In the Frontier Province a "people's party" was in power, "while in the Punjab [the] masses are dominated by feudal landlords."[260] Qazi Attaullah said that "Pakistan will be nothing more than Khanistan", which would remain linked to Britain.[261] Malik Amir Awan, a former secretary of the FPCC and now president of a body called the "Frontier Provincial Kisan Sabha", also supported the idea of independent Pakhtunistan, for which he advocated the establishment of a "Kisan Raj." He claimed that the Frontier Congress was already committed to that idea but that it was opposed by the nawabs and *jagirdars* of the Muslim League.[262] And the "Azad Pathanistan Publicity Board" circulated a poster in Urdu and Pashto in which the following points were stated to be the aim of Pakhtunistan: a government based on Islamic law; free education for everybody; no private property and no-one would be subject to anybody else's personal authority; an end to the exploitation by khans and nawabs; equal and just distribution of all lands fit for cultivation; only those who laboured would be entitled to benefit from the production; development of the Pashto language and Pakhtun culture; equal opportunities and suitable employment for all.[263]

[257] *Ibid.; Pakhtun* 1/8/47; Tendulkar p. 441.
[258] *Pakhtun* 24/7/47, 1/8/47, 9/6/47.
[259] *Hindustan Times* 9/7/47. In *Tribune* 9/7/47 he is quoted as saying: "By Pakhtun I mean everyone, whether Hindu, Muslim, Sikh or Christian, whether rich or poor, Pir, Khan or ordinary layman."
[260] *Tribune* 20/5/47.
[261] *Hindustan Times* 14/6/47.
[262] *Tribune* 14/6/47.
[263] *Hindustan Times* 15/7/47.

The atmosphere during the referendum campaign was often tense. In the cities of Peshawar and Bannu Red Shirts started "showing off by carrying large quantities of arms and letting them off in the air in the streets" which "led to the Leaguers doing exactly the same."[264] On 19th June about 350 Red Shirts in uniform and two hundred others paraded through Peshawar City. The processionists carried twenty-four shotguns and fifty-five pistols.[265] The following day a League demonstration of over five thousand people took place in the city. Among the demonstrators were 850 Muslim National Guards in uniform. The demonstrators were armed with three hundred rifles, one sten gun, one tommy gun, as well as pistols and other weapons. This demonstration met a small party of Red Shirts and a quarrel ensued. The Red Shirts were fired at and chased away. After the demonstration had dispersed, a Leaguer was stabbed, allegedly by a Red Shirt.[266] The next day a party of Red Shirts were prevented from attacking the League's office only by Dr Khan Sahib's personal intervention on the spot.[267]

The Hindus and Sikh constituted about 14 per cent of the total electorate but a very large share of them had left their homes in the turmoil of the preceding months. Not unexpectedly, the Muslim Leaguers showed signs of being "by no means anxious to see members of minority communities return to the Province to participate in the referendum."[268] On 13th June, Abdul Qaiyum gave a speech in Peshawar Cantonment warning the Hindus and Sikhs not to interfere in the referendum. In the evening of the same day a bomb exploded in a Hindu quarter in Peshawar City.[269] An armed Muslim League procession in Bannu City on the 19th created "acute alarm" among the minorities.[270]

Generally speaking, however, the referendum campaign was surprisingly peaceful. One reason was the Congress boycott. Another was the discrete behaviour of the minorities. Finally, although a few Muslim League agitators used "unrestrained language and even threats, the general tone of Muslim League speeches [was not] unduly provocative."[271]

According to the 3rd June Plan, the referendum was to "be held under the aegis of the Governor-General and in consultation with the provincial Government."[272] In practice this meant it was conducted in the following way. At the request of the Congress as well as the Muslim League the army, not the civil administration, was put in charge. Forty-one British officers were seconded to supervise the conduct

[264] Governor's Report 23/6/47.
[265] Telegram Norwef Peshawar to Viceroy 20/6/47 IOL R/3/1/151.
[266] Telegram NORWEF Peshawar to Viceroy 21/6/47 IOL R/3/1/151.
[267] Telegram NORWEF Peshawar to Viceroy 22/6/47 IOL R/3/1/151.
[268] FR I June 1947.
[269] *Ibid.*; Telegram Caroe to Viceroy 14/6/47 IOL R/3/1/151.
[270] Telegram Norwef Peshawar to Viceroy 20/6/47 IOL R/3/1/151.
[271] FR II June 1947.
[272] Menon Appendix X.

of the referendum. At the top was a "referendum commissioner", a Brigadier Booth. Under him there were eight "supervisors", six lieutenant-colonels and two senior majors. There was one such supervisor for each district, except in Peshawar and Mardan districts, for each of which two supervisors were appointed. Each supervisor was assisted by "assistant supervisors", who were either majors, captains or lieutenants. There were five of these in Hazara district, eight in Mardan, ten in Peshawar, three in each of the districts of Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. In addition to these British officers, a number of Viceroy's commissioned officers, senior Indian non-commissioned officers and havildar clerks were made available.[273] It was, however, "impossible to find in India, in present conditions, enough military officers to operate 460 polling stations over an area 600 miles long". Thus the usual provincial election staff had to be used for the ordinary work at the polling stations.[274]

The Governor-General issued an ordinance giving the military forces stationed in the province extensive powers to maintain law and order.[275]

The polling began on 6th July and ended about ten days later. Outwardly the Frontier Congress maintained its defiant attitude to the last and the Pakhtunistan campaign continued. On the 5th a meeting was held in Peshawar, at which Dr Khan Sahib said:

> This is an hour of life and death in the history of the Pakhtun race. If the public remain united, disciplined and organised, their future will be bright and no power on earth can prevent them from obtaining their cherished goal of Pathanistan ...

It was, he said, his duty to warn the nation of the coming danger. The exploiters of yesterday were now posing as friends of the exploited while in fact they were only "furthering their own ends by playing on the unsophisticated nature of the poor masses."[276]

The 7th of July was celebrated as "Pakhtunistan Day" in Peshawar. Large crowds of Khudai Khidmatgars and *Zalme Pakhtuns* marched through Kissa Khani Bazaar shouting slogans about Pakhtunistan.[277]

But at the same time the Khan brothers continued their endeavours to reach an agreement with the Muslim League. On 14th July they met the acting governor and told him they were prepared to open negotiations but as their terms were essentially the same as before, Jinnah was not interested.[278] About the same time Ghaffar Khan also met the Pir of Manki Sharif but without result.[279]

[273] Press statement by the referendum commissioner Brigadier Booth, *Tribune* 4/7/47.

[274] Unsigned report n.d. on the referendum by Booth IOL R/3/1/151. Lockhart wrote that the "executive subordinates" were "somewhat inferior". Governor's Report 6/7/47.

[275] *Tribune* 4/7/47.

[276] *Tribune* 8/7/47; also *Hindustan Times* 8/7/47.

[277] *Ibid.*

[278] Express letter Lockart to Mountbatten 16/7/47 IOL R/3/1/151; Jinnah to Sir Eric Miéville 25/7/47 IOL R/3/1/151.

[279] *Hindustan Times* 18/7/47.

Table 11. Result of the referendum

Total number of votes cast	292,118
Votes for Pakistan	289,244
Votes for India	2,874
Total electorate	572,798
Turn-out in per cent	51.00

(*Source:* Booth to Private Secretary to the Viceroy 20/7/47 enclosure IOL R/3/151 Folio 240.)

Table 11 shows the results of the referendum. The votes cast for Pakistan represented 99.02 of the total number of votes cast, and those cast for India 0.98 per cent. Thus the referendum had gone overwhelmingly in favour of Pakistan. However, from 1947 on the verdict of the referendum has been challenged from many sides. One argument against it has been that the low turn-out, only 51 per cent, indicates that the Congress boycott met with wide response and thus a significant share of the population was opposed to Pakistan. In fact, the votes cast for Pakistan represented only 50.50 per cent of the total electorate.[280]

This argument is refuted by Rittenberg, in whose opinion the boycott was "rather ineffectual." He has come to this conclusion by comparing the figures for the referendum to those of the 1946 elections. The electoral rolls prepared for the 1946 elections were adopted for the referendum without amendment in spite of the fact that many of those on the rolls had since died and many others, including perhaps the majority of all Hindus and Sikhs, had left their homes and were unable to exercise their franchise. In 1946 the turnout had been 62 per cent and in 1947 it was 51 per cent. Thus, in spite of the fact that the figure for the total electorate in 1947 was much higher than the number of people who could actually take part in the voting, the turn-out in 1947 was only 11 percentage points lower than in 1946.[281]

Then Rittenberg has compared the figure for the votes polled by the Muslim League in 1946 to that for the Pakistan votes in 1947. In 1946 the League candidates had received 38.89 per cent of all votes cast, whereas in 1947, 99.02 per cent of those voting voted for Pakistan. From these figures Rittenberg concludes that there had been a massive swing to the Muslim League and Pakistan since the 1946 elections.[282]

One flaw in Rittenberg's analysis is that in 1946 seven out of nine Hindu candidates had been returned unopposed. Thus no votes were polled in their constituencies, which makes the figure for the total turn-out a bit misleading. If a

[280] See e.g., Wali Khan p. 81. Abawi's main theme is that the referendum was not legally valid. One of his arguments is based on the low turn-out. His figures are, however, not correct.

[281] Rittenberg p. 393 f.

[282] *Ibid.*

comparison should be made between the 1946 elections and the referendum, it should be confined to the Muslim voters. The minorities had in any case not been in favour of the Muslim League in 1946 and were solidly opposed to Pakistan in 1947.[283] In 1946 the turn-out in the Muslim constituencies[284] was 66.79 per cent while 58.27 per cent of the enfranchised Muslims voted in the referendum. This gives a difference of between 8 and 9 percentage points, which in view of the circumstances mentioned by Rittenberg must be regarded as a very low figure. On the basis of these figures it seems as if the Congress boycott was a fiasco among the Muslims. In 1946, 146,235 Muslim votes had been polled for the Muslim League, i.e., only 27.87 per cent of the total Muslim electorate, and only 41.77 per cent total number of Muslim votes actually cast. By contrast, 288,341 Muslims voted for Pakistan in 1947, i.e., 58.28 per cent of all enfranchised Muslims and 99.02 per cent of those actually voting. This would appear to indicate an enormous swing to the Muslim League and Pakistan.

These figures can, however, be somewhat misleading, as the 1946 elections and the referendum cannot be directly compared. The elections were fought by individuals—particularly on the Muslim League side—for the prize of seats in the assembly and of office. The Muslim League was defeated largely because of the factionalism prevailing in the party.[285] The referendum, on the other hand, was a contest between two ideas and there was no scope for factional struggles. It is true that in 1946 the Muslim League had tried to introduce the Pakistan issue in the campaign, but, as we have seen, it was by and large ignored by the Frontier Congress. In 1946 freedom or continued British rule had been the main issue for the Congress and the question of partition or no partition had not as yet arisen for the Congress sympathisers. They were basically anti-British and not anti-Pakistan. Furthermore, the Congress had a programme of social and economic reform, which appealed to the masses and was largely directed against the big khans, the representatives of the Muslim League. This programme, however, and the support it received had nothing to do with Pakistan. Finally, although the Muslim League tried to fight the 1946 elections on the issue of Pakistan, the question put to the people then was different from that of the referendum. In 1946 it

[283] In 1947 the minorities voted with their feet. Out of an electorate of about 80,000 only 931 took part in the referendum. Twenty-eight of them voted for India and the rest for Pakistan. These and the figures in the following are taken from or calculated on the basis of Booth to Private Secretary to the Viceroy 20/7/47 Enclosure IOL R/3/1/151 or *Press Information Bureau's Morgue and Reference Series. Results of Elections to N.W.F.P. Assembly* NAI Home Poll. 79/6. There are some minor discrepancies between these two sources but they do not affect my arguments.

[284] Including the Landholders' constituencies.

[285] In 1946 Independent candidates had received almost 10 per cent of the total Muslim votes cast. About 4 per cent had been polled for Khaksar candidates. It seems probable that these candidates and their supporters were more in sympathy with the Muslim League and Pakistan than the Congress and India.

was not possible for the Muslim League to present the issue as being directly between a Muslim state and a Hindu one. In so far as Pakistan was an issue, the question was whether India should remain united or be partitioned. In 1947, on the other hand, it had already been decided that India was to be partitioned on religious lines. The only question which remained to be answered was whether the NWFP wished to join the Muslim state or the Hindu one.

The conclusion of all this is that the Muslim League succeeded in 1947 where it had failed in 1946, because in 1947 the conditions were different and the issue was different.

Another factor which contributed to the overwhelming victory of Pakistan in 1947 was the fact that the referendum was a one-sided affair. An election in this part of the world is to a significant extent a question of bringing the voters to the polls, feasting them or influencing them in some other such way and then getting their votes in return. In a walk-over the party remaining in the contest will alone take care of all these voters and will therefore get its figures inflated as compared to the support it really enjoys among the people.[286]

Finally there is the question of cheating. Allegations of various malpractices were made by prominent Congressites during and after the referendum, and the president of the FPCC Amir Mohammad Khan demanded an impartial inquiry into the question.[287] These charges were repudiated by the referendum commissioner and the acting governor. Lockhart had "no doubt that a number of bogus votes were, in fact, cast in favour of [Pakistan], but the number was not sufficiently large to have any material effect upon the result." Taking the "ethical standards" of the province into account the referendum could, in his opinion, not have been fairer.[288] In fact, he was convinced that it was more honest than any elections ever held in the province.[289] And according to Booth, the bogus votes were so few that they "could not possibly have affected the over-all result by more than a fractional percentage."[290]

It is of course extremely difficult to go into a question of this kind after a lapse of more than thirty years. I have, however, made an attempt and although my results are highly inconclusive, they are presented here for what they are worth.

There is no dearth of witnesses to the referendum but the accounts they give vary according to their political sympathies and it is difficult to know which side to believe. Many of the tales told by old Congressites are undoubtedly wild ex-

[286] This point was stressed by Alam Khan. In his village, Latambar in Kohat district, the Congress enjoyed strong support from the *kamins*, who constituted a large share of the population. In 1947, however, the Muslim Leaguers had no difficulties in persuading the *kamins* to vote for Pakistan, as the Congressites just ignored the referendum. Interview.

[287] *Tribune* 19/7/47.

[288] Governor's Report 23/7/47.

[289] Lockhart to Mountbatten 25/7/47 IOL R/3/1/151.

[290] Unsigned report n.d. by Booth on the referendum IOL R/3/1/151.

aggerations.[291] Some old Muslim Leaguers, who claim to have knowledge of wide-spread cheating, have since gone over to Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Wali Khan, which lessens the value of their evidence.[292] Others admit to having cast several votes but do not claim to have been involved in any organised large-scale cheating.[293] I have, however, met a number of well-placed, balanced and reliable persons who support the allegations of wide-spread cheating. One of them was the late Askar Ali Shah, according to whom the cheating in 1947 was on a scale that surpassed anything that had taken place before or since; actually, the atmosphere was such that in some circles people used to boast about how many votes they had cast.[294]

The best evidence of large-scale cheating was, however, given by three informants from the Muslim Students' Federation.[295] In detail their accounts differ but on the main points they agree. During the referendum groups of students were sent to all polling stations to supervise the voting on behalf of the Muslim League. No explicit orders to cheat seem to have been issued by anyone but since the Congress was boycotting the referendum, the idea to cheat was in the air and the students felt in advance they would do something. At the polling stations they naturally encouraged the people to vote for Pakistan but did not confine themselves to that. They had access to the electoral rolls and whenever they saw that someone had abstained from voting, they would see that someone else voted in his place—for Pakistan, of course. Far from preventing them, the polling of-

[291] I was, for instance, told by an old Congressite at Hangu that in Ustarzai, a village about ten miles east of Hangu, all votes for Pakistan had been cast by only ten persons. I have been to Ustarzai a couple of times, spoken to several people there and made two interviews (with Haji Rajab Ali and Sargand Ramzy Bangash) and their evidence is unequivocal: with the exception of a handful of persons, the people of Ustarzai were for Pakistan. According to Sargand Ramzy Bangash, the Muslim Leaguers even forced one of the few Congressites to vote for Pakistan.

[292] This is the case with Arbab Abdul Ghafoor, who says that although he personally did nothing irregular, the Muslim Leaguers did everything in their power to win the referendum. A lot of bogus votes were cast. This was possible because of the Congress boycott and because the staff at the polling stations were all in favour of Pakistan. Interview.

Another such case is Qalandar Mohmand. He says that he cast fourteen votes for Pakistan in spite of the fact that he was only seventeen at the time and thus not registered as a voter. In the end, when he came up to vote once more, the polling officer told him: "No, not any more. You have cast too many votes. Go to a different polling station." Interview.

[293] For example Anonymous I, who at the time was a young student but old enough to participate in the referendum. He was not an active League worker but supported the party in youthful enthusiasm and cast five votes for Pakistan. All people he saw or knew did the same. They just walked in and out, in and out and voted over and over again. However, Anonymous I had no idea how widespread this was or how far it affected the outcome of the referendum.

[294] Interview with Askar Ali Shah. Admittedly, before Independence he had Congress sympathies and in present-day Pakistani politics he supported Wali Khan, but he was a very balanced man, who always tried to be fair. On the other hand, if the atmosphere was such that people boasted about how many votes they had cast, they probably exaggerated too.

[295] Mohammad Anwar, Anonymous II and III. It is only fair to point out that the leader of the Frontier Muslim Students' Federation, Malik Tahmasp, strongly denies there was any cheating.

ficers actually encouraged this. In this way about four hundred bogus votes were cast at a polling station in Kohat district under the supervision of Anonymous III. The Congress polling agents were unable to stop him, because for each vote they wanted to challenge they had to deposit twenty rupees, which was completely impossible for them owing to the large number of bogus votes. Moreover, they had to prove the identity of the bogus voters, which was very difficult. Mohammad Anwar and Anonymous II walked about in Peshawar City from one polling station to another supervising the work of the students. Everywhere it was the same: bogus votes were cast with the support of the polling officers.

This evidence indicates that at least in some places significant numbers of bogus votes were cast. On the other hand, the question remains how widely spread these practices were. As we have seen, no orders seem to have been issued by any superior authorities and nothing to have been planned in advance. The cheating can by no means have been universal. Had that been the case, the figures for the total turn-out would have been different. Unfortunately my sources give only the figures for the constituencies and contain no information about the individual polling stations. The figures for some constituencies do seem suspect but the over-all figures do not give the impression that there was any general cheating on the scale described by my informants.

If we first look at the constituencies where my informants were active, we find that in the Teri South Muslim Rural constituency, in which Anonymous III's polling station was situated, the turn-out fell from 71.2 per cent in 1946 to 67.5 in 1947. This would hardly seem to indicate that there was any mass cheating at the other polling stations in the constituency. In the Peshawar Muslim Urban constituency, where Mohammad Anwar and Anonymous II were posted, the figure fell from 65.69. per cent to 63.4.[296] This again does not indicate any general mass cheating.

However, the figures for seven out of the nine Hazara constituencies show very large increases. They are given in Table 12. Naturally these increases need not necessarily have been due to bogus voting. The Muslim League was better organised in Hazara than elsewhere and had a dedicated and efficient leader in Mohammad Jalaluddin.[297]

In the old Red Shirt strongholds in the Vale of Peshawar the boycott was clearly very effective. The figures for the Mardan and Peshawar Muslim Rural constituencies are given in Table 13.

On the basis of my sources it seems impossible to go any deeper into the question how far the referendum was affected by bogus votes and how far the boycott

[296] The figures are found in Booth to Private Secretary to the Viceroy 20/7/47 Enclosure IOL R/3/1/151.

[297] He was also the owner of a big transport company, which may have been of great help to the Muslim Leaguers in bringing the voters to the polls.

Table 12. Turn-out in per cent in seven Hazara constituencies. Comparison between the 1946 elections and the 1947 referendum.

Constituency	1946	1947
Tanawal	51.9	86.18
Abbottabad West	58.3	85.8
Abbottabad East	46.2	73.27
Haripur North	48.8	75.00
Haripur Central	60.8	78.8
Haripur South	66.00	84.3
Upper Pakhli	59.2	80.1

(*Source:* Appendix III and Booth to Private Secretary to the Viceroy 20/7/47 enclosure IOL R/3/1/151 Folio 240.)

Table 13. Percentage of total electorate who voted in the 1946 elections and the 1947 referendum in the Muslim Rural constituencies of Peshawar and Mardan districts

Constituency	1946	1947
Bara Mohmands	70.4	55.7
Khalil	78.7	46.6
Hashtnagar North	82.3	37.5
Hashtnagar South	72	20.6
Doaba Daudzai	82	24.8
Nowshara South	66	51.1
Nowshera North	67.6	48.9
Baizai	76.18	50.2
Kamalzai	65.9	48.2
Utmannama	73.8	37.5
Razzar	76.6	27.3
Amazai	78	36.27

(*Source:* Appendix III and Booth to Private Secretary to the Viceroy 20/7/47 enclosure IOL R/3/1/151 Folio 240.)

was effective. It would also be a somewhat futile exercise. The result was legally binding, no matter whether it resulted in a big or narrow victory and once the Congress had decided on a boycott, the outcome was certain. However, in view of subsequent events, the question of how much support the Congress still enjoyed is of considerable interest.

So far as Pakistan—as opposed to the provincial Muslim League—was concerned, it had the support of the most articulate, vociferous and influential groups. This set the pace for the developments in the spring of 1947 and decided the outcome of the ten-year-old struggle between the Congress and the Muslim League on the Frontier. It did not mean, however, that the Frontier Congress had been crushed. It still remained the strongest political organisation in the province.

Several prominent Muslim Leaguers and League sympathisers have admitted that had the Congress fought the referendum, it would have been able to put up a good fight.[298]

The Dismissal of the Congress Ministry

Immediately after the referendum the question of the future of the ministry, the moral losers of the referendum, arose. The provincial Muslim League urged the governor to dismiss the ministers and promulgate governor's rule.[299] At the centre the Pakistan provisional government formally advised Mountbatten to dismiss the Congress ministers and instead appoint a Muslim League ministry, or else take over the administration himself, give the Muslim League leaders some advisory capacity and by Independence Day on 14th August instal a Muslim League ministry. Mountbatten himself favoured the latter alternative.[300] Cunningham, who at Jinnah's instance was resuming the governorship, was, however, strongly opposed to this, and the India Office refused to sanction either course on the ground that they would both be unconstitutional, as long as Dr Khan Sahib still commanded a majority in the assembly.[301]

Actually, when the polling for the referendum opened, Dr Khan Sahib said that if more than half of the 63 per cent, who had voted in the 1946 elections, now voted for Pakistan, he would be "morally and conscientiously bound to resign." But he emphasised that this was only his personal view. He did not know the views of the party and therefore he would not commit himself. And he added that if he

[298] Fida Mohammad said that in numbers the Congress was still a force to be reckoned with but they had lost the support of all the important and vocal groups and were therefore overawed by the Muslim League. This was the reason why they boycotted the referendum. Had they fought it, he believed Pakistan would still have won, but not so overwhelmingly. Fifty-three per cent for Pakistan and forty-seven for India did not seem an unreasonable guess to him. Arbab Abdul Ghafoor said that God knows what would have happened, if the Congress had fought the referendum, but it is certain there would have been a marked difference. Another prominent Muslim Leaguer with a leading role in the referendum campaign, who, however, did not wish his name to be cited in this context, believed the Congress would have won the referendum if they had participated. Pakistan was created by God, he said. Cf. Chapter VIII footnote 2.

[299] Governor's Report 23/7/47.

[300] Viceroy's Personal Report 1/8/47 IOL L/PO/433. It seems as if one reason why Mountbatten was prepared to comply with the provisional government's request was that Liaqat Ali Khan had told him that on 15th August Dr Khan Sahib would proclaim independent Pakhtunistan (Sayeed 1968 p. 271). There were undoubtedly many such rumours abroad and many provocative things were said by more or less responsible Congress leaders (see e.g., Governor's Report 23/7/47) but there is no evidence that the Frontier Congress ever seriously considered a declaration of independence. On the contrary, when on 13th August Cunningham arrived in Peshawar, Dr Khan Sahib assured him that he had no such intentions or, indeed, of doing anything injurious to the constitution of Pakistan. Mitchell p. 131 f.; Sayeed 1968 p. 271 f.

[301] Sayeed 1968 p. 270 f.; Mitchell p. 130 f.

did resign, new elections ought to be held.[302] Abdul Ghaffar Khan also said that if the referendum should go in favour Pakistan, the Congress would press for new elections.[303]

Before the referendum was over, Dr Khan Sahib's attitude had changed. On 17th July, the last day of the polling, he said that he would not resign, "unless a definite promise is forthcoming that general elections will ultimately be held in an absolutely free fair atmosphere to ascertain the real will of the people." When he made his previous statement, he said, he had been expecting a fair and impartial referendum.[304]

If a new election had been announced, the Congress would have fought it on the issue of Pakistan versus Pakhtunistan.[305] Obviously such an election soon after the establishment of Pakistan was unacceptable to the leaders of the new state.[306]

On 14th August Pakistan came into being. Within a week Jinnah as governor-general passed orders legalising the dismissal of the Congress ministry in the NWFP and an 22nd Dr Khan Sahib and his colleagues were dismissed. In their place a Muslim League ministry under Abdul Qaiyum was sworn in.[307]

[302] *Tribune* 9/7/47; *Hindustan Times* 9/7/47.

[303] *Tribune* 10/7/47.

[304] *Tribune* 19/7/47; also *Hindustan Times* 18/7/47.

[305] In an interview Mehr Chand Khanna said: "I fail to understand why our demand for holding fresh elections on the issue of Pathanistan versus Pakistan remains unaccepted. The obvious reason is that the idea of Pathanistan is gaining momentum every day and its protagonists are confident of their victory at the polls." *Tribune* 5/8/47.

[306] It is ironic that when the 3rd June Plan was being worked out, Jinnah wanted the referendum to be followed by elections, if the verdict should go in favour of Pakistan. Mountbatten refused to include this proposal in the plan, as it would have made the plan unacceptable to the Congress. *Note of an interview which the Viceroy gave to Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan* 4/5/47 IOL R/3/1/151.

[307] Sayeed 1968 p. 271 f.; Mitchell p. 134.

Chapter VIII

Epilogue: The Frontier in Pakistan

The Settled Districts

The period immediately after independence was one of political confusion and repression but also of considerable economic progress. The Muslim League ministry under Abdul Qaiyum, which was appointed on 23rd August 1947, did not at the time have a majority in the assembly. Abdul Qaiyum suggested that the best arrangement would be to abandon the parliamentary form of government and instead hold a referendum regularly to elect a leader who could appoint a few colleagues together with whom he would run the administration till a new referendum was held. Jinnah thought in terms of a dissolution of the assembly *sine die.* Neither course became necessary. By the time the assembly was convened for a budget session in spring 1948, seven Congress MLAs had decided to join the Muslim League and thus there was a majority for the ministry.[1]

Throughout his tenure of office Abdul Qaiyum was unable to brook any opposition and it was not long before he began taking action against all potential rivals on the pretext that they were enemies of Pakistan. The first and main target for his repression were the Khudai Khidmatgars. The only reason appears to have been that he knew that if the government of Pakistan should come to an agreement with the Khan brothers, his own career as a front rank leader would be over.[2] The Khan brothers and their followers undoubtedly did and said many things which gave their opponents ample opportunity for attacks, the most striking example being the decision of Dr Khan Sahib and the other ministers to absent themselves from the official Independence celebrations.[3] Nevertheless there is no

[1] Sayeed 1968 p. 273.

[2] Abdul Qaiyum has during his long and extremely chequered career made so many enemies that it is difficult to know how far one can believe what is said about him. All tend to blame him for everything. However, this much seems to be reasonably certain: 1.—although the Khudai Khidmatgars had been weakened during the Pakistan movement, their basic organisation remained intact and the strongest political force in the province; 2.—the Khudai Khidmatgar leaders were loyal to Pakistan and did not represent any threat to the integrity of the country; 3.—had there been an agreement between Jinnah and Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Abdul Qaiyum's own career would have come to an end. Even men like Sardar Abdur Rashid and Faridullah Shah, who in no way could be said to be biassed in favour of the Congress, agree with this and maintain that this was the only reason for Abdul Qaiyum's persecution of the Khudai Khidmatgars. Cf. Sayeed 1968 p. 273 f.

[3] Some have maintained that they refused to take the oath of loyalty to Pakistan and that this was the reason for their dismissal but this is not correct. Others maintain that the ministers' absence from the flag-hoisting ceremony was proof of their disloyalty to Pakistan. In Congress circles,

doubt that the Khan brothers were at this time very anxious to come to terms with Pakistan and her leaders, to work within Pakistan for their old ideals, and that this was appreciated by the rulers of Pakistan.

At a meeting on 3rd and 4th September 1947 of the FPCC, the Congress parliamentary party, *Zalme Pakhtun* and the Khudai Khidmatgars the following resolutions were adopted:

> (a) The Khudai Khidmatgars regard Pakistan as their own country and pledge that they shall do their utmost to strengthen and safeguard its interests and make every sacrifice for the cause. (b) The dismissal of Dr. Khan Sahib's ministry and the setting up of Abdul Qaiyum's ministry is undemocratic, but as our country is passing through a critical stage, the Khudai Khidmatgars shall take no step which might create difficulties in the way of either the Provincial or Central Government. (c) After the division of the country the Khudai Khidmatgars sever their connection with the All-India Congress organisation . . .[4]

Pakhtunistan was defined as meaning autonomy for the Pakhtuns, organised in one unit within Pakistan. "This new state", ran the relevant resolution,

> will comprise the present six Settled Districts of the North-West Frontier Province and all such other contiguous areas inhabited by the Pakhtuns which may wish to join the new state of their own free will. The state will enter into agreement on defence, external affairs, and communications with Pakistan.[5]

In the autumn of 1947 the Frontier Congress made an attempt to by-pass the provincial Muslim League and instead reach an agreement with the High Command but without success.[6] In the NWFP itself the conditions deteriorated rapidly. Immediately after coming to power the Muslim League ministry had begun harassing the Khudai Khidmatgars and the harassment soon escalated to persecution. Ghani Khan was arrested less than a week after the change of regime but was released on bail.[7] In January 1948 Abdul Ghaffar Khan was put before a District Magistrate's Court together with Mehr Chand Khanna on a charge of illegal possession of arms.[8] In Cunningham's opinion, the district magistrate concerned was actuated only by a desire to victimise political opponents and none "of the cases ought really to have gone into court at all".[9] Both Ghaffar Khan and Mehr Chand Khanna appear to have been either acquitted or released before long but naturally such experiences did not endear the new rulers of the province to

however, it is claimed that the ministers had planned to attend the ceremony but were warned by the governor that their safety could not be guaranteed and that this was the reason for their absence. See Sayeed p. 246 f., 270 ff.; Yahya Jan p. 2.

[4] Quoted in Tendulkar p. 450 f.

[5] Quoted in Tendulkar p. 451.

[6] *Extracts from Report of Deputy High Commissioner in Peshawar* 10/12/47 IOL L/P&S /12/3240.

[7] *Khyber Mail* 29/8/47.

[8] *Civil & Military Gazette* 7/1/48.

[9] Governor's Report 2/2/48 IOL Cunningham Papers MSS. Eur. D. 670/23.

them. It seemed to Ghaffar Khan that his fears about Pakistan were coming true and his speeches became increasingly critical and bitter. Nevertheless he did not deviate from the path he had chosen but remained loyal to his new country.

In February 1948 he attended the first session of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and took the oath of allegiance to Pakistan. He also met Jinnah for discussions and invited him to come to the NWFP and visit the Khudai Khidmatgars, an invitation that was accepted.[10] However, for reasons which remain obscure the visit failed to ease the situation.[11]

In March the Frontier Assembly met for the first time since the coming of independence. As already mentioned, seven former Congressites had by now joined the Muslim League and thus Abdul Qaiyum's ministry had a majority. Dr Khan Sahib became leader of the opposition. He and his followers took the oath of allegiance to Pakistan along with the Muslim League MLAs.[12]

While Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his principal followers by now thus unequivocally supported Pakistan, they refused to merge their organisation with the Muslim League. Instead they sharply criticised the shape things were taking in Pakistan under the League's leadership and began to organise themselves to counter these developments. Together with G.M. Syed from Sind and Abdus Samad Achakzai from Baluchistan, Ghaffar Khan formed the People's Party, while he was in Karachi. The aims of this party were:

> Stabilization and security of Pakistan as a 'Union of the Socialist Republics', drawing its sanctions and authority from the people through their willing consent; provision of full and unimpaired autonomy for all, and cultural relations with neighbouring states, particularly, with the Indian Union.[13]

This party never played any significant role[14] but its formation was indicative of the political pattern which was to dominate Pakistan for the next decades: provincialism versus centralism. Political leaders, whose support has been confined to the NWFP, Baluchistan, Sind or Bengal have tried to unite in opposition claiming that their provinces have been neglected by the essentially Punjabi and *Muhajirin* (refugee) government.

When the session of the Constituent Assembly was over, Abdul Ghaffar Khan went on a tour of the NWFP. In his speeches he criticised the continued British presence, pointed out that Islamic law was practised no more in Pakistan than it

[10] Tendulkar p. 453.

[11] The Khudai Khidmatgars claim that it was owing to Abdul Qaiyum's machinations that they failed to achieve a rapprochement with Jinnah during this visit (Tendulkar p. 461 f; Yahya Jan p. 5). Abdul Qaiyum, on the other hand, maintains that after meeting the Khudai Khidmatgar leaders, Jinnah came to the conclusion that they were implacably opposed to Pakistan (interview).

[12] *Year Book of the North-West Frontier Province 1954* p. 29. All Hindu and Sikh members except one, Kotu Ram, had emigrated to India. Thus the strength of the assembly was reduced to 39 and Abdul Qaiyum had a comfortable majority.

[13] Tendulkar p. 463.

[14] For this party, see Afzal, pp. 89–91.

had been before Independence and insisted on the necessity of provincial autonomy in very strong, even provocative terms.[15] In one speech he said:

> I warn you, my Pathan brothers, that you are partners in the state of Pakistan. You are fully entitled to a one-fourth share. It is up to you now to awake, unite and pledge to achieve what is your due. Unite and act with determination, and thus demolish the sandy walls which the leaders of Pakistan have built around you. We cannot tolerate the present state of affairs any longer. Gird up your loins and march towards the goal of freedom for the Pakhtuns, who have already made great sacrifices and suffered untold privations. We will not rest content till we succeed in establishing Pakhtunistan—rule of the Pakhtuns, by the Pakhtuns, and for the Pakhtuns.[16]

However, speeches such as these did not mean that any serious trouble was brewing. No-one seems to have felt that the Khudai Khidmatgars in any way threatened the integrity of Pakistan. In May Cunningham wrote that the internal political situation in his opinion was "pretty sound." The anti-Pakistan movement was "negligible."

> Dr. Khan Sahib says, and believes, that it is impossible for the N.W.F.P. ever to join India or to leave Pakistan. I think Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Qazi Attaullah . . . think the same. Nor have I seen any real sign among the tribes (except a very few disgruntled individuals) nor, of course, among the people of the settled districts to join up with Afghanistan.
>
> The only sense in which the "Pathanistan" movement has any reality seems to me to be that there is a definite disinclination of the people (officials and public) to be linked up with the Punjab. I think they fear that the Punjab might swamp them.[17]

Nevertheless, on 15th June Abdul Ghaffar Khan was arrested while he was on his way to the southern districts. He was charged with sedition and planning to declare independent Pakhtunistan in cooperation with the Faqir of Ipi. On refusing to furnish security for good behaviour in the future, he was sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment.[18]

[15] Tendulkar p. 464.

[16] Quoted in Tendulkar p. 464 f.

[17] *Note on the N.W. Frontier Province* by Cunningham dated 8/5/48 Cunningham Papers MSS. Eur. D. 670/23. Similar views were expressed by Sardar Abdur Rashid, Faridullah Shah and Colonel Sharif, when I interviewed them.

[18] Tendulkar p. 465. According to the Frontier government, "the Faqir of Ipi with a small group of hostiles on June 15 started attacking a few posts in North Waziristan . . . The coincidence of this hostile action by the Faqir of Ipi with the appearance of Abdul Ghaffar Khan at Bannu, ostensibly on a propaganda tour, suggests a clear, close liaison between the two in their endeavour to foment unrest on the North-West Frontier." Press communique issued by the Frontier government published in *Civil & Military Gazette* 24/7/48. Sardar Abdur Rashid, on the other hand, maintains that everybody including the central government knew that there was no connection between Ipi and Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Faridullah Shah, who has served as political agent in North Waziristan, also strongly denies there ever was any link between the two. File L/P&S/12/3241 in IOL contains a number of documents written by British High Commission officials concerning the Faqir of Ipi. Most of these documents deal with his alleged contacts with India. However, they also reveal how sceptical British officials were about all reports which Abdul Qaiyum published.

As a result of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's imprisonment the tension between the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Pakistani authorities grew and soon the breaking-point was reached. On 8th July the Frontier government assumed extraordinary powers which allowed it to outlaw by ordinance all organisations which threatened peace and security. In protest large numbers of Khudai Khidmatgars courted arrest and were sent to jail. On 12th August the police opened fire on a gathering of Khudai Khidmatgars at a village in the Charsadda *tahsil* called Babra. According to the official reports, fifteen persons were killed but the Khudai Khidmatgars claimed that the figure was much higher.[19]

Soon thereafter Dr Khan Sahib, Ghani Khan and other leading Khudai Khidmatgars were arrested. The Khudai Khidmatgars were declared an unlawful organisation.[20]

In this way the old Frontier Congress was crushed by Abdul Qaiyum's ministry. Even more remarkable is perhaps the fact that the Muslim League did not thrive either. The party was not able to exploit the new conditions to build up a sound organisation and instead the old confusion and factionalism continued. This was further aggravated by the chief minister's intolerance towards other leaders in the party, whom he regarded as potential rivals. Before long his high-handedness drove many prominent Leaguers, such as Samin Jan Khan, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor, Ghulam Mohammad and Fida Mohammad, into political inactivity or open opposition. Leading big khans were also alienated. Finding himself deprived of influence over the party, the Pir of Manki Sharif left it, too. At the national level he joined up with the Bengali leader H.S. Suhrawardy and other former provincial Muslim League leaders, who had now lost their positions, and formed the All-Pakistan Jinnah Awami Muslim League. However, it was only in Bengal and the NWFP that the new party received any real following.[21]

New elections to the Frontier assembly were held in 1951. Owing to the restrictions imposed on his party, Pir Manki boycotted them. The elections resulted in an almost complete victory for the Muslim League. The opposition managed to win only four seats in the assembly, which had now been enlarged to eighty-five members. However, in a by-election a few years later Pir Manki defeated a Muslim League candidate by 5,011 to 794 votes. In the assembly he became leader of the opposition.[22]

While Abdul Qaiyum during his tenure of office gained notoriety in practically all political all circles for his ruthless, vindictive and faithless behaviour, few would dispute that he was a highly successful chief minister and that the province under his leadership made great strides in the social and economic field. Actually,

[19] Tendulkar p. 466 f.
[20] Tendulkar p. 467.
[21] Based on Afzal pp. 69–74, 95–103; *Year Book of the North-West Frontier Province 1954* p. 31; Spain 1963 pp. 211–213; interviews with Fida Mohammad and Sardar Abdur Rashid.
[22] *Ibid.*

the programme carried through by his administration was very similar to that of the old Frontier Congress. Only a few of the reforms can be mentioned here. *Jagirs* were abolished and instead the income from them went into the provincial treasury. Occupancy tenants became entitled to buy their land at rates fixed by the government. Tenants-at-will were given security of tenure for three years and were absolved from the liability of rendering service to the landlord or paying any cesses extra to the rent. The distinction between agriculturist and non-agriculturist Muslim tribes was abolished; under the new orders all Muslims became equal and entitled to buy land. A large expansion took place in the industrial sector and communications were greatly improved. Finally one must mention the foundation of Peshawar University in 1950.[23]

The net result of Abdul Qaiyum's regime was thus, on the one hand, improved social and economic conditions for the people but, on the other, a political system in ruins. With the Khudai Khidmatgars crushed and the Muslim League in disarray, there were at the end of his tenure no real parties which could operate the system of parliamentary democracy envisaged by the constitution. This was illustrated in a striking manner when in 1953 he was forced by the central government to resign—and instead was appointed a member of the federal cabinet! The Frontier Muslim League could not agree on any candidate to succeed him and instead a leading official, the inspector-general of police, Sardar Abdur Rashid, had to be brought in. Once he had been installed as chief minister, he had no difficulties in winning the allegiance of the Muslim League party in the assembly.[24]

These developments were not unique to the NWFP but ran parallel to those in other provinces and at the centre. The politicians proved themselves unable to manage the affairs of the country and instead senior officials increasingly took over.[25] The NWFP stands out in one respect, however. In other provinces political chaos arose owing to the absence of any deep-rooted political party with a genuine, stable mass following. In the NWFP there had existed such a party but it had been destroyed by systematic persecution.

The post-independence period lies beyond the scope of this study. Of the further developments we shall only sketch a few features pertinent to the main themes of this study, Pakhtun nationalism and Pakistani nationalism, and say a few words of their foremost protagonists.[26] In 1954 Abdul Ghaffar Khan was

[23] For the achievements of Abdul Qaiyum's administration, see *The N.-W.F. Province Year Book 1953* and *Year Book of the North-West Frontier Province 1954, passim*; also Spain 1963 p. 214 ff.

[24] According to Sardar Abdur Rashid, Mian Jaffar Shah, who had joined the Muslim League in 1948, had the strongest position in the party but was opposed by Abdul Qaiyum, who instead wanted M.R. Kiyani as chief minister. The latter's position in the party was, however, too weak. Sardar Abdur Rashid stressed that he was brought in by the governor to solve this deadlock; his appointment was in no way the result of a plot among the officials.

[25] Sayeed 1980 pp. 32–46.

[26] For more exhaustive accounts, see Rittenberg's article in Emree (ed.) and Sayeed 1980 pp. 121–136.

released and resumed his political activities. He suffered long terms of imprisonment under Ayub Khan as well as under Bhutto. Today he is about ninety years old and lives in semi-retirement and voluntary exile in Afghanistan but nevertheless he continues to wield great influence and his movement, now under his son Wali's leadership, is one of the strongest forces in Frontier politics. Its basic tenet, Pakhtun nationalism, has in the wider Pakistan context led the movement into alliances with parties from other provinces, which have demanded more provincial autonomy. This has also been the main reason why the movement has been in practically constant opposition and has found further allies among other parties, which for one reason or other have gone into opposition.

After its hey-day in 1947, the Frontier Muslim League, as we have seen, suffered a decline in the first post-independence decade. In the mid-fifties the Pir of Manki Sharif and other prominent leaders of the Pakistan movement, such as Arbab Abdul Ghafoor and Samin Jan, joined Abdul Ghaffar Khan. In Hazara district, however, and in the towns the party remained strong.

Abdul Qaiyum's career had been the opposite of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's. He has zig-zagged between the pit-falls of Pakistani politics, for the most part he has been on good terms with the central government, irrespective of its political colour, and as late as 1977 was a member of the federal cabinet. Soon before Bhutto's fall, however, he resigned. His departure from the NWFP in 1953 was ignominious but he remains one of the foremost political leaders in the province and in the villages I have often met people who cherish the memory of his chief ministership for the progress that took place.

Both the Pakhtun nationalists and the Muslim League have in recent years had increasing difficulties to contend with. The Muslim League's claim to represent the Qaid-e-Azam, Pakistan and Islam is beginning to wear very thin and other parties can now do that with as much or more justification and success. Under the name of the National Awami Party and later the National Democratic Party, the Pakhtun nationalists have in the last decade laid much stress on socialism but nevertheless they have increasingly come to be associated with landlord interests and tenants and labourers have often turned to other parties.

The Tribal Areas

According to the 3rd June Plan, the British treaties with the Frontier tribes would have to be re-negotiated "by the appropriate successor authority"[27] which after the referendum meant Pakistan. At the time of independence the position of the tribes was still inclear.[28] As we have seen, there had been a tendency among the

[27] Menon Appendix X.
[28] See the Indian Independence Act para. 7 (1) (c) Menon Appendix XI.

tribes and particularly among the Afridis not to commit themselves but instead to stress their independent status, a tendency that appears to have been inspired or at least encouraged by Muslim officials in order to strengthen the Muslim bargaining leverage. When the partition plan had been announced nothing more was heard of this demand and after independence the authorities had no difficulties in bringing the tribal areas within the fold of Pakistan. In *jirgas* with the governor and other officials the tribes one by one acceeded to Pakistan. Cunningham had been somewhat uncertain about the attitude in North Waziristan where the Faqir of Ipi was busy with propaganda against an agreement with Pakistan but the political agent and his men had also "been working hard at all the leading Maliks" so there was no problem.[29] The terms of the new agreements were similar to the old ones with the British. The tribes declared their allegiance to Pakistan, promised to defend its integrity, to maintain friendly relations with the government and the people of the settled districts and were in return allowed to retain their internal freedom as well as the old government subsidies.[30]

However, soon after independence there arose among the tribes a Pakhtunistan movement. In Waziristan it was led by the Faqir of Ipi and among the Afridis the *Sarishta* party adopted the cause of Pakhtunistan. In January 1950 the Faqir of Ipi was elected president of Pakhtunistan. In this capacity he demanded Pakistani withdrawal from Pakhtun territory and also appealed to the United Nations for recognition.[31] Under the president there existed—or so it was claimed – departments charged with the various functions of the state. Pakhtunistan also had a "national assembly" which was divided into three branches, one for the north, one for the central parts and one for the south. However, only rarely were any meetings held and this governmental structure was little more than a façade behind which were hidden much confusion and the Government of Afghanistan. The only practical result of the movement visible to the outside world was that a number of *lashkars* were raised against Pakistan by pro-Pakhtunistan *maliks*, particularly in the years 1950–54.[32]

As we have seen, in 1948 Abdul Ghaffar Khan was arrested and charged with planning to declare an independent Pakhtunistan in cooperation with the Faqir of Ipi. There seems to be little doubt that this charge was groundless and concocted only for political reasons. The Pakhtunistan movement in the tribal areas had little or nothing in common with that of the settled districts except the name. Not only is there no convincing evidence of political cooperation between the two movements. In fact they had very few interests in common. Abdul Ghaffar

[29] Governor's Report 15/11/47 Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/23.

[30] Spain 1963 p. 204. An English translation of the treaty between the Government of Pakistan and the Kurram tribes is found in Cunningham Papers IOL MSS. Eur. D. 670/21.

[31] Anonymous source in author's private possession.

[32] For Pakhtunistan since Independence, see Spain 1963 pp. 236–243; Nyrop *et al.* pp. 124–126, 255–257, 266.

Khan's movement was a "modern" nationalist movement with its own ideology and a reform programme for the Pakhtun people. The Pakhtunistan movement in the tribal areas, on the other hand, was no nationalist movement. It was only a matter of the same traditional tribal divisions and groupings as before and the same old political horse-trading, which now appeared in yet another form. It never constituted any threat to the integrity of Pakistan. It received its significance only because it was exploited by others. Outside Pakistan it was exploited by Afghanistan, which financed it, and also, although to a much lesser extent, by India and the Soviet Union. Inside Pakistan it was exploited by those who wanted to create a sense of a national emergency, notably Abdul Qaiyum.[33]

Generally speaking Pakistan has been a success with the tribes. The establishment of a Muslim government removed one of the tribesmen's main grievances against the central authorities. Through the Kashmir *jehad* they at an early stage came to identify with the interests of Pakistan. Soon after independence the Government of Pakistan withdrew all army units from tribal territory. While the tribal administration remains basically the same today as it was under British rule, the role of the government in the tribal areas has changed. Under the British the tribal administration was mainly geared to sealing off the tribal areas from the settled districts, but today it has become a channel of reform. The tribesmen have given up raiding and kidnapping as means of livelihood and have instead been eager to avail themselves of the benefits of the modern world. They are today far better off than before, though, admittedly, they are often found in rather unorthodox lines of business. However, in spite of the significant changes which have taken place in the social and economic field, the tribes show little inclination to be integrated with the settled areas for administrative purposes. They are acutely aware that their special status is the best bargaining leverage they have to improve their position.[34]

[33] Men like Sardar Abdur Rashid, Faridullah Shah and Colonel Sharif maintain that the Pakhtunistan issue was kept alive by Punjabis to put the Frontier under suspicion.

[34] For the developments in the tribal areas after independence, see Ahmed 1977 *passim*; also Ahmed 1980 *passim*.

Conclusion

The problem of national integration and creating a national identity is common to most of the young countries in the Third World today but nowhere has it been more difficult than in Pakistan. The most striking example, obviously, is East Bengal which in the end seceded to form an independent state of its own, Bangladesh. In the western half of the Pakistan which came into being in 1947 it has above all been in the NWFP that regionalism has flourished—at least till the 1970s when a similar problem arose in Baluchistan. Several explanations have been put forward why it has been so difficult to integrate the NWFP politically with the rest of Pakistan. The regionalists themselves maintain that the NWFP has been exploited economically by the Punjabis and the immigrants from India. Others analyse the struggle between regionalists and centralists in terms of rivalries within the NWFP itself. These questions lie beyond the scope of this study. However, it must be stressed that the NWFP had a very special position, adminstratively and politically, long before independence and that the roots of the problem posed by the Frontier extend to that period. This old problem was further aggravated by the way it was mishandled in the immediate post-independence period.

Pakistan was founded on the idea of a homeland for India's Muslims but, paradoxically, the NWFP, which had the largest Muslim majority of all British Indian provinces, was the last to support the idea. For most of the period under review in this work, it adhered to the All-India National Congress and spurned the Muslim League. Owing to the overwhelming Muslim predominance in the province there was in fact very little scope for the kind of communal politics which prevailed elsewhere. Instead other divisions determined people's political allegiance.

After the British annexation, the political control over the Frontier was exercised by an alliance of the big landlords, *khans*, and the British. In return for economic and other favours the former used their influence at the local level to support British rule. Gradually, however, the big khans lost their influence in the villages and became unable to fulfil their role as buttresses of the British government. Instead power in indigenous society gravitated toward the smaller khans, who were not attached to the government in the same way as the big ones. As there existed no political institutions through which the altered power relations could be expressed, there was no way left for the small khans to assert their position except by some form of rebellion. In the 1920s a number of organisations were formed with more or less explicit political aims. The most important of them

were the Khudai Khidmatgars, who under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan came to represent the interests of the small Pakhtun khans. In the 1930–31 disturbances on the Frontier the Khudai Khidmatgars emerged as the chief opponents of British rule and as powerful champions of Pakhtun nationalism. In 1931 they joined the AINC and from them on the Frontier Congress was for all practical purposes identical with the Khudai Khidmatgars.

The programme and ideology of the Khudai Khidmatgars had five main features: firstly, they were vehemently opposed to British rule; secondly, they were opposed to the big khans, who were associated with the British; thirdly, they had a programme of social and economic reform, which, although very vague, had strong appeal among the rural poor; fourthly, it was a staunchly Muslim movement; and finally, the Khudai Khidmatgars were *Pakhtun* nationalists concerned with the political emancipation of the Pakhtuns and with little interest in other ethnic groups. Yet another prominent feature of their creed was non-violence but in the long run this was of little practical importance.

The stress the Khudai Khidmatgars put on Pakhtun nationalism confined the appeal of the movement to the Pakhtun areas of the province, i.e. the rural areas of the central districts, Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat and Bannu. In the towns, Dera Ismail Khan district in the south and particularly in Hazara in the north, other ethnic groups dominated. These groups were repelled by the Pakhtun nationalism of the Khudai Khidmatgars and the Frontier Congress never managed to get any firm foothold among them. Instead they remained opposed to the Congress throughout the period under study.

Furthermore, the hostility of the Khudai Khidmatgars toward the big khans and the latter's alliance with the British divided the Pakhtuns into two camps, the small khans, who supported the Congress, and the big ones, who were opposed to it. However, the latter camp was hopelessly divided within itself and was very slow to get organised to meet the challenge of the Congress.

As a result of the 1930–31 disturbances the British realised they could no longer rely only on the big khans but had to give political rights to much wider strata of the population. This was done by extending the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms to the NWFP in 1932 and above all by the 1935 Government of India Act. In the first elections held under the 1935 Act the Congress was the only large and properly organised party. It was also the only real nationalist party. Most other parties as well as individual candidates represented various loyalist groups. A few months after the elections a Congress ministry came into power. Generally speaking this ministry carried through a mildly progressive programme. In the economic sphere it favoured the agricultural classes at the expense of the commercial ones, which also meant that it favoured Muslim interests at the expense of Hindu interests. Thus the Hindu community, not the Muslims, became disgruntled with Congress rule.

The politically most important measures of the Congress ministry were those which deprived the big khans of some of their old privileges. To defend their in-

terests these khans rallied under the banner of the Muslim League. Other loyalist groups, notably retired government servants, also joined the party, and in this way the Frontier Muslim League came to be dominated by conservative landlords and pro-British interests. So far as Pakistan was concerned, these groups did little or nothing to promote the idea. On the contrary, the structure, ideology and performance of the party hampered rather than helped the spread of the Pakistan idea on the Frontier.

A closer look at Frontier politics reveals that in fact local party branches were not really extensions of the central parties speaking on their behalf and representing their interests at the local level. Politics in the NWFP revolved basically around local issues. Political affiliations often had little to do with sympathy for the all-India parties, Congress or the Muslim League. Instead they reflected rivalries between or within local élites, the most important of which were the landlords. It should, however, be stressed that the division between big khans and small khans was not primarily a question of wealth, the wealthiest khans in the province supporting the Muslim League and the less wealthy supporting the Congress. It was first of all a question of their position in the local hierarchy and their rivalry concerned local power. Broadly speaking each locality would be divided into two factions, each led by a khan. The wealthiest of them was normally attached to the government, which in this way controlled the country-side. The other faction was usually led by a somewhat smaller landlord. When he challenged his local rival, he automatically became opposed to the government as well. It was the leaders of these latter factions, who formed the backbone of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. Just as the bigger khans were allied with the government, the Khudai Khidmatgars also found an ally at the all-India level, namely the AINC, which like the Khudai Khidmatgars was opposed to the British-controlled government. When under the 1935 Act the Congress assumed control of the Frontier government, the big khans had to find a new ally and the Muslim League was their natural choice.

So far as the other political élites were concerned, they played only secondary roles until after the war.

With the end of World War II a new situation arose. It became clear that independence was near at hand. The question now was whether India was to remain united, as the AINC wanted, or whether it was to be partitioned on religious lines, as the Muslim League demanded. This was a question of no relevance to the factional divisions in Pakhtun society, but its religious implications had strong emotional appeal: should the Pakhtuns be under Muslim rule or under a Hindu government? This new situation also brought other latent rivalries to the surface. As a result, new political groups came to be the forefront. Religious leaders preached the necessity of Pakistan and their preachings were echoed by Muslim students. A crucial role for the Pakistan movement was played by Muslim government servants. In addition to being actuated by the same religious feelings as others, they knew that if the Hindus went as well as the British, their own chances

of promotion would be greatly improved. During the Pakistan movement of 1946–47 many Muslim government servants used their official position to promote the cause of Pakistan in every possible way, which meant that they often worked against the government they were supposed to serve. When they transferred their loyalty to the Muslim League, the provincial government became unable to control the province. Furthermore, it became difficult for the British, who functioned as arbiters between the Muslim League and the Congress, to know what was going on.

These groups—the religious leaders, the officials and also the students—were instrumental in creating an atmosphere of religious fervour on the Frontier, which the Congress could not withstand. Many old Khudai Khidmatgars were carried away from the party by this flood of religious enthusiasm. Others just jumped on the bandwagon. When the 3rd June Plan was announced, the position of the Khudai Khidmatgars became untenable. India was going to be partitioned and the choice was now between the Muslim state of Pakistan and Hindu-dominated India. The latter alternative had to be ruled out not only for religious but also for geographical reasons. In this situation the right course for the Khudai Khidmatgars would perhaps have been to admit defeat and to support Pakistan. Their affiliation with the AINC was in any case largely due to a historical coincidence and there was no fundamental reason why they should be opposed to the concept of a Muslim state. On the contrary, Islam had always been a prominent feature of the movement's ideology. However, they held back from supporting Pakistan for several reasons. They feared that in Pakistan they would be dominated by their old enemies in the Muslim League. In the NWFP they could more than hold their own against the provincial League but if the classes behind the Frontier League should join forces with the corresponding classes in the other provinces of Pakistan, they could not. There was also an element of ethnic animosity. The Khudai Khidmatgar leaders feared that the Pakhtuns should come under Punjabi domination. Finally they were afraid that even after independence Pakistan would remain under British hegemony. Before they were prepared to give their blessing to Pakistan, they wanted guarantees in these regards. It was in this context that the Pakhtunistan idea cropped up. The idea was in keeping with their old Pakhtun nationalism and it was also an idea that could be expected to get wide popular support. However, Abdul Ghaffar Khan raised the demand for a separate Pakhtun state only as a bargaining counter to salvage as much as possible of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement in the desperate situation of 1947. The Khudai Khidmatgar leaders never planned to proclaim independence. While they were conducting a campaign on the Frontier for Pakhtunistan, they were also in negotiations with the Muslim League High Command regarding the future of the Pakhtuns and the NWFP in Pakistan.

The Pakistan movement had by the summer of 1947 achieved virtually complete control over the political scene of the Frontier and the referendum resulted in a total victory for Pakistan. Owing to the Congress boycott it is, however, difficult

to know how far the referendum really reflected the strength of the political forces in the province. The conduct of the referendum was not above reproach, a fact that was exploited by the Muslim League, and there were also other factors which contributed to the figures for Pakistan being inflated. There is no doubt, however, that Pakistan enjoyed overwhelming support from such key groups in Frontier society as religious leaders, officials, students and big khans, and probably also from a majority of the ordinary people. The problem was that the predominant position the Muslim League had won was ephemeral. It depended mainly on the fact that provincial politics was now subordinated to the problems at the centre, from where the all-India communal problem was projected on to the Frontier scene. Once Pakistan had been achieved, the unity of the Pakistan movement eroded and the provincial Muslim League began to disintegrate. The Khudai Khidmatgars were probably again the strongest force in the province.

To break the Khudai Khidmatgars the new rulers on the one hand resorted to systematic persecution but on the other also took over a good deal of their programme, thereby diminishing the appeal of the movement. The approach of the Muslim League ministry in fact bore a striking resemblance to the old paternalism of the British. Reforms were decided autocratically and enforced by the bureaucracy rather than hammered out through a political process. Inevitably the same kind of broad-based opposition, vague in content but vehement in feeling, arose as in the British days.

Before long the new administration had a number of considerable achievements to its credit but, in a longer perspective, these achievements seem less significant than the political consequences of this kind of policy; the dismissal of the Congress ministry and the persecution of the Khudai Khidmatgars appear as the first steps in a development where provincial and national politics were reduced to a sham and a playground for entrepreneurial hangers-on. From the political degeneration, which began in the NWFP in August 1947, Pakistan has never been able to recover.

This judgement of Pakistan may seem harsh, particularly in view of the fact that other young countries have hardly done any better. However, the developments in the NWFP were, if not worse than elsewhere, then at least especially sad. The Khudai Khidmatgars were arguably the best organised mass party involved in the freedom struggle not only in Pakistan but in the entire subcontinent. Elsewhere the AINC—as well as the Muslim League—was largely an urban élite party which struck more or less durable alliances with rural groups. For all their shortcomings, the Khudai Khidmatgars were a rural party with a genuine mass following in the villages. They were led by men of proven administrative ability, remarkable political skill and, above all, extraordinary moral stature. It was therefore a great tragedy for Pakistan that they should have been prevented from contributing their share to building up the country.

Appendix I

Civil Servants in the NWFP by Communities

In the executive posts which gave direct influence in local politics the situation was as follows in 1947. Out of six deputy commissioners, five were British and one was a Muslim. Out of eight assistant commissioners, one was British, one was a Hindu and the rest were Muslims.[1] In the tribal areas, the Resident, Waziristan, who was the immediate superior of the two political agents in Waziristan, was British, three political agents were British and the remaining two were Muslims. One assistant political agent was a Muslim and the remaining two were British.[2] I have no figures for the assistant political officers but there is no doubt that Muslims dominated heavily.

In the police corps, the inspector-general of police was British while his deputy was a Muslim.[3]

The table below gives the figures for the provincial branches of the civil service.

Gazetted officers in the provincial civil service of the NWFP in 1941 by communities and branches.

Branch	Community				
	Europeans	Anglo-Indians	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs
NWFP Civil Service, Executive Branch, extra assistant commissioners	—	—	37	5	1
NWFP Civil Service, Sub-Judges, Senior Sub-Judges and Sessions Judges	1	1	21	4	2
Provincial Educational Service, Women's Branch	1	—	—	—	—
Provincial Educational Service, Class I	1	1	1	—	—
Provincial Educational Service, Men's Branch	—	—	9	1	—
Medical Dept., Public Health	—	—	2	—	—
Medical Dept., Civil and Asst. Surgeons	—	—	11	10	1
Police Dept., Provincial Police Service	2	2	17	3	2
Provincial Service of Engineers	6	—	18	8	2
Provincial Service of Electrical Engineers	4	1	8	8	—
Agriculture Department	—	—	7	1	—
Co-operative Department	—	—	3	—	—
Veterinary Department	—	—	1	1	—
Miscellaneous Departments	—	1	5	1	—
Total	17	6	140	41	8

(*Source*: Gazetted Government Servants serving under the North-West Frontier Province Government. Figures based on the names and other information given. Some of the Europeans and Anglo-Indians are uncertain.)

[1] *The India Office and Burma Office List 1947* p. 29.
[2] *Op. cit.* p. 9.
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 29.

Appendix II

The 1937 Elections in the NWFP[4]

Muslim Rural Constituencies

Hazara District

Upper Pakhli: K.S. Mohammad Attai Khan (I: 1,178), Khan of Battal, had a *jagir* of Rs. 250 *per annum*, which he had been given for recruitment work. Ghulam Ghaus (C: 1,085) was the president of the Frontier Ahrars but had been given the Congress ticket as part of an electoral agreement between these two parties.

Lower Pakhli: Faqira Khan (C: 1,612) belonged to a family of minor khans. He had previously been regarded as a loyalist and had been a district *durbari* and *inamdar*. In 1920 he had been rewarded for his loyalty when disturbances broke out in the Mansehra area. Towards the end of the 1920s he had, however, been sentenced to jail and lost his previous honours. On being released, he demanded in writing that they should be restored to him, or else he would join the Congress. The government refused, and Faqira Khan soon established himself as leader of the Mansehra *tahsil* Congress. Ghulam Rabbani (I: 1,479) represented the Giddarpur khans, a leading family in the constituency. Religion played a prominent part in this contest. Faqira Khan had employed four religious leaders to tell people that since Ghulam Rabbani was a Qadiani, he was a *kafir*. Ghulam Rabbani filed an election petition against this, claiming that it represented a form of "undue influence". The petition was, however, dismissed as Ghulam Rabbani had not been able to prove that the mullahs had threatened that those who voted for him would also become *kafirs;* only that would have amounted to undue influence.[5]

Mansehra North: Mohammad Abbas Khan (I: 1070) was the brother of one of the biggest landlords in the area. He was also an honorary magistrate and had been a member of the provincial legislative council. There was no Congress candidate in this constituency. Two Independent candidates polled less than 300 votes between them.

[4] This appendix is in the main based on Griffith to Linlithgow February 1937 IOL R/3/1/43 and Rittenberg's Appendix II. With a few exceptions, Griffith discusses only the successful candidates while Rittenberg also takes up most of the other candidates. The figures in this appendix are mainly based on *Return Showing the Results of Elections in India 1937*, which in a few places have been complemented by newspaper reports, mostly from the *Tribune*. No further references will be made to any of these sources except to indicate where direct quotations have been taken from. The numerals within brackets show the number of votes polled and the letters C, I and HSNP mean Congress, Independent and Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party.

[5] Report of election tribunal *NWFP Govt. Gazette* 11/12/37 Part I.

Haripur South: Nawab Sir Sahibzada Abdul Qaiyum Khan (I: 1,667; for him, see p. 68 f.) defeated Pir Sultan-ul-arifin (C: 646). Raja Haidar Zaman Khan, who was the leading landowner in Hazara district, had stepped down in Sir Abdul Qaiyum's favour. After the latter's death, Haidar Zaman Khan's brother Manocher Khan won the seat by defeating Pir Sultan-ul-arifin who again represented the Congress.[6] However, Raja Manocher Khan soon joined the Congress, then the Muslim League and then the Congress again.[7]

Haripur Central: K.S. Abdul Majid Khan (I: 1,729) was a retired extra assistant commissioner and an honorary magistrate. The Congress had no candidate. Two other Independents polled 1,359 and 1,199 votes.

Haripur North: Mohammad Sarwar Khan (I: 1,654) was a man of humble origin but had served as an extra assistant commissioner. After a couple of years he had, however, been charged with corruption and was forced to resign in order to avoid an enquiry into his conduct. He had since practiced as a lawyer except for two years when he was suspended for unprofessional conduct. Mohammad Sarwar Khan won this election because he received solid support from his tribe, the Tarkhelis, while the votes of the largest tribe in the constituency, the Utmanzais, were split between K.B. Mohammad Zaman Khan (I: 1,169) and his first cousin Mahdi Zaman Khan (C: 1,152). Soon after the election Sarwar Khan was unseated and disqualified from voting for a period of six years after an election petition filed by Mohammad Zaman Khan had been upheld. It was found that bogus votes had been cast in his favour at the instance or at least with the connivance of his election agent. However, the election tribunal also disqualified Mohammad Zaman as he had "treated the voters at various polling stations on an extensive and liberal scale with the corrupt intention of influencing them to vote in his favour". There had also been double voting for him. Finally, he had returned false election expenses. It is also clear from the tribunal's report that a large number religious accusations of various kinds were made during the campaign.[8]

Abbottabad East: K.S. Abdur Rahman Khan (I: 1,757) was a retired deputy superintendent of police. Mohammad Sadiq Khan (I: 1,260) was a lawyer. There was no Congress candidate in the constituency.

Abbottabad West: Pir Mohammad Kamran (C: 1,365) belonged to a family of religious leaders. He defeated three Independent candidates, K.S. Mohammad

[6] *Tribune* 2/2/38.
[7] See p. 113 and 143 f.
[8] Report of election tribunal *NWFP Govt. Gazette* 29/4/38 Part I.

Akbar Khan (867), K.S. Sultan Hassan Ali Khan (851) and Mohammad Aslam Khan (429).

Tanawal: Mohammad Zaman Khan (I), *jagirdar* of Chamhad and an honorary lieutenant, defeated one Independent and one Congress candidate.

Mardan District

Razzar: Mian Ziauddin (I: 891), Bar.-at-Law, was a prosperous lawyer practising in Peshawar. His family was closely connected with the government. In recognition of his services to the British, Mian Ziauddin's grandfather had been rewarded with a substantial *jagir*. Most of his uncles served in the police or the Political Service[9] and his brother was an officer in the army. Nevertheless, Mian Ziauddin had, according to the governor, sought the Congress nomination for this constituency but failed. The Congress instead tried to field Kamdar Khan, but his nomination papers were rejected by the returning officer. The Congress therefore boycotted the election. Mohammad Azim Khan (I: 864) belonged to the Nawab of Toru's family. Mian Ziauddin himself describes the election thus: ". . . the only thing that mattered was personal influence or the influence of friends . . . The Nawabzada [Mohammad Azim Khan] was supported by most of the Khans in the constituency, while my supporters were . . . personal friends."[10]

Amazai: Azizullah Khan (I: 1,854), Bar.-at-Law, belonged to the family of the Nawab of Toru but his father, K.B. Rahmatullah Khan, was on bad terms with the nawab. Sultan Mohammad (765) was an Independent. The Congress boycotted this election because their candidate had been rejected by the authorities.

Utmannama: Abdul Aziz Khan (C: 2,613) was a small *zamindar*. He had joined the Khudai Khidmatgars in 1930. This was Sir Abdul Qaiyum's home constituency (for him, see above p. 68 f.) but with 2,397 votes, he was defeated. The reason was, according to Aziz Khan, that Sir Abdul Qaiyum, who was a very fine man and superior to him in every way, supported the government while he himself was opposed to the British; the people were opposed to the British and therefore they voted for him.[11]

Baizai: Mohammad Zarin Khan (C: 2,952) was one of the founding members of the Afghan Jirga and had spent two terms in prison for his political activities. He defeated Redi Khan (I: 1,180). There had for many years been rivalry for social status and leadership between the two men's families. Zarin Khan conducted his

[9] Mian Ziauddin p. 4 ff.
[10] *Op. cit.* p. 50.
[11] Interview with Aziz Khan.

campaign on a programme of social reform among the Pakhtuns and freedom for their country. He had no special economic programme beyond that of the Congress.[12]

Kamalzai: Amir Mohammad Khan (C: 3,163) was a substantial landowner and one of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's closest associates. He defeated the Nawab of Hoti (I: 2,599), reputedly the richest khan in the province, and K.S. Mohammad Yakub Khan (I: 1,003), the nawab's first cousin.

Peshawar District

Nowshera North: Mohammad Samin Jan (C: 2,217) was a lawyer practising in Mardan. He had come into political prominence during the *Khilafat* movement and subsequently joined the Khudai Khidmatgars and had been imprisoned in the early 1930s. He defeated two Independent candidates who polled about 1,200 votes together. Samin Jan later broke with the Congress, allegedly because he was disappointed at not being appointed a minister, and became a prominent member of the Muslim League.[13]

Nowshera South: Mian Jaffar Shah (C: 2,654) was the son of K.B. Mian Rahim Khan, a wealthy timber merchant and government contractor who had held a personal *jagir* of Rs. 2,500 *per annum.*[14] Mian Jaffar Shah had been closely associated with Abdul Ghaffar Khan but had broken with him soon before the Khudai Khidmatgars were banned in 1931. According to Mian Jaffar Shah himself, he was asked to stand in this election by his brother and a "representative whole *jirga*" and allowed himself to be persuaded in order to vindicate the family honour. He represented the Congress because Dr Khan Sahib asked him.[15] His leading opponent, K.B. Taj Mohammad Khan (I: 1,628), was a government contractor and a rival of Mian Jaffar Shah's family.

Doaba Daudzai: Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan (C:4,096) had previously been a member of the provincial legislative council, apparently as an Independent. He now seems to have been recruited for the Congress by Dr Khan Sahib. His only opponent, Mughal Khan (I), received 404 votes.

Hashtnagar South: Dr Khan Sahib (C: 3,948), Madad Khan (I: 31).

Hashtnagar North: Abdul Ghafoor Khan (C: 2,496) had been a member of the provincial legislative council where he belonged to the Independent Party. He was

[12] Interview with Zarin Khan.
[13] See Chapter III footnote 13.
[14] Dane Appendix F.
[15] Interview with Mian Jaffar Shah.

a personal friend of Dr Khan Sahib's. Abdul Akbar (I:973) had at one time been president of the Afghan Jirga. K.B. Saadullah Khan (I: 2) and K.S. Mir Alam Khan (I: 1) also ran in the Peshawar Landholders' constituency.

Khalil: Arbab Abdul Ghafoor Khan (C: 1,535) had started his political career in 1931, when he was expelled from Islamia College for spreading anti-government propaganda. Since then he had spent two terms in jail. He defeated his maternal uncle, K.B. Sher Ali Khan (I: 1,403) who was the titular chief of the Khalils and as such head of one of "the three or four most important families on the North-Wewt Frontier". This was a semi-hereditary government appointment, the holder of which enjoyed large *jagirs.*[16]

Bara Mohmands: Qazi Attaullah Khan (C: 2,278) was a leading lawyer of Mardan and a minor landowner. Arbab Mohammad Sharif (I: 1,584) was the brother of the Arbab of Landi, a leading khan closely associated with the government.

Kohat District

Teri North: Captain Nawab Baz Mohammad Khan (I: 1,393), the Nawab of Teri, defeated Mohammad Aslam Khan (C: 1,296). The nawab was the titular chief (a semi-hereditary government appointment) of the Khattaks of the Teri *tahsil.* However, the area had a long history of conflict between the ordinary members of the tribe and the nawabs. The nawabs were always loyal to the British and had in return been given extensive privileges. The present incumbment had taken a prominent part in the suppression of the Khudai Khidmatgars in 1930–31. In 1932 he had been elected a member of the legislative council. Salar Mohammad Aslam Khan was the commander of the Khudai Khidmatgars in Kohat district. He had joined the organisation in 1931 and been imprisoned for his political activities. His family did not by tradition have a high standing but they were well off as his father had been given a good deal of land for military service.

The nawab did not conduct any election campaign at all: "Not for one minute did I leave my house for election purposes." To make his candidacy known, he sent out his servants among the Khattaks. He looked upon himself as their representative.[17] The main theme in Aslam Khan's campaign was that the British must leave the country. All defects in Frontier society were said to be due to them. He also took up the so-called Teri dues, a number of special taxes payable to the nawab, which were very unpopular. He said that it was the fault of the British that the people had to pay these dues and demanded that they should be abolished.[18]

[16] *N.-W.F. Province Gazetteer, Peshawar District 1931* Part A p. 134 and p. 126.
[17] Interview with the Nawab of Teri.
[18] Interview with Aslam Khan.

Teri South: Mohammad Afzal Khan (C: 1,589) had previously served in the army, apparently as an officer, but had resigned in 1930 to become a Congress leader and had subsequently been sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment. Like his colleague in the other Teri constituency, Afzal Khan, among other things, took up the Teri dues in his election campaign. Afzal Khan's sister was a widow of the former Nawab of Teri and sister-in-law of the present incumbent. K.B. Kuli Khan (I: 1,369) was a retired civil servant.

Kohat: Pir Said Jalal Shah (I: 1,132) was a retired extra assistant commissioner and a nominated member of the Kohat municipal committee. Pir Shahinshah (C: 1,025) was the son of a wealthy government contractor.

Hangu: Malikur Rahman Kiyani (I: 2,988) was the son of a retired extra assistant commissioner. He had been a member of the legislative council. As a leading Shia landowner he seems to have drawn much of his support from the large Shia community in the area.[19] Ghulam Haider Khan (C: 2,618) belonged to the family of the khans of Hangu. By profession he was a shopkeeper but he also owned some land. Two other members of his family, Abdul Hanan Khan and Mohammad Munawar Khan, supported the Congress. The former was the commander of the Khudai Khidmatgars in the Hangu *tahsil* while the latter was propaganda secretary of the local organisation. The other members of the family were in government service or enjoyed economic favours from the government and therefore opposed the Congress.[20]

Bannu District

Lakki West: Nawab Zaffar Khan (I: 2,599) was a provincial *durbari,* honorary additional magistrate and a former extra assistant commissioner, who enjoyed a number of different economic favours from the government. During the unrest in the early 1930s he had been "intensely loyal". He was, according to Sir Ralph Griffith, an "old-fashioned Khan of the best type." He belonged to the *Spin Gundi* (white faction) among the Marwats, while his opponent, Abdus Sattar Khan (I: 2,496) belonged to the *Tor Gundi* (black faction).[21] There was no Congress candidate in this constituency.

Lakki East: Faizullah Khan (I: 3,611) was a government contractor and a large landowner. He belonged to the *Tor Gundi* while his leading opponent, Mohammad Hakim Khan (I: 3,223) belonged to the *Spin Gundi.* A Congress candidate lost his deposit.

[19] Interview with Maulana Jafar Ali.
[20] Interview with Abdul Hanan Khan.
[21] The origin of this division of the tribe into two hostile factions is unknown.

Bannu West: Akbar Ali Khan (C), the leading *malik* of his village, easily defeated an Independent candidate.

Bannu East: Nasrullah Khan (I: 1,623) was a lawyer and son of K.S. Mir Jan, a Wazir chief.[22] Mohammad Aslam Khan (C) received, 1,556 votes.

Dera Ismail Khan District

D.I. Khan North: Abdullah Khan was a former *zaildar* who had been dismissed and sentenced to prison. Nasrullah Khan (I: 1,168) was the son of a nawab.

D.I. Khan South: Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan (I), was the son of the Nawab of Dera. By profession he was a pleader. He had been a nominated member of the legislative council. He defeated two Independent candidates. There was no Congress candidate in this constituency.

Tank: Nawabzada Mohammad Said Khan (I: 2,863) was the younger brother of the Nawab of Tank, who for technical reasons had failed to secure nomination. He represented the nawab in the election. K.B. Rahim Khan Kundi (I: 1,766) was the former president of the provincial legislative council. The rivalry between these men's families went back at least to the 1870s when they had competed for British favour.[23] A Congress candidate polled 531 votes.

Kulachi: K.S. Asadullah Khan was a big landowner, a *jagirdar* and a provincial *durbari*. Mohammad Ramzan Khan (C: 1,418) was a lawyer who belonged to a leading family of Kulachi. By profession he was a lawyer. He charged Asadullah Khan with being a *kafir*[24] and put up posters with a letter from Mufti Kifayat Ullah in Delhi, president of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, according to which, in the absence of a Muslim League candidate, all Muslims should vote for Ramzan Khan.[25]

Muslim Urban Constituencies

Peshawar City: This was a dual constituency, i.e., two candidates were returned from it. The two winners were Pir Baksh (Independent Party: 7,725) and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (I: 4,932). Both of them were lawyers. At one time Pir Baksh had been general secretary of the FPCC but in 1931 he left the Congress. In the following year he was elected to the legislative council where he became a member

[22] See above p. 110.
[23] Howell p. 2 f.
[24] Governor's Report 22/2/37.
[25] This poster is found in TARC File 172—S.P.I. The letter apparently had the form of a *fatwa*.

of the Independent Party and one of the strongest opponents of the government. Nevertheless his candidature to the assembly was supported by Sir Abdul Qaiyum. Abdur Rab Nishtar was a former *Khilafatist* and had also belonged to the Congress, which, however, he left in 1931. He had previously been a close ally of Pir Baksh but the two had now fallen out. The Congress candidate in this constituency, Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan, received 4,764 votes.

NWFP Towns: Malik Khuda Baksh (Independent Party: 3,372) was a lawyer. He had been active in the Khilafat movement and a member of the Congress. In 1931, however, he resigned from that party and was the following year elected a member of the legislative council where he as leader of the Independent Party also became leader of the opposition. His Congress opponent (1,111) was also a lawyer, who had left the Congress in 1931 but he had subsequently rejoined it.

Landholders' Constituencies

Peshawar District: K.B. Saadullah Khan (I: 360) was former officer of the Political Service who at the time of his retirement was deputy commissioner of Bannu district. He was also one of the biggest landlords in Peshawar district and enjoyed a minor *jagir*. K.S. Mir Alam Khan (I: 180) was another big landlord in the area. The Congress did not contest this seat.

NWFP: Sardar Aurangzeb Khan (I) hailed from Dera Ismail Khan district but practised as a pleader in Peshawar. In 1936 he had on Sir Abdul Qaiyum's suggestion been nominated as a member of the legislative council of the NWFP. He defeated three other Independent candidates.

General Constituencies

Hazara Rural: R.B. Ishar Dass (HSNP: 2,001) was together with R.B. Mehr Chand Khanna the leading Hindu politician of the NWFP. He was a wealthy businessman, whose economic interests extended as far as the United Provinces and Bengal. He was a former member of the legislative council and an honorary magistrate. Gobind Sahai (C: 610) was a medical doctor.

Peshawar West Rural: Dr C.C. Ghosh (C: 2,132), a medical doctor, had begun his political career in 1919 in connection with the Rowlatt agitation. The Hindu-Sikh Nationalist candidate received 552 votes.

Peshawar East Rural: Jamna Das (C) was a revolutionary whose brother had been executed for an attempt on the life of the governor of Punjab. He easily defeated two other candidates, one of whom belonged to the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party.

Kohat Rural: Lala Hukam Chand (C: 1,103) had in the early twenties been a petty government servant but had been dismissed. He then became a *munshi* (clerk) to a lawyer. In 1931 he joined the Congress and became secretary of the Kohat District Congress Committee. His main opponent was a wealthy businessman, R.B. Mathra Dass (HSNP: 718).

Bannu Rural: R.S. Kanwar Khan Bagai (HSNP) owned a transport company and was a big government contractor responsible for transport in Waziristan. The Congress candidate in this constituency was a lawyer and a school teacher. He finished third and last.

Dera Ismail Khan Rural: R.B. Rochi Ram (HSNP: 1,580) was a prosperous government contractor and a big businessman, who had been a member of the provincial legislative council. According to the governor, he was "a man of solid and reliable views."[26] Roshanlal (I: 761) was a lawyer. The Congress had no candidate.

Peshawar Cantonment Urban: R.B. Mehr Chand Khanna (HSNP: 1,469) was a banker and the biggest landlord in the Peshawar cantonment. He was president of the provincial Hindu Sabha and was together with R.B. Ishar Dass the leading Hindu politician in the province. In the early 1930s he had put up strong opposition against the introduction of representative reforms but had in 1932 been elected to the provincial legislative assembly, where he became a bitter opponent of Sir Abdul Qaiyum and his policies. Gokhand Chand Kohli (C) received 654 votes.

Bannu Urban: R.B. Chiman Lal (I: 1,447) was an advocate of Bannu. Ladha Ram (HSNP: 1,281) was a former member of the legislative council and by profession a lawyer. Kewal Ram (C: 1,211) was a school teacher and a lawyer.

Dera Ismail Khan Urban: Lala Bhanju Ram Gandhi (C: 1,535) was a Congressite of long standing. By profession he was a lawyer. He defeated Narain Dass (I: 963) and R.B. Beli Ram (HSNP: 598).

Sikh Seats

Hazara: R.S. Parmanand (HSNP), Bar.-at-Law, belonged to a family who had at one time been extremely wealthy but who had run into difficulties and for some time been placed under a court of wards. They had now recovered and Parmanand was a considerable landowner. The Congress did not contest this constituency.

[26] Griffith to Linlithgow February 1937 Enclosure IOL R/3/1/43.

Peshawar: Sardar Jaggat Singh (HSNP) was a prosperous merchant who narrowly defeated two Independent candidates.

Southern Districts: Sardar Ajit Singh (I) was a pleader from Kohat who easily defeated two other Independent candidates. Soon after the elections he joined the Hindu-Sikh Nationalists.

Appendix III

The 1946 Elections[27]

Muslim Rural Constituencies

Hazara District

Upper Pakhli: Abdul Qaiyum Swathi (C: 1,987), the general secretary of the FPCC, defeated Sarbiland Khan (ML: 1,863), a prosperous merchant, Ghulam Ghaus (A: 1,530), Salma Farsi (K: 270) and Umar Farooq (I: 16). The former incumbment, K.S. Attai Khan, supported Abdul Qaiyum in spite of the fact that he had previously supported the Muslim League. One of the explanations put forward is that the Congress ministry in return promised to drop a case against his son, who was a junior official charged with corruption.[28]

Lower Pakhli: Ali Gohar Khan (ML: 2,653); Malik Mir Azam (I: 1,367); Ayub Khan (C: 1,322); Mohammad Umar (A: 1,007); Mehtab Gul (K: ?).

Mansehra North: Khan Mohammad Abbas Khan (ML: 1,597, re-elected) had been a minister in both of Dr Khan Sahib's administrations but had now joined the Muslim League. After Independence he became a minister in Abdul Qaiyum's Muslim League administration. K.B. Ali Gohar Khan (K: 1,108) was an old Muslim Leaguer who had been denied the Muslim League ticket.[29] He and Mohammad Abbas Khan were traditional enemies.[30] Haji Faqira Khan (C: ?) had represented the Lower Pakhli constituency in the former assembly.

Haripur North: K.B. Mohammad Zaman Khan, M.B.E. (ML: 3,390) was a leading *jagirdar* of Hazara district. During the war he had been a recruiting officer. He defeated Mohammad Sarwar Khan (I: 1,623) who had sought the Muslim League nomination but been rejected.[31] Mahdi Zaman Khan (A: 1,518) received Congress support. All these candidates had contested this seat in 1937 but in that year Sarwar Khan won. It is also noteworthy that in 1937 Mohammad Zaman Khan and Mahdi Zaman Khan used different party labels. Abdul Rauf (K) received 564 votes.

[27] The figures for the number of votes polled are taken from *Press Information Bureau's Morgue and Reference Series. Results of Elections to N.W.F.P. Assembly* NAI Home Poll. 79/46 which also gives some biographical data. Rittenberg's Appendix III contains more detailed data. No further reference will be made to either of these sources. The numerals within brackets show the number of votes polled and the abbreviations A, C, I, J, K and ML stand for Ahrar, Congress, Independent, Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Khaksar and Muslim League.

[28] Governor's Report 10/4/46.

[29] Jalaluddin to Mian Ziauddin 6/3/46 Jalaluddin Papers.

[30] Interview with Malik Tahmasp.

[31] Jalaluddin to Mian Ziauddin 6/3/46 Jalaluddin Papers.

Haripur Central: Sardar Bahadur Khan (ML: 3,788) had been Speaker in the previous assembly. He had at first been denied renomination but had appealed to the central Selection Board of the Muslim League and the decision was rescinded. Haji Mohammad Ashraf (I: 1,660) had at first received the Muslim League ticket. Three other candidates were Hakim Abdus Salam (A: 1,611), Sultan Mohammad (K: 1,134) and Qazi Mohammad Akram (C: 1,003).

Haripur South: Raja Haidar Zaman Khan, O.B.E. (ML: 2,348) was the leading landowner of the district[32] and a big *jagirdar*. Raja Aziz Khan (K: 1,611) was a cousin of his and Raja Manocher Khan (I: 559), who had represented this constituency in the previous assembly, was his brother. Khalilur Rahman (A) polled 378 votes.

Abbottabad East: K.S. Raja Abdur Rahman Khan (ML: 6,389, re-elected) had been a minister in Aurangzeb Khan's administration. He defeated Mohammad Azim (I: 559).

Abbottabad West: Lieutenant Zain Mohammad Khan, O.B.E. (ML: 4,909) defeated six other candidates, namely: Wali Mohammad Khan (I: 2,953) who had applied for the Muslim League nomination but been rejected;[33] Qalandar Ali Khan (C: 1,170); Khushal Khan Jadoon (I: 658) who had also sought the Muslim League nomination but been rejected;[34] Zarif Khan (K: 271); Fateh Khan (A: 107); and finally, Pir Sultan-ul-arifin (I:21) who had twice stood for election to the provincial assembly as a Congressite.[35]

Tanawal: Mohammad Tarid Khan (ML: 2,721) was the *jagirdar* of Bir. Nur Elahi (I: 1,657) had applied for the Muslim League ticket but had been rejected.[36] The other candidates were Wali Mohammad Khan (J: 1,375), Mohammad Farid Soha (I: 1,126), Sarwar Khan (I: 651) and Allah Dad (K: 298).

Mardan District

Razzar: Munfatullah Khan (C: 7,053), a man of no special status, defeated Mian Ziauddin (ML: 2,924), the general secretary of the provincial Muslim League who had also stood in this constituency in 1937.

Amazai: Qazi Attaullah Khan (C: 8,135), the minister of education, had in 1937 been defeated in this constituency but was instead returned from Bara

[32] Governor's Report 24/2/39.
[33] Jalaluddin to Mian Ziauddin 6/3/46 Jalaluddin Papers.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] Appendix II Haripur South.
[36] Jalaluddin to Mian Ziauddin 6/3/46 Jalaluddin Papers.

Mohmands. Mohammad Yakub Khan (ML: 4,790) was a lawyer who belonged to a leading family of his village.[37] Sher Zaman (I) received 24 votes.

Utmannama: Abdul Aziz Khan (C: 5,278, re-elected). Abdus Shakoor Bacha belonged to a well-known *sayyid* family who were respected for serving the people. According to Aziz Khan, he had no previous experience of politics but was persuaded by the Muslim League to represent them for the sake of Islam. Mohammad Ayub Khan (K: 107) had no previous connection with the Khaksars.[38]

Baizai: Mohammad Zarin Khan (C: 6,792, re-elected) defeated Ghulam Mohammad (I: 3,667), the former FPCC president, Mohammad Akbar (ML: 2,761), son of Redi Khan who had been defeated in this constituency in 1937, and Mohammad Amin (I: 1,198). The main issue in Zarin Khan's campaign was the freedom of the country. He did not take up the question of Pakistan. The reason was that the British had as yet not made it quite clear that they were going to leave India. Thus Pakistan or no Pakistan was not the Congress' main concern; freedom was.[39]

Kamalzai: Nawab Sir Akbar Khan (ML: 8,354), the Nawab of Hoti, the leading pro-British khan and reputedly the richest man in the province, had stood unsuccessfully in this constituency in 1937 but now he defeated Mian Shakirullah (C: 8,185). During the campaign the nawab, who had been appointed secretary of the provincial League's Finance Board, "placed two of his shops in Hoti at the disposal of the Hoti Primary Muslim League to be used as its office and . . . donated Rs. 500 for its initial expenses of providing uniforms for the members of the Muslim National Guards of Hoti." At a meeting of the local Muslim League held in his house, the nawab "asked those present to volunteer one man per house for the Muslim National Guards. The Nawab Sahib then offered amidst cheers" to pay for the uniforms of the Muslim National Guards.[40]

Peshawar District

Nowshera North: Yakub Shah (C: 7,635); Khan Sher Bahadur Khan (ML: 3,615); Mohammad Shah (I: 1,085).

Nowshera South: Mian Jaffar Shah (C: 8,886, re-elected) defeated Mir Aslam Khan (ML: 5,795), a nominee of the Pir of Manki Sharif, who later became the

[37] Interview with Aziz Khan.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] Interview with Zarin Khan.
[40] *Khyber Mail* 9/11/45.

most prominent personality in the Pakistan movement on the Frontier. Mian Jaffar Shah's family and the Pirs of Manki were traditional rivals.[41]

Doaba Daudzai: Arbab Abdur Rahman Khan (C: 8,141, re-elected) defeated his cousin, the titular chief of the Daudzais, Arbab Attaullah Khan (ML: 3,343).

Hashtnagar South: Dr Khan Sahib (C: 7,546, re-elected) defeated Mohammad Akbar (ML: 2,045) who had been one of Abdul Ghaffar Khan's first followers and was a well known Pashto poet.[42]

Hashtnagar North: Syed Qaid Shah (C: 4,031) defeated K.B. Mir Alam Khan (ML: 2,587) and Mohammad Saed Khan (I: 1,085).

Khalil: Khan Amin Jan Khan (C: 3,768) was the commander-in-chief of the Khudai Khidmatgars. In 1937 this seat had been won for the Congress by Arbab Abdul Ghafoor but he had now joined the Muslim League. When his maternal uncle, Nawabzada K.B. Sher Ali Khan (ML: 3,587), who had lost this seat to his nephew in 1937, received the Muslim League nomination, Arbab Abdul Ghafoor temporarily withdrew his support from the Muslim League and refused to support Sher Ali Khan,[43] which was probably the reason for the League's narrow defeat in this constituency.

Bara Mohmands: Arbab Mohammad Sharif (ML: 4,881) was the paternal uncle of Arbab Noor Mohammad, chief of Landi (a semi-hereditary government appointment), who had first been given the Muslim League ticket but had been rejected by the returning officer as he was too young. Qazi Attaullah (C: 4,483) who had represented this constituency in the previous assembly was now defeated but had the consolation of winning in Amazai (see Mardan district) instead.

Kohat District

Teri North: Aslam Khan (C: 4,521) defeated Sardar Khan (ML: 1,056). In 1937 Aslam Khan had been defeated by the Nawab of Teri but this time the nawab did not stand. Nor did any other members of his family. This was the result of a good deal of political horse-trading. In return for not standing himself, the nawab, who was notoriously improvident in financial matters, was helped by the Congress to get a big loan from a co-operative bank. The sureties were offered by Mohabat Ali Khan, a leading Muslim Leaguer (see the Kohat Muslim Rural constituency) who

[41] Interview with Mian Jaffar Shah.
[42] *Khyber Mail* 1/2/46.
[43] Interview with Arbab Abdul Ghafoor.

presumably got something in return, and Khair Mohammad Jelali, the propaganda secretary of the provincial Congress.[44]

Since 1937 the Congress' position had improved considerably in this area, according to Aslam Khan. The main reason was that the Congress ministry had abolished the Teri dues. Other factors which contributed to the party's strength was that after its victory in the 1937 elections people did not any longer fear the British so much and they also realised that *jagirdars* and other privileged people could be defeated. In his election campaign of 1946, Aslam Khan said that the elections were a struggle between rich and poor; the Muslim Leaguers were all nawabs and *jagirdars*. The Muslim League conducted its campaign on the issue of Pakistan but he ignored this question. The Congressites were strong enough not to bother about Pakistan. They were the only organised party and that was why they won the election.[45]

Teri South: Sahib Gul (C: 5,135) was the commander of the Khudai Khidmatgars in the Teri *tahsil*. Mohammad Yusaf Khan (ML: 4,357) was the son of K.B. Kuli Khan who had stood unsuccessfully in this constituency in 1937 and who during the war had been in charge of one of the networks of mullahs who spread pro-British propaganda. Master Khan Gul Khan (K) received 390 votes.

Kohat: Pir Shahinshah (C: 3,979), former FPCC president, defeated Nawabzada K.B. Mohabat Ali Khan, a big *jagirdar* (ML: 3,773). In 1937 Pir Shahinshah had lost to Pir Said Jalal who subsequently joined the Muslim League. When the latter was denied the Muslim League ticket, he refused to support Mohabat Ali Khan.[46] This was presumably also the constituency where, according to Caroe, the outcome was affected by the Pir of Makhad's attitude. He was a religious leader who lived just on the Punjab side of the border but who had many followers in Kohat district. As his nominees did not receive the League nomination in their respective constituencies of Kohat district, he instructed his followers to vote for the Congress instead. The *pir* himself was elected to the Punjab assembly as an Independent but soon afterwards joined the Muslim League. When Caroe pointed out to him that his behaviour seemed contradictory, he defended himself by saying that Punjab and the NWFP were two different provinces "but, if you wanted a loyal subject, he was it."[47]

[44] Interview with Aslam Khan. This is corroborated by a statement by Abdul Qaiyum in the provincial assembly quoted in the *Khyber Mail* 29/2/46. See also his statement to the Cabinet Mission in Mansergh Vol. VII No. 40.

[45] Interview with Aslam Khan.

[46] Interview with Malik Tahmasp.

[47] Governor's Report 8/5/46.

Hangu: Syed Ali Badshah (C: 6,495) defeated M.R. Kiyani (ML: 4,717), who had held this seat in the previous assembly, and Pir Ghulam Hussain Ali (I: 4). Afterwards Kiyani filed a petition against the election of Syed Ali Badshah which was upheld. The complaint was that the Congress leaders Ghulam Haider Khan and Abdul Hanan Khan (for them, see the Hangu constituency, Appendix II) had by beat of drum made a proclamation in Hangu town that if any person from Tirah (tribal territory north of the constituency; tribals owning land in the settled districts were enfranchised) should vote for the Muslim League, the tribe would impose a fine of Rs. 500 on him and sack his house in tribal territory.[48]

Bannu District

Lakki West: Abdul Latif Khan (ML: 5,571), better known as the Pir of Zakori, was a prominent religious leader from Dera Ismail Khan who had a large number of followers in this district. He subsequently became one of the foremost leaders in the Pakistan movement on the Frontier. He defeated Abdus Sattar Khan (I: 3,776) and Mohammad Ayub Khan (K: 80).

Lakki East: Khan Habibullah Khan (ML: 6,982) defeated Saifullah Khan (I: 5,599).

Bannu West: Malik Akbar Ali Khan (C: 4,823, re-elected). Malik Zardad Khan (ML: 2,184).

Bannu East: Salar Mohammad Yakub Khan (C: 4,582) defeated K.S. Malik Damsaz Khan (ML: 2,885), Attah Mohammad (I: 1,158) and Khan Zaman Khan (I: 678). Both the main candidates belonged to the leading family of Bannu, the Shah Bazurg Khel. Another prominent member of the family was Taj Ali Khan, president of the Bannu District Muslim League and former vice-president of the provincial Muslim League. His father was K.B. Ghulam Haider Khan, a former government servant, who as the recognised head of the family held an ancestral *jagir* of Rs. 4000 *per annum.* His father's position gave Taj Ali great influence and he had for several years been the undisputed leader of the Muslim League in Bannu district. Malik Damsaz Khan was Ghulam Haider Khan's second cousin and was also married to Ghulam Haider's daughter, Taj Ali's sister. By profession he was a government contractor and had made a large fortune on the war in Waziristan in the 1930s. He was intensely loyal to the British and had joined the Muslim League because he was a title-holder and because the British

[48] *NWFP Govt. Gazette* 5/7/46 Part I. Old Congressites have claimed that it was only after Independence that this petition was upheld. I have no documentary evidence when it happened.

wanted something to be done about the Congress. He was also personally against the Congress.[49]

In 1945 both Taj Ali Khan and Malik Damsaz Khan sought the League nomination. The latter was chosen as he could afford to spend much more on the election campaign. During Jinnah's visit to Peshawar in November 1945, he had shown his generosity by making the largest contribution of all to the party, Rs. 5000. When the League ticket was given to Damsaz Khan, Taj Ali reacted by fielding his maternal uncle, Zaman Khan, as an Independent candidate. The latter lost his deposit, but his candidacy encouraged Attah Mohammad, a *jagirdar,* to stand as well, and together they drew away many votes from the League candidate. Damsaz Khan believes that Taj Ali's behaviour was perhaps caused not only by hurt pride. It is possible, he thinks, that Taj Ali feared that in case Damsaz Khan should emerge as the leading member of the family, Ghulam Haider's *jagir* would devolve on him rather than on Taj Ali Khan himself.[50]

The Congress candidate Yakub Khan belonged to a somewhat improverished branch of the family. Between his branch and the dominant branch there existed "the usual Pakhtun type" of rivalry. Yakub Khan's branch had fallen out with the British and had for many years been politically active against them. His father had, for example, joined the *hijrat* to Afghanistan in connection with the *Khilafat* movement and had died there. Yakub Khan himself had first got involved in politics during the *Khilafat* movement. In 1930 he joined the Khudai Khidmatgars and was now a senior officer in the movement.[51]

Damsaz Khan fought the election on the issue of Pakistan.[52] Yakub Khan's main theme was that the Congress wanted to turn the British out of India while the Muslim League wanted to keep them in, and he jibed at Damsaz Khan for having become rich as a government contractor. He ignored the question of Pakistan. He and other Congressites could not imagine that India would ever be partitioned.[53]

Dera Ismail Khan District

D.I. Khan South: Nawabzada Allah Nawaz Khan (J: 3,368, re-elected) was the son of the Saddozai Nawab of Dera. There was also an Alizai nawab, who was the elder brother of Nawabzada Zulfiqar Khan (ML: 1,405). Two Independents received 837 and 41 votes.

D.I. Khan North: Abdullah Khan (C: 4,908, re-elected) defeated Nawab Nasrullah Khan (ML: 3,225). These candidates were the same as in 1937 and so was the outcome. An Independent candidate received 12 votes.

[49] Interview with Malik Damsaz Khan.
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] Interview with Yakub Khan.
[52] Interview with Damsaz Khan.
[53] Interview with Yakub Khan.

Tank: Qutbuddin Khan (ML: 5,474), the Nawab of Tank, defeated Abdul Hamid Khan Kundi, who belonged to the leading family of the Kundis. This family were traditional rivals of the Nawabs of Tank. In the previous assembly the nawab's younger brother had represented this constituency as the nawab himself for technical reason had failed to secure nomination in 1936. The former Muslim League premier Aurangzeb Khan, who was not on good terms with the nawab, encouraged Mohammad Said Khan to seek the League nomination which aroused the nawab's wrath and he complained to Jinnah. In this letter he also maintained that he had been offered the Congress ticket by Dr Khan Sahib.[54]

Kulachi: Asadullah Jan (J: 4,507, re-elected) had Congress support. Sardar Abdul Qaiyum Khan (ML) received 2,332 votes.

Muslim Urban Constituencies

Peshawar City: This was a dual constituency, i.e., two candidates were returned from it. Each voter had two votes. The Congress supporters cast both their votes for the only Congress candidate, Mohammad Yahya Jan (11,241). He was Abdul Ghaffar Khan's son-in-law. By profession he was a school principal. Muslim League supporters were instructed to cast one vote for Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan (9,077) and one for the former minister Abdur Rab Nishtar (7,737) but instead each of the two League candidates tried to make League supporters cast both their votes only for himself.[55] Abdul Qaiyum appears to have benefitted most from this and Abdur Rab Nishtar only placed fourth, after Arbab Sher Akbar Khan (K: 8,890). Abdul Qaiyum Popalzai (A) received 2,436 votes.

NWFP Towns: K.B. Jalaluddin (ML: 6,238) was a wealthy, self-made government contractor from Abbottabad who owned a big transport company. He had for several years dominated League affairs in Hazara district. There was no Congress candidate in this constituency. Instead the Congress supported Syed Makhdum Shah (A: 4,967). He was in fact an old Congressite who was also a member of the Ahrars. I met him by chance during a brief visit to Kohat and made an impromptu interview. In this interview he spoke of himself as a Congressite and never mentioned the Ahrars and the fact that he fought this election for them. As for his platform, he said that he did not campaign directly against Pakistan; he campaigned against the Muslim League, saying that its members were British stooges.

[54] Nawab of Tank to Jinnah 22/9/45 NAP Shamsul Hasan Collection File 29.

[55] See correspondence on this subject in NAP Shamsul Hasan Collection Correspondence of Qaide Azam . . . Vol. 2.

Landholders' Constituencies

Peshawar District: Mian Musharraf Shah (ML: 501) was the elder brother of Mian Jaffar Shah, the Congress MLA for Nowshera South. The two brothers were not on good terms.[56] Khan Nasrullah Khan (C) received 279 votes.

NWFP: Sultan Hasan Ali Khan (ML: 294) defeated K.B. Mohammad Nawaz Khan (J: 168) and Mohammad Nawaz Kundi (I: 100).

General Constituencies

All nine seats went to the Congress. Seven of them were uncontested. Among those returned, all but one were old Congressites. The exception was Mehr Chand Khanna, former leader of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalists, who now stood on the Congress ticket in his old constituency, Peshawar Cantonment. He subsequently became finance minister in Dr Khan Sahib's third administration.

Sikh Constituencies

Two out of three seats went to the Congress. The third went to the Akali Dal, a Sikh party. The exception was the Peshawar constituency, where Sardar Partap Singh defeated Sardar Saran Singh. The election in this constituency usually reflected the rivalry between two prominent Sikh families who had put up candidates against each other since the introduction of representative reforms. Not long before this election, Saran Singh had appeared under the Congress label in a by-election against a member of the other family who stood on the Akali Dal ticket.[57] Presumably Sardar Partap Singh represented that family, too.

[56] Interview with Mian Jaffar Shah.
[57] Report of election tribunal *NWFP Govt. Gazette* 9/3/45 Part I.

Appendix IV

On Tribes, Tribal Politics and Leading Tribesmen

The Afridis[58]

The Afridis, who with the exception of part of the Adam Khel section, live in the Khyber agency, are divided into eight major sections, *viz.*, Zakha Khel (fighting strength in 1947 = 8,700), Malikdin Khel (9,400), Qambar Khel (12,100), Kamarai (2,200), Aka Khel (4,700), Kuki Khel (9,100), Sepah (2000) and Adam Khel (1,900; this is the figure for those of the Khyber agency). With the exception of the Adam Khel, they are all partly migratory, *i.e.*, a large portion of the tribesmen in the hot season move from the plains just west and south of Peshawar to the hills in Tirah further west.[59]

Afridi politics could perhaps best be illustrated by the changing fortunes of the leading family of the Kuki Khel section, one of the two or three most important of all sections. They have their winter settlements around Jamrud, which controls the entry to the Khyber Pass. Thus they were at an early stage in contact with the British. The family with which we will be concerned here belonged to a subdivision called the Sher Khan Khel. In 1861, when we pick up the story from Warburton, the leading man of the family, Abdullah Nur, had

> paid a thousand rupees to have Malik Gholam Kadir killed in his fort . . . and in this way not only did he secure the chieftainship of the whole tribe, but he married at the same time the mother and the widow of the murdered man. By the first he had his eldest son Hyder; and from the second were born to him three or four lads, the senior being Amin Khan, the next Zaman Khan, whose names will appear further on in one or two trouble-some episodes. Abdullah Nur had always been hostile to be British Government.[60]

In spite of being in constant opposition to the British, Malik Abdullah Nur "feathered his nest pretty well". For various reasons he personally received large sums from the government but he also appropriated a good deal of the allowances intended for the entire section. This naturally led to friction between him and his clansmen. In 1883, for example, after "surrounding his fort, they had it out with him for several hours in rifle practice, and made him pay up a fair proportion of their share of allowances, but not the full portion, before they permitted him to take his departure [to Tirah]."[61] The following year his son Amin Khan, on his orders but for unknown reasons, killed one Malik Nurullah and within forty-

[58] Where not otherwise indicated, the paragraphs on the Afridis are based on *Who's Who in the Khyber Agency . . . 1939* and *Who's Who in the Khyber Agency . . . 1950* which are found in TARC. Tribesmen appearing in Chapter VII are written in capitals.

[59] For the Afridi migration, see *Census of India, 1921* p. 218 f.

[60] Warburton p. 103 f.

[61] *Op. cit.* p. 120.

eight hours Abdullah Nur was himself shot dead.[62] Amin Khan was chosen by the tribal elders in preference to the elder brother, Hyder Khan, to succeed his father as the spokesman of the Kuki Khel. Amin Khan, who by his father "had been brought up to believe that we could be squeezed to any extent", sent a letter to the authorities demanding that, in addition to his *maliki* allowance, his father's special allowance of Rs. 150 *per mensem* should be continued to him but his request was turned down as this allowance had been a personal one granted for life only. Amin Khan, however, did not leave matters at that. When the lieutenant-governor of Punjab planned a visit to Khyber, Amin Khan threatened that if he was not confirmed in his father's allowance, he would fire at the lieutenant-governor. Warburton, who was in charge of Khyber at this time, advised the government to depose Amin Khan and order the Kuki Khel to choose a new chief. The lieutenant-governor, however, confined himself to warning the Kuki Khel that they would be held responsible for the behaviour of Amin Khan, and cancelled his visit to the Khyber Pass.[63] Like his father before him, Amin Khan got into difficulties with his clansmen owing to his inclination to keep for himself the allowance meant for the entire section. A party opposed to him tried to launch his elder brother as an alternative but the latter was bought off with a pension. In 1892 Amin Khan raised a *lashkar* against the British which, however, did not achieve much except that it cost him his *maliki* allowance. After a couple of years he managed to be reinstated. This led to discontent among the party who had supported the government against Amin Khan's *lashkar*. In 1898 Amin Khan was killed by Qambar Khan, son of Akbar Khan, who had been the leading pro-government *malik* in the Kuki Khel section during the previous decade and in whose killing Amin Khan had probably been involved.[64]

On Amin Khan's death, his younger brother Zaman Khan returned from Afghanistan, where he had been in the amir's service, and was invested with the full *maliki*, by-passing Amin Khan's son. Mohammad Zaman Khan had been involved in raising the *lashkar* of 1892 but now he changed his policy vis-à-vis the British completely and soon made himself indispensible to them. For about fours decades, until his death (to my knowledge of old age some time around 1943–45) he was the leading pro-government *malik* among the Afridis. In 1923 he was created a nawab. In 1939 he enjoyed in addition to his *maliki* allowance of Rs. 900 *per mensem* a special monthly allowance of Rs. 450. One of his sons served in the British-Indian army. He was "the cleverest of the Afridi maliks and elders, a great politician, but sometimes hard to understand."[65]

Amin Khan's son Jabbar Khan had been the recognised successor to the

[62] *Op. cit.* p. 123.
[63] *Op. cit.* p. 131 f.
[64] *Op. cit.* pp. 239–280.
[65] *Who's Who in the Khyber Agency ... 1939.* TARC.

nawab but he seems to have died before his uncle. He was an influential man and had been awarded the title of *Khan Sahib* but he "used his influence mostly to promote anti-Government activities."[66] His son Wali Khan succeeded Nawab Mohammad Zaman Khan as *malik* of the Kuki Khel section. To begin with he was friendly towards the Government of Pakistan. When Jinnah visited Khyber in 1948, Wali Khan was one of the foremost in the Afridi *jirga* that received him and presented the Qaid-e-Azam with a rifle as a token of friendship and loyalty.[67] However, in 1950 he turned hostile, apparently for economic reasons.[68] In the next few years he was the leading Pakhtunistan *malik* and raised large *lashkars* against Pakistan. His village in Tirah was bombed by the Pakistan Air Force and he had to remove himself to Afghanistan. However, he subsequently changed sides again and in 1963 he was elected a member of the National Assembly of Pakistan.

I am uncertain as to what happened to the Kuki Khel *maliki* after Wali Khan's volte-face in the early 1950s. It seems likely that it was given to one of Nawab Mohammad Zaman Khan's sons, possibly KHALIFA KHAN, a B.A. of Islamia College. From what I gave gathered, one of Khalifa Khan's sons, a former officer in the British-Indian army, now shares the Kuki Khel *maliki* with one or two others, one of whom would be Wali Khan. I have also been told that in spite of his present attitude and in spite of the events in Afghanistan in the last couple of years, Wali Khan retains some economic interests on the Afghan side of the border.[69]

In the Afridi *jirgas* which have appeared in this study, Malik ABDUL LATIF KHAN usually acted as spokesmen for the others. He was the grandson of Malik Feroz Khan, who had been the *malik* of half of the Malikdin section. Malik Abdul Latif Khan had built up a position for himself in this section and become an influential man. He had, however, grown "inclined to live in Peshawar overmuch and so lose influence with his tribe."[70]

KHUSHAL KHAN, Malikdin Khel, was perhaps the most prominent of the *Sarishta* leaders and an Afghan allowance-holder. He had been one of the leaders of the *lashkar* which attacked Peshawar in the summer of 1930. He had great influence among the *kashars* (young elements, "political have-nots"). At one time the British suspected him of being a Bolshevik agent. In Afghan politics, he had pro-Amanullah sympathies and in 1934 he was involved in an attempt to start a revolt in Afghanistan. After that his relations with the Afghan authorities were

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] Spain 1963 p. 204.

[68] Faridullah Shah stressed very strongly that Wali Khan's actions have always been motivated by economic considerations. Interview.

[69] Information received through talks with various knowledgeable Kuki Khel Afridis.

[70] *Who's Who in the Khyber Agency ... 1950.* TARC.

strained for many years but in 1949 they improved. He took an active part in the Pakhtunistan propaganda but, according to Faridullah Shah, he approached the Pakistani authorities towards the end of his life and wanted to settle down in Peshawar.

SWATAI KHAN belonged to the Sher Khan Khel of the Kuki Khel section. He was a leading elder but a deadly enemy of Nawab Mohammad Zaman Khan. He was regarded as a good contractor and one of his sons was in the provincial civil service. After Independence he was friendly to the Government of Pakistan and in 1955 he was made a *malik* of the Kuki Khel section.

The Mahsuds

Mahsud politics was even more involved than that among the Afridis. Here we shall content ourselves with listing the Mahsuds who have appeared in the previous pages and giving some biographical data pertinent to the argument there. To begin with those who were on the Muslim League side, K.B. MEHR DIL KHAN had in his youth been "a notorious raider." He was also one of the leaders during the troubles in South Waziristan in connection with the Third Afghan War but then he changed his policy and was "extremely useful to Government" in carrying through the new arrangements in South Waziristan. He was "wealthy for a Mahsud" and the most influential *malik* in his section. He had no particular political affiliation in Pakistani politics but always sided with the government. In 1956 he was elected a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.[71]

Captain MIR BADSHAH was the son of Mehr Dil. He had served in France during World War I where he "showed exceptional gallantry." He was a literate man and an able contractor. He was the "No. 1 Mahsud in loyalty and usefulness" and was of particularly great assistance during the disturbances in Waziristan in the 1930s. During World War II he was given the rank of captain and acted as recruiting officer in South Waziristan. He was decorated for his services in the Kashmir *jehad* and subsequently became a major in the army of Pakistan[72] and a member of the National Assembly.[73]

SHAH PASAND was the son of a leading Mahsud *malik*. Until 1925 he had been an Afghan colonel and in command of the King's body-guard. In that year, however, he deserted, allegedly owing to his disappointment over promotion, and bringing twenty-one rifles with him returned to his home, where he succeeded his brother as *malik* of his subsection. His allowance was reduced after his nephew Khaisor (see below) had been one of the leaders of the Mahsud *lashkar* of 1930. After Independence he took a prominent part in the fighting in Kashmir.[74]

[71] *Who's Who in the South Waziristan Agency . . . 1949.* TARC.
[72] *Ibid.*
[73] Afridi p. 11.
[74] *Who's Who in the South Waziristan Agency . . . 1949.* TARC.

MALIK KHAISOR drew a monthly allowance of Rs. 20. He was "exceedingly intelligent and a capable contractor" and had "more influence over the tribe than his uncle." After 1930 he had "behaved well." He took an active part in the Kashmir *jehad*.[75]

QUTAB KHAN was by heredity the khan of all Mahsuds but had no corresponding influence. He had been hostile to the government until 1925 since which year he had "rendered consistently useful services." He drew a monthly allowance of Rs. 130 and in 1946 he was given the title of *Khan Sahib*. His eldest son was a major in the British-Indian army.[76]

Lieutenant SHER BADSHAH had received his rank in the British-Indian army during World War II. His father had been a very influential *malik*. He drew an allowance of Rs. 100 a month but his uncle, Palaki, father of Gulab Khan, acted as *malik* for him.[77]

GULAB KHAN was at this time not one of the senior-most Mahsud *maliks* but has since then become a very influential man in Waziristan. He led the Mahsud *lashkars* in Kashmir where he stayed throughout the fighting and won fame for his gallantry and chivalry. He was subsequently decorated.[78] In the 1970s he became a senator in the Parliament of Pakistan.[79]

PIR RAKHMAN occupied an intermediate position between the Muslim Leaguers and those who inclined towards the Congress. He was the leading Shabi Khel *malik* and enjoyed a monthly *maliki* allowance of Rs. 100. He was suspected of having been involved in the kidnapping of the political agent in 1946, was arrested but on furnishing security for future good behaviour, he was released.[80] His involvement with the pro-Congress elements in the agency could perhaps be explained by the fact that his position was based on very disparate elements, namely all those opposed to Captain Mir Badshah.[81] He became an ardent supporter of Pakistan[82] and a member of the National Assembly.[83]

N.S. MUSA KHAN was the son of Karim Khan, who had been killed by the Mahsuds for helping the British. In 1919 Musa Khan was the leader of the Mahsuds who fought against the government. He drew an allowance from the Afghan government from which he also received the title of *Naib Salar* (a military rank). After Independence he used "all his influence in anti-Pakistan propaganda".[84]

[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *Ibid.*
[77] *Ibid.*
[78] *Ibid.*
[79] Afridi p. 11.
[80] *Who's Who in the South Waziristan Agency ... 1949.* TARC.
[81] For his power basis, see *Political Agent South Waziristan ...* p. 58 f. Curtis Papers.
[82] *Who's Who in the South Waziristan Agency ... 1949.* TARC.
[83] Afridi p. 11.
[84] *Who's Who in the South Waziristan Agency ... 1949.* TARC.

PARMANA KHAN belonged to a very volatile family. His nephew had in 1927 deserted with his company of *khassadars* (tribal militiamen used for escort in tribal territory) and gone to Kabul whereafter he became an Afghan allowance-holder. One of Parmana Khan's half-brothers had a similar career. The British regarded the whole family as mentally disturbed and Parmana Khan as its most stable member. After Independence he became opposed to the Government of Pakistan.[85]

HAYAT KHAN had between 1927 and 1930 given much trouble to the authorities but then for eight years rendered "consistently useful services" and received a monthly allowance of Rs. 35. He was one of the most influential *maliks* in the entire Mahsud tribe. In 1938 he turned hostile and became the leading anti-government *malik* in South Waziristan.[86] Despite his pro-Congress inclinations in the pre-Independence period, he took part in the invasion of Kashmir.[87]

FAZAL DIN was the son of Mullah Powindah who for two decades led the resistance against the British in South Waziristan. Fazal Din was treated as his father's successor by the Mahsuds and was "a powerful factor for good or evil". He drew an allowance from the Afghan government but occasionally he also approached the Government of India with a request for similar favours from that side. After Independence he became favourable to Pakistan and gave "physical and moral support" during the Kashmir *jehad*.[88]

Other tribes[89]

Of the other tribes which have appeared in Chapter VII, the Wazirs were the most important in the period under review. They are divided into two major sections, the Utmanzai Wazirs and the Ahmadzai Wazirs. The former live in North Waziristan and it was mainly among them that the Faqir of Ipi was active. Most Ahmadzai Wazirs live around Wana in South Waziristan. The leading *malik* among them was K.S. HAFTA KHAN, who drew an allowance of Rs. 90 a month from the Government of India.[90]

The Mullagoris are a small, relatively unimportant tribe in the Khyber agency. The Shinwaris are an important Pakhtun tribe, but with the exception of a small section living in the Khyber agency, they live on the Afghan side of the border. The Mohmands are a large and important tribe inhabiting the hills north-west of Peshawar. They live on both sides of the Durand Line. The Turis are a Shia tribe

[85] *Ibid.*
[86] *Ibid.*; also *The North-West Frontier of India 1940–41* p. 32. TARC.
[87] *Political Agent South Waziristan* ... p. 34. Curtis Papers.
[88] *Who's Who in the South Waziristan Agency ... 1949* TARC.
[89] For a short summary of the North-West Frontier tribes, see *Census of India, 1921* pp. 248–253.
[90] *Who's Who in the South Waziristan Agency ... 1949.* TARC.

settled in Kurram. The Orakzais are a large tribe settled in Tirah north of Kohat district. Part of the Bangash tribe live in Kohat district and part in Kurram. The Bhittanis, finally, are a tribe settled to the west of Dera Ismail Khan district. Their reputation has suffered from the comparison with their more warlike neighbours, the Mahsuds.

List of Tables and Figures

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Abbreviations

AICC	All-India Congress Committee
AIML	All-India Muslim League
AINC	All-India National Congress
FR	(Chief Secretary's) Fortnightly Report. FR I Jan. means "Fortnightly Report for the first half of January", FR II Jan. "for the second half", etc.
FPCC	Frontier Province Congress Committee
Home Poll.	Home Political
IOL	India Office Library and Records
LAD	Legislative Assembly Debates
K.B.	Khan Bahadaur (honorific title awarded to Muslims by the government)
K.S.	Khan Shaib (honorific title awarded to Muslims by the government)
MLA	Member of the Legislative Assembly
NAI	National Archives of India
NAP	National Archives of Pakistan
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
QAP	Qaide Azam papers
R.B.	Rais Sahib (honorific title awarded by the government to Hindus or Sikhs)
R.S.	Rai Sahib (honorific title awarded by the government to Hindus or Sikhs)

Glossary

anjuman	association, society
crore	10,000,000
durbari	derived from the word *durbar*, a cremeonial reception by senior officials to honour prominent Indians. A *durbari* was a person who was entitled to participate in a *durbar*.
fatwa	formal religious-judicial decree
firenghi	foreigner, Englishman
hartal	strike, closing of all shops to indicate mourning or protest
hijrat	religously motivated emigration from a non-Muslim country to a Muslim one
inam	in this period, a cash grant from the government
inamdar	person enjoying an *inam*
jagir	land or cash grant from the government
jagirdar	person enjoying a *jagir*
jehad	holy war
jirga	tribal council, body of tribesmen representing a tribe vis-à-vis the government, or informal court under the Frontier Crimes Regulation
kafir	unbeliever, heretic
kamin	usually village artisan, "village menial"
khan	chief, landlord
khel	subdivision of a tribe
khilafat	adj., "– movement", political movement among the Indian Muslims in the 1920s to protect the *Khalifah*, the sultan of Turkey
lashkar	tribal war party
lathi	bamboo cane used by the police
madrasah	Muslim seminary
malik	tribal leader
marakka	tribal council, tribal meeting
maulana	religious leader with formal training
maulvi	–"–
muhajarin	religious refugee
murid	follower of a "saint", e.g., a *pir*
nawabzada	son of a nawab
parajamba	factionalism
pir	hereditary "saint"
purdah	seclusion of women
Qaide Azam	The Great Leader, title given to Jinnah
sajjada nashin	hereditary "saint" in charge of a shrine
satyagraha	non-violent civil disobedience
sayyid	descendent of the Prophet
Shariat	Islamic law
tahsil	administrative unit in a district
tarbur	first cousin (father's brother's son), traditional rival
tarburwali	agnatic rivalry
zamindar	landowner, landlord

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Haji Rajab Ali.
Jan Ali Khan.
Mahmud Khan.
Majidullah Khan.

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Malik Tahmasp.
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
GILGIT
JAMMU & KASHMIR
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Hazara
Mansehra
Abbottabad
Amb
Mardan
Landi Kotal
Peshawar
Mardan
Peshawar
Parachinar
Khyber Agency
Kurram Agency
Kohat
Hangu
Thal
North Waziristan
Miran Shah
Bannu
Bannu
South Waziristan
Wana
Tank
Dera Ismail Khan
Dera Ismail Khan
BALUCHISTAN
PUNJAB
A
B
C
D
E
F
Map 1
THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE
A Under the deputy commissioner of Hazara
B " " Mardan
C " " Peshawar
D " " Kohat
E " " Bannu
F " " D.I.Khan
Settled districts
Tribal areas
States
0 20 40 Miles


AFGHANISTAN
KAFIRS
CHITRALIS
DARD TRIBES
AKOZAI
YUSAFZAIS
BAJAUR
MAMUNDS
SWATIS
R. Kunar
R. Kabul
UTMAN KHEL
BUNER-WALS
MOHMANDS
MANDANIS
JADUNS
YUSAFZAIS
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TURIS
ORAKZAIS
AFRIDIS
BANGASH
ZAIM-UKHT
BANGASH
KHOST
R. Shamil
JAJIS
DARWESH KHEL
KHATTAKS
UTMANZAI WAZIRS
BANNUCHIS
DARWESH KHEL
R. Kurram
MARWATS
MAHSUDS
SHITT-ANNIS
AHMADZAI WAZIRS
KHASOR
KUNDI
BALUCH
LOHANI
KAJURI KACH
DOTANNI
GANDAPUR
SULEMAN KHEL
SHERANIS
MIAN KHEL
MANDO KHEL
LARGHA
BABAR
BARGHA
R. Indus
PUNJAB
Map 2
DISTRIBUTION OF PAKHTUN TRIBES ON THE NORT-WEST FRONTIER
1 MULLAGORI
2 DAUDZAI
3 MOHAMMADZAI
4 BABA MOHMAND
5 KHALIL
0 20 40 Miles

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Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis
STUDIA HISTORICA UPSALIENSIA

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